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This project was started in September 2005. Initially, it was intended as an attempt 
to compare and evaluate the different strategies – polemical, philosophical, and 
performative – for a legitimization of liberal democracy that could or could not be 
reconstructed on the basis of the work of Karl Popper, Leo Strauss, and Hannah 
Arendt, with specific reference to their respective interpretations of the work of 
Plato. Gradually, the focus of the project shifted to the more fundamental question 
of the nature of the political as such, and, finally, to what is perhaps the most 
fundamental question a political philosopher could raise: the question of the 
conditions of political thinking itself.  
During the years, I have learned a lot from many different people. In the 
first place, I wish to express my gratitude to Pauline Kleingeld, my advisor, who 
hired me as a PhD candidate in Leiden, who kept expressing her confidence in my 
work, and who provided concise and detailed comments on my writing, always 
pressing me to examine whether my arguments were logically sound and well-
grounded in textual evidence. Moreover, she was always willing to give me advise 
concerning more general academic matters surrounding the writing of a doctoral 
thesis. In the second place, I wish to thank Bert van den Brink, who generously 
agreed to be my second advisor, and whose appreciation for the distinctness of my 
philosophical approach gave me the courage to find my own voice and to develop 
my study of the three authors into a conceptual whole. 
I received my philosophical formation at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen, which I came to realize only after I had crossed the Anglo-Saxon / 
continental boundary within the Dutch philosophical landscape, when colleagues 
suddenly started labeling my work as “hermeneutical”, “existentialist”, or 
“phenomenological”. I am grateful to all of my Nijmegen teachers, two of whom I 
like to mention here. Ad Vennix, who was my first true teacher of philosophy, gave 
me a veritable grounding in the living tradition of “first philosophy”. In the 2000-
2001 academic year, Veronica Vasterling and Machiel Karskens coordinated a 
course on the work of Hannah Arendt, to which they let all faculty members of the 
section of Social and Political Philosophy contribute. Marin Terpstra, in his lecture 
on Arendt’s The Human Condition, attentively pointed to a “contradiction” in the 
‘Action’ section of her work, whereby he demonstrated to me ad oculos how to 
read a philosophical text (and, as I came to realize later, how not to read Arendt). 
In many ways, Chapter 5 of this dissertation is a response to this one lecture. 
At Leiden University, I was always welcomed by Lies Klumper, secretary 
of the Institute for Philosophy. Her warm support over many cups of tea has been a 
tremendous help over the years. I also wish to thank my fellow PhD candidates, 
especially Leon de Bruin, Remco van der Geest, Victor Gijsbers, Mariska 
Leunissen, Marije Martijn, and Zsolt Novak, who were there from the start, and 
whose company I so greatly enjoyed. I am grateful to the members of the 
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(extended) section of Practical Philosophy: Herman Siemens, for showing 
confidence in my work from the beginning, and for involving me in his projects; 
Bruno Verbeek, for his readiness to discuss political-philosophical questions of all 
sorts; Gerard Visser, for his understanding of the predicament of philosophic 
activity in general and especially today; Edith Brugmans, whose kind presence 
made the transition from Nijmegen to Leiden much easier. Finally, I wish to thank 
Jeroen van Rijen, who was always willing to support my initiatives, such as 
organizing a lecture series for the yearly Month of Philosophy, and founding a 
Leiden Centre for Political Philosophy, which was finally realized in 2012. 
I am grateful to the Dutch Research School for Practical Philosophy, in the 
PhD program of which I participated, and especially to its director, Marcus Düwell, 
who kept following me from a distance and who was always willing to give me 
advise when necessary. I thank my many fellow-PhD-candidates of the school, 
with whom I have been in the same boat for many years. I wish to say special 
thanks to the Terschelling group, which consisted of Mandy Bosma, Marieke ten 
Have, Frederike Kaldewaij, Annemarie Kalis, David Moszkowicz, Lonneke Poort, 
Anna Westra, and Boukje van der Zee. 
I am grateful to the members of the International Research Group Hannah 
Arendt ‘IoHannah’, based in Nijmegen, for giving me a forum where I could 
discuss my project in its early stages: Caspar Govaart (†), Dirk De Schutter, Remi 
Peeters, Marc De Kesel, Veronica Vasterling, Theo de Wit, Evert van der Zweerde, 
Annelies Degryse, and Marieke Borren.  
Over the years, I have benefited much from conversations with David 
Janssens about the work of Strauss. Thanks to his generous recommendation, I was 
given the chance to spend a term at the University of Chicago’s Committee on 
Social Thought in the fall of 2007. I am grateful to Nathan Tarcov, who kindly 
acted as my sponsor, Joseph Cropsey (†), for granting me access to the Strauss 
Papers, John McCormick, from whose course on Weimar political theology I 
profited in several ways, and Patchen Markell. Our recurrent encounters throughout 
the years and conversations about Arendt’s “work” have always been very 
stimulating. Of the many fellow PhD candidates I met at the time, I wish to thank 
Loren Goldman especially, who has been a wonderful host and guide in “my kind 
of town”. 
I was given the opportunity to attend a summer school and several 
conferences hosted by the University of Leuven, where I have since felt at home. I 
wish to thank Toon Braeckman, Bart Raymaekers, and Raf Geenens for continuing 
to show interest in my work.  
At conferences and workshops at home and abroad I met countless people 
with whom I got the opportunity to discuss my work, for which I am tremendously 
grateful. I only mention the people who carefully commented on a chapter or on a 
paper that would eventually become (part of) one: Toon Braeckman, Luigi Corrias, 
Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Robert Howse, David Janssens, Patchen Markell, Bart 
Raymaekers, Nathan Tarcov, Veronica Vasterling; participants of the Political 
Theory Workshop of the Politicologenetmaal, the Manchester Political Theory 
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Workshop, the Political Theory Workshop (Chicago), the Arendt Circle 
Conference (DePaul), the Arendt Center Working Group Conference (Bard), and 
conferences in Leuven and Prague. In addition, I wish to express my gratitude to 
the following people with whom I got the chance to discuss – in some cases just 
once, in other cases more often – the theme of my dissertation and questions within 
the field of political philosophy broadly conceived: Arnold Burms, Rutger 
Claassen, Thomas Fossen, Stephen Holmes, Liisi Keedus, Richard Kraut, Melissa 
Lane, Jonathan Lear, Larry May, John McCormick, Heinrich Meier, Jan-Werner 
Mueller, Robert Pippin, Larry Siedentop, Herman Sinaiko, Dana Villa. I thank 
Bonnie Honig for convincing me of the legitimacy of my “method”, whereby she 
made room for my “argument”.  
During my time at the Faculty of Law of the VU University Amsterdam, I 
had the privilege of working with many wonderful colleagues who were a 
tremendous support during the years in which I had to combine heavy teaching and 
administrative responsibilities with the task of finishing my dissertation. Wim 
Boor, Bertjan Wolthuis, Hedwig van Rossum, Frances Gilligan, Juan Amaya-
Castro, and Irena Rosenthal deserve special mention. 
I am grateful to the Wiardi Beckman Foundation, especially its director, 
Monika Sie Dhian Ho, for involving me in several of its activities, thanks to which 
I got to work with a group of people from various disciplinary backgrounds who all 
share a critical interest in politics, and thanks to which I got to see the workings of 
“real” politics from close by. In the fall of 2012, I took a course with the Dutch 
writer Willem Jan Otten, called ‘Voor de bijl en door de bocht’. Thanks to his 
inspiring thoughts, I realized that carefully considering every word need not be a 
sign of failure.  
I thank the Schrofer family for generously offering me to use their house in 
Breezand, in the province of Zeeland, where I could withdraw and work quietly on 
my dissertation. I thank Ian Priestnall for correcting the English of my final 
manuscript where necessary. Any remaining errors are mine.  
Jan Zeggelaar provided me a home in my own house, often by making me 
cappucino’s, but still more often by simply being there for me. 
Without the friendship of my “peers”, I could not have done it. I thank 
Gert-Jan van der Heiden for remaining present, this time from a distance, and for 
reminding me of and pointing me towards my philosophical “roots”; Luigi Corrias, 
for his loving friendship, both when we were colleagues at the VU and at home, 
and for his unfailing faith in my capacities, philosophical and otherwise; Adriaan 
van Veldhuizen, for cheerfully keeping me company on an almost daily basis in the 
Koninklijke Bibliotheek in The Hague and for our conversations about a wide 
range of topics, but especially about social democracy in its historical, ideological, 
and most concrete manifestations; Rutger Claassen, for his twofold example of 
self-confidence and self-criticism, and for his honesty, a virtue in both philosophy 
and friendship; Thomas Fossen, for his philosophical seriousness ánd wit and for 
his ceaseless commitment as a friend, which started when he asked me to join his 
reading group in political philosophy, in Leiden, 2005. 
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Without my family, I would be nowhere. I wish to express my deepest 
gratitude to my parents, who, both in their own distinct way, never ceased to 
support me in my choices (and afterwards). I thank my brother Geert for his 
inspiring optimism (and computer support), and my sister Lien for our regularly 
shared indignation about and analyses of current-day politics and working life (and 
her hospitality around dinner time).  
Finally, I thank my dear Mirjam, whose love of life has become such a 
radiant and humbling presence in the life I now share with her. 
 








Callicles: ‘You’re in nice time, Socrates. For a war or battle, as the saying goes.’ 





Not all of us are interested in politics, and none of us is interested in politics all the 
time. However, to the extent that we are interested in it, that is to say, in passing 
the right political judgments and making the right political decisions, in doing what 
is, politically speaking, the right thing to do, we need to have some kind of 
acquaintance with politics. At least implicitly, we need to have some kind of 
answer to the question: what is “political”? For instance, we need to be able to 
distinguish between political and non-political “things”. On the basis of this 
distinction, we can decide whether what is presented to us as “political” or what is 
said to belong to the sphere of “politics” (e.g. by the government or the powers that 
be) is “really” political, is “rightly” on the political agenda. The converse is also 
true: we need to be able to decide whether what is implicitly ignored or what is 
explicitly denied to be “political” and is instead labeled as, for instance, “merely” 
“technical”, or “personal”, ought, to the contrary, be characterized as “political”. 
To be sure, the question what “counts” as political is by no means merely 
theoretical, for we also need to possess some kind of knowledge of what it means 
to act politically, what is involved in actually exercising political judgment and in 
taking political decisions in concrete situations. In other words, we need to be able 
to orient ourselves within “the political” as a specific realm of human interaction.  
It is by no means evident that we should turn to philosophy if we wish to 
learn something about politics in the sense just described. Other disciplines, such as 
journalism, historiography, literature, and other arts such as theatre, film, and 
photography, may seem to serve as a much better guide, insofar as they acquaint us 
with and attune us to political reality in its concreteness and particularity. More 
often than not, political philosophy, being a “branch” of philosophy, considers 
itself as an attempt to justify in an intellectually rigorous way certain (moral) 
standards, criteria, principles, or ideals in light of which actual political practices 
(institutions, forms of legislation, policies, etc.) are to be evaluated, that is, to be 
adopted or rejected.
2
 Typically, a political philosopher claims to provide a 
rationally justified answer to the question of which policies or forms of legislation 
                                                     
1 Plato, Gorgias, 447a, opening sentences of this dialogue. 
2 See e.g. Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy, 2: “Political philosophy is a normative 
discipline, meaning that it tries to establish norms (rules or ideal standards).”, Bird, An Introduction to 
Political Philosophy, 4: “…our political arrangements are subject to rational assessment and choice. 
This assumption lies behind the effort to distinguish political practices and forms of political action 
that can be justified and those that cannot. That effort, more than anything else, defines the general 
project of political philosophy.”; Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 3, 7. 
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a state or government may legitimately adopt, or to the question of the conditions 
under which we are even permitted to speak of legitimate power or rule, with 
reference to a certain standard, principle, or ideal which should in itself also be 
capable of rational justification.  
Usually, this conception of political philosophy is called “normative” 
political philosophy – as opposed to what is termed “conceptual” political 
philosophy – but in fact this name is not entirely felicitous. In so far as political 
practice itself is inherently normative (as such, all human actions, including 
political ones, are capable of being approved or disapproved of, of being called 
good or bad, right or wrong, legitimate or illegitimate, desirable or undesirable, 
etc.), political philosophy – as theory of that practice – can never completely avoid 
becoming to some extent evaluative, even if it considers itself to be “merely” 
conceptual.
3
 It is impossible to separate the allegedly conceptual question “what is 
politics?” from the allegedly normative question “what is good politics?”, or “what 
is political par excellence?” Hence, in fact it is not the normative character as such 
which constitutes the specific difference between this conception of political 
philosophy and other possible conceptions. Rather, I submit, the specific character 
of the self-conception of political philosophy just introduced lies in a combination 
of the following two elements: (i) the positing of certain normative propositions 
(ranging from more abstract or theoretical standards or principles to more concrete 
or practical proposals or judgments); (ii) the validity of which it derives exclusively 
from their (being capable of) being rationally justified. 
According to this conception of political philosophy, Plato is taken to argue 
in favor of the “ideal state” presented in his Republic, whereas Aristotle, his 
archetypical adversary, is understood to have decided in favor of the “mixed 
regime” as presented in his Politics. We read these philosophical texts “as if” their 
authors were actually in a position to decide which proposal is to be adopted and 
which is not, or what course of action is “allowed” and what is “not allowed”,
4
 
which brings them close to what actual politicians and legislators are doing. Yet, at 
the same time, we understand them as positioning themselves at a certain distance 
from actual politics, for their “proposals” lay claim to validity exclusively on the 
basis of their being rationally justified according to specific universal 
epistemological (or “methodological”) criteria of validity which are themselves 
understood as being non-political, or at least as not being political in the strict 
sense of the term.
5
 
                                                     
3 Lane, ‘Constraint, Theory, and Exemplar’, 133: “We are reflective as well as political animals, 
which makes us (among other things) reflectively political; the two practices cannot be segregated or 
insulated from each other. The study of what political agents do becomes normative when pursued in 
light of what they should do.” 
4 Waldron, ‘What Would Plato Allow?’, who turns against this approach. 
5 Lane, ‘Constraint, Theory, and Exemplar’, 131-132: “Insofar as it is ‘normative’, political theory is 
a branch of moral theory considered in its widest sense: it involves the advancing and testing of 
ought-claims, both prescriptions for actions and claims about how concepts ought to be understood. 
Insofar as it is ‘theory’, it positions itself at some remove from actual practice, though the nature of 
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This tension can be traced back to the opposition traditionally derived from 
Plato, especially from his Gorgias, in which a privileged (because “rational” and 
truthful) philosophy on the one hand is played off against a depreciated (because 
“irrational” and untruthful) politics on the other. To be more specific, the Socratic 
search for true knowledge is contrasted with the sophists’ competition [agōn] for 
political success or victory. Accordingly, “dialectical” conversation or discussion is 
contrasted with the “rhetoric” of polemical speech, and “being right” is contrasted 
with “being proved right”. Plato allows his main character, Socrates, to present 
himself as Athens’ only “true politician” because he,
6
 in contradistinction to 
Callicles and other sophists, rationally examines his opinions [doxai] according to 
the criterion of truth / untruth rather than success / failure: the truth, and not “the 
majority” or “the strong”, should “decide”. Only the philosopher is capable of 
reaching true knowledge [epistēmē], and only a life devoted to a search for the 
truth is worth living. Yet, at the same time, Socrates clearly draws on the 
vocabulary of actual politics, as when he depicts the struggle for truth within the 
soul as an “agōn”.
7
 
Political philosophy thus understood usually takes for granted what politics 
typically consists of, viz.: lawmaking by the government; advocating proposals 
before or within a people’s assembly; the solution of social problems by 
institutional reform, etc. Put otherwise, by focusing on the question of what 
“politics” is to do, or what counts as legitimate “outcomes” of politics (which 
decisions the government is to take, which laws the state is to adopt), the answer to 
the question of what “politics” is, is already presupposed, i.e., it is not first treated 
as a question. Little is explicitly articulated about the nature of politics as a 
peculiar form of human interaction, nor about its difference from other forms of 
human action – one of these being the practice of philosophizing itself.  
Indeed, more often than not, philosophy tends to disregard the fact that its 
own activity of theorizing, testing propositions and thus acquiring knowledge, is 
itself also a practice. As a consequence, political philosophy tends to interpret 
politics, its object of investigation, in the image of its own activity – i.e. the 
rational justification of cognitive claims – and it tends to disregard the respects in 
which it is precisely at odds with the practice of politics. Thereby, certain features 
or aspects of the practice of politics tend to disappear from view, among them 
being the contingent temporal and spatial conditions under which political “things” 
(i.e., the words, deeds, and events which make up political reality) occur, as well as 





                                                                                                                                       
that remove and relation to such practice is a matter of divergence among diverse theorists. Yet 
insofar as it is ‘political’, it must be related to the political as a domain of practical predicament.” 
6 Plato, Gorgias, 521d. 
7 Ibid., 526e. 




Political philosophy does not seem to offer much, then, if we wish to find an 
explicitly articulated answer to the question “what is political?” Yet, what we have 
described so far is by no means the only possible self-conception of the intellectual 
pursuit named “political philosophy”. In fact, what we have presented so far is 
primarily a specific way of reading political-philosophical texts, which are indeed 
often read “as if” the authors offer a proposal to do something; but they may as 
well be read “as if” they aim to offer a certain understanding, or to make sense of 
something, such as the phenomenon we call “politics” itself.
9
 To stick to the 
example of Plato’s Republic: instead of reading it “as if” Plato presents a blueprint 
for a perfectly just society which is to be realized in practice, we may read it as an 
attempt to understand the problem of justice and its political realization. 
Moreover, we can go one step further, since what the reading of texts as if 
they present a practical “proposal” or “ideal” and reading them as if they offer a 
specific theoretical understanding (of a problem, or a phenomenon) have in 
common, is that they remain focused on the explicit propositions that are contained 
in a text, the truth value and / or normative validity of which we may examine. By 
contrast, we may say that there are texts which can be read not so much as to offer 
a certain “result” or a “last word” (either in the form of a practical proposal or a 
theoretical proposition), but rather so as to stage and set the example for a certain 
way of thinking or for a certain “thoughtful” attitude or approach to politics, which 
we may or may not start to practice for and by ourselves. Accordingly, we may 
take into account that Plato’s Republic is written in the form of a dialogue (instead 
of considering the dialogue as a mere left-over of a “primitive” stage of philosophy 
when it had not yet developed into its “mature” form of “Aristotelian” rational 
justification) and discover that Socrates, Plato’s main interlocutor, eventually lets 
go of the “constitutional” proposal of the rule of philosopher-kings and instead 
claims that the ideal state serves as the model for the individual soul. What is 
ultimately at stake becomes clear in the concluding myth of the dialogue: learning 
“to distinguish the good life from the bad and always to make the best choice 
possible in every situation”.
10
 Similarly, Socrates’ famous words in Plato’s Gorgias 
that he is the only “true politician” may be read not so much as the prescription of 
an alternative way of life (viz. the only “true” way of life with its one and only 
“method” of philosophical “dialectics”), but rather as an invitation to us, as readers 
of this text, to investigate for and by ourselves whether what presents itself as the 
best way of life (or what pretends to be the best way of life – indeed, even if that 
                                                     
9 See Waldron, ‘What Would Plato Allow?’, 143: “we run a great danger if we think of theory – even 
evaluative theory – as primarily political advocacy or as primarily the laying out of a social or a 
constitutional “wish-list.” We should think of it instead, I want to say, literally as political philosophy 
– a deepening of our insight into the realm of the political and of our understanding of what is 
involved in making judgments and decision in that realm.”. For example, Waldron himself speaks of 
“the circumstances of politics” as “the felt need among the members of a certain group for a common 
framework or decision or course of action on some matter, even in the face of disagreement about 
what that framework, decision or action should be” (Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 102). See also 
Dunn, The Cunning of Unreason. 
10 Plato, Republic, 618c. 
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way of life is said to consist in the application of the philosophical “method” of 
“dialectics”) is indeed the best way of life.
11
 
Furthermore, insofar as political philosophy (and political thinking in 
general) is expressed in speech or writing, it becomes itself, as action or as work, 
part of political reality; it becomes part of its own object of examination. As soon 
as we realize that texts, pieces of writing, are “frozen” practices, we may even go 
so far as to suggest that, just as in the case of “real” practices, we can take our cue 
not only from their explicit propositions (i.e., from what is said or claimed to be 
intended), but by taking our cue from their performance (i.e., from what is in a 
certain sense not said), from what kind of activity they actually enact. When we 
apply this manner of reading, we will learn from these philosophical texts not only 
“thanks to” themselves, that is, thanks to what they explicitly assert, propose, or 
claim to intend, but “despite” themselves, that is, thanks to what they do not say 
but nevertheless do. To put this in another way, political philosophies can be 
understood and judged not only in terms of the validity of their propositions (the 
politics they claim to support, that is, descriptive and normative propositions about 
politics that are either verifiable and justifiable or not), but also in terms of their 
performance (the politics they enact and thereby implicitly further). In other words, 
we may find an answer to our initial question “what is political?” not only in what 
political philosophers explicitly say about politics (if indeed they do so at all), but 
also and perhaps even primarily by the politics that they actually enact. 
We may receive an initial indication of the performative meaning of 
political-philosophical texts by taking our cue from their actual “influence” or 
“success” within political reality. As Raymond Geuss has claimed: “In the long 
run, … when a theory is widely believed and has come to inform the way large 
groups of people act, deeply hidden structural features of it can suddenly have a 
tremendous political impact.”
12
 These hidden features may exist in the assumptions 
that people who are going to act upon the theory are bound to make, or in forms of 
language that are used rather than mentioned, such as certain analogies and 
metaphors or a polemical rather than an argumentative way of reasoning. Hence, it 
may well be possible that a political philosophy which explicitly offers and 
understands itself as offering a certain proposal for a “good” or even the only 
“right” form of politics (for instance, one based on individual freedom and 
responsibility) has in fact achieved the opposite (Marx being the classical 
example). Of course, the actual impact of a certain text depends not only on the 
“deeply hidden structural features” of the writing itself, but also on the contingent 
historical circumstances and specific institutional context within which it is 
received.
13
 Accordingly, we can distinguish at least three different ways in which 
political philosophical texts may be read: (i) according to their propositional 
contents (their “proposal”, “theory”, or “argument”); (ii) according to their 
performative meaning (their “action” or “practice”, whether intended or not); (iii) 
                                                     
11 Cf. Lear, A Case for Irony, 22.  
12 Geuss, Outside Ethics, 35. 
13 Cf. Geuss, Outside Ethics, 36.  
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according to their historical impact (their actual “influence”, “success”, or “legacy” 
within political reality).  
By confronting the first two readings with each other, we are able to 
reconstruct the understanding of politics or the specific orientation towards politics 
that is presupposed and furthered by the “performance” of a political philosophy 
which otherwise considers its own pursuit as being merely “propositional”. On this 
basis, we will be able to assess the extent to which the political philosophy in 
question does actually enable us to make sense of politics and to develop a sense 
for politics, that is to say, whether it teaches to adequately assess our day-to-day 
political reality that is constituted by actions and events and of aptly attuning 
ourselves to that reality. As John Dunn has argued: “Few factors have more causal 
force in politics (do more to determine what in fact occurs) than how well we 
understand what we are doing. … If we understood politics better we would 
certainly be less surprised by its outcomes, as well as surprised much less often.”
14
 
In other words, an adequate understanding of politics seems to be a necessary 
prerequisite for the formation of sound political judgment, for taking the right 
political decisions, and for choosing the right courses of action, hic et nunc. 
 Given the political condition to which all political philosophy (and 
political thinking in general) is subject, we may ask which specific demands we 
may set for political philosophy, should it wish to do justice both to the peculiar 
nature and demands of politics (as its object of examination) and to the peculiar 
nature and demands of thinking itself (as its manner of enquiry). The question of 
what is involved in acting politically thus leads us back to the question of what is 
involved in the activity of thinking. 
This leads to the following questions: (i) how can we philosophize (think) 
about politics (action) in such a way; (ii) that it takes into account the specific 
characteristics of both politics (action) and philosophy (thinking); (iii) and that it 
prepares us to exercise what may be called “thoughtful politics”, that is, forming 
sound political judgments, taking adequate political decisions, choosing the right 
courses of political action? 
In answering these questions I argue as follows. In the first place, a 
political philosophy should possess / develop a realistic / adequate understanding 
not only of politics (action) but also of philosophy (thinking), for which it is at least 
required to offer some degree of critical distance from what is generally called 
“political” (e.g. state / government legislation) and what is generally called 
“philosophical” (e.g. the rational justification of propositions). In the second place, 
a political philosophy should possess / develop some degree of theoretical self-
consciousness about the implications of its necessarily being a practice (a) for the 
validity or status of its propositions / theory and (b) for its possible impact within 
political reality / actual politics. In the third place, the forms of “thoughtful” 
                                                     
14 Dunn, The Cunning of Unreason, x. See also: idem, 92-93: “What might make it worthwhile to 
understand politics is the effect of doing so on our political judgment, and hence on our political 
actions. The less we understand what is really going on, the less likely are we to act, individually or 
collectively, in a well-advised way.” 
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political decision-making and judgment suggested or embodied by a political 
philosophy should meet these first two demands.  
 
These questions are refined and answered by offering a reading of the writings of 
Karl Popper (1902-1994), Leo Strauss (1899-1973), and Hannah Arendt (1906-
1973). All three may to some extent be considered outsiders within political 
philosophy, in the sense that, in confrontation with the events and ideologies of 
their time, they explicitly address the question of the relation between politics 
(action) and philosophy (thought), albeit in very different ways and varying 
degrees. To be more precise, all three attempt to “save” a kind of what I call 
“thoughtful politics”, which may be said to be constituted by proper cooperation 
between thought and action, while at the same time doing justice to their specific 
difference and peculiarity.  
Moreover, all three authors attempt to rethink the relation between 
philosophy and politics (or between thought and action) by relating to the 
conceptualization of the relation between the philosophical life [bios theōrētikos] 
and the political life [bios politikos] as it assumed shape in Plato’s dialogues 
(again, especially in the Gorgias and the Republic). In the work of Popper, Strauss, 
and Arendt, the names of Plato, Socrates, the sophists (especially Callicles and 
Thrasymachus) and statesmen (such as Pericles) function as placeholders for 
specific positions that may be occupied within this framework. Popper aligns the 
philosopher “Socrates” and the statesman “Pericles” together as friends of the 
“open society” against the pseudo-philosopher “Plato” as its enemy. By contrast, 
Strauss draws a sharp distinction between the philosopher “Socrates” and the 
statesman “Pericles”, while defending “Plato” (albeit a different Plato than 
Popper’s) against both of them. Finally, Arendt, while at first sight choosing a 
position similar to Popper’s (defending “Socratic” thinking and “Periclean” acting 
against “Platonic” making), in fact aims to think outside the underlying “Platonic” 
framework as such.  
Furthermore, the thought of both Popper and Strauss, in contradistinction 
to Arendt’s, acquired a certain historical influence in the guise of political 
movements, ideologies, or schools that base themselves on their thought,
15
 which 
makes us attentive to the performative meaning of their political thinking. In 
Popper’s case, the substitution of political Islamism for communism as the 
“enemy” of the open society, makes us aware of the force of the friend-enemy 
logic prominent in his writing. In the case of Strauss, him being named the 
“godfather of the neo-cons” during the war against Iraq causes us to attend to the 
question of the extent to which his political philosophy implies a rehabilitation of 
                                                     
15 In the case of Popper, especially his theory of the “open society” has been utilized by liberal 
political parties and activists in Europe to provide an ideological foundation. In the case of Strauss, 
especially the neoconservative movement is, in part, inspired by his thought. Perhaps more 
importantly, he deliberately founded his own “school” of political philosophy. Although Arendt’s 
reflections on the Eichmann case and Little Rock have generated a lot of discussion and controversy 
in public debate, it is striking that there does not seem to be such a thing as an “Arendtian” political 
movement or ideology. 
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the merits of war as instrument of “regime change” and of the use of “noble lies” 
by “the few” against “the many”. The thought (or at least the writing) of both 
authors has been acted on in recent history, and this historical “influence” or 
“success” provides us with a glimpse into the deeply hidden structural features of 
their thought. 
Finally, the choice of three rather than two authors (or even one) reduces 
the risk that we in turn, as readers, lapse from the outset into an approach that 
focuses exclusively on the philosophical and / or polemical weighing of the validity 
of propositions for and / or against concerning a common issue and according to a 
common set of criteria that are self-evidently presupposed and perhaps even 
imposed on their texts from the “outside”, a weighing that is supposed to “result” 
in our own positing, in turn, of a rationally justified and / or polemically defended 
“last word” or “bottom line”. In the secondary literature, these authors have thus 
far been compared as pairs: Popper and Strauss,
16
 and Strauss and Arendt.
17
 The 
advantage of the choice of three authors is that it increases the number of 




As indicated, in order to trace the political within the philosophical (and the other 
way round), it is necessary to study the writings of our authors not only in terms of 
what they say thanks to themselves (their propositions, what they explicitly argue 
for), but also, and more fundamentally, in terms of what they say despite 
themselves (their performance, what they do). We may learn from them not only 
from what they say (what they propose, or what they intend), but also from what 
they do (the principles inherent in their action). 
Popper sets the scene, as we demonstrate what the problem of political 
thinking is by providing a reading of his work. By offering a specific reading of his 
                                                     
16 For a comparison of Popper and Strauss, see e.g.: Lane, ‘Plato, Popper, Strauss, and Utopianism: 
Open Secrets?’; Mueller, ‘Fear and Freedom: On ‘Cold War Liberalism’’. 
17 For a comparison of Strauss and Arendt, see e.g. Beiner, ‘Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: The 
Uncommenced Dialogue’; Villa, ‘The Philosopher versus the Citizen: Arendt, Strauss, and Socrates’; 
Harald Bluhm, ‘Variationen des Höhlengleichnisses. Kritik und Restitution politischer Philosophie 
bei Hannah Arendt und Leo Strauss’; Widmaier, Fin de la philosophie politique? Hannah Arendt 
contre Leo Strauss. The volume edited by Kielmansegg et. al., Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss 
contains essays devoted to either Arendt or Strauss. Except for the chapter by Kateb, ‘The 
Questionable Influence of Arendt (and Strauss)’ (ibid., 29-43), it hardly offers any explicit 
comparison of the two. 
18 The only (other) scholarly piece of work that has ever been published in which the same three 
thinkers (Popper, Strauss, Arendt) are being compared is: Holmes, ‘Aristippus in and out of Athens’. 
Holmes uses a single criterion to measure them: allegedly, they devote insufficient consideration to 
the fundamental distinction between the classical Greek polis on the one hand, which, being a “total” 
state, knew of no distinction between state and society, and our modern society on the other, which, 
by contrast, is essentially characterized by “functional differentiation”. As a result, he not only misses 
the fundamental differences among them within their interpretations of “the Greeks” – Holmes asserts, 
for instance, that Arendt aims for a return to Plato (!) – but, more fundamentally, his approach 
assumes that these philosophers should in the first place be read as if their primary goal lies in 
presenting some decisive standpoint or proposition (answer), instead of articulating and understanding 
a theoretical problem (question). 
21 
 
work we can show that political thought, insofar as it is expressed, also becomes a 
form of political practice; a practice that can be at odds with the theory of politics 
that is formulated in the very same work. It will be argued, however, that Popper 
does not explicitly display any awareness of this performative condition of 
philosophy, nor does he offer a strategy to deal with it. Strauss, by contrast, 
explicitly shows awareness of the implications of this condition, but it will be 
argued that the remedy he offers amounts to the unrealistic fantasy of escaping 
from that very condition. Finally, Arendt is shown to be also aware of the 
predicament, but it will be argued that her thinking offers strategies to deal with 
this condition, which do not amount to an escape from it. 
The first two chapters of this dissertation are devoted to a reading of the 
writing of Karl Popper, especially his The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945). 
Popper conceives of political philosophy as the application of epistemological or 
methodological principles, or the “rational” methods of science to political 
practice: “piecemeal social engineering”. According to him, this approach to 
politics serves the freedom and responsibility of individual citizens. As we will 
argue, however, his methodological assumptions cause his conception of 
“rationality” to be too narrow to account for the normative validity of political 
proposals and decisions (Chapter 1). Subsequently, our attention shifts from the 
level of the inner consistency of the propositions or argument of his texts (i.e., 
what he explicitly accounts for) to the level of performance. We will argue that 
Popper fails to offer a “theoretical self-consciousness” (Geuss) of the political 
conditions to which all thinking about politics is necessarily subject. It is 
demonstrated that his texts do not escape from this condition. In the first place, his 
texts rest upon the force of the analogy with science – a use of language which 
seems to overstep the limits of scientific language he himself explicitly sets. In the 
second place, his texts are written in accordance with a polemical friend-enemy 
logic that is in flat contradiction with the rules of rational discussion he himself 
determines (Chapter 2). 
Strauss, in contradistinction to Popper, acknowledges that philosophy (or 
thinking), insofar as it is expressed in speech or writing, is subject to the conditions 
of politics: one may say that scribere est agere (“writing is acting”). This political 
condition of philosophy (or thinking) is diagnosed as problematic: according to 
Strauss, philosophy and politics are naturally at odds with each other. Although it 
is often stated that Strauss’s thought in the last instance is meant to serve the 
philosophical way of life, I argue that he also offers a specific theory or 
understanding of the political and a specific form of guidance for actual political 
decisions and judgments [phronèsis]. He presents this as an alternative to both 
modern “doctrinairism” and ultramodern “existentialism” (Chapter 3). However, 
the strategies Strauss develops to deal with the conflictual relation between politics 
and philosophy in order that we may philosophize (or think) independently and, as 
an indirect consequence, make better political judgments and take better political 
decisions, implies that he neglects the peculiarity of this relation. It will be 
demonstrated that his theory reflects the supposedly sovereign position of 
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philosophy over politics. A reconstruction is given of his account and practice of 
the politics of philosophy, the “art of writing”, which consists of a “Platonic” 
cooperation between philosophical dialectics (Socrates) and polemical rhetoric 
(Thrasymachus), the latter of which is supposed to be entirely “ministerial” to the 
former. Yet, the performance of this politics of philosophy attests to the 
problematic presupposition that the contingent (political) conditions of thinking 
can be completely known and controlled from the supposedly sovereign position of 
the philosopher (Chapter 4). 
In the case of Arendt, this deconstructive reading of her work – the 
confrontation of its propositions with its performance – has already received quite a 
lot of attention in the secondary literature. In her case too, it can be demonstrated 
that the performative meaning of her writings is at some points at odds with the 
explicitly formulated intention. Yet we will argue that this reading tends to 
disregard the fact that it is not her intention to offer a “proposal” in the guise of a 
“solution” or “ideal” – her alleged and, according to many, deficient advocacy of 
“Greek” political life – for this would place her within the traditional philosophical 
framework which she precisely and explicitly rejects. Instead, space is given to 
what she asserts is her original intention: to understand the specific conditions of 
political action and decision-making. More specifically, we will present her 
conception of politics as one of “public freedom”, by reconstructing the way she 
attempts to understand the question of the legitimacy of political order (power, 
authority) that has “traditionally” been understood as a philosophical (theoretical) 
question, as an “originally” political (practical) question instead (Chapter 5). By 
sticking to Arendt’s explicitly formulated wish not to move within the traditional 
framework, we subsequently allow ourselves to present alternative ways of 
thinking that are capable of doing justice to politics. For, in contrast not only to 
Platonic contemplation and contemporary “thoughtlessness”, and – in 
contradistinction to what is sometimes asserted – also in contrast to Socratic 
dialectics, Arendt presents two different ways of thinking that may be considered 
suitable ways to think about politics and make us more attentive to political reality, 
in order that we may make better judgments and take better decisions. These ways 
of thinking are “representative” thinking – which, in contradistinction to Strauss’s 
conception of phronèsis, aims for perspectival judgment – and “poetic” thinking – 
which amounts to a re-conciliation with and praise of the world by making 





THE SPELL OF POPPER: 
 













Instead of posing as prophets we must become the makers of our fate.  
We must learn to do things as well as we can, and to look out for our mistakes.  
And when we have dropped the idea that the history of power will be our judge,  
when we have given up worrying whether or not history will justify us,  
then one day perhaps we may succeed in getting power under control.  
In this way we may even justify history, in our turn.  





Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means,  
and these are not political but technical, that is to say, capable of being settled  
by experts or machines, like arguments between engineers or doctors. That is why those 
who put their faith in some immense, world-transforming phenomenon, like the final 
triumph of reason or the proletarian revolution, must believe that all political and  







The concept of the “open society” is often invoked in public debate to indicate who 
“we” are, in terms of both “our” way of life and “our” form of government. Those 
who use the term often refer to the philosophy of Karl Popper (1902-1994), whose 
book The Open Society and Its Enemies, published in 1945, gave the term 
widespread currency. The book, which can be read as a defense of liberal 
democracy against totalitarianism (both fascist and communist), played an 
important role in the dissident movement in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. 
Popper is therefore sometimes classified as a typical “Cold War liberal”.
21
 This 
does not mean, however, that his influence declined after 1989. His philosophy 
formed the inspiration for George Soros’s Open Society Institute, founded in 1993. 
Furthermore, in response to the rise of ethnic violence on the fringes of Europe in 
the ’90s and the challenge of political Islam in the wake of “9/11”, his book is 
being taken off the shelves again, to be used in the struggle against ethnic 
nationalism and fundamentalist religion, which are depicted as embodiments of the 
                                                     
19 OSE2 280. 
20 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 168. 
21 Together with Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) and Raymond Aron (1905-1983), see Mueller, ‘Fear and 
Freedom’; Shearmur, The Political Thought of Karl Popper, 24. Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) is 
sometimes also counted among them. 
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idea of a “closed society”. Apparently, the logic of Popper’s argument remains 
appealing, even though his original enemies have been gone for over twenty years. 
In contrast to his presence in public debate, Popper is almost completely 
ignored in academic political philosophy. Some suggest that this is due to the fact 
that it is sometimes still believed, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, that 
nothing of much importance happened in this field in the second half of the 
twentieth century before the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 
1971.
22
 It is certainly due to the fact that within the university, Popper is primarily 
known as a philosopher of science. His books The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
(1934) and Conjectures and Refutations (1963) are still read, and his falsificationist 
theory of science is still taught, at least in introductory courses. Moreover, Popper 




In this light The Open Society and Its Enemies might be considered as 
nothing more than a pamphlet, a polemical intervention in current affairs written by 
a worried citizen who chose to publish his personal opinion on the political 
situation of his time. Indeed, Popper himself called his book his “war effort”, his 
contribution to World War II against Hitler and to the Cold War against Stalin.
24
 At 
the same time, though, he intended it to be more than a tract for the times. He 
describes it as a contribution to “the philosophy of society and politics” (OSE2 
259), or, to be more specific, as an examination of “the application of the critical 
and rational methods of science to the problems of the open society” (OSE1 1). His 
criticism of the two influential totalitarian political movements of his time is 
informed by his criticism of “historicism”, a faulty methodology of the social 
sciences which he ascribes especially to Plato, Hegel, and Marx. It seems thus that 
Popper’s approach to politics is embedded in, or even dependent on, a broader set 
of philosophical, (that is, epistemological) convictions.
25
  
Whether his book is considered a “mere” pamphlet or a “mere” application 
of his philosophy of science, in neither case does it seem to be of serious interest to 
political philosophers. Some have argued, however, that Popper’s philosophy of 
science should be understood as an application of his philosophy of politics, in 
which case the latter would deserve to be taken more seriously.
26
 However this 
may be – whether his political philosophy is regarded as an “application” of his 
philosophy of science or the other way around – insofar as political philosophers 
are interested in the conditions of their own enterprise, they ought to be interested 
in Popper’s work for a different reason. For, precisely if and insofar as a political 
philosophy is “influential” – that is, insofar as people write, speak, and hence act in 
                                                     
22 This is the explanation given by Mueller, ‘Fear and Freedom’, 46. 
23 See, inter alia, OSE1 2, OSE2 85. 
24 Popper, Unended Quest, 131. 
25  Lessnoff, Political Philosophers of the Twentieth Century, 176-177: “There is no doubt that 
Popper’s political theory builds on his analysis of the scientific enterprise, of the conditions necessary 
for the growth of knowledge, and for rational thought in general.” See also T.E. Burke, The 
Philosophy of Popper. 
26 See Stokes, Popper: Philosophy, Politics, and Scientific Method. 
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accordance with its assumptions – it may teach us something worthwhile about the 
conditions of our political understanding. As Raymond Geuss aptly formulates it: 
 
A political philosophy ... is not really an exclusively theoretical 
construction, but it must also be seen as an attempt to intervene in the 
world of politics: the consequences of acting on it ought thus never to be 
considered matters of complete indifference in evaluating it. ... In the long 
run ..., when a theory is widely believed and has come to inform the way 
large groups of people act, deeply hidden structural features of it can 




Insofar as a political philosophy’s underlying conceptual assumptions inform our 
actual political understanding and judgment, then, we are permitted to ask whether 
its contribution to that understanding and judgment is sound or not.  
The force and positive appeal of Popper’s idea of the “open society” was 
felt especially due to the contrasting force of the negative, almost demonic picture 
he drew of the “closed society” as a backward and primitive society reigned over 
by irrational belief in magical taboos. Now that the imminent threat of his original 
contemporary enemies is gone, however, we may seize the opportunity to evaluate 
his philosophy of the open society on its own terms, according to its inner 
structure. 
As is well-known, Popper’s attack on Marxism in the second volume of 
The Open Society and Its Enemies – entitled The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, 
Marx, and the Aftermath – is preceded by his attempt to break the “spell” of the 
“alluring philosophy” (OSE1 199) of Plato in the first volume – entitled The Spell 
of Plato. Popper accuses Plato of having laid the basis for the success of later kinds 
of utopianism by propagating an “Ideal State” that pretends to be wise, just, and 
happy, and thus by consciously appealing to humanitarian ideas and sentiments, 
which is reinforced by his use of Socrates as his mouthpiece. Yet, Popper argues, 
in fact, when judged from a rational point of view, this state is totalitarian in 
nature. He points to an “inner conflict” (OSE1 196) within Plato’s mind between 
reason and sentiment, which was decided in favor of the latter, the remedy to which 
would consist in making political philosophy more “rational”. 
When, in turn, I attempt to identify what may be called “the spell of 
Popper”, the way I read his work differs from the way he read Plato, if only 
because, as we shall see, the criterion of “rationality” used by Popper turns out to 
be too narrow. Moreover, I do not point to any “inner conflict” in Popper’s mind, 
nor do I turn the tables by defending Plato or any other of his “enemies” against 
him.
28
 Instead, I will reconstruct and then deconstruct what may be called 
respectively the “inner logic” and the “deeply hidden structural features” of 
Popper’s writing, in the first case by critically examining the inner consistency of 
                                                     
27 Geuss, Outside Ethics, 35.  
28 For the latter, see, inter alia, Levinson, In Defense of Plato. 
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what is explicitly proposed in it (what is explicitly articulated and accounted for),
29
 
and in the second case by examining what is actually enacted by it (what is 
performed, even without being explicitly articulated and accounted for).
30
  
The current chapter examines the inner logic of Popper’s work, that is, the 
consistency of his work on the level of its propositions. He presents his theory as 
an “application” of the “rational” methods of science to politics, which results in 
his “proposal” for a politics of “piecemeal social engineering”. We examine 
whether the “rational” and (hence) “responsible” politics he aims to further is in 
fact supported by his epistemological assumptions. We will argue that, in fact, he 
requires a wider conception of rationality, for which he can at the same time not 
account within the epistemological framework he explicitly advocates. As a 
consequence, his work is vulnerable to the reproach that it lapses into some kind of 
“decisionism”.  
The next chapter examines what I have called the deeply hidden structural 
features of his work, that is, the assumptions performatively affirmed by his 
writing, as well as their consistency with what is proposed in it. In the first part, I 
draw attention to the fact that the force of his proposal for a politics of the rational 
discussion of proposals turns out in the end to rest on the use of the analogy 
between science (or engineering) and politics. Besides being problematic in terms 
of substance, the crucial because constitutive role of the language of analogy 
within his work remains unaccounted for within his rationalist picture of language. 
In the second part, I draw attention to the fact that his proposal for a politics of 
proposing is set in a state of necessity, that is, in a situation in which a collective of 
“friends” is urged to unite against its “enemies”. Hence, the rational (and thus 
freely discussable) character of Popper’s “proposal” is impaired by the conception 
of politics as polemics that is performatively affirmed by his writing. Thus, the 
“open” society harbors in itself a moment of “closure”, which leads me to question 
both the consistency and the adequacy of Popper’s rationalist conception of 
politics. 
In the first two sections of the present chapter, I give an account both of 
Popper’s notion of “the open society” and of the two alternative approaches to 
                                                     
29 Mueller, ‘Fear and Freedom’, 56: “Of course, personal professions are one thing – the inner logic of 
political ideas propounded another.” 
30 Geuss, Outside Ethics, 35. See also ibid., 36: “The liberal thinkers like Berlin who gave their 
penetrating historical and conceptual analysis in the middle of the last century realized that 
understanding a political philosophy involves taking account of a wide variety of factors that have no 
parallel in the case of strictly empirical theories. These include hidden structural features of the theory, 
various assumptions the people who are going to act on the theory make, and the actual institutional, 
economic, and political reality of the world in which the theory is trying to allow us to intervene 
(even if that intervention is at the level of a mere normative assessment). Liberalism ought to have 
applied the theoretical sophistication which it had acquired in its critical struggle against Marxism to 
the task of understanding itself better in terms of these factors.” Holmes, ‘Aristippus in and out of 
Athens’, 118, mentions only the third factor: “the normative claims of political philosophy, so I 
believe, can never be understood from behind a self-imposed veil of ignorance, but rather must 
always be interpreted in light of historical information about the institutional order within which these 
claims are to be enforced.” 
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politics that he distinguishes: historicism and social engineering, the former of 
which he rejects, while embracing the latter on condition that it is not “utopian” but 
“piecemeal” in nature. He claims that the latter is the only approach that does 
justice to the open society’s demand to assume full responsibility for our political 
decisions. Since Popper argues that “piecemeal social engineering” is the only 
approach to politics that deserves the predicate “scientific”, in the third section I go 
on to provide an explanation of his distinctive philosophy of science, more 
specifically of his strict separation of “facts” (or scientific propositions) and 
“decisions” (or moral and political proposals). In the fourth section, I reconstruct in 
detail both his criticism of the “utopian” form of social engineering and of 
“totalitarianism”, which he ascribes to Plato, and his own “piecemeal”, liberal-
democratic alternative to it, which he ascribes to Pericles and Socrates. In the final 
two sections, I critically examine the consistency of Popper’s position, arguing that 
the distinction between “piecemeal” and “utopian” social engineering, crucial to 
his project, is in fact difficult to maintain if it is based on the restricted conception 
of rationality inherent in the “scientific” attitude of “social engineering”. I show 
that he requires as complement a more comprehensive conception of rationality, 
that is, a conception that is capable of accounting for the rational validity not only 
of technological propositions (the choice of means) but also of political proposals 
(the choice of ends). However, this broader conception of rationality can itself not 
be accounted for on the basis of Popper’s restricted epistemological 
presuppositions, especially due to his strict separation of facts from decisions. As 
mentioned above, he thereby runs the danger of lapsing into some kind of 
“irrational” political “decisionism”, despite his explicitly professed rejection of this 
stance. 
 
1.2. POLITICS WITHIN THE OPEN SOCIETY 
 
Before we are able to answer the question of whether Popper’s philosophy of 
science does indeed further the rational and responsible form of politics he 
advocates, we need to reconstruct Popper’s concrete “proposals” as presented 
especially in The Open Society and Its Enemies – by far his most influential 
political philosophical work.
31
 In the preface (written in 1943) to the first edition, 
he states that what is at stake is nothing less than the survival of our “civilization”. 
The aim of his book is to unite “those on whose defence civilization depends” 
(OSE1 vii) by breaking with “the habit of deference to great men” who “supported 
                                                     
31 In my analysis of Popper’s writing I focus primarily on The Open Society and Its Enemies, which 
became his most influential work. I also refer to The Poverty of Historicism (published as a book in 
1957, being a re-worked and expanded version of a paper originally written in 1936) and to an 
unpublished paper written between 1944 and 1946. Because I am primarily interested in the 
illustrative function of Popper’s work for our purposes of understanding the practice of political 
philosophy rather than offering a full exegesis of the idiosyncrasies of the work, I largely leave out of 
consideration his so-called “later” political philosophy and his theory of three worlds. For a detailed 
account of these aspects of Popper’s work, see especially Shearmur, The Political Thought of Karl 
Popper, chapter 3, entitled ‘After The Open Society’. 
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the perennial attack on freedom and reason” (OSE1 vii). The larger part of the 
book consists of an attack on the authority of three such “intellectual leaders” in 
particular: Plato, Hegel, and Marx. Still, he claims that the problems treated are 
“the problems of our own time”, and although he states he has tried to state them as 
simply as he could, the object of his book is “not so much to popularize the 
questions treated as to solve them” (OSE1 vii).  
Hence, Popper’s final aim consists in a defense of free and rational 
political decision-making. As he explains in chapter 10 (which bears the same title 
as the book as a whole), “civilization” or an “open society” is characterized by the 
fact that people accept their individual freedom and their responsibility for 
decisions. In a “closed society”, on the other hand, decisions are governed by a 
belief in magical taboos. As Popper calls his distinction between these types of 
society a “rationalist” one,
32
 we may conclude that the adoption of the distinction 
itself already presupposes the “method” and perspective of the “open society”. 
 In fact, however, his distinction is more than a purely “rationalist” one, 
because Popper places its adoption and defense within the context of a grand 
historical narrative of a continuing struggle, which runs through the history of 
Western civilization, between the adherents of the open society on the one hand, 
and those who wish to “return” to the closed society on the other. He states that the 
open society first came into being in Greece with the “breakdown” of the archaic 
tribal societies.
33
 He regards Socrates, Pericles, and some of the sophists
34
 – all of 
whom he counts among “the Great Generation” – as the first to articulate the 
principles of the open society, but who were confronted by the conservative 
reaction of Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle. Later in history, the principles of early 
Christianity were challenged by orthodox Judaism and the authoritarian medieval 
Christian Church; early modern and Enlightenment thinking, as embodied 
especially in the French and American Revolutions, was jeopardized by 
Romanticism and its nationalist aftermath; and, finally, in the twentieth century, 
liberal democracy was threatened by totalitarianism. Popper speaks of a “perennial 
fight” (OSE1 1) for freedom, individualism, egalitarianism, and humanitarianism 
against collectivism and the division of mankind into superiors and inferiors – a 
struggle to which he clearly wishes to add his own share. 
 As Popper explains, one of the issues in an open society which assumes the 
character of “a problem which can be rationally discussed”, is the quest for the 
“best constitution” (OSE1 173): as soon as political laws are no longer considered 
magical taboos, they become capable of rational discussion, to be changed 
                                                     
32 OSE1 202n. Popper derives the terms “open society” and “closed society” from Henri Bergson, Les 
deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), but Popper uses them in a different way: “My 
terms indicate, as it were, a rationalist distinction; the closed society is characterized by the belief in 
magical taboos, while the open society is one in which men have learned to be to some extent critical 
of taboos, and to base decisions on the authority of their own intelligence (after discussion). Bergson, 
on the other hand, has a kind of religious distinction in mind.” 
33 OSE1 176. 
34 Of the sophists, Popper considers Protagoras as one of the most prominent theorists of the open 
society, while he counts Callicles and Thrasymachus as adherents of the idea of the closed society.  
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according to the outcome of that discussion. Although Popper does not explicitly 
thematize the question “what is political?”, he uses a specific conception of 
“political” that can be distilled from his work. If only in passing, he describes 
“political life” as “the field of problems concerned with the power of man over 
man” (OSE2 236). In addition, he claims that “all power, and political power at 
least as much as economic power, is dangerous” (OSE2 129). Throughout his book 
it becomes clear that for him, the “most fundamental problem of all politics” 
consists in “the control of the controller, of the dangerous accumulation of power 
represented in the state” (OSE2 129).
35
 He seems to take it for granted that the use 
of power by some human beings over other human beings is an ineradicable fact of 
human reality, an empirical datum which he wishes neither to dispute nor 
challenge. Hence, he is no anarchist.
36
 What he wants to challenge, though, is how 




To be sure, Popper addresses the problem of political power insofar as the 
latter is institutionalized in the state. He identifies “political laws” with “the laws of 
the state” (OSE1 173), and he distinguishes “the realm of legality, i.e. of state-
enforced norms” as the sphere of politics from “the realm of morality proper, i.e. 
norms enforced not by the state, but by our conscience” (OSE1 113). In other 
words, he conceives of the “political” as a separate sphere within our (open) 
society or civilization, called “state” or “government”. Hence, insofar as he claims 
to offer a “political philosophy” or a “philosophy of politics” – terms he does not 
use that often – he is primarily thinking of a philosophy of state or of government. 
 
1.3. TWO APPROACHES TO POLITICS: HISTORICISM VERSUS SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING 
 
As Popper writes in the introduction, his book examines “the application of the 
critical and rational methods of science to the problems of the open society” (OSE1 
1). Thus, he approaches “the problem of politics” from the perspective of “social 
philosophy” – a term he uses as shorthand for the (his) methodology of the social 
sciences. He states that we are ultimately confronted with a choice between two 
alternative approaches to the problem of politics, only one of which is 
methodologically sound: either we pose as the “prophets” of our fate and thus let 
“the history of power … be our judge”, or we become the “makers” of our fate and 
then “one day perhaps we may succeed in getting power under control.” (OSE2 
280 – see epigraph to this chapter). In the first case, we adopt the attitude of 
                                                     
35 See also OSE1 120-121. 
36 Cf. Popper, ‘Reason and the Open Society’, 282: “government is a necessary evil. Total absence of 
government is an impossibility and – another regrettable truth – the more people, the more 
government.” 




“historicism”: in the second, we adopt the attitude of “social engineering”, which is 
then subdivided into a “utopian” and a “piecemeal” variant.  
In the secondary literature, Popper’s own choice for “piecemeal social 
engineering” is usually presented as a “middle way” between “historicism” and 
“utopian social engineering”.
38
 Accordingly, Jeremy Shearmur depicts the last two 
as the “Scylla” and “Charybdis” which Popper wishes to avoid.
39
 Although this 
imagery aptly captures the equal polemical distance of Popper’s proposal from 
these two alternatives, its use is slightly misleading if we wish to determine the 
exact philosophical relation between the three positions. We therefore adhere to the 
initial account provided by Popper himself, who presents the distinction between 
historicism and social engineering as the primary one.
40
 
Popper describes historicism as the doctrine which holds that “history is 
controlled by specific historical or evolutionary laws whose discovery would 
enable us to prophesy the destiny of man.” (OSE1 8). Knowledge of these 
historical laws enables the historicist to foretell “which political actions are likely 
to succeed or likely to fail”, and thereby to “put politics upon a solid basis” (OSE1 
8).
41
 Hence, human beings cannot alter the course of history.
42
 The appeal of 
historicism consists specifically in its providing “certainty regarding the ultimate 
outcome of history” (OSE1 9), its promise to relieve us from “the strain of 
                                                     
38 Lessnoff, Political Philosophies of the Twentieth Century, 188. 
39 Shearmur, The Political Thought of Karl Popper, 40-47. 
40 OSE, chapters 1-3. 
41 This conception of historicism should be distinguished from the more common understanding of 
historicism [Historismus], viz. the doctrine which holds that all human thought and knowledge is 
historically determined. In order to avoid the two being mixed up, Popper calls the latter ‘historism’ 
(OSE2 208, 255). In fact, he opposes both kinds of historicism, if only because the latter is 
necessarily part of the former. As the second part of this dissertation shows, Leo Strauss employs the 
second understanding of Historismus only, which he renders in English as “historicism”. 
42 According to Popper, “one of the simplest and oldest” forms of historicism is the religious doctrine 
of the chosen people, for it assumes that God has laid down the law of historical development insofar 
as it holds that “God has chosen one people to function as the selected instrument of His will, and that 
this people will inherit the earth” (OSE1 8). Popper indicates that his picture of “theistic” historicism 
serves to illustrate characteristics that are also shared by “the two most important modern versions of 
historicism”, that is, the “non-theistic” historicism of racialism or fascism on the right and that of 
Marxism or communism on the left (OSE1 9). The former substitutes the chosen people by the chosen 
race, the latter substitutes the chosen people by the chosen class.  
It should be noted that Popper comes close to formulating the thesis that modern totalitarian 
movements are “political religions”, that is, secularized forms of religion. Although he claims that his 
attack on “theistic” forms of historicism “should … not be interpreted as an attack upon religion” 
(OSE1 9), I am inclined to conclude that this claim is difficult to uphold. On the one hand, it seems 
that he does indeed criticize only some forms of religion, while embracing others. For instance, he 
speaks approvingly of (early) Christianity as a form of protest against “Jewish tribalism” (OSE2 22-
23, OSE2 301n56). Sometimes he suggests that a similar distinction can be drawn within Judaism 
(OSE2 23) and within Christianity (OSE2 24, 273). On the other hand, to the extent that he reduces 
“the theistic doctrine of historicism” to a mere effect of historical, that is, human circumstances 
(social change, oppression), and insofar as he makes human conscience (OSE2 271) instead of divine 
law the touchstone of human conduct, he seems to turn against revealed religion as such. 
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civilization”, that is, from the demand inherent in the open society to assume our 
individual freedom and responsibility, even in times of great social turmoil.
43
 
Social engineering, by contrast,
44
 implies that “man is the master of his 
own destiny and that, in accordance with our aims, we can influence or change the 
history of man just as we have changed the face of the earth” (OSE1 22). 
Moreover, the social engineer is convinced that a “scientific basis of politics” is to 
be found in “the factual information necessary for the construction or alteration of 
social institutions, in accordance with our wishes and aims” (OSE1 22) and not in 
any knowledge of the future course of history. Whereas the historicist will ask for 
the “origin” and “end” of certain social institutions or the “true role” played by 
certain institutions in the development of history, the engineer will ask: “If such 
and such are our aims, is the institution well designed and organized to serve 
them?” (OSE1 23). Accordingly, “the engineer or the technologist approaches 
institutions rationally as means that serve certain ends, and ... he judges them 
wholly according to their appropriateness, efficiency, simplicity, etc.” (OSE1 24).  
Next, Popper draws a distinction within the camp of the social engineers 
between a “utopian” and a “piecemeal” kind.
45
 The “utopian” social engineer 
adopts certain institutional means in order to realize ends that are presumed to be 
set by history. Popper therefore sometimes characterizes the utopian kind as a 
combination of the attitudes of social engineering (viz. its belief in the possibility 
of human intervention by institutional means) and of historicism (viz. its 
determination of the choice of ends).
46
 The “piecemeal” social engineer, by 
contrast, restricts himself to a consideration of the facts, that is, of the actual 
efficiency and effectiveness of certain measures, while the ends that these measures 
are meant to serve are chosen by the citizen,
47
 who, as we shall see below, is 




According to Popper, “piecemeal” social engineering  which he 
sometimes calls “democratic social reconstruction” – is the only approach that 
                                                     
43 Popper notes that historicist ideas seem to surface especially in times of great social change: “They 
appeared when Greek tribal life broke up, as well as when that of the Jews was shattered by the 
impact of the Babylonian conquest. (...) In modern Europe, historicist ideas were revived during the 
industrial revolution, and especially through the impact of the political revolutions in America and 
France” (OSE1 17). More specifically, he claims that the doctrines of the chosen people, of the 
chosen race, and of the chosen class originated as reactions to some kind of oppression. The doctrine 
of the chosen people became important during the Babylonian captivity; Gobineau’s theory of race 
was a reaction to the revolutionaries’ rise against aristocracy; Marx’s prophecy of the victory of the 
proletariat is a reply to a period of great oppression and exploitation (see OSE1 203n3). In these 
circumstances especially, “the strain of civilization”, that is, the demand for personal responsibility, is 
harder than ever to bear. See especially OSE1, Introduction, and Chapter 10. 
44 In OSE1 210n9 Popper indicates that the term “social engineering” (in the “piecemeal” sense at 
least) seems to have been used first by Roscoe Pound in his An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 
(1922). 
45 OSE1 22, 24, 157. 
46 OSE1 24, 157. 
47 OSE1 23-24. 
48 Cf. OSE1 211n11. 
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offers a truly “scientific” and “rational” basis for politics, being an “application” of 
the critical and rational methods of science to the problems of the open society. In 
his view, only this method will lead to free and responsible political action. As his 
plea for a program of “piecemeal social engineering” is clearly linked with his 
philosophy of science, we turn to the latter first.  
 
1.4. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: DUALISM OF FACTS AND DECISIONS 
 
As indicated above, Popper himself has repeatedly claimed that his primary interest 
lies in the methodology of the natural sciences. His book The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, originally published in German in 1934, was written in response to the 
logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. Popper famously argued that the latter’s 
method of verification does not offer a solution to the problem of logical induction. 
He argued that only the method of falsification can offer a criterion by which to 
“demarcate” scientific from pseudo-scientific propositions. For, whereas 
verification cannot lead to logical certainty, falsification can. Hence, a theory or 
proposition deserves the predicate “scientific” only if it is capable of being refuted 
by experiment. If it is refuted, it is demonstrated to be false by way of logical 
deduction. This method is not only applicable to natural science, but also to 
technology or engineering (as applied sciences), the latter of which are not so much 
interested in the explanation of phenomena through the positing of universal laws, 




 Popper argues that the social sciences, by contrast, presuppose a distinction 
between factual statements (sociological laws, to be formulated in the language of 
scientific propositions) and normative statements (social norms and decisions, to be 
formulated in the language of normative proposals).
50
 He claims that norms cannot 
be reduced to facts: “it is impossible to derive a sentence stating a norm or a 
decision, or, say, a proposal for a policy from a sentence stating a fact; this is only 
another way of saying that it is impossible to derive norms or decisions or 
proposals from facts” [emphasis in original] (OSE1 64).  
Hence, he speaks of “the autonomy of ethics” (OSE1 67). That is to say, 
whereas the truth (or in any case the falsity) of statements of fact (i.e. of natural or 
sociological laws) can in principle be proved by scientific experiment, there is no 





A normative law, whether it is now a legal enactment or a moral 
commandment, can be enforced by men. Also, it is alterable. It may be 
perhaps described as good or bad, right or wrong, acceptable or 
                                                     
49 OSE2 263. 
50 OSE1, chapter 5. 
51 Cf. OSE2 238: “it is impossible to prove the rightness of any ethical principle, or even to argue in 




unacceptable; but only in a metaphorical sense can it be called ‘true’ or 
‘false’, since it does not describe a fact, but lays down directions for our 
behavior. (OSE1 58)  
 
For instance, Popper claims that “equality before the law” is “not a fact but a 
political demand based upon a moral decision; and it is quite independent of the 
theory – which is probably false – that ‘all men are born equal’.” (OSE2 234).
52
 
Social sciences have the task of predicting the “unintended social repercussions of 
intentional human actions” (OSE2 95) by the formulation of sociological laws, but 
they cannot establish moral and political norms. Social engineering (as applied 
social science) implies the same strict distinction between factual and normative 
statements, the former of which establish the most efficient and effective 
functioning of social institutions, while the latter formulate the ends the institutions 
are chosen to serve. 
We should note that the adoption of the “rationalist” distinction between 
facts and norms (or decisions) is itself again placed by Popper within the very same 
grand historical narrative of the progressive development of human civilization 
mentioned above. He provides a sketch of the history of mankind (still) developing 
itself from “naïve monism”, which does not distinguish between natural and 
normative laws and which belongs to the tribal, closed society, to “critical 
dualism”, which does distinguish natural laws from man-made norms and which 
belongs to the individualist, open society.
53
  
Popper seems to offer two grounds for the adoption of this distinction, and 
hence for the autonomy of ethics. His first argument is of a logical kind: it is 
against the rules of logic to infer the validity / invalidity of a normative statement 
from a factual statement, for the mere existence of a decision (or norm) does not 
yet vouch for its validity. However, there appears to be a second, “deeper” reason 
for the need to maintain this distinction, which “possibly forms the background of 
the first” (OSE1 73), and which consists in the recognition that: 
 
… the responsibility for our ethical decisions is entirely ours and cannot 
be shifted to anybody else; neither to God, nor to nature, nor to society, 
nor to history. … Whatever authority we accept, it is we who accept it. 
We only deceive ourselves if we do not realize this simple point. (OSE1 
73) 
 
To be sure, Popper displays his awareness of a possibly problematic consequence 
of this allegedly “simple point”. For, if norms are “man-made” or “conventional”, 
they may as well be said to be “arbitrary”.
54
 In fact, he explains, the attempt to 
escape from moral “autonomy” into some form of what we may call moral 
                                                     
52 Cf. OSE2 278: “Men are not equal; but we can decide to fight for equal rights.”; cf. Popper’s claim 
that the decision to oppose slavery “does not depend upon the fact that all men are born free and equal” 
(OSE1 62). 
53 OSE1 59-61. 
54 OSE1 61, 64-65. 
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Besides historicism, which has already been introduced in the previous 
section, Popper mentions two other strategies that attempt to deal with this risk of 
the “arbitrariness” of norms and decisions. The first is “naturalism”, which reduces 
norms to natural laws. A defense of the “natural” inequality of human beings, for 
example, may be mounted by justifying the “natural” rule of the strong (cf. 
Callicles’ plea in Plato’s Gorgias),
56
 or proclaiming the “natural” prerogatives of 
the few “noble” or “wise” (as, in Popper’s view, Plato has done),
57
 but naturalism 
may just as well be used to defend a humanitarian form of ethics which proclaims 
the “natural” rights of each human being.
58
 The second strategy is “positivism”, 
which reduces norms to actually posited laws, to which “historism” [Historismus], 
which claims that all norms are historically determined, is obviously closely 
related. Just as in the case of naturalism, some positivists have come to defend a 
conservative or authoritarian position – “might is right” –
59
 while others have taken 
a progressive or humanitarian position – “if all norms are arbitrary, why not be 
tolerant?” (OSE1 72). 
 Popper claims that his own position does not imply, however, that moral 
“decisions” or “demands” (such as the demand for the autonomy of ethics itself) 
are “arbitrary”: 
 
The statement that norms are man-made (man-made not in the sense that 
they were consciously designed, but in the sense that men can judge and 
alter them – that is to say, in the sense that the responsibility for them is 
entirely ours) has often been misunderstood. Nearly all misunderstandings 
can be traced back to one fundamental misapprehension, namely, to the 
belief that ‘convention’ implies ‘arbitrariness’; that if we are free to 
choose any system of norms we like, then one system is just as good as 
any other. (OSE 64-65) 
 
We will have to examine, however, whether his claim that his position is more than 
“merely” a personal opinion is actually vouched for by the assumptions of his 
philosophy of science,
 60
 or whether the inner logic of his theory (in terms of its 
propositions) is consistent. Doing so provides part of the answer to the central 
question of this chapter: do Popper’s epistemological assumptions indeed permit 
rational, responsible political decision-making?  
                                                     
55 OSE1 68. 
56 OSE1 70. 
57 OSE1 73. 
58 Popper comments that “this form of naturalism is so wide and so vague that it may be used to 
defend anything” (OSE1 73). 
59 Popper contends that the first outcome especially is an expression of “ethical nihilism”, that is, of 
“an extreme moral skepticism” or “a distrust of man and of his possibilities” (OSE1 72). See also 
OSE2, Addendum 11, esp. 381-383, where Popper criticizes Nietzsche’s nihilism. 
60 OSE2 259. Cf. OSE1 3, 123, 171. 
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After having reconstructed the principles of Popper’s philosophy of 
science, I now go on to reconstruct the content of his preferred “solution” to the 
problems of the open society, his answer to the fundamental question of “the best 
constitution”, which consists in his “proposal” for “piecemeal social engineering”.  
 
1.5. TWO POLITICAL PROGRAMS: UTOPIAN VERSUS PIECEMEAL SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING 
 
As the two epigraphs with which Popper opens the first volume of The Open 
Society and Its Enemies reveal, he associates piecemeal social engineering, as 
“method” of the open society, with the name of Pericles, whereas he associates 
Utopian social engineering, as “method” of the closed society, with the name of 
Plato: 
 
For the Open Society (about 430 B.C.): 
Although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it. 
Pericles of Athens 
Against the Open Society (about 80 years later): 
The greatest principle of all is that nobody, whether male or female, 
should be without a leader. Nor should the mind of anybody be habituated 
to letting him do anything at all on his own initiative; neither out of zeal, 
nor even playfully. But in war and in the midst of peace – to his leader he 
shall direct his eye and follow him faithfully. And even in the smallest 
matter he should stand under leadership. For example, he should get up, 
or move, or wash, or take his meals ... only if he has been told to do so. In 
a word, he should teach his soul, by long habit, never to dream of acting 
independently, and to become utterly incapable of it. 
Plato of Athens  
 
These two contrasting passages illustrate that in the final instance,
61
 Popper wants 
to have us realize that we have a choice between independent political judgment 
and decision-making on the one hand, and blind adherence to authority on the 
other. He wants to save our individual responsibility by preventing us from 
handing it over to the compelling laws of History (as in the case of “historicism”), 
of Nature (as in the case of “naturalism”), of Society (as in the case of 
“positivism”), or of God (as in the case of authoritarian religion). Hence, Popper’s 
struggle against historicism is in fact part of a greater fight against the escape from 
personal freedom and responsibility, from what he considers “the strain of 
civilization” that has accompanied the open society since its birth.
62
 I therefore 
                                                     
61  OSE1 7. Popper ascribes the first fragment to Pericles, whereas his words (from the Funeral 
Oration) were written down by Thucydides in his The Peloponnesian War, while he chooses to 
ascribe the second fragment to Plato, who in fact put these words in the mouth of the Athenian 
Stranger, his main dialogue character in the Laws. The exact references are Thucydides, The 
Peloponnesian War II .40 and Plato, Laws, 942abc. The same two passages are quoted by Popper in 
OSE1 186 and OSE1 103 respectively. 
62 OSE1 4-5, 176. 
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examine the extent to which his own approach to politics, viz. “piecemeal social 
engineering”, indeed serves his final aim.  
As he develops his approach primarily in opposition to the “utopian social 
engineering” of Plato, we turn to Popper’s account of the latter first. Although his 
most significant contemporary enemy was Marxism – which he regards as “so far 
the purest, the most developed and the most dangerous form of historicism” (OSE2 
81) – in the first (and best known) volume of his book he chose Plato as his main 
intellectual opponent, because he considers Plato’s social and political philosophy 
to be “the earliest and probably the most influential example” (OSE1 24) of 
“utopian social engineering”, that is, of the combination of technological and 
historicist elements which he regards as “representative of quite a number of social 




Popper grants that Plato’s intentions were benevolent and that he 
“attempted to answer a very real need” (OSE1 170).
64
 For, he states, “we find in 
the work of Plato … indications that he suffered desperately under the political 
instability and insecurity of his time” (OSE1 18-19),
65
 and that he wished “to win 
back happiness for the citizens” (OSE1 171) by relieving them from the “strain” 
that accompanied the birth of the open society. Yet, Popper adds, by employing his 
excellent writing skills, especially by using Socrates as his mouthpiece, in order to 
present his Ideal State as being wise, just, happy, etc. and by thus consciously 
appealing to humanitarian ideas – Popper suggests that in this respect he “knew 
very well what he was doing” (OSE1 93) – Plato “fully succeeded” (OSE1 92) in 
casting a “spell” over the friends of the open society which lulled their critical 
capacities.
66
 Hence, they do not realize that his political program is in fact anti-
humanitarian and even totalitarian in nature.
67
  
Popper claims that Plato’s “political program” consists of three demands. 
First, it adopts the historicist law that “all social change is corruption or decay or 
degeneration” (OSE1 19). Popper bases himself here especially upon Plato’s 
Statesman, which contains a myth about “the Age of Cronus”, a kind of Golden 
Age in which human beings are ruled by the Gods, which is followed by “the Age 
of Zeus”, our own age, “in which the world is abandoned by the gods and left to its 
own resources, and which consequently is one of increasing corruption.” (OSE1 
19).
68
 Secondly, Popper claims that Plato, despite his historicist stance, nevertheless 
believed “that it is possible for us, by a human, or rather by a superhuman effort, to 
                                                     
63 OSE1 24: “All these systems recommend some kind of social engineering, since they demand the 
adoption of certain institutional means, though not always very realistic ones, for the achievements of 
their ends. But when we proceed to a consideration of these ends, then we frequently find that they 
are determined by historicism.” See also OSE1 157. 
64 OSE1 293n5. 
65  Popper quotes from Plato’s Seventh Letter, 325e: “Seeing that everything swayed and shifted 
aimlessly, I felt giddy and desperate” (translation Popper, OSE1 19). 
66 OSE1 92-93, 99, 169-170, 199-200. 
67 OSE1 34, 87-88, 92, 169-170. 
68 Plato, Statesman, 268e-274d.. 
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break through the fatal historical trend, and to put an end to the process of decay” 
(OSE1 20). In other words, Plato believed in the possibility of social engineering: 
further corruption in “the political field” can be stopped by “arresting all political 
change” (OSE1 21),
69
 by the establishment of “a state which is free from the evils 
of all other states because it does not degenerate, because it does not change” 
(OSE1 21). Thirdly, Popper claims, Plato found the model or original of this 
perfect state in a distant past, viz. in the Golden Age of Cronus.
70
 He puts forward 
the naturalist demand to go “back to nature”, that is, to “the original state of our 
forefathers, the primitive state founded in accordance with human nature, and 
therefore stable; back to the tribal patriarchy of the time before the Fall, to the 
natural class rule of the wise few over the ignorant many” (OSE1 86).  
Popper claims that the last two demands, taken together, result in a 
“totalitarian” political program, laid down especially in Plato’s Republic, which 
consists in a strict division of society into two classes and in the identification of 
the fate of the state with the ruling class, which, in turn, is divided into “herdsmen” 
and “watch dogs”. This class operates as a strong unity; it possesses a monopoly of 
violence; it does not participate in economic activities; its intellectual activities are 
censored and controlled by means of propaganda; and the state as a whole is 
completely self-sufficient and not dependent on trade.
71
 
Yet, Popper asks, if this is the case, what then to make of the fact that Plato 
claims that his Ideal State is perfectly just, that it is ruled wisely, and that its 
individual citizens are happy? Is his political program not fundamentally different 
from modern totalitarianism in this respect?
72
 It is precisely Popper’s intention to 
unmask this benevolent intention as being part of the “spell” of Plato. We will 
therefore now turn to Popper’s criticism of the “anti-humanitarian” way in which 
Plato invokes the ideas of justice, wisdom, and especially happiness,
73
 as well as to 
his own alternative, “humanitarian” interpretation of these concepts. 
 
  
                                                     
69 OSE1 86. 
70 OSE1 25. 
71 OSE1 86-87. 
72 OSE1 87: “Even writers who criticize Plato believe that his political doctrine, in spite of certain 
similarities, is clearly distinguished from modern totalitarianism by these aims of his, the happiness of 
the citizens and the rule of justice.” One of the authors to whom Popper refers here is Richard 
Crossman, Plato Today (1937). 
We may ask, of course, whether it is not the case that modern totalitarian regimes, too, 
possess an element of idealism insofar as they, too, claim to make their individual citizens happy. 
Popper seems to grant this, for he claims that “the strength of both the old and the new totalitarian 
movements rested on the fact that they attempted to answer a very real need, however badly 
conceived this attempt may have been. In the light of my new interpretation, it appears to me that 
Plato’s declaration of his wish to make the state and its citizens happy is not merely propaganda. I am 
ready to grant his fundamental benevolence [emphases added].” (OSE1 171)  
73 Popper’s treatment of these three concepts largely coincides with chapters 6, 7, and 10 of OSE1, 
respectively. Other (Platonic) ideas he discusses are “truth” (chapter 8) and “beauty” (chapter 9). 
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1.5.1. JUSTICE: STATE INTEREST VERSUS PROTECTIONISM 
 
The central question of Plato’s Republic is “what is justice [dikaiosunē]?”, and its 
Ideal State is presented as being perfectly just. Popper argues, however, that Plato 
employs a concept of justice that is completely opposite to our liberal 
understanding of justice as “equality of the citizens before the law” (OSE1 89).
74
 
He claims that for Plato, the predicate “just” refers to “that which is in the interest 
of the best state” (OSE1 89): it is in the interest of the state that each of its classes 
attends to what is its own work, assigned by nature, which means in fact that “the 
state is just if the ruler rules, if the worker works, and if the slave slaves.” (OSE1 
91) By thus using “justice” as a characteristic of the state as a whole instead of as 
category of how individuals are to be treated, Popper states, Plato changed the 
meaning even of the Greek term, which was “isonomy” [isonomia] or equality 




 Popper argues that Plato’s conception of justice displays a refusal to use 
“the language of political demands or of political proposals” (OSE1 109). Instead 
of asking the “historicist” question “How did the state originate, and what is the 
origin of political obligation?” or the “naturalist” question “What is the state, what 
is its true nature, its real meaning?”, Popper deems it rational to ask “What do we 
demand from a state?” or “What do we propose to consider as the legitimate aim of 
state activity?” (OSE1 109). He claims that a rational way to answer this question 
would be: “I demand that the state must limit the freedom of the citizens as equally 
as possible, and not beyond what is necessary for achieving an equal limitation of 
freedom” (OSE1 110). Popper calls this demand “protectionism”, for it situates the 
aim of state activity in the protection of the freedom of its citizens, both against 
each other and against state power. The underlying egalitarianism and 
individualism find expression, he adds, in the Kantian demand to always recognize 





                                                     
74 OSE1, chapter 6 is devoted to the Idea of Justice. 
75 OSE1 95, 102. Popper refers to Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, II, 37 ff., more specifically to 
37 and 41. In OSE1 95, 255n17, Popper also points to Herodotus, Histories, III, 80, 6, which contains 
a eulogy on “isonomy”.  
As chapter 5 shows, Hannah Arendt also praises the Greek concept of “isonomy”, in both 
The Human Condition, 32n22 and in On Revolution, 30. She too derives it from Herodotus. 
76 OSE1 102. See also OSE1 256n20: “I hold, with Kant, that it must be the principle of all morality 
that no man should consider himself more valuable than any other person.” Cf. Shearmur, The 
Political Thought of Karl Popper, 47, who notes that Popper adheres to “a liberal universalism which 
has a decidedly Kantian flavor, in that all people are treated by Popper as ends in themselves, not to 
be sacrificed to the general well-being, or to the well-being of the state.” Shearmur treats this 
Popper’s “liberal universalism” as one of the two main elements of Popper’s political thought, the 
other being his “negative utilitarianism”. He rightly notes that there is a tension between these two 
elements (ibid., 99-106). 
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1.5.2. WISDOM: UNCHECKED SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS CHECKS AND BALANCES 
 
Popper states that the Athenian philosopher Socrates, Plato’s teacher, embodied 
“the true scientific spirit” (OSE1 128), for Socrates’ wisdom consisted precisely in 
“his awareness of what he does not know” (OSE1 129), in his realization that he 
was not wise. Accordingly, he regarded the philosopher as a lover of truth, a seeker 
for it, rather than as a learned professional (a “sophist”) or as a proud possessor of 
truth.
77
 Popper states that Plato, by contrast, “gives the term philosopher a new 
meaning” (OSE1 145), which follows from the famous statement which Plato put 
in the mouth of Socrates, the culmination of Plato’s Republic which Popper calls 
“the key to the whole work” (OSE1 152): 
 
… unless, in their cities, philosophers are vested with the might of kings, 
or those now called kings and oligarchs become genuine and fully 
qualified philosophers; and unless these two, political might and 
philosophy, are fused (while the many who nowadays follow their natural 
inclination for only one of these two are suppressed by force), unless this 
happens, my dear Glaucon, there can be no rest; and the evil will not 





Plato presents the philosopher-king as “a lover and seer of the divine world of 
Forms or Ideas” (OSE1 145),
79
 which he is capable of seeing by intellectual 
intuition and which he longs to realize on earth, as “a painter of constitutions”
80
 
who is “letting [his] eyes wander to and fro, from the model to the picture, and 
back from the picture to the model” (OSE1 145).
81
 According to Popper, the idea 
of the philosopher-king implies that the philosopher is a “proud possessor” of truth 
rather than its “modest seeker” (OSE1 132). He contends, therefore, that the 
Platonic state is correctly to be described as “the rule of learnedness”, or a 
“sophocracy” (OSE1 144).
82
 Furthermore, as the philosopher-king knows what is 
in the best interest of the state, Plato allows him to administer “noble lies” to its 
                                                     
77 OSE1 132. Popper also explains Socrates’ conviction that knowledge can only be taught by the 
method of “midwifery” [maieutikē]: “Those eager to learn may be helped to free themselves from 
their prejudice; thus they may learn self-criticism, and that truth is not easily attained. But they may 
also learn to make up their minds, and to rely, critically, on their decisions, and on their insight.” 
(OSE1 129) 
78 Plato, Republic, 473cde, as quoted by Popper. 
79 Cf. OSE1 132. 
80 Plato, Republic, 501c (translation Popper). See also OSE1 165-166. 
81 Plato, Republic, 501b (translation Popper), cf. 484c. The Idea of Beauty is also at stake here, in the 
attempt of the philosopher-king to bring about a radical change in reality by imitating the beauty of 
the Ideal State. See OSE1, chapter 8 (second half), chapter 9 (second half), 145, 165-6.  





 – rendered by Popper as “lordly lies” in order to avoid the positive 
connotation of the adjective “noble” [gennaios].
84
  
 Popper argues that Plato’s plea for the rule of wisdom is rooted in the 
wrong approach to “the fundamental problem of politics”: by asking the question 
“Who should rule?”, “Plato created a lasting confusion in political philosophy.” 
(OSE1 120). For, Popper argues, as soon as this question is asked, it is hard to 
avoid answers like “the best” or “the wisest”, or even “the general will” 
(Rousseau), “the master race” (racism), “the industrial workers” (Marxism), or “the 
people” (as in the theory of popular sovereignty).
85
 Indeed, he asserts, “far from 
having solved any fundamental problems, we have merely skipped over them” 
(OSE1 121), for “even those who share this assumption of Plato’s admit that 
political rulers are not always sufficiently ‘good’ or ‘wise’ ... and that it is not at all 
easy to get a government on whose goodness and wisdom one can implicitly rely” 
(OSE1 121).  
 According to Popper, Plato’s approach presupposes that political power is 
essentially sovereign, that is, unchecked. Popper provides three arguments against 
this “theory of (unchecked) sovereignty” (OSE1 121). First, he formulates the 
objection that, in fact, no regime has ever been completely sovereign, and that “as 
long as men remain human …, there can be no absolute and unrestrained political 
power. So long as one man cannot accumulate enough physical power in his hands 
to dominate all others, just so long must he depend upon his helpers” (OSE1 122-
123). However, he himself indicates that “these empirical points” do not really 
count as an “argument” (OSE1 122). Secondly, therefore, he issues the claim that 
“it is reasonable to adopt, in politics, the principle of preparing for the worst, as 
well as we can, though we should, of course, at the same time try to obtain the 
best” (OSE1 122). Yet, again, he hastens to add that his argument does not depend 
on these “more personal opinions” either (OSE1 122). Apparently, he believes that 
something more compelling is required than empirical facts or personal opinions. 
Thirdly, therefore, he has recourse to “a kind of logical argument”, which serves to 
lay bare the inconsistency of any theory of (unchecked) sovereignty (OSE1 123). 
One variant of this argument is the so-called “paradox of freedom” (OSE1 123), 
which he claims was in fact first formulated by Plato himself. According to Popper, 
in Book VIII of the Republic, in the context of the story of the degeneration of 
democracy into tyranny, Plato implicitly raises the question of what to do if it turns 
out to be the will of the people that not they, but a tyrant should rule: “The free 
man, Plato suggests, may exercise his absolute freedom, first by defying the laws 




                                                     
83 Popper claims that the Idea of Truth is at stake here. See OSE1, chapter 8 (first half): 138-141, 
where Popper refers to Plato, Republic. 414b-415d. 
84 In OSE1 270-271n9, Popper calls the common choice to translate “noble lie” or “noble falsehood” 
“one of the typical attempts of idealizing Plato.” 
85 OSE1 120. 
86 Popper refers to Plato, Republic, 562b-565e, more specifically to 562c, 563de, 564a, and 565cd. 
Popper claims that the assumption of (unchecked) sovereignty leads to similar paradoxes in the case 
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Yet, Popper says, what Plato overlooked is the fact that all theories of 
sovereignty are necessarily paradoxical. After all, “the wisest” might select “the 
best”, and “the best” in his goodness might decide that “the majority” should rule. 
Popper therefore proposes to replace the question “Who should rule?” by the 
question “How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent 
rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?” (OSE1 121), and thus to 
replace the theory of sovereignty by the “theory of checks and balances” (OSE1 
122). The latter proceeds not from “a doctrine of the intrinsic goodness or 
righteousness of a majority rule,” but rather from “the baseness of tyranny; or more 
precisely, it rests upon the decision, or upon the adoption of the proposal, to avoid 
and to resist tyranny” (OSE1 124). 
Popper claims that this proposal allows us to draw a distinction between 
two main types of government: “democracy”, and “dictatorship” or “tyranny”. He 
adds that these labels are “nominalist”, in the sense that they do not define any 
“essence”. That is to say, the term democracy does not signify something like “the 
rule of the people” – if only because “the people” in itself of course never rules, but 
only its representatives.
87
 Instead, Popper provides the following, by now famous, 
description of democracies: 
 
… governments of which we can get rid without bloodshed – for 
example, by way of general elections; that is to say, the social institutions 
provide means by which the rulers may be dismissed by the ruled, and the 
social traditions ensure that these institutions will not easily be destroyed 
by those who are in power. (OSE1 124) 
 
Tyrannies, on the other hand, are “governments which the ruled cannot get rid of 
except by way of a successful revolution – that is to say, in most cases, not at all” 
(OSE1 125). In other words, it is impossible to get rid of a tyranny except by 
means of a revolution, which is understood by Popper as a bloody, that is, a violent 
replacement of the rulers. Democracy, by contrast, enables the reform of existing 
institutions and the design of new institutions by the use of reason instead of 
violence. Popper adds that this does not mean that these institutions will be 
faultless, nor that there is any guarantee that the outcome of democratic policy will 
be “wise” or “good”. His point is rather that the various methods of democratic 
control, such as general elections and representative government, are safeguards 
against tyranny, which in themselves remain “open for improvement, and even 
providing methods for their own improvement.” (OSE1 125). In this respect, 
                                                                                                                                       
of the principle of majority rule – “What if a democratic majority chooses to abolish democracy?” – 
and in the case of the principle of toleration – “What if we are tolerant towards the intolerant?” 
(OSE1 265n4). 
87 OSE1 125 (in parentheses): “For although ‘the people’ may influence the actions of their rulers by 
the threat of dismissal, they never rule themselves in any concrete, practical sense.” Cf. Popper, ‘Zur 
Theorie der Demokratie’, 207-208: “Denn nirgends herrscht das Volk: Überall herrschen die 
Regierungen (und leider auch die Bürokratie, das heisst die Beamten, die nur schwer oder gar nicht 
zur Verantwortung gezogen werden können.)” 
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Popper may be said to regard democracy as the political institutionalization of the 




1.5.3. HAPPINESS: PROMOTING GOOD VERSUS AVOIDING EVIL 
 
As we have seen, in answer to the question of what the primary purpose of the state 
is (the aim of government), Popper formulates the demand that the freedom of 
individual citizens should be duly protected, both against other individuals and, 
especially, against the state itself. In addition, in answer to the question of how to 
deal with power (the form of government), Popper formulates “the principle of a 
democratic policy” as “the proposal to create, develop, and protect, political 
institutions for the avoidance of tyranny” (OSE1 125). In both cases, Popper tends 
to formulate his demands negatively. Accordingly, not only our choice of the 
primary aim of the state and of the way we deal with power, but also the concrete 
content of public policy is to be determined by one and the same principle: the 
avoidance of evil rather than the promotion of some good. As he puts it: “Pain, 
suffering, injustice, and their prevention, these are the eternal problems of public 
morals, the ‘agenda’ of public policy .... The ‘higher’ values should very largely be 






 he provides a more explicit exposition of what is sometimes 
called his negative utilitarianism.
91
 Popper describes his own view as a “complete 
inversion” of the ethical philosophy defended by theorists (like Plato) who 
 
… had the idea of an ultimate or highest good (usually made even higher 
and better by calling it by its Latin name the summum bonum) and they 
believed that all the lesser goods were in some way dependent on, or 
derivable from this highest good. And they believed that the realization of 
the highest good was a duty of the greatest urgency, while the realization 




Popper asserts, to the contrary, that it is “the most urgent duty to fight the greatest 
and most concrete evil” and he adds that “the urgency decreases when we proceed 
to lesser evils and certainly when we proceed to positive goods.”
93
  
                                                     
88 Cf. OSE2 238-239. 
89 Cf. OSE1 158. 
90 See Popper, ‘Public and Private Values’, unpublished paper written between 1944 and 1946. 
91 Shearmur, The Political Thought of Karl Popper, 47. Cf. OSE 235n6(2), 284-285n2. 
92 Popper, ‘Public and Private Values’, 120.  
As is shown in chapter 2, Popper’s thesis that the highest good was also considered as the 
most urgent good is disputed by Leo Strauss in the name of classical political philosophy.  
93 Popper, ‘Public and Private Values’, 120. He explicitly states that he does not mean to say that 
“positive values” – “health, wealth, happiness, and so on, or more concretely, the enjoyment of one’s 
life, or of one’s work; or more concretely, of music; or perhaps of a discussion” (ibid., 119) – are 
unimportant: “On the contrary, few things are more important in our lives than our hopes, and dreams, 
our aesthetic and our religious ideals. My contention is that the world of these values is our private 
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As Jan-Werner Mueller has noted, insofar as Popper’s political philosophy 
focuses on preventing the worst rather than promoting the best, it fits perfectly 
within the framework of what Judith Shklar has called “the liberalism of fear”.
94
 
This type of liberalism, which considers cruelty an absolute evil against which 
every state should protect its citizens, goes back rather to Locke and Kant (who is 
indeed one of the few philosophers to whom Popper refers in positive terms) than 
to Hobbes (OSE1 247n4),
95
 insofar as the former focus on the claims or rights of 
the individual citizens towards or against the state or government rather than on 
their obligations to state or government authority. 
To summarize this section, in answer to the “fundamental” question of the 
best constitution, Popper demands the following. First, the question itself is to be 
phrased and answered in the language of “proposals”, for “rational” political 
philosophy ought to express itself in the language of discussable proposals instead 
of in historicist or naturalist language. Secondly, the content of the “proposals” 
formulated in answer to this question consists in the demands of negative 
utilitarianism, that is, the avoidance of human suffering. In this spirit, Popper 
defines liberalism as the protection of individuals against avoidable suffering 
caused by other individuals or the state, and democracy is defined as the avoidance 
of tyranny. Thirdly, these “constitutional” proposals regarding the aim and form of 
government are to be realized by means of what we may choose to call the 
“normal” politics of “piecemeal social engineering”, which is supposed to 
determine the most efficient and effective means for realizing the ends or aims that 
we have set for social institutions. For, against the objection that the very principle 
of freedom is endangered as soon as one demands that freedom should be limited 
by the state, Popper answers that “[i]t mixes up the fundamental question of what 
we want from the state with certain important technological difficulties in the way 
of its realization of our aims [emphasis added]” (OSE1 110). He calls these 
“technological” difficulties of determining the degree of freedom “the main task of 
legislation in democracies” (OSE1 110).  
When we take a closer look, however, it is not particularly easy to neatly 
separate the “constitutional” politics of proposing from the “normal” politics of 
social engineering. If we wish to answer the question whether the notion of 
“piecemeal social engineering” does indeed further Popper’s goal of “rational” and 
                                                                                                                                       
world – the world which we may share with our intimate friends; but we deprave and destroy these 
values if we try to force them upon the public.” (ibid., 121). 
94 Mueller, ‘Fear and Freedom’, 47-48. See Shklar, ‘The Liberalism of Fear’, 11: “The liberalism of 
fear … does not … offer a summum bonum toward which all political agents should strive, but it 
certainly does begin with a summum malum, which all of us know and would avoid if only we could. 
That evil is cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself.” 
95 In OSE1 247n4 Popper refers to Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 373, where he describes a just 
constitution as “a constitution that achieves the greatest possible freedom of human individuals by 
framing the laws in such a way that the freedom of each can co-exist with that of all others”, as well 
as to Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ‘Introduction to the Theory of Right’, §B: “Right (or justice) 
is the sum total of the conditions which are necessary for everybody’s free choice to co-exist with that 
of everybody else, in accordance with a general law of liberty.” 
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“responsible” politics, we need to examine the complexity of this notion more 
critically. 
 
1.6. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF RATIONALITY: SCIENTIFIC AND MORAL 
 
On the one hand, it seems that Popper suggests that engineering or technology, that 
is, the method of empirically establishing the most efficient and effective 
functioning of social institutions, differs from the moral or political choice of the 
right ends of those institutions:  
 
In his function as a citizen who pursues certain ends in which he believes, 
[the social engineer or technologist] may demand that these ends, and the 
appropriate measures, should be adopted. But as a technologist, he would 
carefully distinguish between the question of the ends and their choice 
and questions concerning the facts, i.e. the social effects of any measure 
which might be taken. (OSE1 23-24)  
 
On this account, social engineering in itself is value neutral, while its ends can 
either be formulated in the language of “proposals”, as in the case of “piecemeal” 
social engineering (presumably by citizens on the basis of common deliberation 
with an eye to a democratic process of legislation; Popper does not say much about 
the kind of citizenship he envisions),
96
 or in historicist or naturalist language, as in 
the case of “utopian” social engineering.  
On the other hand, Popper may be understood to suggest that the use of the 
language of “proposals” intrinsically belongs to the scientific attitude that is 
inherent in “social engineering” itself. When he explains that formulating the 
question of the aim of the state in the language of proposals or demands constitutes 
a “rational” approach to politics, he adds that it will lead to a demand “which 
permits the social technologist to approach political problems rationally, i.e. from 
the point of view of a fairly clear and definite aim” (OSE1 110).
97
 He would thus 
seem to suggest that social technology or engineering can itself be considered as 
“rational” only if it employs the “piecemeal” approach, that is, the language of 
proposals, and that it is hence by definition incompatible with the “utopian” 
approach. 
In order to get a clear grasp, therefore, of the apparently complex nature of 
“piecemeal social engineering” and the conception of rationality implied in it, we 
need to contrast it more carefully with “utopian social engineering” than we have 
done so far. For, if we gain a better view of the difference between them – that is, 
between the “utopian” or “wholesale” approach on the one hand and the 
“piecemeal” / “democratic” approach on the other – we will also gain a clearer 
                                                     
96 Cf. OSE1 207n, 234n5(3). 
97  Cf. “It is a question which a technologist must try to answer before he can proceed to the 
construction or reconstruction of any political institution. For only if he knows what he wants can he 
decide whether a certain institution is or is not well adapted to its function.” (OSE1 109) 
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view of the similarity between them, especially with regard to the specific nature of 
“social engineering” or the technological means-end-rationality itself.  
 As is apparent in Popper’s critical account of Plato’s “canvas-cleaning” 
especially,
98
 the “utopian” engineer aims for a radical reform of society as a whole 
on the basis of a positive answer to the question of the best society, viz. the Ideal 
State, which serves as blueprint and ultimate end. He wants to go to the root of the 
matter and eradicate all evil: “Both Plato and Marx are dreaming of the apocalyptic 
revolution which will radically transfigure the whole social world.” (OSE1 164) 
The “piecemeal” or “democratic” engineer, by contrast, tries to reform parts of 
society (viz. specific social institutions) step by step on the basis of moderate goals, 
that is, on the basis of a negative answer to the question of the best society, that 
consists in the elimination of avoidable human suffering. 
 At first sight, what we are dealing with here is a difference in scale or 
scope, as the terminology of “piecemeal” and “wholesale” suggests. However, in 
fact the outcome of a specific experiment with reform may lead to the conclusion 
that a “wholesale” reform is in some cases rational – a possibility that is clearly 
suggested by some of Popper’s formulations: “we must reform … institutions little 
by little, until we have more experience [emphasis added]”; “it is not reasonable to 
assume that a complete reconstruction of our social world would lead at once to a 
workable system [underlining added]” (OSE1 167); “At present, the sociological 
knowledge necessary for large-scale engineering is simply non-existent [emphasis 
added]” (OSE1 162). These phrasings leave open the possibility that at some future 
point we will have gained the experience that sanctions large-scale planning. If this 
is the case, Popper’s theory is vulnerable to the criticism that the distinction 
between “piecemeal” and “utopian” is not a principled one, but that in fact it is 
only the success of an experiment that decides for us whether or not a specific 
program is desirable, and not so much its planned scale or scope. 
 Popper seems to be aware of this possibility. In the second volume of The 
Open Society and Its Enemies he addresses what he calls “the paradox of state 
planning”: “If we plan too much, if we give too much power to the state, then 
freedom will be lost, and that will be the end of planning” (OSE2 130). Yet, by 
indicating that the solution to this problem is to be found within the resources of 
(piecemeal) social engineering itself – “this is again merely a problem of social 
technology and of social piecemeal engineering. But it is important to tackle it 
early, for it constitutes a danger to democracy” (OSE2 193-194) – he is begging 
our question whether social engineering does in and of itself imply a “democratic” 
approach. In The Poverty of Historicism (1957), he addresses the same issue more 
sharply: “It may be questioned, perhaps, whether the piecemeal and holistic 
approaches here described are fundamentally different, considering that we have 
                                                     
98 OSE1, chapter 9, especially 165-166: “They will take as their canvas a city and the characters of 
men, and they will, first of all, make their canvas clean – by no means an easy matter. But this is just 
the point, you know, where they will differ from all others. They will not start work on a city nor on 
an individual (nor will they draw up laws) unless they are given a clean canvas, or have cleaned it 
themselves.” (OSE1 166) 
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put no limits to the scope of a piecemeal approach” (PH 62). Popper now indicates 
that the distinction between “utopian” and “piecemeal” is to be found elsewhere. 
As we have seen, his philosophy of science offers a demarcation criterion 
on the basis of which science can be distinguished from pseudo-science. Yet his 
philosophy of the social sciences does not offer such a precise demarcation 
criterion on the basis of which the two methods can be distinguished from each 
other. Instead, he speaks of “the rather different point of view from which the holist 
and the piecemeal technologist look upon the task of reforming society [emphasis 
added]” (PH 62). As he indicates, “while the piecemeal social engineer can attack 
his problem with an open mind as to the scope of the reform, the holist cannot do 
this; for he has decided beforehand that a complete reconstruction is possible and 
necessary [emphasis added]” (PH 63).
99
 Nevertheless, Popper adds that the 
decision to adopt a piecemeal “point of view” or “attitude” is supported by the 
empirical fact that it is impossible to centralize all the knowledge that would be 
required for a holistic project,
100
 and that it is impossible to place oneself, like 
Archimedes, outside the social world one wishes to reform.
101
  
We may argue, however, that the adoption of a scientific “attitude” or 
“point of view” already presupposes an affirmation of the value of science, an 
interest in acquiring scientific knowledge and in applying that knowledge through 
technology (in order to solve political problems by the reform of social 
institutions). As Jürgen Habermas has argued, this “technical cognitive interest” in 
which the scientific attitude is rooted is itself by no means value-neutral.
102
 As 
Geoffrey Stokes contends, Popper’s epistemology may indeed be said to depend on 
a specific set of moral or political values, rather than vice versa.
103
  
However, because Popper asserts that normative judgments (which he 
demands must be formulated in the language of proposing, demanding, deciding, 
etc.) are by definition unscientific, it follows that science cannot establish its own 
normative value (or meaning), nor that of technology (as applied science, with its 
criteria of efficiency and success). A rational justification of values would require a 
more encompassing notion of rationality than Popper’s strictly scientific one.  
Yet, besides the difference between a scientific and an unscientific “point 
of view”, viz. regarding the choice of means, of what will and what will not 
“work”, there is another way in which Popper draws the distinction between the 
“piecemeal” and “utopian” approaches, viz. in terms of their different way of 
choosing their ends. The “utopian” approach presupposes knowledge of some 
highest good. Yet, Popper retorts, this presupposition can only be saved by “the 
Platonic belief in one absolute and unchanging ideal” (OSE1 161), together with 
the assumptions that there are rational methods for determining what this ideal is, 
and that there are rational methods for determining the best means for its 
                                                     
99 Cf. OSE1 163, 167. 
100 See PH 58n10, 82. 
101 See OSE1 167. 
102 Habermas, ‘Dogmatism, Reason, and Decision’, 264. 
103 Stokes, Popper: Philosophy, Politics and Scientific Method. 
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realization. He asserts that “even Plato himself and the most ardent Platonists” 
(OSE1 161) would admit that there are no rational methods to determine this 
ultimate goal, but at best some kind of intuition.
104
 Moreover, as soon as 
disagreement arises, reason would be of no help here, and a resort to violence will 
be the only option left. The “piecemeal” engineer, by contrast, adopts the method 
of “fighting for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society” 
instead of “searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good” (OSE1 158). 
What counts in favor of this method, Popper claims, is that:  
 
a systematic fight against suffering and injustice is more likely to be 
supported by the approval and agreement of a great number of people 
than the fight for the establishment of some ideal. The existence of social 
evils, that is to say, of social conditions under which many men are 
suffering, can be comparatively well established, whereas it is infinitely 
more difficult to judge about an ideal society [emphasis added]. (OSE1 
158-159) 
 
Hence, in Popper’s view, the fact that a peaceful agreement will likely be reached 
counts as an argument in favor of the piecemeal approach.  
 However, we may argue that this second way of drawing a line between the 
two approaches again presupposes a certain conception of rationality that enables 
us to distinguish justified moral decisions and judgments from unjustified ones; 
that is, a conception on the basis of which some moral decisions and judgments can 
be considered “justified” (such as “negative utilitarian” ones), and others cannot 
(such as the choice of an “ultimate good”).  
In other words, it seems that Popper requires a conception of rationality 
which vouches for the rationality both of the choice for the application of the 
“scientific” attitude as such (to politics) and of the choice for certain (moral, 
political) ends (aims, proposals, decisions) above others (which may be said to 
include the choice for the scientific attitude itself).
105
 Should he turn out not to (be 
able to) deliver a more encompassing conception of rationality which is required 
for this purpose, he will then run the danger that the “language of proposals” has 
nothing more to offer than “personal professions” in the sense of subjective, 
arbitrary preferences – a result which he explicitly denies.  
                                                     
104 It should be noted that Plato does believe that there are rational methods to determine this goal, but 
Popper is not capable of taking this claim seriously, due to his more restricted, “scientific”, 
conception of rationality. 
105 In his article ‘Dogmatism, Reason, and Decision’, Habermas criticizes “positivism” – a system of 
thought to which he also reckons Karl Popper – for failing to distinguish between two different 
conceptions of rationality, the one formal or scientific, the other more substantial and comprehensive, 
comprising enlightenment values such as individual autonomy and emancipation. He argues that 
Popper’s rationalism tacitly requires “the comprehensive rationality of unconstrained dialogue 
between communicating human beings” which he cannot justify according to his explicit conception 
of rationality. In other words, he is in need of a form of “committed reason” (ibid., 258, 268, 281), 
that is, a form of rationality that is not yet divested from its normative elements (ibid., 279). 
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We now ask, therefore, whether his “critical rationalism” – which presents 
itself as being broader than scientific rationality – does indeed provide a broader 
conception of rationality that is capable of incorporating value rationality, and 
hence the value of rationality, within itself. 
 
1.7. THE (IR)RATIONALITY OF RATIONALISM 
 
While the “scientific attitude” restricts itself to logical arguments and experiments 
– with falsification as criterion – Popper defines the “rationalist attitude” in the 
broader sense (which he sometimes calls the attitude of “reasonableness”, OSE2 
225) as an attitude that tries to solve problems by having recourse to arguments and 
experience instead of emotions and sentiments.
106
 He describes this attitude as 
follows: 
 
It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you 
may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.’ It is an 
attitude which does not lightly give up hope that by such means as 
argument and careful observation, people may reach some kind of 
agreement on many problems of importance; and that, even where their 
demands and their interests clash, it is often possible to argue about the 
various demands and proposals, and to reach – perhaps by arbitration – a 
compromise which, because of its equity, is acceptable to most, if not to 
all. (OSE2 225) 
 
In other words, a rationalist attitude in this broader sense implies a readiness to 
listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. In fact, Popper continues, 
we only argue with ourselves because we have learned to argue with others. 
Furthermore, we have learned that it is the argument that counts, rather than the 
person arguing. This leads to the view that each individual is a potential source of 
arguments and information, or to what Popper calls “the rational unity of mankind” 
(OSE2 225). He draws a link between this “inter-personal theory of reason” (OSE2 
226) and the rationalism of Socrates, which consists in “the awareness of one’s 
limitations, the intellectual modesty of those who know how often they err, and 
how much they depend on others even for this knowledge” (OSE2 227). Popper 
contrasts it with the “intellectual intuitionism” of Plato, which regards reason as “a 
kind of ‘faculty’, which may be possessed and developed by different men in vastly 
different degrees” (OSE2 226).  
 Popper is intellectually honest enough to acknowledge that the adoption of 
the attitude of “rationalism” itself – being an attitude which claims that only 
arguments and experience may count – cannot be justified (“established”) by its 
own rational means, that is, by arguments and experience, because their use already 
presupposes an attitude of readiness to use them.
107
 He therefore draws a 
distinction between “uncritical” and “critical” rationalism. “Uncritical” rationalism 
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107 OSE2 230. 
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would claim that any assumption that cannot be established by argument or 
experience is invalid. Yet, Popper states, this principle cannot itself be established 
by argument or experience. Thus, being logically inconsistent, it is defeated by its 
own means. “Critical” rationalism, on the other hand, acknowledges that the 
rationalist attitude itself cannot be established by argument or experience, because 
“only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have 
therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them [emphasis 
added]” (OSE2 230), and because “no rational argument will have a rational effect 
on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude [emphasis added]” (OSE2 
231).  
Popper concludes that the choice for rationalism is an “irrational” one, for 
it cannot be established in terms of the rationalist criteria themselves: “…whoever 
adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or 
unconsciously, some proposal, or decision, or belief, or behaviour; an adoption 
which may be called ‘irrational’” (OSE2 231). Hence, Popper speaks of an “act of 
faith”, an “irrational faith in reason” (OSE2 231).
108
  
He claims that the nineteenth-century conflict between faith and reason has 
become “superseded”: “Since an ‘uncritical’ rationalism is inconsistent, the 
problem cannot be the choice between knowledge and faith, but between two kinds 
of faith” (OSE2 246). In Popper’s view, we are confronted with a choice between a 
“faith in reason” on the one hand and a “faith in the mystical faculties of man” on 
the other (OSE2 248).
109
  
Yet, although this decision cannot be “determined” by argument, Popper 
adds that arguments may nevertheless be of some help, for we may imagine the 
concrete consequences that are likely to result from the alternative options between 
which we have to choose – a procedure which will at least prevent us from 
deciding “blindly”.
110
 On this basis, he argues that irrationalism is closely related to 
a division of mankind into “few” and “many”, into “friends” and “foes”,
111
 for the 
emphasis on emotions, such as fear, but also love (of one’s own group), will 
eventually lead to violence as arbiter. After all, he states, “we cannot feel the same 
emotions towards everybody. Emotionally, we all divide men into those who are 
near to us, and those who are far from us. The division of mankind into friend and 
foe is a most obvious emotional division ….” (OSE2 235) Rationalism, by contrast, 
is “bound up with” the idea that everyone is liable to mistakes, and that, hence, 
everyone deserves to be heard, which suggests the ideas of impartiality, tolerance, 
and, finally, responsibility: “we have a duty to respond, to answer, where our 
                                                     
108 Cf. OSE1 353n6, where Popper states that the teaching of Duns Scotus and Immanuel Kant could 
be interpreted as approaching his “critical rationalism”, insofar as their doctrines of “the primacy of 
the will” may be interpreted as the primacy of an irrational decision. 
109 See also OSE2 238, 240. 
110 OSE2 232-233. 
111 See also OSE2 236: “By thus abandoning reason, they split mankind into friends and foes; into the 
few who share in reason with the gods, and the many who don’t (as Plato says); into the few who 
stand near and the many who stand far; into those who speak the untranslatable language of our own 
emotions and passions and those whose tongue is not our tongue.” 
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actions affect others” (OSE2 238). In this sense, Popper posits, there is indeed an 
“ethical basis of science, and of rationalism” (OSE2 238), although he concedes 
that “the rightness of any ethical principle” (OSE2 238) can still not be proved.  
 Finally, we have to conclude that Popper’s broader conception of 
rationality, or what he calls the “rationalist attitude” or the “attitude of 
reasonableness” – which, in contradistinction to the strictly “scientific attitude”, 
concerns the determination of the validity of moral and political “proposals” – 
cannot be justified by its own standards. Elisabeth Ströker has argued that Popper 
could have resolved this dilemma by explicitly differentiating between his 
conception of scientific rationality (of falsification), which is in the foreground, 
and his broader conception of “reasonableness” (of listening to others), which is in 
the background.
112
 According to her, the latter concept “turns out to be much 
broader and breaks out of the frame of Popper’s expressly represented concept of 
rationality, yet without his having become aware of it.”
113 
This conception would 
allow for the possibility that decisions might be “reasonable” instead of completely 
“arbitrary”, were it not for the fact that it does not fit into his explicitly defended 
conception of scientific rationality.  
Habermas concludes that Popper runs the risk of lapsing into some kind of 
“decisionism”, which maintains that political decisions are not accessible to 
rational consideration at all,
114
 as in the political existentialism of Carl Schmitt 
(1888-1985). However, although in Popper’s case a genuine rational “consensus” 
about moral and political values does indeed seem to be impossible, he still allows 
for some kind of “arbitration” of our proposals or demands or decisions, in order 
thus to reach a “compromise”.
115
 He claims: 
 
… we can compare the existing normative laws (or social institutions) 
with some standard norms which we have decided are worthy of being 
realized. But even these standards are of our making in the sense that our 
decision in favour of them is our own decision, and that we alone carry 
the responsibility for adopting them. (OSE1 61) 
 
At one point Popper characterizes our demands or decisions as “ad hominem 
arguments”, that is, “appeals made in the hope that you may be induced to think or 
to feel in certain matters similarly as I do”.
116
 Again he claims that “rational 
argument is not entirely impossible”, for: 
 
We can ... investigate our demand from the point of view of its 
compatibility with certain important and widely accepted moral and 
                                                     
112 Ströker, ‘Does Popper’s Conventionalism Contradict His Critical Rationalism?’, 275-277. 
113 Ibid., 276. 
114 Habermas, ‘Dogmatism, Reason, and Decision’, 266; idem, ‘The Analytical Theory of Science and 
Dialectics’, 146. 
115 OSE2 225; Popper, ‘Public and Private Values’, 121. Cf. Habermas, ‘Dogmatism, Reason, and 
Decision’, 271. 
116 Popper, ‘Public and Private Values’, 121. 
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political creeds. If we can show that it may be acceptable to some of the 
major creeds, and especially to some creeds which seem to disagree on 
the issue in question, then we can consider our demand as a little more 




However, we may argue, insofar as these “major creeds” are merely accepted 
because they are “widely accepted”, this position comes very close to what Popper 
himself explicitly rejects as “historism” [Historismus], or the doctrine that all 
human knowledge is historically dependent,
118
 which was precisely one of the 






Geoffrey Stokes has argued that it is not so much the case that Popper’s political 
philosophy is an application of his philosophy of science – his “social philosophy” 
in the sense of “methodology of the social sciences” – but that it is in fact the other 
way around. He claims that “Popper’s commitment to certain political values such 
as freedom and toleration are conceptually prior to any epistemological 
commitment” and that his moral and political philosophy is “constitutive” of his 
philosophy of science.
120
 He adds the qualification that this conceptual priority is 
not of any “formal” or “deductive” nature 
121
 – which leaves open the question of 
what kind of conceptual relation it is. 
We have seen that, on the one hand, Popper himself indeed acknowledges 
that “there is an ethical basis of science, and of rationalism” (OSE2 238). 
Moreover, we have argued that in order for moral proposals to be in some sense 
rationally justified, he is bound to presuppose some kind of broader rationality. Yet 
at the same time he is incapable of incorporating this form of rationality within his 
narrower conception of scientific rationality. Accordingly, Popper maintains that 
“there is no ‘rational scientific basis’ of ethics” (OSE2 238). As a consequence, we 
may conclude, his “ethical basis of science, and of rationality” (OSE2 238) is 
floating in the air. 
Nevertheless, Popper maintains that his thesis of the “autonomy” of ethics 
by no means implies that moral decisions are necessarily “arbitrary”. On the basis 
of his own propositions, however, we have to conclude that this remains a mere 
“personal opinion”,
122
 because our examination of the inner logic of his theory – 
the mutual consistency of his propositions – leaves us with no other conclusion 
than that norms or decisions are by definition “personal” or “ad hominem”. 
However, precisely insofar as his “proposals” retain their ad hominem character, 
                                                     
117 Ibid., 122. 
118 OSE2 208, 255. 
119 Cf. OSE2 267-269. 
120 Stokes, Popper: Philosophy, Politics and Scientific Method, 5, 6. Cf. OSE2 238, where Popper 
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Popper’s polemical rejection of absolute heteronomy (that is, of historicism – 
“posing as prophets” – and of naturalism, but also of “historism”), must indeed 
lead to a polemical embrace of absolute autonomy (that is, of moral statements 
being created and posited “ex nihilo” – “becoming the makers of our fate” – as in 
the case of “decisionism”). 
 The following chapter examines whether there are moments in Popper’s 
writing in which this binary distinction between and mutual interdependence of 
strictly objective, scientific rationality on the one hand and irrational, subjective 
“personal” preference on the other, is left behind. We look for moments in the text 
of The Open Society and Its Enemies about which his propositionally defended, 
narrower conception of rationality remains silent or for which it cannot account, 
but which de facto form the “ratio” or raison d’être of what Popper himself calls 
his “irrational” faith in reason. We examine what this “irrational” decision attests 
to, what his “act of faith” shows him to be committed to and oriented by without its 
being (fully) explicitly articulated by him. Moreover, we examine what the 
presence of these moments tell us about the conditions and possibility of political 
philosophy, of “thoughtfully” approaching the political. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 




Rationality, in the sense of an appeal to a universal and impersonal standard of truth,  
is of supreme importance .., not only in ages in which it easily prevails, but also,  
and even more in those less fortunate times in which it is despised 
 and rejected as the vain dream of men who lack the virility to kill  
where they cannot agree.
123
 
Bertrand Russell  
 
If we dream of a return to our childhood, if we are tempted to rely on others and so be 
happy, if we shrink from the task of carrying our cross, the cross of humaneness,  
of reason, of responsibility, if we lose courage and flinch from the strain,  
then we must try to fortify ourselves with a clear understanding  
of the simple decision before us. We can return to the beasts.  
But if we wish to remain human, then there is only one way, 







As we have seen in the previous chapter, the framework of Popper’s own “critical 
rationalism” contains no standards on the basis of which the normative decision in 
favor of rationalism itself can be rationally justified. In fact, he claims that 
rationalism coincides with the explicit discussion or justification on the basis of 
arguments and experience of decisions or “proposals”, but the decision to adopt the 
attitude of rationalism in the first place cannot be justified in these terms. Instead, 
he speaks of “an irrational faith in reason” (OSE2 231). 
Yet we may say that Popper’s distinction between “reason” / the “rational” 
and “faith” / the “irrational” remains stuck within the traditional “Platonic” binary 
and hierarchical opposition between knowledge [epistēmē] and opinion [doxa], 
between demonstrated and undemonstrated knowledge. Within this framework, 
Popper can only conceive of ethics (or morality) either as being “scientific” or as 
being “arbitrary”. As we have seen, however, he explicitly rejects both 
conceptions, for neither of them serves his primary intention of “saving” our 
individual responsibility for decisions.  
 Yet it should be noted that there is one occasion in The Open Society and 
Its Enemies where Popper does not merely speak of a decision in the sense of a 
                                                     
123 Russell, ‘The Ancestry of Fascism’, 71, quoted by Karl Popper as epigraph to Chapter 23 of OSE2 
212. 
124 OSE1 201. 
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“proposal”, “demand” or “claim”, but also in the sense of a “belief” or (some form 
of) “behavior”. This is the passage in which he asserts that “whoever adopts the 
rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or unconsciously, 
some proposal, decision, or belief, or behaviour; an adoption which may be called 
‘irrational’” (OSE2 231). It may be said that Popper is gradually turning away here 
from the notion of a “decision” understood as a “proposal”, in the sense of a piece 
of knowledge to be explicitly discussed in rational terms (that is, in what he calls 
the language of proposals, demands, etc.), towards the notion of a “decision” 
understood as an act. What is brought to light by focusing on this one passage, is 
the common presupposition that underlies Popper’s explicitly articulated 
conception(s) of rationality, for he conceives both of “propositions” (in the sense of 
statements of fact, “truth” claims) and “proposals” (in the sense of statements of 
value, claims of “rightness”) as statements that are somehow capable of explicit 
demonstration or justification. In other words, he thinks of “decisions” in either of 
the following two ways: (i) as propositional attitudes, the truth / falsity or rightness 
/ wrongness of which is rationally and cognitively to be established (which 
explains his use of the term “belief” here – which may still be understood as a 
propositional attitude – instead of “act of faith”); (ii) as empirical facts, the 
occurrence of which is to be empirically established (which explains his use of the 
term “behavior” here – a social scientific term – again instead of “act of faith”).
125
 
It seems thus that Popper can only conceive of an “act of faith” as a form of 
immature knowledge – knowledge still to be “tested” by rational justification or by 
empirical proof – instead of as a form of action or practice. 
Indeed, what is hidden by his use of the terms “belief” and “behavior” is 
the possibility that his “irrational faith in reason” could as well be conceived of as a 
form of thoughtful action,
 
which, precisely because it falls outside of Popper’s 
binary rationality / irrationality distinction, need not be characterized as “irrational” 
merely for the fact that it is not (yet) explicitly formulated in the form of a 
cognitive and testable “proposition” or “proposal”.
 
James Tully has argued that 
even Jürgen Habermas, while being a critic of Popper, does not sufficiently 
acknowledge that the form of validation – the form of rational justification inherent 
in communicative action which demands that an agreement reached 
communicatively must be based “in the end” on reasons that are capable of being 
made explicit – must itself be considered as a practice of thought, which, in 
common with all practices, presuppose ways of acting with words that are in 
themselves not true or false.
126
 Accordingly, Tully speaks of a false dichotomy 
between rational justification and irrational behavior.
127
 Similarly, Arnold Burms 
has argued that the demand for rational justification or a foundation of morals 
                                                     
125 See OSE1 63-64. 
126 Tully, ‘Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy’, especially 18, 21, 24, 26. 
127 Ibid., 27: “… once we free ourselves from the convention that we are free and rational only if we 
can justify the grounds of any uses we follow, we can see that there is a multiplicity of ways of being 
rationally (and thoughtfully) guided by rules of use, short of self-grounding validation, that is not 
reducible to the behaviorist’s causal compulsion of habit.” 
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falsely assumes that ethics is the same kind of “objectifying” pursuit as science.
128
 
Instead, he proposes to replace the notion of a “justifying truth” by the alternative 
notion of an “orientating truth”, which he uses to refer to an evocative truth to 
which my life is attuned, towards which my life is oriented,
129
 or by which I am 
inspired,
130




 This chapter examines the de facto ratio (or raison d’être) of the 
“decision” which Popper himself characterizes as “irrational” and yet not 
“arbitrary”, in order thus to contribute to tracing the “deeply hidden structural 
features” of his writing, that is, the elements which shape the performative meaning 
of his work.  
In the first part, we explore the main strategy that is employed in Popper’s 
The Open Society and Its Enemies in order to escape from the possible 
consequence of his conception of rationality, viz. the verdict that decisions are 
“arbitrary”. Although moral or political “proposals” – including the “proposal” to 
adopt the attitude of rationalism itself – cannot be justified in the same strict sense 
as scientific propositions – after all, Popper maintains a strict dualism of facts and 
values – attention is drawn to the fact that he takes refuge instead in the use of 
several analogies between politics and science. We examine three of such 
analogies that can be traced within his writing. It is not only their content that is 
assessed, that is, their correspondence to political reality – is politics “really” “like” 
science? – but, and perhaps more fundamentally, we also take notice of the fact that 
the use of analogies as such points to the presence of a language within Popper’s 
writing that differs from the “propositional” language that has been discerned so 
far. In fact, the former turns out to be constitutive of the latter, insofar as “faith” in 
reason (or in “rationalism”) is carried by reason’s analogy with science. It is argued 
that science, or rather Popper’s idealized picture thereof, serves as an “orientating 
truth” in our understanding of politics, or as that in light of which Popper makes 
sense of politics and gives it its meaning.  
The second part explores another moment in Popper’s writing that escapes 
from the “propositional”, that is, from the order both of testable scientific 
rationality and value rationality. Attention is drawn to the conception of politics 
that is performed by his discourse, viz. the polemical politics of appealing to 
sentiments such as fear and pride in the sole service of achieving victory in the 
“necessitated” struggle between the “friends” and the “enemies” of the open 
society, which is precisely the opposite of the conception of politics which is 
proposed in his discourse, viz. the politics of rational (free and impartial) 
discussion of proposals.  
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2.2. ANALOGIES WITH SCIENCE 
 
Here we assess three different analogies between scientific and political rationality 
that can be traced throughout Popper’s book, all of which fulfill an orientating role 
in the decision to adopt the attitude of rationalism, a decision that he characterizes 
as “irrational” according to his explicit standards. The analogies surface on several 
occasions in The Open Society and Its Enemies, and especially towards the end of 
its second volume, in chapters 24 and 25, where Popper articulates his “critical 
rationalism” and his method of historical interpretation. 
 
2.2.1. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENT AND MORAL 
IMAGINATION 
 
Popper acknowledges that moral and political proposals or decisions differ from 
scientific propositions to the extent that they cannot be immediately deduced from 
experience, nor can they be unambiguously “determined” by argument. 
Nevertheless, as the previous chapter has shown, he argues that they may be 
“helped” by a kind of argument, which consists in the visualization of the concrete 
consequences that are likely to result from the alternatives between which we have 




... whenever we are faced with a moral decision of a more abstract kind, it 
is most helpful to analyse carefully the consequences which are likely to 
result from the alternatives between which we have to choose. For only if 
we can visualize the consequences in a concrete and practical way, do we 
really know what our decision is about; otherwise we decide blindly. 
(OSE2 232) 
 
In this respect, Popper contends, there is “a certain analogy” (OSE2 233) between 
testing by argument and actual experiment on the one hand (as in the case of a 
scientific method), and testing by our conscience, that is, by argument and 
imagined experience, by foreseeing and assessing the consequences of one’s 
actions, on the other hand (as in the case of moral and political decision-making). 
In both cases, we employ a kind of decision procedure that enables us to “test” the 
validity of propositions and proposals.
133
  
However, we argue that this analogy has several shortcomings. In the first 
place, I would argue that the mere visualization of the (possible) consequences of 
our moral decisions is not sufficient, for what is still needed is a substantial 
standard or norm in light of which we may assess and decide which consequences 
are morally permissible and which are not.
134
 As the previous chapter has shown, 
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134 Cf. OSE1 61: “… we can compare the existing normative laws (or social institutions) with some 
standard norms which we have decided are worthy to be realized.” 
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when seeking to establish substantial norms, Popper does not seem to go further 
than claiming that such “standard norms” (OSE1 61) – presumably freedom, 
individualism, egalitarianism, humanitarianism – are also “of our making” (OSE1 
61), which would merely reiterate the problem of the grounding of these norms. 
There are only a few occasions when Popper comes to a more concrete scrutiny of 
the validity of these standard norms, as in the following passage, for instance: 
 
We can … investigate our demand from the point of view of its 
compatibility with certain important and widely accepted moral and 
political creeds. If we can show that it may be acceptable to some of the 
major creeds, and especially to some creeds which seem to disagree on 
the issue in question, then we can consider our demand as a little more 




As has already been asserted, Popper does not make it clear why we ought to 
accept these “creeds” for reasons other than that they are “important” insofar as 
they are in fact “widely accepted”, and hence he comes very close to adopting a 
historicist (or, in Popper’s terms, a “historist”) position, which is precisely one of 
the positions he criticizes.
136
  
 Apart from this failure to provide a substantial norm, there is a second 
shortcoming of this procedural analogy, which consists in the fact that it does not 
differentiate between moral decisions – i.e. “norms enforced not by the state but … 
by our conscience” – and political decisions – i.e. “state-enforced norms” (OSE1 
113) or laws. It is not clear to what extent and exactly how a procedure for the 
“testing” of moral decisions by individual consciences would work in the case of 
political decision-making. For, in the first place, the additional element that comes 
into play in the case of political decision-making is the problem of how to attune 
(the decisions of) different individual consciences to each other. To that end, 
Popper needs a notion of citizenship or public reason, which in this analogy 
remains underdeveloped.
137
 Later, political philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas 
and John Rawls, who wrote at a time when liberal democracy was (once again) 
more firmly established, did focus on the development of such notions.
138
 In the 
second place, another element that comes into play in the case of political decision-
making is that political proposals are to be turned into law, that is, into binding 
norms (decisions that are somehow collectively enforced) that constitute a duty or 
an obligation, instead of norms that are agreed to by our conscience (decisions that 
are individually upheld) and that constitute a mere demand or claim.  
Popper seems to acknowledge this crucial difference between a moral (or 
private) and a political (or public) decision when he states that Socrates, whom he 
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associates closest with the idea of individual conscience,
139
 “was mistaken when he 
considered himself a politician; he was a teacher” (OSE1 191). Socrates, in caring 
for the souls or individual selves of his interlocutors, proved to be more interested 
in the “personal aspect” of the open society than in “institutional reform” (OSE1 
191).
140
 In his book as a whole, the crucial difference – and even opposition, as is 
shown in Plato’s Gorgias – between Socrates, a philosopher, and Pericles, a 
politican, is downplayed by Popper in service of his attempt to stage them as allies 
against Plato in what he considers the crucial respect: the decisive and even 




2.2.2. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN ELIMINATING FALSITY AND ELIMINATING 
SUFFERING 
 
As we have seen, the first analogy Popper uses, which focuses on the procedural 
character of scientific and moral or political decisions, does not offer any 
substantial criterion. The second analogy, to which we now turn, does appear to 
offer such a substantial standard. According to Popper, there is an analogy to be 
drawn between the elimination of false theories (or falsificationism), which he 
considers to be the task of science, and the elimination of human suffering (or 
negative utilitarianism), which he considers to be the task of politics.
142
 Jan-Werner 
Mueller has noted that, by thus taking the fallibility of human knowledge as his 
basic assumption, Popper seeks a kind of “certainty about uncertainty”.
143
 
To be sure, Popper’s analogy does not draw solely on the common element 
of “elimination”, that is, of negation. For the general or universal validity of the 
attempt to eliminate human suffering is somehow linked to the urgency that is 
inherent in such matters: “human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, 
the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man 
who is doing well anyway” (OSE1 284n2).
144
 Accordingly, and perhaps more 
                                                     
139 OSE1 66: “[The historical Socrates] felt compelled, by his conscience as well as by his religious 
beliefs, to question all authority and … searched for the norms in whose justice he could trust. 
140 Cf. OSE2 276. 
141 As we shall see in the second and third part of this dissertation, both Leo Strauss and Hannah 
Arendt are much more aware of the difference between philosophy and politics, and between 
individual conscience and the law, which testifies to the extent to which Popper’s political philosophy 
moves within the framework of liberal and democratic political philosophy, according to which both 
conscience and law rule within their own, pre-established spheres within the already structurally 
differentiated “open society”. 
142 OSE1 285n2: “There is some kind of analogy between this view of ethics [i.e. the negative 
utilitarian one, WC] and the view of scientific methodology which I have advocated in my The Logic 
of Scientific Discovery. It adds to clarity in the field of ethics if we formulate our demands negatively, 
i.e. if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness. Similarly, it is 
helpful to formulate the task of scientific method as the elimination of false theories (from the various 
theories tentatively proffered) rather than the attainment of established truths.” 
143 Mueller, ‘Fear and Freedom’, 51. 
144 Cf. OSE1 65, where Popper explains the difference between moral and aesthetic decisions in terms 
of the greater urgency of the former: “Many moral decisions involve the life and death of other men. 
Decisions in the field of art are much less urgent and important. It is therefore most misleading to say 
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precisely, Popper points to an analogy between the compelling character of the 
logic of falsification (which is absent in case of the logic of verification) and the 
equally compelling character of appeal of the need to escape from suffering and 




 However, it is questionable whether this analogy solves the problem of 
“arbitrariness” either, for it should be noted that the professed universal validity of 
the collective effort to eliminate human suffering cannot be understood without and 
must in the last instance be derived from the experience of a particular appeal of a 
concrete human individual who is in distress. As Arnold Burms has argued, one 
first needs to understand what it means to respond to the suffering of a concrete 
individual in order to be able to understand what it would mean to care about the 
reduction of the totality of human suffering. Because the latter enterprise is 
embedded in an experience it cannot incorporate, then, our response to the 
suffering of a concrete individual cannot be understood as a mere additive 
contribution to the collective enterprise of reducing the totality of human 
suffering.
146
 Moreover, when we focus on the particular experience of a concrete 
moral appeal, it is clear that as long as someone is in severe pain, the relief of that 
pain will indeed be the urgent and encompassing goal that takes precedence over 
all other possible moral goals. As Burms argues, however, it is not thereby implied 
that the relief of pain is also the central or highest goal in life. What deserves 
priority (or what is compelling) in some situations is not thereby the highest goal in 
all situations, in human life as such.
147
 This implies that the difficult and potentially 
divisive question “how should we live?” (which positive values do we consider 
worth realizing?) cannot be avoided by having recourse to the professed 
compelling appeal of human suffering – as if it were possible to find a standard in 
moral and political reasoning that provides the same compelling evidence as do the 
rules of logic in scientific reasoning.  
 Perhaps we should say, then, that the final reason why Popper embraces a 
negative utilitarian view of ethics in answer to those questions is based on the 
expectation that this is the only answer that will increase the chance that agreement 
will be reached. For, as we have seen in the previous chapter, he seems to praise 
the value of political disagreement at best and exclusively within the limits of 
technology, that is, precisely when the fundamental, constitutional questions have 
already been decided,
148
 about which he says: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
that a man decides for or against slavery as he may decide for or against certain works of music and 
literature, or that moral decisions are purely matters of taste. Nor are they merely decisions about how 
to make the world more beautiful, or about other luxuries of this kind; they are decisions of much 
greater urgency.” 
145 Cf. OSE2 237. 
146 Burms, ‘Disagreement, Perspectivism, Consequentialism’, 162-163. 
147 Burms, Waarheid, evocatie, symbool [Truth, Evocation, Symbol], 96-97. 
148 See OSE1 110-111. 
62 
 
In favour of his method, the piecemeal engineer can claim that a 
systematic fight against suffering and injustice and war is more likely to 
be supported by the approval and agreement of a great number of people 
than the fight for the establishment of some ideal. The existence of social 
evils, that is to say, of social conditions under which many men are 
suffering, can be comparatively well established. Those who suffer can 
judge for themselves, and the others can hardly deny that they would not 




We may answer that, even in this case, Popper would still need to provide an 
answer to the question of what makes “agreement” (or public peace) a greater good 
than “disagreement” (or public conflict), and in which cases. To conclude, there is 
no way to avoid the question of the positive (or substantial) good from surfacing in 
moral and political matters. 
On the basis of this analysis, we may argue that Popper, rather than 
insisting on the “irrationality” of moral and political decisions, could have adopted 
a different conception of rationality, one that does not seek an objective “decision 
procedure” or compelling standard (either of a more procedural or a more 
substantial nature) analogous to (empirical) science. For, as Burms has argued, the 
search for an objective decision procedure is simply not what we are doing when 
we are making moral (and political) decisions. Perhaps it would be possible to 
avoid the danger of the “arbitrariness” of moral and political decisions, then, 
precisely on the condition that we leave behind the functioning of science or 
engineering as our “orientating truth” (and look instead for a different “orientating 
truth”). 
One of the advantages of this approach would be that it fits much better 
with Popper’s own explicit rejection of what he calls a “scientific ethics”, that is, an 
ethics that aims “at telling us what we ought to do, i.e. at constructing a code of 
norms upon a scientific basis, so that we need only look up the index of the code if 
we are faced with a difficult moral decision” (OSE1 237n18). He calls this form of 
ethics “a form of escape, and escape from the realities of moral life, i.e. from our 
moral responsibilities” (OSE1 237n18). Hence, Popper’s rejection of “scientific 
ethics”, which is informed by his assumption of the logical separation of facts (or 
science) and norms (or ethics), stands in direct opposition to his embrace of any 
analogical correspondence between the two. He argues that “scientific” ethics 
harbors the same danger as would a “historicist”, “naturalist”, etc. ethics, viz. turn 
it into something “heteronomous”. Apparently, in this sense ethics is far from 
analogous to science. 
In sum, we may say that Popper wishes to have it both ways: he insists on 
the strictly logical distinction between science and ethics (the dualism of facts and 
                                                     
149 Cf. Popper, ‘Public and Private Values’, 122: “It is much easier to agree on a list of urgent social 
evils to be combated at once and by piecemeal measures than on a vision of a good society, to be 
realized in some more or less distant future.” See also Judith Shklar, ‘The Liberalism of Fear’, 11: 
“Because the fear of systematic cruelty is so universal, moral claims based on its prohibition have an 
immediate appeal and can gain recognition without much argument.” 
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values) – “ethical problems cannot be solved by the rational methods of science” 
(OSE1 292n11) – but in order to escape from the verdict of “arbitrariness”, he 
simultaneously insists on the analogical similarity between them, in the hope of 
somehow thereby bestowing the aura of “certainty” upon ethics, a characteristic 
which in fact belongs to science (or his idealized picture thereof). 
 
2.2.3. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF SCIENTIFIC 
RATIONALITY AND THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF MORAL RATIONALITY 
 
We now return to our question of what the de facto foundation is for the rationalist 
attitude (or the attitude of reasonableness). As the previous chapter has shown, 
Popper asserts that it rests on an “irrational faith”, while he also claims that the 
rationalist attitude is intrinsically “linked up with” (OSE2 238) certain ethical 
principles and the political institutionalization thereof. In order to fortify this latter 
thesis, he uses another analogy. 
This third analogy which we can trace in Popper’s writing, is drawn 
between the social or inter-personal character of scientific method on the one hand 
and the social or inter-personal character of the rationalist attitude on the other.
150
 
Thus he seems to suggest that the validity of the moral recognition of the other 
which is linked with the (broader) rationalist attitude, is somehow “similar” to the 
same recognition that is part of the scientific attitude. Popper explains that 
scientific method has a public character: the scientists needs to allow his theories to 
be freely criticized, and the observations and experiments done need to be of a 
public character: “scientists try to express their theories in such a form that they 
can be tested, i.e. refuted (or else corroborated) by such experience” (OSE2 218). 
Analogously, the attitude of rationalism (or of reasonableness) in general requires 
one to listen to the others’ arguments, and to refer to arguments and experiences 
(rather than emotions and passions), which can be publicly scrutinized.
151
 In the 
first place, the attitude of rationalism implies – is “bound up with” or “linked up 
with” (OSE2 238) – the moral recognition of the other as other, just as in the case 
of science. In the second place, the attitude of rationalism requires some kind of 




 It is clear that, just as in the case of the previous analogies, this one does 
not serve as a justification for the decision to adopt a rationalist attitude (or an 
attitude of reasonableness), because, from the perspective of Popper’s conception 
of rationalism at least, the validity of the scientific attitude in light of which it is 
interpreted – or which provides its orientation – would also require justification: 
what justifies the decision to adopt the method of science in the first place? What 
Popper needs instead is a theoretical account of what it means to adopt an 
                                                     
150 OSE2 225, 217-218. 
151 OSE2 224-225. 
152 OSE2 227, 236, 238-239. 
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“attitude” or to participate in a “practice”, and of the extent to which analogical 
thinking may serve as ratio for that adoption. 
 In the second place, we may ask how the political institutionalization of the 
moral principles that are embodied within the attitude of reasonableness takes 
shape.
153
 For there is an important difference between the “social institution” of 
science on the one hand, and the “social institution” of politics or of the state on the 
other. In the case of science, the recognition of the other only regards people who 
are somehow willing to contribute to the search for knowledge and the methods for 
gaining knowledge (for example, by speaking the language of science). What is at 
stake in science (that is to say, in Popper’s idealized form thereof), is the search for 
theoretical, propositional truth, or, in the case of the applied sciences such as 
engineering, the successful application of that knowledge. In the field of politics, 
on the other hand, what is at stake is “the power of man over man” (OSE2 236), as 
Popper himself acknowledges in passing. In this case, the binding – in the sense of 
obligating – power of the institution in question is at least to a certain extent bound 
up with the implicitly presupposed and potentially violent use of force that is 
exercised by the state or government, sanctioned by the law. As we have seen, the 
presence of state power is always presupposed by Popper, although he does not 
provide a full theoretical articulation of it. Moreover, nor does he articulate the 
founding or institution of the state as such, that is, the obligating rather than 
claiming decision with which it is bound up. We may therefore characterize 
Popper’s explicit conception of politics as an anti-revolutionary (anti-violent) one: 
because politics coincides with democratic politics, the decisive moment (the 
choice in favor of democracy) is removed from sight and is not recognized as itself 
also political.  
This omission may well be connected to the fact that Popper chooses from 
the outset to treat his political philosophy within the framework of “social 
philosophy”. That is to say, he applies the methodology of the social sciences and 
social engineering / technology as applied social science to the sphere of “the 
state”, that is, the realm of “the political” insofar as it can be distinguished as a 
separate sphere within “the open society” (or “civilization”), while (the legitimacy 
of) the institution or founding of the latter is always already presupposed, without 
being called into question. As a result, Popper does not arrive at the formulation of 
a political philosophy in the more encompassing sense of an explicit and theoretical 
articulation of the raison d’être of “the political” in a broader sense, that is, “the 
political” as it is implied in the decision in favor of the “open society” as a 
particular type of society, a decision which precedes and constitutes the institution 
of “the political” in the narrower sense of the realm of the state or of legality, 
understood as a sub-sphere within that “open society”. 
 
So far, this section has shown that Popper attempts to remedy the danger of the 
“arbitrariness” of his “faith” in reason – which is in itself caused by his strict 
separation of (scientific) facts and (moral) decisions – by drawing on several 
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analogies between scientific reasoning on the one side and moral (and political) 
reasoning on the other. As such, the aura of certainty – or of certainty about 
uncertainty, as Jan-Werner Mueller puts it 
154
 – which belongs to science (or to 
Popper’s idealized picture thereof) is “carried over” to morality and politics. We 
have traced and examined three such analogies: (i) the analogy between testing by 
scientific experiment and testing by the imaginative power of our conscience; (ii) 
the analogy between the elimination of false theories and the elimination of human 
suffering; (iii) the analogy between the social (or inter-personal) character of the 
science and the social (or inter-personal) character of moral (and political) 
reasoning. 
 All three of these analogies have been found wanting for several reasons. 
In the first place, they are wanting in their substance. By invoking and attesting to 
the self-evidence of “science” and “engineering” as models or ideal types for 
politics, several aspects of the latter are removed from sight. Insofar as Popper (and 
his readers) is (are) led by this picture of politics, that is, insofar as this picture of 
politics is constitutive of his discourse, insofar as it provides the orientation for his 
discourse instead of merely being the subject of his discourse (which it also is), we 
can locate part of what I would call “the spell of Popper” – the effect of a language 
he uses that falls outside the “scientific” or “rationalist” language he advocates – 
precisely in the force and meaning of these analogies. These analogies are enforced 
by Popper’s use of the expression “social engineering”, which is a frozen metaphor 
for the analogy between mechanical engineering and political reform, and which 
determines from the outset the perspective from which he invites us to picture the 
phenomenon of politics.
155
 Whereas the use of metaphorical language seems to be 
excluded from Popper’s conception of rational language on the propositional level 
– remember his claim that a normative statement, in contradistinction to a factual 
one, can “only in a metaphorical sense [emphasis added]” be called “true” or 
“false” (OSE1 58) – at crucial moments his writing turns out to be resting precisely 
on such language.  
In the second place, and more fundamentally, Popper fails to account for 
this crucial, because orientating (rather than justifying) role of analogies which is 
present within and which underlies his own discourse. That is to say, he does not 
make it clear whether the use of analogies can be considered as part of the 
“rationalist attitude” or not; that is, of the attitude in which only logical argument 
and actual experience may count.
156
 
                                                     
154 Mueller, ‘Fear and Freedom’, 51. 
155 See especially OSE1 24, 67-68, 163. 
156 In his ‘Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition’, 180-182, Popper draws a distinction between the 
“expressive” and “stimulating” functions of language on the one hand, and the “descriptive” and 
“argumentative” functions on the other. He claims that human beings share the first two functions of 
language with the animals, while he considers the latter two specifically human. Although he admits 
that language, in so far as language qua language has all four functions, may be ambivalent, Popper 
strongly defends a critical tradition which works against this ambivalence, in favor of the descriptive 
and argumentative uses of language only. 
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Popper might reply that the role performed by analogy within the 
rationalist attitude belonging to moral and political reasoning is similar to that of 
the role of the “searchlight” in the empirical sciences (OSE2 260-261, 268).
157
 He 
claims that the role performed by a hypothesis in the empirical science “is 
analogous to” that of a “point of view” or an “interest” in historiography or the 
interpretative sciences. However, when it comes to explaining what such a “point 
of view” or “interest” in the case of the latter sciences consists of, Popper claims 
that it is determined by a certain “pressing need’, while he does not mention the 
constitutive role of analogies in shaping such a “point of view” or “interest”. As he 
characterizes the use of such a “point of view” within the interpretative sciences as 
“analogous” to the role fulfilled by the “searchlight” in the empirical sciences,
158
 
we have in fact traced another, fourth analogy with the (empirical) sciences. 
Thereby our initial point is merely reinforced, for once again Popper employs the 
use of analogy without showing any “theoretical consciousness” (Geuss) of that 
use. 
 Meanwhile, our attention to the unarticulated use of analogies has put us on 
the track of an aspect of philosophical writing that differs from its propositional (or 
justificatory) aspect, for Popper’s multiple appeal to forceful “analogies” within the 
heart of his argumentation shows that there are moments within his writing when 
he uses a language that not only falls outside the “scientific” language of 
“propositions”, but is also not explicitly included by him within the category of the 
“rational” language of “proposals”. 
 
2.3. THE STAGING OF POLEMICS 
 
The second part of this chapter considers the assumption that thought – including 
political thought – is a practice and not merely a body of knowledge, the validity of 
which is to be tested as our starting point. Accordingly, we ask whether the politics 
enacted by Popper – that is, the political attitude to which his writing attests – is in 
fact in agreement with the politics he explicitly proposes, that is, with piecemeal 
social engineering as “rational” method of politics. In other words: with regard to 
the decision in favor of the politics of proposing, does Popper act in accordance 
with his own proposal to conceive of politics in terms of a free and rational 
discussion about proposals?  
 Let us first return to the primary goal of Popper’s project as reconstructed 
in the previous chapter. He aims to save a politics of rationality and responsibility, 
which is closely linked to the moral recognition of “the rational unity of mankind”. 
However, we have found that this kind of politics is jeopardized by the merely 
scientific or technological conception of rationality he defends on the level of his 
propositions. In fact, it turned out that the decision in favor of a rational politics of 
proposing cannot be justified on the basis of its own assumptions, that is, on the 
basis of logical argument and experience. As Popper explains, all argumentation 
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rests on certain assumptions, and these cannot all be based on argumentation 
themselves. He could have chosen to broaden his conception of rationality (in 
order to include assumptions which are themselves not argued for), but he chose to 
retain his narrower, falsificationist, conception of rationality. As a consequence, his 
position seemed to lead to some form of “decisionism”, in which case (moral and 
political) arguments would be merely ad hominem. 
 We now shift our attention from the propositional level of his text to the 
level of its performance. It is argued that his writing attests precisely to a 
“polemical” conception of politics in the emphatic sense of the word, viz. as a life-
and-death struggle between friends and enemies, a conception of politics that is in 
fact very similar to that of Carl Schmitt,
159
 which is completely at odds with the 
rational form of politics defended by Popper on the propositional level. As we have 
seen, Popper stages his act of proposing within the larger framework of a necessary 
and historical struggle, of the invocation of a “state of necessity” in which the very 
survival of “our civilization”, of our “open society”, is at stake.  
 Examining Popper’s discourse more closely, its structure turns out to be 
very polemical indeed. He divides mankind into two camps, a camp of the 
“friends” of the open society and a camp of its “enemies”, who are involved in a 
struggle within which there are only two options: victory or defeat.
160
 As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, Popper speaks of the need to overcome the “fatal 
division” among “those on whose defence civilization depends” (OSE1 vii). There 
is no time for discussion – i.e. for the attitude of “I may be wrong and you may be 
right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” (OSE2 225) – but only for a 
fight, in which it is actually permissible to use other means than (mere) rational 
argument, such as emotions and sentiments. 
 Popper employs several means. In the first place, the choice in favor of the 
open society is staged within a progressive historical narrative within which the 
allies of the “closed society” are pictured as “primitive” and backward. In other 
words, historically, the decision in favor of the open society has already been 
taken, whereas on the propositional level Popper has claimed that historical 
“progress” rests with us and hence is never secure.
161
 In the second place, the 
decision in favor of the open society is equated with being human as such, which 
becomes clear from the penultimate sentences of the first volume of the book: 
 
If we dream of a return to our childhood, if we are tempted to rely on 
others and so be happy, if we shrink from the task of carrying our cross, 
the cross of humaneness, of reason, of responsibility, if we lose courage 
and flinch from the strain, then we must try to fortify ourselves with a 
clear understanding of the simple decision before us. We can return to the 
beasts. But if we wish to remain human, then there is only one way, the 
way into the open society. (OSE1 201) 
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In other words, whoever does not make the “simple decision” in favor of the open 
society is not merely an enemy of the open society or of “civilization”, but places 
himself outside humanity as such.
162
 Thus, Popper acts as if there is “only one 
way”, as if there is really one option, by which he excludes or at least starkly 
reduces the possibility of free choice he wishes to save in the first place. 
 In addition, the sentiments that are actually invoked by Popper here, such 
as fear (of being primitive and even inhuman), and love (for) and pride (in) (being 
progressive and human) are precisely the sentiments which he declares on the 
propositional level are to be rejected because of their divisive and possible violent 
effect. Indeed, we have seen him praising faith in and hope for the open society and 
its concomitant rational attitude over the fear and despair which would lead to an 
escape from the autonomy and responsibility belonging to “the strain of 




 In sum, the polemical politics which Popper performs by his manner of 
writing appeals to the necessity of struggle, that is, to a “decision” in the sense of a 
specific course of action to be taken instead of in the sense of a “proposal” to be 
discussed in theory. This conception of the political includes the following 
elements. First, invoking a space for reasonable discussion in freedom is replaced 
by invoking a state of necessity. Secondly, logical argumentation is replaced by an 
appeal to emotions or sentiments. Thirdly, invoking the rational unity of mankind is 
replaced by a division of mankind into a camp of “friends” and a camp of 
“enemies” (the latter of which are at some point even pushed out of humanity).  
 Popper might defend himself by asserting that the politics which he 
performs here – invoking a state of necessity – is nothing more than invoking a 
state of exception, which is permissible exclusively in name of a defense of the 
state of normal politics, the status quo, which is, as we have seen, identified by him 
as that of the politics of piecemeal social engineering. In his treatment of Marx, 
Popper explicitly – that is, on the level of his propositions – discusses the 
possibility of the necessity to defend democracy.
164
 He posits that the use of 
violence is permitted or considered to be legitimate only if the use of reason falls 
short in defending democracy: “… the use of violence is justified only under a 
tyranny which makes reforms without violence impossible, and it should have only 
one aim, that is, to bring about a state of affairs which makes reforms without 
                                                     
162 In Schmittian terms, Popper’s moral decision (to belong or not to belong to “humanity”) may be 
said to hide what is in fact a political decision (to belong or not to belong to a specific friend-enemy 
grouping). See Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 54: “When a state fights its political enemy in 
the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state 
seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it 
tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and 
civilization in order to claim these as one’s own and to deny the same to the enemy.” 
163 OSE2 279: “… historicism is born of our despair in the rationality and responsibility of our actions. 
It is a debased hope and a debased faith, an attempt o replace the hope and the faith that springs from 
our moral enthusiasm and the contempt for success by a certainty that springs from a pseudo-science; 
a pseudo-science of the stars, or of ‘human nature’, or of historical destiny.” 
164 OSE2 151-152, 160-162. 
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violence possible” (OSE2 151). We could say that “revolutionary” (violent) 
politics is only permitted in defense of “democratic” politics. It may not be a 
coincidence that this is the only occasion when Popper does not speak of a battle 
against tyranny (which is his usual, negative utilitarian formulation), but of a battle 
for democracy (as if he knows that the formulation of a negative goal would not be 
enough to win the battle): 
 
Democracy provides an invaluable battle-ground for any reasonable 
reform, since it permits reform without violence. But if the preservation 
of democracy is not made the first consideration in any particular battle 
fought out on this battle-ground, then the latent anti-democratic 
tendencies which are always present (and which appeal to those who 
suffer under the strain of civilization …) may bring about a breakdown of 
democracy. If an understanding of these principles is not yet developed, 
its development must be fought for. (OSE2 161) 
 
We might say, then, that The Open Society and Its Enemies is to be read as the 
product of a state of exception, in which the first consideration is the preservation 
of democracy. 
 Yet, in a certain sense this is beside the point, for what I am arguing is that 
Popper lacks the “theoretical self-consciousness” (Raymond Geuss) to connect in 
any meaningful way what he is claiming on the propositional level – that is, his 
conception of knowledge and rationality – to what he is doing on the performative 
level. To be more precise: he fails to relate his propositional articulation of the 
possibility and legitimacy of the state of exception in certain circumstances to what 
he himself, as writer and thus as actor, is enacting, viz. furthering a polemical 
conception of politics.  
In the first place, he fails to ask what the effective consequences are (both 
in the sense of the performative meaning and the actual historical impact) of the 
conception of polemical politics he practices in his writing, that is, the “deed” he 
performs, for the actual realization of the rational and responsible politics he 
explicitly argues for, that is, of the “first word” he asserts. In other words, he fails 
in the task of giving a theoretical account of the practice of his thinking. 
In the second place, Popper does not offer an explicit theoretical 
articulation of what the fact that he himself, on the performative level, cannot 
avoid invoking the polemical conception of politics which he rejected on the 
propositional level, would imply for the question of how “realistic” and how 
consistent his explicitly articulated conception of politics (as the politics of 
proposing) actually is. In other words, he fails in the task of offering a conception 
of the political that is sufficiently comprehensive and consistent. 
 
2.4. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES: MODERN AND ANCIENT 
 
The analysis in the previous two sections has established that the positive, 
substantial question of the good society and the best form of government cannot be 
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avoided; that is, the question of the right political order or “best constitution” 
cannot be reduced to or substituted by an (allegedly) “objective” “method”, 
“decision procedure”, or “language”. Moreover, every decisive and obligating 
answer to this fundamental question inevitably implies a form of “closure”, in the 
sense of the exclusion of other answers. Therewith, a form of “closure” (i.e. 
something by which it is constituted but which it cannot incorporate) is present 
within the heart of the “open” society. We have argued that, in Popper’s case, this 
place or moment is occupied by the following two elements: (i) the orientation 
towards the practice of science or engineering as a true or self-evident, 
presupposed ideal to which the practice of politics is pictured as being “analogous” 
and in favor of which ideal Popper has in fact always already decided (as was 
demonstrated in the first section of this chapter); (ii) the staging of a polemical 
politics which is rejected (or at best presented as an “exception”) on the 
propositional level, but which is in fact always already decided in favor of on the 
performative level (as was demonstrated in the second section of this chapter). 
In order to find an alternative account of politics, philosophy (or thinking), 
and their interrelatedness, we need to open up a critical perspective on Popper’s 
political philosophy. We may find such a perspective by drawing attention to an 
apparent contradiction in his work. Throughout his book, Popper claims that the 
problems of the open society are coeval with civilization as such (which he claims 
was “born” in ancient Greece) and have (since then) in a certain sense been 
“perennial”, that is, belonging to the human condition as such. Yet, in the preface 
to the second edition of The Open Society and Its Enemies (1950), Popper suggests 
that the problems that are coeval with the open society – especially the risk of 
social engineering becoming “utopian” – are closely connected to the specifically 





I see now more clearly than ever before that even our greatest troubles 
spring from something that is as admirable and sound as it is dangerous – 
from our impatience to better the lot of our fellows. For these troubles are 
the by-products of what is perhaps the greatest of all moral and spiritual 
revolutions of history, a movement which began three centuries ago. It is 
the longing of uncounted unknown men to free themselves and their 
minds from the tutelage of authority and prejudice. It is their attempt to 
build up an open society which rejects the absolute authority of the 
merely established and the merely traditional while trying to preserve, to 
develop, and to establish traditions, old or new, that measure up to their 
standards of freedom, of humaneness, and of rational criticism. It is their 
unwillingness to sit back and leave the entire responsibility for ruling the 
world to human or superhuman authority, and their readiness to share the 
burden of responsibility for avoidable suffering, and to work for its 
avoidance. This revolution has created powers of appalling 
destructiveness; but they may be conquered. (OSE1 ix) 
                                                     
165 This contradiction is also noted by Holmes, ‘Aristippus in and out of Athens’. 
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What is suggested here is that the problems belonging to the open society originate 
in a “moral and spiritual revolution” that started “three centuries ago”, that is, from 
the middle of the seventeenth century onwards, when Hobbes and Spinoza wrote 
their influential works.
166
 We may say, then, that the problems that coincide with 
the use of science and technology as a means to relieve “the strain of civilization” 
are not the result of a perennial condition, but of a historical decision, led by the 
appeal of modern science and born in a polemic against pre-modern forms of 
authority and prejudice. As soon as this historical horizon is opened up, that is, as 
soon as the institution of “the open society” and of its “method” of “piecemeal 
social engineering” have become opened once again to question, two alternative 
directions become visible.  
In the first place, the principles of modernity (especially technical 
rationality) can be criticized in the name of the principles of modernity itself. This 
is the road that has been taken by Critical Theory, in response to what Theodor W. 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer have called the dialectics of Enlightenment.
167
 In its 
most sophisticated form, this is developed by Habermas in his theory of 
communicative action and deliberative democracy as the political 
institutionalization thereof.
168
 There is indeed a clear similarity between his ideas 
and Popper’s plea for an “attitude of reasonableness” as the embodiment of moral 
ideals such as impartiality, tolerance, and responsibility, based on his “inter-
personal theory of reason”. The drawback of this approach, however, would be that 
it still tends to hold on to an idealized picture of politics as a form of rational 
discussion, which it presents as a privileged use of language. 
Secondly, the principles of modernity can be criticized in the name of those 
of pre-modernity, or, to be more precise, of ancient political philosophy. In a way 
this is the more radical road. As the next two chapters will show, it is connected 
with the name of Leo Strauss (1899-1973), whose restoration of the pre-modern 
horizon re-establishes the difference between philosophy and politics and the 
concomitant ranking of contemplation (theory) above action (practice). “Utopian” 
thinking in the original (pre-modern, classical) sense of the word is never 
“activist”, but raises the theoretical question of the best regime, apart from the 
practical question of its actual realization.
169
  
Against the background of the classical position, then, it becomes clear that 
Popper’s notions of “utopian” and “piecemeal” social engineering in fact share one 
and the same presupposition: political philosophy is active, that is, it culminates in 
laying down a “political program” or “political demand”, which is to be realized in 
practice.
170
 Accordingly, Popper reads Plato from the outset as if he presents a 
“political program”, rather than as a philosopher who wishes to come to a 
theoretical understanding of the problem of politics, that is, of the problematic 
                                                     
166 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), Benedictus de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). 
167 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment . 
168 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action; idem, Between Facts and Norms. Cf. OSE2 238. 
169 See also Shklar, ‘The Political Theory of Utopia’, 164-165. 
170 See Lane, ‘Plato, Popper, Strauss, and Utopianism: Open Secrets?’, 119-142. 
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character of the question of the best constitution, in which the relation between the 
philosopher and the political should always be taken into account. Moreover, 
Popper considers Plato’s dialogues merely as monologues or treatises in disguise, 
instead of written performances of a specific conceptualization of the relation 
between philosophy and politics. There is, however, one passage in The Open 
Society and Its Enemies in which Popper appears to be aware of the possibility that 
Plato’s dialogues can be read in the latter way, which also happens to be one of the 
very few passages in which he speaks favorably about Plato:  
 
It may be remarked that Plato, even though his theory is authoritarian, and 
demands the strict control of the growth of human reason in his guardians 
…, pays tribute, by his manner of writing, to our inter-personal theory of 
reason; for most of his earlier dialogues describe arguments conducted in 




To conclude, our reading of the work of Karl Popper has led us to argue that 
insofar as a political philosophy wishes to realize some form of “rational politics” – 
or, more broadly, of “thoughtful politics” – it should acknowledge its own specific 
character as a practice. Hence, its conception of the political can be traced not only 
by taking notice of the “rational” character of its own cognitive claims about 
politics, but by also taking into account its own performative character; of thought 
being a practice in itself, especially insofar as it is spoken or written. In Chapter 1 
it was argued that, precisely as a result of the epistemological assumptions of his 
“critical rationalism”, Popper is insufficiently able to do justice to his final aim of 
realizing a rational and responsible politics (that is, his way of conceiving what I 
call “thoughtful politics”). Chapter 2 demonstrated that his “last word” appears to 
consist of his use of the analogy of politics with “science” or “engineering” on the 
one hand, and of his performance of politics as polemics on the other. 
 In order to remedy this lack of “theoretical self-consciousness”, this failure 
to think through the conditions of “political philosophy” and of “thoughtful 
politics”, the following three demands should be met. First, one would need a more 
comprehensive conception of both politics and philosophy. On the one hand, the 
political should be understood in a broader sense than as the rational justification of 
proposals and as encompassing more than that which belongs in the sphere of the 
“state” or of “government” as an already limited sub-sphere within an already 
established specific kind of society called “open society”. On the other hand, 
philosophy (or thinking) should be understood in a broader sense than as a 
methodology of the social sciences, with its strict separation of facts and values, its 
concomitant denial of the rationality of value statements, let alone of other 
linguistic usages. Secondly, it needs to be acknowledged that moral and political 
“decisions” are not only capable of being studied under the aspect of either their 
propositional validity or their status as empirically falsifiable behavior, but also 
under the aspect of the performative meaning of their practice. Thirdly, it needs to 
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be acknowledged that some form of rationality for moral and political decisions 
(such as the question of the best constitution) is possible, that is, a form of 
“thoughtful politics” which escapes from the binary opposition between the claim 
that all decisions are “arbitrary” on the one hand and the demand for an 
“objective”, quasi-scientific decision procedure on the other. The next two chapters 







THE SUCCESS OF STRAUSS: 
 








Strauss’s Recovery of “the Fact of the Political” and of “the 




…the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad. 
Are these not the subjects of difference about which,  
when we were unable to come to a satisfactory decision,  





“Doctrinairism” and “existentialism” appear to us as the two faulty extremes.  
While being opposed to each other, they agree with each other in the decisive respect –  
they agree in ignoring prudence, “the god of this lower world.”  
Prudence and “this lower world” cannot be seen properly without  







The previous two chapters have shown that Karl Popper conceives the task of 
political philosophy as to provide criteria for a “rational” form of political decision-
making, called “piecemeal social engineering”. In his case, the term “political” 
refers to a realm of free and rational discussion directed toward legislation by a 
liberal-democratic government, which is understood as a separate realm within a 
larger whole called “open society” or “civilization”. However, it was argued that 
Popper’s conception of rationality, which is modeled after the methodology of 
empirical science, turned out to be incapable in principle of vouching for the 
rationality of the political ends that “social engineering” is supposed to achieve. In 
order to avoid the inevitable conclusion that political decisions must be 
characterized as merely “personal” or even “arbitrary”, he points to the negative 
aim of the relief of avoidable human suffering as the only universally valid aim of 
politics. It was argued, however, that this does not absolve him from the question 
of which positive aims the elimination of human suffering, in turn, is to serve. 
Moreover, it was demonstrated that, in his staging of the decision in favor of “the 
open society” as such, Popper implicitly draws on a conception of the political 
understood as the necessitated and possibly violent struggle between friends and 
enemies, a conception which he precisely excluded from his explicitly defended 
conception of a politics of rational discussion. Popper thus fails to display a 
                                                     
171 Plato, Euthypro, 7cd.  
172 NRH 320-321. 
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“theoretical self-consciousness” of the fact that philosophical writings, including 
his own, can be “influential” not only due to their propositional content but also 
their performative meaning. 
In this chapter and the next we turn to the work of Leo Strauss (1899-
1973), which seems to offer an answer to these shortcomings. As we have seen, 
Popper’s political philosophy is essentially oriented to “application”, or the 
solution of practical problems by rational methods. Accordingly, he reads Plato’s 
Republic as if it were a treatise in which the author presents his very own “political 
program”, which consists in the “utopian” realization of the reign of philosopher-
kings as a practical solution to the problem of justice. By contrast, Strauss reads 
the Republic as a dialogue in which we never hear the author’s own voice, which is 
intended as a theoretical attempt to understand the problem of justice. Hence, the 
“best regime” is a “utopia” in the original sense of the word: it cannot be realized 
“in deed”, but only “in speech”. Strauss emphasizes that Plato and classical 
political philosophy in general insisted on philosophy and politics having 
essentially opposite orientations: while philosophy is understood as the free pursuit 
of theoretical knowledge, the political is characterized first and foremost by the 
binding authority of the law.  
As will be shown, it is precisely Strauss’s recovery of the classical 
insistence on the difference between philosophy and politics that enables him to 
offer an understanding of political reality and a normative framework for the 
guidance of political action, both of which more comprehensive and more refined 
than Popper’s, whose position will turn out to be indebted to what Strauss 
considers the tradition of modern political philosophy. In addition, Strauss’s 
classical insistence on the essential difference between philosophy and politics is 
accompanied by a theoretical self-consciousness that writing is a form of acting. 
Hence, he shows himself to be aware of the fact that philosophical writings, 
including his own, are capable of being read and misread in accordance with their 
performance or “action” just as much as in accordance with their propositions or 
“argument”, for which he recovers and adopts a specific manner of communication 
called “the art of writing between the lines”. 
These few introductory remarks should already suffice to make it clear that 
Strauss is by no means an established member of the canon of political philosophy 
in the common sense of the word. Even stronger, from the very beginning, the 
reception of his work has been highly polemical, not only within academia but also 
in public debate. For instance, not very long ago his detractors regarded him as the 
intellectual mastermind behind the American “neo-cons” who waged war against 
Iraq. His writings were understood as containing a legitimation of the use of “noble 
lies” by elites against the masses and as propagating a strong belief in war as an 
instrument for actively enforcing “regime change”.
173
 His defenders responded that 
this reading of his work rests on several misunderstandings and, to the contrary, 
Strauss was in fact a loyal “friend of liberal democracy” who stood for a politics of 
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 Whichever of these two camps is right, however, their polemic 
continues to revolve around one and the same political question: is Strauss a 
liberal, or is he at least liberal enough? If he is, we may safely side with him; if he 
is not, we should be against him. 
To their great merit, Strauss-scholars like Heinrich Meier, David Janssens 
and others, have managed to steer away from this polemical battlefield to reach 
more neutral ground.
175
 According to them, his ultimate intent is not political but 
philosophical. To be more precise, he aims to rehabilitate the bios theōrētikos over 
and against the bios politikos, that is, a rehabilitation of the philosophic life in the 
classical, Socratic sense, over and above the political life, its ambitions and 
aspirations. If he exposes political ideas at all, they are at best negative: he points 
to the essential “limits” of politics.
176
 Moreover, in his case the adjective “political” 
in “political philosophy” refers rather to the political justification of philosophy 
than any positive, i.e. substantial, philosophy of politics.
177
 
However, what this account tends to neglect is the fact that Strauss’s 
recovery of philosophy actually also presupposes a recovery of politics, against the 
loss of both in modernity. First, it should be noted that Strauss not only warns 
against “visionary expectations from politics”, but also against an “unmanly 
contempt for politics”.
178
 His rejection of political life in the name of philosophical 
life does indeed imply a rejection of the modern fusion of science and politics into 
“social engineering”, which is driven by a powerful belief in the human capacity to 
solve social problems by institutional reform; at the same time, though, it implies 
the rehabilitation of a different, classical understanding of politics. His recovery of 
philosophy understood as the rise from opinion [doxa] to knowledge [epistēmē] is 
accompanied by a recovery of the law as the authoritative opinion to which the 
political community or city “looks up” and by which it is held together. Closely 
related to this, his recovery of philosophical reason [logos] and wisdom [sophia] as 
its virtue is accompanied by a recovery of political “spiritedness” [thumos], i.e. 
anger, indignation, or “eagerness to fight”, and “manliness” [andreia] or courage as 
its virtue.
179
 Secondly, Strauss also suggests the possibility of providing normative 
                                                     
174 See especially Zuckert & Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy & American 
Democracy; Smith, Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, Judaism. 
175  Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem; Janssens, Between Athens and 
Jerusalem: Philosophy, Prophecy, and Politics. See also Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual 
Biography; Tarcov, ‘On a Certain Critique of “Straussianism”’. 
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178 Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern, 24. 
179  See, inter alia, OPS 9: “The polis as polis is characterized by an essential, irremediable 
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guidance for politics. While taking into account the “spirited” nature of politics – 
its “recalcitrance to reason” (CM 22)
180
  he nevertheless makes room for the 
possibility of a “thoughtful” politics. In the slipstream of his rehabilitation of the 
theoretical wisdom [sophia] of the philosopher, he provides a rehabilitation of the 
practical wisdom [phronèsis] or “prudence” of the statesman, which may be said to 
move between logos and thumos, or between an escape from politics into 
philosophical discussion and a reduction of politics to polemical struggle. 
A precise determination of Strauss’s conceptions of the political and 
“thoughtful” politics has not yet receive sufficient attention in the secondary 
literature. In part this is due to the notorious difficulty of his writings. Although he 
explicitly and repeatedly mentions the importance of the dialectical question “what 
is political?” or “what is the city [polis]?”,
181
 nowhere in his published works does 
he present an answer to it in his own name. This is because he not only recovered 
“the art of writing between the lines”, he also practiced it in his own writings. 
Accordingly, he did not write “treatises” in which he presents himself as a 
philosopher who straightforwardly conveys the “results” of his own thought. 
Rather, his oeuvre consists mainly of dense “commentaries” and “histories of 
ideas” in which he offers original interpretations of philosophical works (such as of 
Plato’s Republic) in order to recover a genuine understanding of perennial 
philosophical problems (such as “natural right”) and the alternative solutions to 
them. 
Nevertheless, in these writings of what may prima facie appear to be a 
mere scholar, Strauss conveys a clear philosophical orientation to classical 
political philosophy over and against modern political philosophy and the latter’s 
culmination in positivist and historicist relativism. He even expresses his 
inclination to prefer one philosophical solution in particular, viz. that of classic 
natural right, over the denial of the existence of natural right by conventionalism.
182
 
We therefore take Strauss’s “preferred” solution as the basis for our reconstruction 
of his philosophy of politics, saving an in-depth treatment of his politics of 
philosophy as embodied by “the art of writing between the lines” for the next 
chapter. 
In our reconstruction of Strauss’s philosophy of politics, i.e. his 
conceptions of the political and the rational guidance of political action, we focus 
especially on his “comments” on Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political 
                                                                                                                                       
man die von den Großen unter den griechischen Denkern statuierte Bipolarität menschlicher 
Psychodynamik heute wieder genauer in den Blick fassen kann. Strauss hat vor allem dafür gesorgt, 
daß man neben Platon, dem Erotologen und Verfasser des Symposions, wieder auf Platon, den 
Psychologen der Selbstachtung, aufmerksam wurde.” 
180 See also OPS 9. 
181 WIPP 22, 25; CM 19, NRH 121. 
182 Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 31; NRH vii: “Nothing that I have learned has shaken my 
inclination to prefer “natural right,” especially in its classic form, to the reigning relativism, positivist 
or historicist.” See also Strauss’s letter to Karl Löwith, 15 August 1946: “I truly believe, although it 
apparently appears as fantastic to you, that the perfect political order, as Plato and Aristotle have 
sketched it, is the perfect political order” (Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, 662). 
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(1932) and his “history of ideas” Natural Right and History (1953). Strauss 
develops his classical understanding of the political in discussion with Schmitt and 
with Schmitt’s turn to Hobbes. In addition, Natural Right and History contains his 
most detailed treatment of the possibility of moral guidance for politics, especially 
in his discussion of Hobbes (Chapter V.A.) and classic natural right (Chapter IV), 
in both of which Schmitt’s silent presence can be felt. We read Strauss’s 
“comments” and “history of ideas” as much as possible as “treatises”, which 
implies that we need to make an effort at thinking along with Strauss in the 
direction of the “solution” to which he points. 
This chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which gives an 
account of Strauss’s reopening of “the quarrel between the ancients and the 
moderns” in light of what he calls “the theological-political problem”. We start 
with his critique of modern political philosophy’s culmination in positivism and 
historicism and work toward his recovery of classical political philosophy’s 
defense of philosophical life over and against political life. However, we argue that 
Strauss’s recovery of philosophical life is in fact also accompanied by a recovery 
of political life, against the loss of both in modernity.  
In the second section we begin our reconstruction of Strauss’s 
understanding of the essence of political life by focusing on his “comments” on 
Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political (1932), which he reads as a genuine 
attempt to answer the “Socratic” question “what is political?” It is argued that 
Schmitt and Strauss turn out to agree to a great extent about the nature of “the 
political”, insofar as they both recognize the necessity of “rule” [Herrschaft] within 
closed societies that potentially stand in friend-enemy-relations to each other. They 
turn out to be at odds, however, regarding the raison d’être of the political, which 
Strauss finds not in the seriousness of struggle as such, but in the seriousness of the 
question of what is “by nature” the right way of life. 
Regarding the question of the possibility of rational guidance for political 
action, there seem then to be only two alternatives: (i) either Strauss’s 
philosophical turning away from political life, which would seem to leave us 
without any rational standards within political life; (ii) or Schmitt’s “decisionist” 
(or “existentialist”) immersion in political life, which would seem to leave us 
without any rational standards within political life. At first sight a return to 
Hobbes would seem to be required, insofar as he appears as a successful defender 
of “rule” [Herrschaft] and “natural right”. Therefore, the third section turns to 
Strauss’s account of modern political philosophy in Chapter V.A. of Natural Right 
and History. Strauss claims that Hobbes’s political philosophy is founded on the 
“realist” premises of Machiavelli, who had sought to guarantee the realization of 
the best regime by lowering its standards. Strauss claims that, as a consequence, 
Hobbes jeopardizes both “rule” and “natural right”. Moreover, he adds, the 
“doctrinaire” character of modern “natural public law” decisively prepared the 
“existentialist” response of ultramodern historicism.  
On the basis of a reading of Chapter IV of Natural Right and History, the 
fourth section of this chapter argues that Strauss’s recovery of classical political 
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philosophy, or the classic natural-right teaching, does in fact suggest a possibility 
for “thoughtful” politics between philosophy and polemics. Although the classical 
authors believed that the best regime consists “by nature” in the reign of the wise, 
they posited that any legitimate regime must always “dilute” wisdom with consent. 
To determine the precise nature of this practical solution to the political problem, 
we turn specifically to Strauss’s reconstruction of the “Platonic” and “Aristotelian” 
natural right teachings, the former of which offers an account of the philosopher-
legislator’s “dilution” of natural right with conventional right, while the latter 
offers an account of the prudence of the statesman who decides in concrete 
situations whether “the highest” or “the urgent” is to take precedence. 
By the end of this chapter, then, we will have offered two things. First, a 
reconstruction of Strauss’s classical understanding of “the fact of the political”, 
which, in contradistinction to that of Popper, takes into account the phenomenon of 
the law and of the inevitability of “closure”, while not, in contradistinction to 
Schmitt, reducing it to the latter. Secondly, a reconstruction of Strauss’s recovery 
of the possibility of a “thoughtful” form of political decision-making, which, in 
contradistinction to Schmitt, does uphold rational standards within political life, 
while, in contradistinction to Popper, does not reduce them to the one single 
standard that is to be universally applied in practice, but allows instead for some 
“latitude of statesmanship”. 
 
3.2. THE RE-OPENING OF THE QUARREL BETWEEN THE ANCIENTS AND THE 
MODERNS IN LIGHT OF THE THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL PROBLEM 
 
Leo Strauss is best known for his re-opening of “the quarrel between the ancients 
and the moderns”, or his “change of orientation” from modern political philosophy 
to classical political philosophy. The starting point for this turn is what he calls 
“the crisis of our time”, which he claims becomes manifest when liberal democracy 
became uncertain of itself,
183
 which he illustrates in the introduction to Natural 
Right and History by pointing to the rise of doubt whether the “self-evident truths” 
of the American Declaration of Independence – “that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (NRH 1) – are indeed still 
believed to be self-evident. 
Strauss states that these doubts are raised in the name of Science and 
History, respectively.
184
 He explains that modern social science has culminated in 
positivism, that is, the doctrine which claims that value statements cannot be 
derived from factual statements, and that it is impossible to resolve conflicts 
between value statements in a rational manner.
185
 Against positivism, Strauss 
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claims that, since scientific questions are themselves driven by specific interests or 
values, science is bound to interpret its own enterprise as to be historically relative. 
For this and other reasons, he argues, positivism is bound to culminate in 
historicism, that is, in the doctrine according to which all human knowledge – both 
statements of fact and statements of value – is historically determined. As soon as 
historicism becomes self-reflexive and applies its own thesis to itself, it turns into 
radical historicism or “existentialism”, which even regards the historicist thesis 
itself as historically determined, i.e., as a dispensation of fate. As a final result, 
Strauss concludes, human rationality has undermined itself.
186
 
Strauss notes that, as a consequence of this “self-destruction of reason”,
187
 
political philosophy in the original, classical sense, that is, as the quest for the best 
regime or for “natural right”, is no longer believed to be possible. Originally, he 
claims, philosophy understood itself as the ascent from opinions [doxai] about 
nature or “the whole” to knowledge [epistēmē] of nature or “the whole”. 
Accordingly, political philosophy understood itself as the ascent from conventional 
right to natural right. This ascent is conducted by means of a “dialectical” 
conversation, or a “friendly dispute” (NRH 124), in which authoritative or 
“common sense” opinions are questioned, as a result of which they turn out to be 
contradictory. In this way, they solicit a truth that is itself trans-historical, that is, a 
truth the validity of which does not depend on contingent historical circumstances. 
According to Strauss, the account of philosophy as ascent from opinion to 
knowledge was depicted by Plato in his well-known cave parable. Strauss 
considers modernity’s culmination in radical historicism as the final consequence 
of the creation of a second cave below Plato’s.
188
 In order to regain the situation of 
the original cave, what is urgently needed is a history of ideas to serve as a 
“propaedeutic”, that is, as preparation for philosophy itself. Its task is to restore the 
“natural” horizon of classical political philosophy, against which the “artificial” 
edifice of modern political philosophy had been erected.
189
  
In the seventeenth century, Strauss claims, Hobbes and Spinoza had set 
themselves the task of saving the freedom of philosophizing [libertas 
                                                                                                                                       
Strauss never publicly responded to Popper’s work, in a letter to Eric Voegelin dated 10 April 1950 
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contempt: it was the most washed-out, lifeless positivism trying to whistle in the dark, linked to a 
complete inability to think “rationally,” although it passed itself off as “rationalism” – it was very 
bad. I cannot imagine that such a man ever wrote something that was worthwhile reading, and yet it 
appears to be a professional duty to become familiar with his productions.” (Faith and Political 
Philosophy: The Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin 1934-1964, 66-67.) 
186 WIPP 25-27. See also NRH Chapter I, ‘Natural Right and the Historical Approach’, in which 
Strauss presents Nietzsche, and especially Heidegger, as the principle protagonists of radical 
historicism. 
187 Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 31. 
188  Strauss introduces the image of a “second” cave for the first time in his ‘Review of Julius 
Ebbinghaus, On the Progress of Metaphysics’ (1931), 215. The imagery keeps returning in Strauss’s 
later work, e.g. in PAW 156. 
189 PAW 155. 
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philosophandi] from its severe restriction at the hands of the political authority of 
revealed religion. Making use of the Epicurean critique of religion, they instead 
attempted to ally philosophy with secular political power. Strauss contends that 
their project was decisively “prepared” by Machiavelli, whom he considers the 
“founder” of modern political philosophy. Induced by his “anti-theological ire”, 
Machiavelli had lowered the standards of the best regime in order to make its 
realization more certain, or less dependent on chance.
190
  
As a result of the new alliance between philosophy and politics, Strauss 
argues, the natures of and the specific differences between philosophy, religion, 
and politics came gradually to be forgotten. While religion came to be understood 
as private “faith” or “belief” rather than public “law”, philosophy (or theory) was 
turned into the handmaiden of politics (or practice). It transformed itself into 
science, which (i) aims for the conquest of nature (and of chance), instead of the 
careful imitation and cultivation of nature; and (ii) chooses method as its starting 
point (that is, certainty based on the universal doubt of all opinions) instead of 
speech (that is, opinions that are expressed by people, the contradictions between 
which solicit trans-historical truth).
191
 
In fact, Strauss had set himself the task of writing a “theological-political 
treatise”, taking the opposite direction to that of the treatises written by Hobbes and 
Spinoza.
192
 In order to “restore” classical political philosophy, Strauss recalls to 
memory the “natural” situation of man, or the world not as the object of science or 
the product of technology, but “the world in which we live and act”, that is, “a 
world not of mere objects at which we detachedly look but of ‘things’ or ‘affairs’ 
which we handle” (NRH 79), and political things “as they present themselves in 
political life, that is, in action, when we have to make decisions” (NRH 81). Thus 
understood, the life of the polis is a life in which citizens “look up” to the law, 
which presents itself as “self-evident”, “holy”, or even “divine” [theios nomos].  
One of Strauss’s clearest expressions of the classical approach to politics 
can be found in his article ‘On Classical Political Philosophy’ (1945). In it, he 
explains that the most fundamental political controversy to be settled is: “who 
should rule?”, or “who should form the regime?” In answer to this question, the 
philosopher raises a question that is never asked in the political arena itself: “what 
is virtue?” or “what is that virtue whose possession gives a man the highest right to 
rule?” (CPP 90) Yet, Strauss continues, by questioning the authoritative opinions 
about virtue, the philosopher comes into conflict with the polis. Moreover, he will 
gradually discover that the question to which political life points – “what is 
                                                     
190 WIPP 40-47. 
191 Cf. Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, 58, 60. 
192 Strauss, Philosophy and Law, 138n2: “If “religion” and “politics” are the facts that transcend 
“culture,” or, to speak more precisely, the original facts, then the radical critique of the concept of 
“culture” is possible only in the form of a “theologico-political treatise” – which of course, if it is not 
to lead back again to the foundation of “culture,” must take exactly the opposite direction from the 
theologico-political treatises of the seventeenth century, especially those of Hobbes and Spinoza. The 
first condition for this would be, of course, that these seventeenth-century works no longer be 
understood, as they almost always have been up to now, within the horizon of philosophy of culture.” 
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virtue?”, which is another way of asking “what is the right way of life?” – can only 
be answered in a life devoted to philosophy: “virtue is knowledge”. In this sense, 
Strauss claims, “philosophy – not as a teaching or as a body of knowledge, but as a 
way of life – offers, as it were, the solution to the problem that keeps political life 
in motion” (CPP 91).
193
 He explains that this is what Socrates refers to when he 




In agreement with the thesis that a final political solution to the political 
problem, i.e., a solution “immanent” to political life, is unavailable, Strauss reads 
Plato’s Republic not as it is usually read today, viz. as a “utopian” plea for the rule 
of philosopher-kings which alone would promise a “cessation of evils” (CM 127), 
but as a dialogue which shows that the philosopher and the polis are essentially at 
odds with each other. Since philosophers are devoted to the pursuit of the 
unchangeable truth, they do not desire to interfere with human affairs. In addition, 
the ability of the wise to persuade the unwise to be ruled by them is by nature 
extremely limited. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the best regime – the regime 
which is “by nature” right – will ever be realized. Hence, it is of the essence that 
the best regime be utopian in the original sense of the word, that is, to exist as an 
object of contemplative aspiration rather than active realization, or to exist “in 
speech” rather than “in deed”.
195
 
In light of this account, several authors have suggested that Strauss’s 
political philosophy should ultimately be characterized as a-political.
196
 
Accordingly, Heinrich Meier argues that Strauss turns to politics for the sake of 
philosophy’s self-reflection; that his enterprise “is wholly in the service of self-
examination and the justification of philosophy [emphasis added]”.
197
  
                                                     
193 Cf. NRH 36: “The whole galaxy of political philosophers from Plato to Hegel, and certainly all 
adherents of natural right, assumed that the fundamental political problem is susceptible of a final 
solution. This assumption ultimately rested on the Socratic answer to the question of how man ought 
to live. By realizing that we are ignorant of the most important things, we realize at the same time that 
the most important thing for us, or the one thing needful, is quest for knowledge of the most important 
things or quest for wisdom.” Note the contrast between the following of Strauss’s remarks, the first 
about politics, the second about philosophy: “in political life, in action, when [political things] are our 
business, when we have to make decisions” (NRH 81); “There is no guaranty that the quest for 
adequate articulation will ever lead beyond an understanding of the fundamental alternatives or that 
philosophy will ever legitimately go beyond the stage of discussion or disputation and will ever reach 
the stage of decision” (NRH 125). 
194 CPP 91. See Plato, Gorgias, 521d. 
195 Strauss characterizes Plato’s Republic as “the most magnificent cure ever devised for every form 
of political ambition” (CM 65), that is, for “spiritedness” [thumos]. Strauss speaks of “the education 
to moderation” (CM 97) of Glaucon, “the most spirited speaker in the work” (CM 112). For the 
distinction between the classical and modern conceptions of “utopia”, see also Shklar, ‘The Political 
Theory of Utopia’. 
196  Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, Janssens, Between Athens and 
Jerusalem; Bluhm, Die Ordnung der Ordnung: Das politische Philosophieren von Leo Strauss; 
Gordon, ‘The Concept of the Apolitical: German Jewish Thought and Weimar Political Theology’. 
197  Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, 15. See also ibid., 14: “Strauss’s 
treatises … do not put philosophy to work for the purposes of politics; rather, they turn to politics for 
the sake of philosophy’s self-reflection”. 
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This account implies two things for our understanding of the meaning of 
Strauss’s “political philosophy”. First, insofar as there is a substance to Strauss’s 
“political philosophy”, it is primarily negative: it points to the “essential limits” 
(CM 138) of political life compared to philosophical life, which is considered the 
highest way of life. Polis life is incapable of fulfilling the highest need of man, i.e. 
the search for theoretical knowledge. As Strauss himself contends, in the end, 
philosophizing, or leaving the “cave”, means to use the term “political” in a 
derogatory sense,
198
 it means “to learn to look down on the human as something 
inferior” (WIPP 32). Secondly, because the meaning of philosophy is in general 
insufficiently understood, philosophy needs to justify itself before the tribunal of 
society. Strauss claims, therefore, that the adjective “political” in “political 
philosophy” designates not so much a subject of philosophy, but primarily the 
manner of its treatment.
199
 It is “political” insofar as it employs a specific, 
“politic”, manner of speaking and writing that invites “the few” to radically 
question authoritative opinions in the name of the truth, while making “the many” 
believe in the “salutary” character of philosophy for the polis. 
Accordingly, Meier claims that Strauss’s writings “do not elaborate a 
theory of politics”, and that “they do not promote … the political life as the 
writings of the political philosophers of the past did so emphatically at first 
glance.”
200
 We may therefore have to conclude that there is nothing positive to be 
learned about politics from Strauss’s work, neither about the substance of political 
life nor about normative criteria for “thoughtful” political action. 
Nevertheless, although the account given by Meier and others is correct, 
we must realize that it tells us the story of the relation between the two ways of life 
from one perspective only, viz. from the viewpoint of the philosophic way of life. 
Yet Strauss indicates that insight into the limits of the political sphere as a whole 
“can be expounded fully only by answering the question of the nature of political 
things” (CPP 94). Although Strauss considers the philosophical life to be higher 
than the political, he himself admits that one cannot recognize the “limits” of 
political life, one cannot recognize the polis as a “cave”, i.e., as it appears from the 
perspective of the philosopher, without first understanding the nature of political 
life in and of itself, i.e., as it appears from the perspective of the citizen.
201
 In other 
words, political life needs to be understood not as a “cave”, i.e. as something upon 
which to “look down”, but as a “world”, i.e. as something within which to “look 
up” to certain things:  
                                                     
198 CPP 93n24. 
199 CPP 93. 
200 Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, 14-15. Cf. Bluhm, Die Ordnung der 
Ordnung, 22-23: “er hat keine systematische philosophische Theorie der Politik geschaffen, und zwar 
weder einen Vorschlag zur Lösung des Problems politischer Ordnung, noch eine politische Ethik, 
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201 CM 240. 
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… political understanding or political science cannot start from seeing the 
city as the Cave but it must start from seeing the city as a world, as the 
highest in the world; it must start from seeing man as completely 





Throughout the present chapter, then, we attempt to stay as far as possible within 
the limits of political life, in order thus to reconstruct from Strauss’s work a 
political philosophy in the more common sense of the word, comprising both (i) an 
understanding of the essence of politics, and (ii) the setting of standards that 
provide guidance for politics. We begin by reconstructing Strauss’s exchange with 
Schmitt, who considers the ineradicable possibility of war as essential to the 
political. 
 
3.3. THE RECOVERY OF THE POLITICAL: WITH AND AGAINST SCHMITT 
 
The best way to start our exploration of Strauss’s answer to the question “What is 
political?” is by turning to his “comments” [Anmerkungen] on Carl Schmitt’s The 
Concept of the Political (1932), which he originally published in German in 
1932.
203
 There are several indications that he puts his reading of Schmitt’s treatise 
in service of his own attempt to recover the answer to this question. In his book 
Philosophy and Law (1936), for instance, Strauss explicitly refers to his review of 
Schmitt when he states that “the fact of the political” [die Tatsache des Politischen] 
is one of the two “original facts” that transcend “culture”, the other being “the fact 
of religion” [die Tatsache der Religion].
204
 Moreover, in his lecture ‘The Living 
Issues of German Postwar Philosophy’ (1940), Strauss renders the title of Schmitt’s 
essay as What Is Political?
205
 Furthermore, Strauss points to the central place of his 
Schmitt review within his own oeuvre by his decision to re-publish it as an 
appendix to the American translation of his Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (1930) 
as well as to the German translation of his The Political Philosophy of Hobbes 
(1936), both of which appeared in 1965. In the accompanying “autobiographical 
preface” to the former, he calls his Schmitt review his first public expression of his 
“change of orientation”, i.e. of his belief that a return to pre-modern philosophy is 
possible, i.e. that the classical philosophers may have found the truth. As David 
Janssens has demonstrated, Strauss did indeed read Schmitt’s The Concept of the 
                                                     
202 To be sure, Strauss opposes both of these (classical, “natural”) perspectives together against the 
(modern, “artificial”) perspective of the “neutral” scientific observer. See WIPP 25. 
203  Strauss, ‘Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen’, Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 67:6 (1932), 732-749. English translations appeared in Carl 
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) and in Heinrich 
Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995). 
204 Strauss, Philosophy and Law, 138n2. 
205 Strauss, ‘The Living Issues of Postwar German Philosophy’, 127.  
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Political from the horizon of classical political philosophy, a horizon that he would 
render increasingly visible in his later work.
206
  
As is well known, in The Concept of the Political, which includes the essay 
‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’,
207
 Schmitt aims to recover “the 
political” against its negation by liberalism. Instead of identifying “the political” 
with that which pertains to the “state” (as distinguished from “society”), Schmitt 
claims that the concept of the political is presupposed by the concept of the state.
208
 
He claims that “the political” exists in the effective capacity of correctly 
designating the public enemy in the extreme case [Ernstfall], that is, in case the 
concrete existence of a political community is threatened, either by a foreign 
political power or by an internal public enemy. Hence, the specifically political 
tension of human life is constituted by the extreme case, that is, the real, i.e., 
existential possibility of physical extinction. Accordingly, Schmitt defines “the 
high points of great politics [grosse Politik]” as “the moments in which the enemy 
is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy”.
209
 Only as long as a political 
community possesses the capacity to designate the enemy, it possesses sovereignty 
and it is effectively capable of exercising rule [Herrschaft]. The latter implies the 
authority to demand from its individual citizens the ultimate sacrifice in the 
extreme case, viz. death. In addition, Schmitt claims that political conflicts cannot 
be decided by a previously determined general norm or by the judgment of a 
“neutral” third party, but only by the participants in the conflict themselves. 
According to him, “all political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical 
meaning”,
210
 which is to say that they can only be understood from a concrete, i.e., 
existential situation. 
Schmitt’s militant “decisionism” and his well-known advocacy of a 
conception of the political in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy, 
have made him a controversial figure, especially among liberal and 
“deliberationist” political philosophers. We should not be surprised, therefore, that 
Strauss’s reputation has been affected by his exchange with Schmitt.
211
 Especially 
                                                     
206  Janssens, ‘A Change of Orientation: Leo Strauss’s “Comments” on Carl Schmitt Revisited’; 
Janssens, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 133-147. 
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Strauss’s own claim that his review should be understood as preparation for 
“gaining a horizon beyond liberalism” (NCP 122) is often used as evidence (for 
instance by Stephen Holmes) for the thesis that Strauss himself is not a liberal 
either.
212
 In reply, sympathetic readers of Strauss have tried to demonstrate that he 
in fact draws on different, pre-modern resources in order to fortify liberal 
democracy.
213
 Nevertheless, both camps restrict themselves to the question of 
whether or not Strauss is a liberal. Even Robert Howse, who offers a careful and 
balanced reconstruction of Strauss’s response to Schmitt, argues in the end that 
Strauss still adopts a form of liberalism, albeit of a different, “ancient” kind.
214
 
By contrast, Heinrich Meier, David Janssens, and others have tried to 
demonstrate that Strauss, as defender of philosophy or of the Socratic way of life, 
distances himself from Schmitt as defender of politics or the political way of life. 
They claim that Strauss places Schmitt’s strong defense of “the political” against 
liberalism’s forgetfulness of the political in service of his own attempt to make the 
case for philosophy as strong as possible.
215
 This explains why Meier concludes his 
monograph on the “hidden dialogue” between Schmitt and Strauss with the 
following words:  
 
Whereas the political does have central significance for the thought of 
Leo Strauss, the enemy and enmity do not. Enmity does not touch the 
core of his existence, and his identity does not take its shape in battle with 
the enemy. The friends that Strauss chose for himself tell us much more 





If we understand these words correctly, Meier means to say that there is no place 
for polemics or partisanship in philosophy proper. To the contrary, the 
philosophical quest for the truth is to be pursued sine ira et studio, which is the 




However, I argue that this by no means implies that Strauss’s conception 
of the political is also free from the enemy and enmity. As I show, Strauss agrees 
with Schmitt that the distinction between friend and enemy does indeed inevitably 
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belong to the political, but he disagrees with Schmitt insofar as he claims that the 
raison d’être of the political is not enmity as such, but rather the question of the 
right way of life in answer to which the friend-enemy conflict may arise. 
Strauss’s “comments” on Schmitt’s “treatise” consist of three sections of 
increasing length. In the first part, Strauss says that Schmitt’s positing of “the 
political” should be read in agreement with the latter’s explicitly formulated thesis 
that all political concepts are bound to a concrete polemical situation. Schmitt 
posits the political in opposition to liberalism – the system of thought in which 
modern thought, beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, has culminated. Yet, 
Strauss explains, liberal thought has in fact not destroyed the political, but it has 
covered it. Hence, in order for Schmitt to succeed in recovering it, he is confronted 
with the task to escape from the powerful systematic of liberal thought. Hence, 
Strauss aims to find out in which respect Schmitt differs from liberalism.
218
  
In the second part of his review, Strauss claims that Schmitt understands 
the question of “the essence of the political” as the question of the specific 
difference of the political.
219
 Liberalism regards the political as a part of the genus 
of “culture”, which is understood as the totality of “human thought and action”.
220
 
At first sight, it may therefore seem that Schmitt wishes to recover the autonomy of 
the political and its own specific distinction, viz. that of “friend” and “enemy”, next 
to other, equally autonomous “provinces of culture”,
221
 such as the aesthetic, the 
economic, the juridical, and the moral, each of which also upholds its own specific 
distinctions, viz. that of beautiful and ugly, profitable and unprofitable, lawful and 
unlawful, good and evil, respectively. Strauss explains that a second look, however, 
clearly shows that Schmitt does not regard the political as a cultural “province” 
next to and analogous to others. To the contrary, since the political is oriented 
towards the possibility of war, that is, the real possibility of physical killing, 




Strauss infers that Schmitt’s assumption of the fundamental character of 
the political actually implies a critique of the modern conception of “culture”. In 
modern thought, “culture” is conceived of as a sovereign creation of man. Strauss 
argues, however, that this causes us to forget that culture is always culture of 
nature, which may consist either in the careful cultivation of nature as an 
exemplary order to be obeyed, or in the conquest of nature as a disorder to be 
eliminated. In accordance with the second, distinctly modern conception of culture, 
Hobbes conceives of the status civilis in opposition to the status naturalis, which 
he describes as a state of war, or, to be more precise, as a state of the continuous 
and real possibility of war. Hence, Strauss infers, insofar as Schmitt aims for a 
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recovery of the political, he aims for a recovery of the genus of the “natural” 
situation of mankind. Yet, Strauss adds, there is a crucial difference between 
Hobbes and Schmitt. Hobbes conceives of the state of nature as a state of war 
between individuals, a situation that ought to be overcome in the name of 
protecting the lives of these individuals, which is why Strauss regards him as the 
founder of liberalism.
223
 By contrast, Schmitt considers the state of nature as a state 
of war between collectives, between friend-enemy groupings, each of which 
demand obedience from their individual subjects, including, in the extreme case, 
the sacrifice of their lives. Strauss concludes that liberalism, which was born within 
the modern conception of “culture”, forgets the basis of “culture”, viz. human 
“nature” in its dangerousness and in its being endangered.
224
 
At the beginning of the third, final, and longest part of his review, Strauss 
states that Schmitt’s affirmation of “the political” appears as an attempt to say 
“what is”, that is, to give an un-polemical description of the fact of the political. 
Schmitt considers the political as the inescapable fate of man: it is given in human 
nature. Accordingly, he claims that even the pacifists’ struggle for a “world state”, 
which would put an end to the existence of separate, juxtaposed political entities or 
states, would, as struggle, precisely be an affirmation of the inevitability of the 
political.  
The opposition between the negation and the position of the political can 
ultimately be traced back to a quarrel about human nature, viz. the question of 
whether man is by nature good or evil, that is to say, undangerous or dangerous. In 
Schmitt’s view, the thesis of the inevitability of the political is in the end based on 
the thesis that man is by nature dangerous.
225
 He admits that this thesis is in itself 
an “anthropological confession of faith” [Glaubensbekenntnis].
226
 Yet, if this is the 
case, Strauss infers, it is possible to adhere to a different faith, as a result of which 
the political would remain endangered. Hence, he continues, Schmitt’s positing of 
the political is more than a mere description of the reality of the political: it is an 
affirmation of the political.  
Strauss claims that Schmitt’s affirmation of the political cannot be 
understood politically in the sense mentioned above, i.e. existentially: during war 
one does not wish for dangerous enemies  “a nation in danger wants its own 
dangerousness not for the sake of dangerousness, but for the sake of being rescued 
from danger” (NCP 112). The affirmation of the political must therefore have a 
“normative”, moral meaning: it is the affirmation of the power of state formation, 
virtú in Machiavelli’s sense. Hence, Strauss claims, the ultimate legitimation for 
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For Schmitt, however, the more fundamental question is whether “rule” 
[Herrschaft] of men over men is necessary or superfluous. It is in view of this 
question that the question of man’s dangerousness or undangerousness surfaces 
again. Strauss argues, therefore, that the ultimate quarrel occurs not between 
bellicosity and pacifism, but between authoritarianism and anarchism: while 
authoritarian theorists, such as Hobbes, claim that human beings are by nature 
dangerous and that they thus stand in need of rule, anarchist theorists claim that 
human beings are by nature not dangerous and that hence they do not stand in need 
of rule. Strauss claims that, at first sight, Schmitt seems to follow Hobbes in 
asserting that mankind is evil in the sense of animal dangerousness, that is, of an 
innocent evil. Yet, if this were the case, mankind could be domesticated, educated. 
Whereas Hobbes, whom Strauss considers the founder of liberalism, believed that 
the malleability of mankind in this respect is limited, liberalism itself is more 
optimistic. However, insofar as evil is understood as innocent evil, the opposition 
between good and evil loses its significance. Strauss therefore stipulates that, if 
Schmitt wishes to overcome liberalism, he has to conceive of evil in a stronger 
sense, viz. not as innocent evil but as moral depravity. In an earlier text, Political 
Theology (1922), Schmitt had indeed stated that “the core of the political idea” is 
“the morally demanding decision”.
228
  
Strauss claims, though, that Schmitt contradicts himself insofar as he 
displays a sympathy for evil, that is, a merely aesthetic admiration for animal 
dangerousness. How, after all, can one admire the need for rule, which, being a 
need, is not an excellence, but a deficiency? In reality, Strauss argues, Schmitt 
affirms the political because it is the only guarantee against the world becoming a 
world of “entertainment”, a world that lacks seriousness. Schmitt had said:  
 
A definitively pacified globe, would be a world without politics. In such a 
world there could be various, perhaps very interesting, oppositions and 
contrasts, competitions and intrigues of all kinds, but no opposition on the 
basis of which it could sensibly be demanded of men that they sacrifice 
their lives [emphasis added by Strauss]. (CP 35) 
 
According to Strauss, the “perhaps” conceals and hides Schmitt’s nausea over this 
capacity to be “very interesting”. He concludes that Schmitt rejects pacifism – or 
“civilization” – because it forms a threat to the seriousness of human life: “His 




Strauss claims that Schmitt’s critique of the modern tendency of 
neutralization, which culminates in the spirit of technology, leads to the same 
conclusion. While it is indeed possible in principle to reach agreement regarding 
the means to an end that is already established, Strauss argues that there is always a 
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quarrel about the ends themselves.
230
 If one seeks agreement at all cost, one needs 
to abandon the question of what is right and concern oneself solely with the means, 
which forms the basis of the modern faith in technology. Strauss adds that Schmitt 
rightly indicates that technology is in fact never neutral, however, for it can serve 
any end. Strauss infers that peace at all cost is only possible when the question of 
the meaning of human life, the question of the right way of life, is no longer raised 
in all seriousness. If this question is asked seriously, though, the life-and-death 
quarrel will be ignited. Hence, Strauss concludes, “the political – the grouping of 
humanity into friends and enemies – owes its legitimation to the seriousness of the 
question of what is right” (NCP 118).  
However, he notes, Schmitt does not openly acknowledge this affirmation 
of the seriousness of the moral question, of the question what is right. Strauss 
offers as explanation that in order to defeat liberalism, Schmitt was bound to start 
from the strongest contemporary opinion, which is the liberal conception of 
morality. Liberalism understands morality primarily as private preference or 
demand instead of trans-private obligation or duty. Insofar as Schmitt remains tied 
to the same conception of morality as his opponent, then, he has to conceal the 
moral character of his own affirmation of the political and instead present the 
political as an ineradicable necessity. However, Strauss argues, the affirmation of 
the political in disregard of the moral would mean nothing more than an 
affirmation of struggle as such, regardless of what is struggled for: 
 
He who affirms the political as such respects all who want to fight; he is 
just as tolerant as the liberals – but with the opposite intention: whereas 
the liberal respects and tolerates all “honest” convictions so long as they 
merely acknowledge the legal order, peace, as sacrosanct, he who affirms 
the political as such respects and tolerates all “serious” convictions, that 
is, all decisions oriented to the possibility of war. Thus the affirmation of 





According to Strauss, then, Schmitt is incapable of recovering political authority or 
rule [Herrschaft] insofar as his affirmation of “the political” – of struggle at all 
cost – remains polemically tied to the affirmation of tolerance – of peace at all cost 
– by its liberal opponent. 
Strauss argues, therefore, that Schmitt’s polemic against liberalism can 
only be his “first word”: it is meant to clear the field between “the spirit of 
technology”, the “mass faith that inspires an antireligious, this-worldly activism”, 
                                                     
230 Strauss refers to Plato, Euthypro, 7bd, in which Socrates suggests that differences about number, 
size or weight are capable of being resolved by having recourse to measurements, whereas he asks 
about the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad: “Are these not the 
subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I 
and other men become hostile to each other whenever we do?” Strauss also refers to Plato, Phaedrus, 
263a, which contains a similar passage. 
231 NCP 120. 
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and an opposite faith which seems as yet to have no name.
232
 According to Strauss, 
Schmitt’s “last word” does not consist in the battle against liberalism, but in “the 
order of the human things”.
233
  
Strauss claims that Schmitt’s entanglement in the polemic against 
liberalism is the necessary result of his thesis that “all concepts of the spiritual 
sphere … are to be understood only in terms of concrete political existence” and 
that all political concepts have a polemical meaning.
234
 He notes, though, that 
Schmitt effectively contradicts this principle when he opposes his unpolemical 
concept of the state of nature to Hobbes’s polemical concept of the state of nature, 
and that he even rejects this principle when he states that the order of human things 
is to be expected from a “pure and whole knowledge”. Schmitt concludes his text 
with the following words from Virgil’s Fourth Eclogue: “ab integro nascitur ordo” 
/ “order is born from what is pure and whole”.
235
 According to Strauss, the best 





For a pure and whole knowledge [ein integres Wissen] is never, unless by 
accident, polemical, and a pure and whole knowledge cannot be gained 
“from concrete political existence, from the situation of the age,” but only 
by means of a return to the origin, to “undamaged, noncorrupt nature”. 
(NCP 122)  
 
Heinrich Meier has argued that Schmitt and Strauss find the source for a recovery 
of this moral seriousness in different, even opposing directions. He states that 
Strauss clearly finds it in a return to classical political philosophy, which strives for 
genuine knowledge of nature, whereas Schmitt finds the spirit and faith which 
seemed to have no name in a return to revealed political theology, as the topical 
reference to Virgil’s Eclogues would seem to indicate.
237
 Whereas philosophy lives 
in the seriousness of the question of the right way of life, religion lives in the 
seriousness of the divine answer to the question of the right way of life. In other 
                                                     
232 NCP 121. 
233 NCP 121. 
234 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 84. 
235 Ibid., 96. The complete line from Virgil’s Fourth Eclogue runs as follows: “Magnus ab integro 
saeclorum nascitur ordo.” 
236 Cf. Strauss, letter to Gerhard Krüger, 19 August 1932, in: Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, 
399: “im Gegensatz zu der Verständigung um jeden Preis ist der Streit wahrer; das letzte Wort kann 
aber nur der Friede, d.h. die Verständigung in der Wahrheit, sein. Dass diese Verständigung der 
Vernunft möglich sei – firmitur credo.” Strauss suggests that struggle is “truer” than agreement at all 
cost because its concomitant conviction that one is in the right implies that it is at least possible to 
know the truth. See CM 111: “every act of human spiritedness seems to include a sense that one is in 
the right.” 
237  Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue, 60-71, 65n70. Meier interprets 
Schmitt’s use of Virgil’s words from the Fourth Eclogue, 5 as a signal of his underlying belief in 
divine providence. See also Meier, Die Lehre Carl Schmitts, 256: “Sosehr sich die geschichtlichen 
Lagen ändern, auf die Schmitt mit seinem »blinden Vorgebot« unmittelbar antwortet, sowenig ändert 
sich sein Glaube, daß die göttliche Vorsehung die Geschichte regiert.” 
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words, whereas in the case of philosophy, “moral evil” consists in a lack of 
knowledge – “virtue is knowledge” is the Socratic dictum – in the case of revealed 
religion, moral evil consists in a lack of obedience to divine authority.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that a difference in understanding of the 
source of the raison d’être of the political does not yet imply a difference in 
understanding of what the political in itself – political life, the political world from 
the perspective of the citizen – looks like. As we have seen, Strauss stated that the 
opposition between authoritarian and anarchist theories of the political is more 
fundamental than that between bellicose nationalism and pacifist internationalism. 
In a letter to Schmitt which he presents as a follow-up to his review, Strauss 
explains how they are connected:   
 
… because man is by nature evil, he therefore needs rule [Herrschaft]. 
But rule can be established, that is, men can be unified, only in a unity 
[Einheit] against – against other men. Every association 
[Zusammenschluss] of men is necessarily a separation [Abschluss] from 
other men. The tendency to separate [Abschliesungstendenz] (and 
therewith the grouping of humanity into friends and enemies) is given 





In other words, Strauss suggests that the co-existence of political unities that are 
characterized by mutual “closure” and the possibility of the friend-enemy conflict 
is according to nature. In the same letter, he notes that Schmitt’s opening thesis 
that the concept of the state “presupposes” the concept of the political is in fact 
ambiguous.
239
 Pointing to the etymological affinity between the word “political” 
and the Greek word polis, Strauss claims that the political should not be understood 
as the constituting principle of the modern state, but rather as its condition.
240
 Eight 
years later, in a letter to Karl Löwith, Strauss would explicitly express his belief in 
the truth of the classical understanding of the political:  
 
I truly believe, although it apparently appears as fantastic to you, that the 
perfect political order, as Plato and Aristotle have sketched it, is the 
perfect political order. Or do you believe in a world state? If it is true that 
real unity [Einheit] is only possible through knowledge of the truth or 
through searching for the truth, then a real unity of all human beings can 
only exist on the basis of the popularized, final teaching [Lehre] of 
philosophy (which is of course unavailable), or if all human beings would 
be philosophers (and not D.Phil. etc.) (which is not the case either). 
                                                     
238 Strauss, letter to Carl Schmitt, 4 September 1932, 125. 
239 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 19. 
240 Strauss, letter to Carl Schmitt, 4 September 1932, 125. In other words, the most “natural” form of 
“the political” – understood as the inevitable existence of mutually exclusive friend-enemy groupings 









Strauss makes explicit here the classical assumption that unity of all men on the 
basis of knowledge of the truth or searching for the truth is impossible, because by 
nature not all human beings are or will become philosophers. Since it is the case 
that not all human beings are capable of realizing that “virtue is knowledge”, 
therefore, the world cannot be united in “pure and whole” [integer] knowledge. If 
“real” unity on the basis of philosophy – the highest use of reason [logos] – is 
impossible, political unity on the basis of polemics – “spiritedness” [thumos] – 
seems to be the only alternative.
242
  
We may conclude, therefore, that Strauss agrees with Schmitt in regarding 
the possibility of the friend-enemy conflict as central to the political experience.
243
 
Although the source of the raison d’être of the political may be different in the 
case of Schmitt and Strauss – viz. the moral seriousness gained by religion (versus 
unbelief) and by philosophy (versus ignorance), respectively – their description of 
the political is much the same. For Strauss just as much as for Schmitt, “the fact of 
the political” consists in the division of mankind into friend-enemy groupings or 
“closed societies”. Each of these political communities is characterized by the 
exercise of rule [Herrschaft, archè] and by its concomitant enforcement of the law 
[Gesetz, nomos], which implies the inescapable presence of a trans-private 
obligation on its individual subjects, existing in the obligation to sacrifice their 
individual lives in case of war, that is, in the extreme situation. 
 
3.4. THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: MACHIAVELLI 
AND HOBBES 
 
After our reconstruction of Strauss’s preliminary recovery of “the fact of the 
political”, we now proceed to our second question: to what extent does he leave 




                                                     
241 Strauss, letter to Karl Löwith, 15 August 1946, in: Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, 662 
(translation my own). 
242 Cf. CM 111: “the city … separates itself from others by opposing or resisting them; the opposition 
of ‘We and They’ is essential to the political association.” 
243 Sympathizers with Strauss deny that this is the case. See e.g. Smith, Reading Leo Strauss, 196: 
“Strauss hardly accepted a Schmittean view of the political universe as divided into mutually hostile 
camps of friend and enemy.”; 188-189; and Zuckert & Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss, 192: 
“according to Strauss, the political is not defined or constituted by the friend-enemy-distinction.” 
Finally, Shell, in her article ‘Taking Evil Seriously: Schmitt’s “Concept of the Political” and Strauss’s 
“True Politics”’, also claims that Schmitt and Strauss “differ fundamentally … in their understanding 
what politics is” (ibid., 185). Even so, she points to the difference between Schmitt’s affirmation of 
human dangerousness and Strauss’s affirmation of human evil as sources of dominion, while she is 
silent about the question of the extent to which the friend-enemy distinction plays a role in the 
conceptions of the politicalof both of them.. 
244 NRH 127. 
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On the basis of the analysis so far, we seem to be left with only two 
options: (i) either Strauss’s philosophical turning away from politics – which 
seems to leave us without any rational standards within political life; (ii) or 
Schmitt’s “decisionist” (or “existentialist”) immersion in politics – which seem to 
leave us without any rational standards within political life. We thus seem to be 
caught between Socrates’ “true politics”, which uses “dialectical” conversation to 
find unity in genuine knowledge of the truth, and Schmitt’s “great politics”, which 
takes decisions demanded by the concrete existential situation, especially the state 
of exception, in which unity and sovereign rule are established by polemically 
closing off one’s own political community against another. While political life is 
incapable of fulfilling the goal of philosophic life, the goal of political life itself 
coincides entirely with the self-preservation of the political community. In either 
case, it seems there is not much to hope for within political life. 
As we demonstrate, however, in fact Strauss does suggest the possibility of 
a politics between philosophy and polemics, which we reconstruct on the basis of 
his account of “classic natural right”, especially its Platonic and Aristotelian 
variants, in chapter IV of Natural Right and History. Just as in the case of his 
classical “theory” of politics, Strauss’s classical “theory” of “thoughtful” political 
action or of “prudence” [phronèsis] takes shape in dialogue with Schmitt’s 
“existentialism”, although less conspicuously so. In addition, it is to be understood 
as a response to what he calls the “doctrinaire” character of modern political 
philosophy. Strauss concludes his Schmitt review by formulating the task of 
achieving an adequate understanding of Hobbes, or of the horizon within which the 
foundation of liberalism was completed.
245
 In accordance with this aim, Strauss 
published a book called The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936). As he would 
only later discover that Hobbes was decisively influenced by Machiavelli, for a full 
understanding of Strauss’s thinking on Hobbes we turn to Chapter V.A. of Natural 
Right and History (1953). 
As the first section of this chapter briefly explained, Strauss regards 
Machiavelli as the “founder” of modern political philosophy, because he decided to 
break with classical political philosophy, which had taken its bearings by how 
human beings ought to live, and had argued that in answering the question of the 
right political order we should instead take our bearings by how human beings 
actually live. According to Strauss, Machiavelli replaced the highest virtue, that is, 
the virtue of philosophical life, by merely political virtue, or patriotism. By thus 
lowering the standard of the right political order, the probability of its realization is 
increased, or, stated otherwise, its actualization has become less dependent on 
chance. In order to conquer chance, Machiavelli in fact decided to take his bearings 
                                                     
245 NCP 122: “The critique introduced by Schmitt against liberalism can … be completed only if one 
succeeds in gaining a horizon beyond liberalism. In such a horizon Hobbes completed the foundation 
of liberalism. A radical critique of liberalism is thus possible only on the basis of an adequate 
understanding of Hobbes. To show what can be learned from Schmitt in order to achieve that urgent 
task was therefore the principle intention of our notes.” 
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not so much by how human beings actually live as by how they live in the extreme 
case, i.e. in the state of necessity.
246
  
Strauss tells us that Hobbes, in turn, attempted to restore the moral 
principles of politics, i.e. the “natural law”. However, he did so on the plane of 
Machiavelli’s “realism”: in order to guarantee the actualization of the right 
political order, certainty is needed about the nature of the right political order and 
about the conditions of its actualization. Accordingly, Hobbes attempted to deduce 
the natural law, not from an idea of human excellence or virtue, but from the most 
powerful of all human passions, which is fear of violent death,
247
 or, as Strauss had 
put it in his earlier book: “death – being the summum malum, while there is no 
summum bonum – is the only absolute standard by reference to which man may 
coherently order his life”.
248
 Fear of violent death, in turn, is the expression of the 
desire for self-preservation. Hence, all moral laws or duties are derived from this 
one fundamental and inalienable right to self-preservation. Strauss concludes, 
therefore: 
 
If we may call liberalism that political doctrine which regards as the 
fundamental political fact the rights, as distinguished from the duties, of 
man and which identifies the function of the state with the protection or 
the safeguarding of those rights, we must say that the founder of 
liberalism was Hobbes. (NRH 181-182) 
 
Stated differently, Hobbes conceives of the human individual not as a being who is 
social or political by nature [zoion politikon], but as a being who is already 
complete by nature, i.e. within the status naturalis, independently of civil society, 
i.e. the status civilis. Thus, Strauss claims, Hobbes defends an uncompromising 
form of individualism. As a result, if everyone has an equal right, everyone is by 
nature the judge of what are the right means to his self-preservation. Strauss claims 
that only on this premise does the problem of sovereignty arise. If the question 
“who should rule?” cannot be decided by reason, someone or some group of 




According to Strauss, the doctrine of “natural public law”, which emerged 
in the seventeenth century, replaced the concern for “the best regime” with a 
concern for “legitimate government”.
250
 Classical political philosophy had insisted 
on the difference between the one best regime – which exists “in speech” only – 
and the various legitimate regimes – which may be realized “in deed”. In the case 
of the modern doctrine of natural public law, Strauss indicates, this difference 
disappears: 
 
                                                     
246 NRH 177-179. 
247 NRH 179-181. 
248 Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 16. 
249 NRH 186. 
250 NRH 191. 
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Natural public law, we may say, replaces the idea of the best regime, 
which does not supply, and is not meant to supply, an answer to the 
question of what is the just order here and now, by the idea of the just 
social order which answers the basic practical question once and for all, 
i.e., regardless of place and time. Natural public law intends to give such 
a universally valid solution to the political problem as is meant to be 
universally applicable in practice. (NRH 191) 
 
As a consequence of the claim that political theory has already solved the 
essentially practical problem of what order is just here and now, there is no longer 
any need for statesmanship as distinguished from political theory. Strauss calls this 
type of thinking “doctrinairism”,
251
 while failing to mention his indebtedness to 
Schmitt in this regard, who had used this term in a similar way in his Constitutional 
Theory (1928).
252
 Strauss claims that, from the seventeenth century on, “the 
sensible flexibility of classical political philosophy gave way to fanatical rigidity”, 
as a result of which “the political philosopher became more and more 
indistinguishable from the partisan” (NRH 192). In addition, he claims that from 
the viewpoint of natural public law, what is needed to establish the right political 
order is less “the formation of character” than “the devising of the right kind of 
institutions” (NRH 193). 
When we now choose to interpret Popper’s political philosophy against the 
background of Strauss’s sketch of modern political philosophy, he turns out to fit 
very well within the profile. As we have seen, Popper abandons the “utopian” 
question of “the ideal state”, claiming that there is only one legitimate form of 
government: democracy. Moreover, he claims that the fundamental political 
problem has been “solved” by the demand that there is one single value that may 
serve as the goal of politics: the reduction of avoidable human suffering, being the 
summum malum. Finally, the only political problems left are mere “technological” 
ones, capable of being solved by “social engineering”, that is, by the design and 
reform of social institutions which serve as efficiently and effectively as possible 
the realization of an aim that has already been established.  
Strauss continues his account of Hobbes by stating that the historical 
thought of the nineteenth century has tried “to recover for statesmanship that 
latitude which natural public law had so severely restricted” (NRH 192). However, 
he notes, “since that historical thought was absolutely under the spell of modern 
“realism”, it succeeded in destroying natural public law only by destroying in the 
                                                     
251 Strauss uses the term in NRH, 192, 277, 303, 319, 321. 
252 Carl Schmitt speaks in his Constitutional Theory, 63 of “doctrinaires” as a group of nineteenth-
century French liberal legal thinkers who regarded the “constitution” [Verfassung] as the seat of 
“sovereignty”. In a broader sense, his use of the term can be understood to refer to the thesis that not 
men but laws are sovereign. Schmitt claims that the “doctrinaires” circumvent “the actual political 
question”, i.e. the question “who should rule?” (viz. the people or the prince) (ibid., 63). While 
Schmitt speaks about a specific group of legal thinkers, Strauss notes that “lawyers are altogether a 
class by themselves” (NRH 192), thereby suggesting that legal thinkers are “doctrinaires” by 
profession. Strauss claims, however, that “doctrinairism” was introduced within political philosophy 
in the seventeenth century.  
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process all moral principles of politics” (NRH 192). As we have seen above, 
Strauss contends that historical thought culminated in “radical historicism” or 
“existentialism”,
253
 a position which he associates with Nietzsche and more 
especially with Heidegger.
254
 Although he does not mention Schmitt explicitly, it is 
clear that he must have had him in mind as well, since he explicitly adopts an 




Finally, I point to the following lines from the last chapter of Natural Right 
and History, which may serve as conclusion to Strauss’s account of “the moderns”:  
 
“Doctrinairism” and “existentialism” appear to us as the two faulty 
extremes. While being opposed to each other, they agree with each other 
in the decisive respect – they agree in ignoring prudence, “the god of this 
lower world.” Prudence and “this lower world” cannot be seen properly 
without some knowledge of “the higher world” – without genuine theoria. 
(NRH 321) 
 
In sum, both Schmitt’s “existentialism” and Strauss’s attempt at a recovery of the 
bios theōrētikos are to be understood as responses to modern political philosophy’s 
“doctrinaire” (con)fusion of philosophy and politics. However, whereas Schmitt’s 
position leaves us without any moral standards within political life, Strauss’s 
recovery of philosophical life, or the pursuit of purely theoretical wisdom [sophia], 
which may at first appear to be an escape from political life, in fact serves as 
prerequisite for the recovery of “thoughtful” political action, or for the practical 





3.5. THE RECOVERY OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: PLATO AND 
ARISTOTLE 
 
We now turn to Strauss’s account of classical political philosophy, or more 
specifically, to his reconstruction of the classic account of “natural right”,
257
 i.e., of 
the “best regime”, which he offers in Chapter IV of Natural Right and History. As 
has already been stated, in the end this book is meant as an attempt to understand 
                                                     
253 NRH, chapter 1. He uses the term “existentialism” in NRH 32, 321. 
254 NRH 320. 
255 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 64: “The fact is a constitution is valid because it derives from a 
constitution-making capacity (power or authority) and is established by the will of this constitution-
making power. In contrast to mere norms, the word “will” denotes an actually existing power as the 
origin of command. The will is existentially present; its power or authority lies in its being. A norm 
can be valid because it is correct. The logical conclusion, reached systematically, is natural law, not 
the positive constitution. The alternative is that a norm is valid because it is positively established, in 
other words, by virtue of an existing will.” 
256 Cf. Strauss, letter to Karl Löwith, 2 February 1933, in: idem, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, 620: 
“Es fragt sich also: ob man bei der Antithese Tapferkeit-Wissen stehenbleiben muss.” 
257 NRH 93: “This precisely is the basic controversy in political philosophy: Is there any natural right?” 
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the problem of “natural right” (the question whether such a thing as natural right 
exists) and the alternative solutions to it,
258
 most notably conventionalism (which 
denies the existence of natural right, claiming that all right is of human origin) and 
the classic natural right teaching (which affirms the existence of natural right). 
However, the book suggests a strong preference for the latter solution, not only 
against contemporary relativism, positivist and historicist,
259
 but also against 
classical conventionalism. Our account of Strauss’s answer to “doctrinairism” and 
“existentialism” is therefore based on the classic natural-right teaching. 
It is important to note that Strauss’s recovery of “natural right” [phusei 
dikaion] should not be confused with a recovery of “natural law”. He notes that in 
light of the classical distinction between “nature” [phusis] and “law” [nomos], 
“natural law” [nomos tēs phuseōs] is a contradiction in terms rather than a matter of 
course.
260
 Hence, the notion of “natural right” is to be distinguished from the 
Thomistic teaching on natural law. Strauss argues that if the best regime is the City 
of God, or if the cessation of evil is brought about by God’s supernatural 
intervention, the question of the best regime loses its crucial significance: “The 
notion of God as lawgiver takes on a certainty and definiteness which it never 
possessed in classical philosophy” (NRH 144). Moreover, the notion of “natural 
right” should also be distinguished from the modern notion of “natural public law”, 
of which we have seen in the previous section that its certainty is “scientifically” 




In contrast to these “natural law” doctrines, Strauss notes, the classic 
natural right teaching is “political” in nature: it consists in the construction “in 
speech” of the best regime. It holds that the definite character of the virtues, and 
hence of the virtue of justice, cannot be deduced from human nature. After all, 
Strauss argues, the idea of man is not problematic in the same way as the idea of 
justice: “there is hardly disagreement as to whether a given being is a man, whereas 
there is habitual disagreement in regard to things just and noble” (NRH 145). As 
virtue exists in most cases as an object of aspiration rather than fulfillment, it exists 
“in speech” rather than “in deed”. Therefore, Strauss argues, the proper starting 
point for the study of the virtues is what is said about them, i.e. opinions about 
justice. Against the claim of positivism, that the existence of natural right is refuted 
by the actual existence of a variety of opinions about justice, Strauss suggests that 
this would only be the case if actual consent of all men in regard to the principles 
of right were required, whereas in fact only potential consent is required.
262
 The 
                                                     
258 See NRH 6: “Let us beware of the danger of pursuing a Socratic goal with the means, and the 
temper, of Thrasymachus.” Cf. Kennington, ‘Strauss’s Natural Right and History’, 67; Tanguay, Leo 
Strauss: An Intellectual Biography, 123. 
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replacement of mere opinions [doxai] by true knowledge [epistēmē] about natural 
right is sought for in philosophical conversation. Yet there is no guarantee that it 
“will ever legitimately go beyond the stage of discussion or disputation and will 
ever reach the stage of decision” (NRH 125).  
In fulfillment of the aim of this chapter, we reconstruct the description of 
the essence of the political and the prescriptions for the thoughtful guidance of 
political action as they are manifest in Strauss’s account of classic natural right. We 
first turn to his account of the classic teaching of natural right in general, after 
which we focus on his treatment of what he calls “the Socratic-Platonic-Stoic” and 
the “Aristotelian” subtypes, respectively.
263
 In each case, we take an effort at 
thinking along with Strauss in the direction he points, paying specific attention to 
his uses of the word “political” and related terms.  
 
3.5.1. CLASSIC NATURAL RIGHT AND THE RECOVERY OF THE POLITICAL 
 
Against conventionalism, which identifies the good with the pleasant, the classical 
natural-right thinkers hold that the good is higher than the pleasant. They claim that 
every being possesses a natural order of wants, which is determined by the natural 
constitution, or the “what” of the being concerned. A being is good if it does well 
the work that corresponds with its nature. Hence, a good human life consists in the 
perfection of human nature, i.e. in excellence or virtue.
264
 Strauss suggests that “the 
rules circumscribing the general character of the good life” may be called “natural 
law” (NRH 127). By putting the latter term between quotation marks he reminds us 
that the actual decision in favor of a specific “natural law” always remains a matter 
of (contestable) speech about “ideas” rather than (certain) deduction from “facts” 
or divine revelation. 
According to the classics, man distinguishes himself from the brutes in the 
first place by his possession of “speech or reason or understanding” (NRH 127) 
[zoion logon echon]. The proper work of man thus consists in “living 
thoughtfully”, i.e. in “understanding” (especially philosophical understanding) and 
in “thoughtful action” (especially thoughtful political action) (NRH 127). Man 
distinguishes himself in the second place because he is by nature a social being 
[zoion politikon]. Since speech is communication, man is social in a more radical 
sense than any other social animal: “Man refers himself to others, or rather he is 
referred to others, in every human act, regardless of whether he is ‘social’ or 
‘antisocial’” (NRH 129). Hence, Strauss explains, implicitly arguing against 
Hobbes, man’s sociality does not proceed from a calculation of the pleasures or 
benefits he expects from association, but he derives pleasures from association 
because he is by nature social. He adds: 
 
                                                     
263 For reasons just indicated, we will leave the third type – Thomistic natural right (NRH 163-164) – 
out of consideration. 
264 NRH 128. 
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By virtue of his rationality, man has a latitude of alternatives such as no 
other earthly being has. The sense of this latitude, of this freedom, is 
accompanied by a sense that the full and unrestrained exercise of that 
freedom is not right. Man’s freedom is accompanied by a sacred awe, by 
a kind of divination that not everything is permitted. (NRH 130) 
 
In other words, and again in contrast with Hobbes, restraint is as natural as 
freedom. Moreover, Strauss argues, since restraint must sometimes be coercive to 
be effective, “rule” or “power” [archè, Herrschaft] is as such not against nature, 
nor is it in itself an “evil”.
265
  
Since man is a social being, Strauss adds, he can only reach perfection in 
society, i.e. in a specific kind of society called “civil society” or “city” [polis]. This 
is a closed society as well as a small society, for, Strauss explains, the classics 
believed that freedom requires trust, and that trust presupposes a certain degree of 
acquaintance. They also believed that man’s capacity for “love” or “active 
concern” is limited. Furthermore, he goes on to explain, the classics believed that 
political freedom, especially that which justifies itself by the pursuit of human 
excellence, becomes actual only through the effort of many generations. Hence, the 
chance that all human societies should be capable of achieving it is very small. In 
the following passage, Strauss implicitly takes up his discussion with Schmitt about 
the possibility of a “world-state”, or, with implicit reference to Popper, an “open 
society”:  
 
An open or all-comprehensive society would consist of many societies 
which are on vastly different levels of political maturity, and the chances 
are overwhelming that the lower societies would drag down the higher 
ones. An open or all-comprehensive society will exist on a lower level of 
humanity than a closed society, which, through generations, has made a 
supreme effort toward human perfection. The prospects for the existence 
of a good society are therefore greater if there is a multitude of 
independent societies than if there is only one independent society. If the 
society in which man can reach the perfection of his nature is necessarily 
a closed society, the distinction of the human race into a number of 
independent groups is according to nature. (NRH 132) 
 
We may now therefore conclude that according to Strauss’s preferred classical 
position, the justification for the existence of “closed societies” rather than an 
“open society” consists not in the ineradicable possibility of war, but in its being 
the best condition for the realization of human excellence. 
 Moreover, Strauss claims, the classics believed that the full actualization of 
humanity consists not in passive citizenship but in “the properly directed activity of 
the statesman, the legislator, or the founder” (NRH 133). He states that “political 
greatness” manifests itself in the pursuit of “mankind’s great objects”, viz. 
“freedom” [eleutheria, Freiheit] (i.e. independence from other cities) and “empire” 
                                                     
265 NRH 130, 132-133. 
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[archè, Herrschaft] (i.e. hegemonic or even imperial power over other cities).
266
 
These are conditions of happiness, Strauss claims, while reminding us that 
happiness consists in human excellence. Since political activity is then properly 
directed toward human virtue, the end of the city and of the individual is ultimately 
the same: “the end of the city is peaceful activity in accordance with the dignity of 
man, and not war and conquest” (NRH 134).  
 As mentioned already, according to the classics the question of natural 
right coincides with the question of the best regime. For the classics, Strauss 
explains, the fundamental social fact is the regime, and not “culture” or 
“civilization”.
267
 In order to reach excellence, the classics believed, man must live 
in the best kind of society, i.e., in the city [polis] par excellence, which they called 
politeia. Strauss translates this term as “regime” rather than “constitution”, for it 
does not refer to a legal phenomenon but rather to the source of the laws, or to “the 
factual distribution of power within the community” rather than to “what 
constitutional law stipulates in regard to political power” (NRH 136). In implicit 
agreement with the descriptive part of Schmitt’s existentialism, Strauss claims: 
“No law, and hence no constitution, can be the fundamental political fact, because 
all laws depend on human beings” (NRH 136). He defines the “regime” as the 
“way of life” of a community as it is essentially determined by its “form of 
government” (NRH 136):  
 
The character, or tone, of a society depends on what the society regards as 
most respectable or most worthy of admiration. But by regarding certain 
habits or attitudes as most respectable, a society admits the superiority, 
the superior dignity, of those human beings who most perfectly embody 
the habits or attitudes in question. That is to say, every society regards a 
specific human type (or a specific mixture of human types) as 
authoritative. … In order to be truly authoritative, the human beings who 
embody the admired habits or attitudes must have the decisive say within 
the community in broad daylight: they must form the regime. (NRH 137) 
 
                                                     
266 NRH 134. As he makes clear in his footnote (NRH134n13), Strauss derives these terms from 
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, III, 45.6. Strauss appeals to the same passage in CM 239, where 
he emphasizes that cities are unequal in power, which leads to the consequence that “the most 
powerful cities cannot help being hegemonial or even imperial”. He claims: “The city is neither self-
sufficient nor is it essentially a part of a good or just order comprising many or all cities. The lack of 
order which necessarily characterizes the “society” of the cities or, in other words, the omnipresence 
of War puts a much lower ceiling on the highest aspiration of any city toward justice and virtue than 
classical philosophy might seem to have admitted. … For the city which is not on the verge of civil 
war or in it, the most important questions concern its relations with other cities. Not without reason 
does Thucydides make his Diodotus call freedom (i.e. freedom from foreign domination) and empire 
“the greatest things” (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, III 45.6).” Cf. the following two lines 
from the Prologue of Friedrich Schiller’s Wallenstein, to which Strauss refers in ‘Cohen und 
Maimuni’, 406: “Und um der Menschheit grosse Gegenstände / Um Herrschaft und um Freiheit wird 
gerungen”. 
267 NRH 137-138. 
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Strauss explains that the classics’ answer to the question of the best regime is that 
the wise should rule. Although they were convinced that the best regime in this 
sense is desirable (it is the object of “wish” or “prayer” by all good men or 
“gentlemen”) and possible (it is according to nature), they knew that its realization 
is highly unlikely: it depends on chance. As the best regime is possible only under 
the most favorable conditions, it is only legitimate under those conditions. Under 
less favorable conditions only less perfect regimes are possible and legitimate. 
Because the wise cannot rule the many unwise by force, the wise must be 
recognized by the unwise and be freely obeyed because of their wisdom. However, 
the ability of the wise to persuade the unwise is naturally extremely limited. In fact, 
Strauss says: 
 
What is more likely to happen is that an unwise man, appealing to the 
natural right of wisdom and catering to the lowest desires of the many, 
will persuade the multitude of his right: the prospects for tyranny are 
brighter than those for rule of the wise. This being the case, the natural 
right of the wise must be questioned, and the indispensable requirement 
for wisdom must be qualified by the requirement for consent. The 
political problem consists in reconciling the requirement for wisdom with 
the requirement for consent. (NRH 141)  
 
More concretely, what ought to happen according to the classics is that a wise 
legislator frames a code which is then freely adopted by the citizens. That code 
should be as little subject to change as possible: “the rule of law is to take the place 
of the rule of men, however wise” (NRH 141). The equitable administration of the 
law as well as the “completion” of the law in light of situations that were not 
foreseen by the lawgiver should be entrusted to a specific type of men, called 
“gentlemen”. Strauss describes the “gentleman” [kalokagathos] as “the political 
reflection, or imitation, of the wise man”,
268
 for, like the wise, he is experienced in 
“noble” things and he “looks down” on many things that are esteemed by common 
men, but unlike the wise he has a “noble” contempt for exactness (NRH 142). In 
sum, since the best regime – the rule of the wise – is not available, the practically 
best regime exists in the rule, under law, of gentlemen, or, as Strauss calls it, the 
“mixed regime”. 
On the basis of our reconstruction of Strauss’s account of classic natural 
right, we have found the following picture of the political. In his Schmitt review, 
Strauss claims that the justification for the existence of “closed societies” consists 
in the question of the right way of life. In classical political philosophy this 
question coincides with the question of natural right or the best regime. The 
construction “in speech” of the best regime, which consists in the rule of the wise, 
shows that it is not available “in deed”, i.e., that it is not available as a political 
solution, the underlying premises being that not all human beings are or are capable 
of becoming philosophers and that the “natural” rift between “the few” and “the 
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many” cannot be healed. Strauss’s picture of “political greatness” in fact coincides 
with Schmitt’s identification of it with the safeguarding of the independence and 
power of separate friend-enemy groupings or “closed societies”, the difference 
being that Schmitt reduces their aim to the urgent goal of self-preservation or 
physical existence only, while Strauss considers this goal as the condition for and 
as justified by the higher goal of self-improvement or human excellence.
269
 
Having completed our reconstruction of Strauss’s classical understanding 
of the nature of the political, which he began to develop in his Schmitt review, we 
now turn to a more precise determination of the possibility for normative guidance 
for political action as presented in his accounts of two subtypes of classic natural 
right that he distinguishes, viz. (i) the Socratic-Platonic-Stoic type; (i) the 
Aristotelian type. In the first case we focus on the Platonic elements only.
270
 In 
both cases, the understanding of the political we reconstructed so far is 
presupposed without further justification. The difference between Plato and 
Aristotle consists in the fact that the former considers the political life with 
constant reference to the philosophic life. Since he considers the philosophic life as 
the only way of life which is by nature right, the city requires a “dilution” of 
natural right. By contrast, Aristotle treats natural right on the level of political right 
only. 
 
3.5.2. THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHER-LAWGIVER 
 
What is characteristic of Plato is that he is continuously aware of the tension 
between the requirements of justice (i.e. of what is by nature just – in the end only 
the philosophic life is by nature right: “virtue is knowledge”) and the requirements 
of the city (i.e. of what is just by law and according to “merely” moral or political 
virtue). Strauss notes that this tension is not relieved even in the best regime, i.e., a 
regime in which wise men are in absolute control, for it is still the regime [politeia] 
of a “city”, or “civil society’ [polis]: 
 
Civil society as closed society necessarily implies that there is more than 
one civil society, and therewith that war is possible. Civil society must 
therefore foster warlike habits. But these habits are at variance with the 
requirements of justice. If people are engaged in war, they are concerned 
with victory and not with assigning to the enemy what an impartial and 
discerning judge would consider beneficial to the enemy. (NRH 149) 
 
                                                     
269 Cf. CM 6: “for the foreseeable future, political society remains what it always has been: a partial 
or particular society whose most urgent and primary task is its self-preservation and whose highest 
task is its self-improvement.” 
270 As Tanguay explains, in Strauss’s view the Stoic doctrine differed from the teaching of Plato (and 
Aristotle) inasmuch as it relied on belief in a divine providence that sanctioned men’s actions. It thus 
became the foundation of the natural law tradition which culminated in the Thomistic teaching. See 
Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography, 120. Cf. Strauss, ‘On Natural Law’, 141. 
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Whereas Plato suggests that the man who is simply just appears not to harm 
anyone, Strauss notes in implicit agreement with Schmitt that the city necessarily 
draws a distinction between “friends” and “enemies”: “the just man is who does 
not harm, but loves, his friends or neighbors, i.e. his fellow-citizens, but who does 
harm or who hates his enemies, i.e. the foreigners who as such are at least potential 
enemies of his city” (NRH 149). According to Strauss, the city necessarily requires 
this type of justice, which he calls “citizen-morality” (NRH 149) and of which he 
claims elsewhere that it is akin to “spiritedness” [thumos].
271
  
He adds that citizen-morality distinguishes between war and peace: 
deception of others in order to harm them is just in wartime, but not in peacetime. 
He notes, though, that the city cannot help but regard deception in order to harm 
other people as something that is in itself not something to be admired, i.e., not 
even in wartime. If the city wishes to resolve this tension, Strauss contends, some 
suggest that it must transform itself into a “world-state”. However, he states 
without adding further justification, “no human being and no group of human 
beings can rule the whole human race justly” (NRH 149). Since a “world-state” is 
impossible, then, “the justice which is possible within the city, can be only 
imperfect or cannot be unquestionably good” (NRH 151).  
As the first section of this chapter showed, there is at least one “solution” 
to the problem of justice that transcends the limits of political life, which consists 
in the life of the philosopher who strives for wisdom [sophia], i.e. knowledge of the 
eternal truth. As we have seen, the philosopher ascends from the city and he looks 
down upon it as a “cave”.
272
 So far, then, the Platonic natural right teaching does 
not seem to have much to offer in answer to our search for orientation and 
normative guidance within political life. 
However, Strauss notes, Plato makes the philosopher descend back into the 
cave, both because of “the obvious dependence of the philosophic life on the city” 
and because of “the natural affection which men have for men, and especially for 
their kin, regardless of whether or not these men have “good natures” or are 
                                                     
271 CM 111, where Strauss also states: “the opposition of ‘We and They’ is essential to the political 
association.” 
272 Cf. NRH 151: “If striving for knowledge of the eternal truth is the ultimate end of man, justice and 
moral virtue in general can be fully legitimated only by the fact that they are required for the sake of 
that ultimate end or that they are conditions of the philosophic life. From this point of view, the man 
who is merely just or moral without being a philosopher appears as a mutilated being. It thus becomes 
a question whether the moral or just man who is not a philosopher is simply superior to the 
nonphilosophic “erotic” man.” See also Strauss’s letter to Jacob Klein, 16 February 1939, in: Strauss, 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, 567, in which he claims that according to Xenophon just as according 
to the Platonic Socrates, morality [Moral] is “purely exoteric” and that in the Socratic circle 
kalokagathia – i.e. to be a “gentleman” – was in fact a term of abuse [Schimpfwort]. In the same letter, 
Strauss states that thumos is also “purely ironic”: “Die unterscheidung zwischen [epithumia] und 
[thumos] ist nur exoterisch zulässig, und damit bricht “Glaukons” [kallipolis] zusammen.” (ibid. 568). 
In other words, the distinction between the lower part of the soul (epithumia) and the middle part of 
the soul (thumos), which is essential to the perfect polis, is actually a “noble lie”. Due to the 
unbridgeable gap between “non-philosophic” and “philosophical” eros, the perfect polis or best 
regime as it is wished for by the “gentleman” Glaucon will never be realized in practice. 
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potential philosophers” (NRH 152). He is thereby necessitated to “take care of the 
affairs of the city, whether in a direct or more remote manner” (NRH 152). By 
doing so, Strauss explains, the philosopher acknowledges that what is by nature 
“the highest” – viz. the philosophic life – is not the most “urgent” for man. When 
attempting to guide the city, the philosopher must “dilute” the requirements of 
wisdom with the requirements of the city. In other words, the city requires a 
“fundamental compromise” (NRH 152) between natural right, which is discerned 
by reason or understanding [logos], and conventional right, which is discerned by 
opinion [doxa] only: 
 
… the simply good, which is what is good by nature and which is 
radically distinct from the ancestral, must be transformed into the 
politically good, which is, as it were, the quotient of the simply good and 
the ancestral: the politically good is what “removes a vast mass of evil 
without shocking a vast mass of prejudice.”
273
 (NRH 153)  
 
Only when we turn to his footnote to this passage do we get an indication of what 
Strauss has in mind when he speaks about the task of determining “the political 
good”.
274
 In it, he mentions two passages from Plato’s Republic. First, he refers to 
Republic 414b-415d, which is about the “noble lie” that is to be told by 
philosopher-lawgivers to the rulers and citizens of the ideal city, which consists of 
two parts: (i) they are told that the city into which they were born is their “natural” 
city; (ii) they are told that the social class into which they were born is their 
“natural” class. Secondly, he refers to Republic 501a-c, in which the philosopher-
lawgivers are presented as painters who are looking at the virtues on the one hand 
and at human reality on the other hand, trying to reproduce the former in the latter 
by a process of “mixing” and “diluting”. 
 Note that both the notion of the “noble lie” and the notion of “dilution” 
imply that the philosopher-lawgiver is somehow in the position to assume a 
viewpoint that is cognitively superior to that of the citizens, who are the object of 
his knowledge and active intervention. However this may be, both notions remain 
rather remote, since they do not provide us with any concrete orientation for the 
“thoughtful” handling of political affairs. To that end, we now turn to Strauss’s 
reconstruction of the natural right teaching of Aristotle, who, in contradistinction to 
Plato, treats natural right exclusively within the limits of political life. 
 
3.5.3. THE ARISTOTELIAN STATESMAN 
 
According to Strauss, Aristotle suggests in his Nicomachean Ethics that there is no 
need for the “dilution” of natural right. He treats human life in its own terms. Since 
man is by nature a social being [zoion politikon], a right that transcends political 
society cannot be a right natural to man. Insofar as Aristotle is concerned with the 
                                                     
273 Strauss took the quote from Macaulay, The History of England, 280. 
274 NRH 153n27. 
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In addition, Strauss notes, Aristotle claims that all natural right is 
changeable. Strauss suggests that this means that natural right consists not so much 
in general rules, but concrete decisions: “In every human conflict there exists the 
possibility of a just decision based on full consideration of all the circumstances, a 
decision demanded by the situation. Natural right consists of such decisions” (NRH 
159). Strauss adds, though, that every individual decision implies general 
principles. Justice, or the common good, consists of two parts: (i) justice in the 
normal sense of the word, that is, in Aristotle’s case, “distributive” and 
“commutative” justice; (ii) the demands of public safety, that is, everything that is 
needed for the mere existence, the mere survival and independence of a political 
community. According to Aristotle, only in extreme situations may considerations 
of public safety prevail over justice in the normal sense. Strauss adds that there is 
no principle that clearly defines when justice in the sense of public safety and when 
justice in the normal sense prevails, for it is impossible exactly to define what 
constitutes an extreme situation and what a normal one. However, he claims: 
 
What cannot be decided in advance by universal rules, what can be 
decided in the critical moment by the most competent and most 
conscientious statesman on the spot, can be made visible as just, in 
retrospect, to all; the objective discrimination between extreme actions 
which were just and extreme actions which were unjust is one of the 
noblest duties of the historian. (NRH 161) 
 
In conclusion to his treatment of Aristotle, Strauss contrasts Aristotelian natural 
right with Machiavellianism, claiming that Machiavelli denies natural right because 
he takes his bearings from the extreme situation in which the demands of justice 
coincide with the requirements of necessity. By contrast, the Aristotelian statesman 
takes his bearings from the normal situation and by what is normally right, from 
which he reluctantly deviates only in order to serve “the cause of justice and 
humanity itself” (NRH 162).
276
 Strauss adds that there is no way of expressing the 
difference between the two positions in legal terms, but its political importance is 
obvious. Strauss’s “Aristotelian” reply to “Machiavellianism” may clearly also be 
read as a reply to Schmitt, who, as we have seen, also takes his bearings from the 
extreme situation.
277
 Furthermore, Strauss claims, according to the classics the 
quality of the decisions taken is decisively determined by the character of the 
statesman concerned. They therefore believed that character formation, or the 
                                                     
275 This does not imply that Strauss denies that Aristotle considers the philosophic life as the highest 
way of life, nor that he also offers a theoretical understanding of political action. 
276 Machiavelli turned against a natural law that was based on revealed religion and that restricted the 
“latitude of statesmanship” (NRH 164) in dealing with moral and political matters. Strauss seems to 
believe that by turning to Aristotle instead, the “evil” consequences of Machiavellianism can be 
avoided. See Schall, ‘A Latitude for Statesmanship? Strauss on St. Thomas’, 132. 
277 Cf. Howse, ‘From Legitimacy to Dictatorship – And Back Again’, 80-81. 
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To conclude, whereas the “Platonic” kind of guidance to politics seems to 
remain rather general and relatively remote, the “Aristotelian” kind clearly offers a 
more elaborate framework for “normal” political decision-making and judgment. 
 
3.5.4. THOUGHTFUL POLITICS BEYOND DOCTRINAIRISM AND EXISTENTIALISM 
 
Strauss concludes his treatment of classic natural right by stating that what Plato 
and Aristotle have in common, despite the differences just indicated, is the 
acknowledgement that the demands of justice may vary in practice. As Strauss puts 
it, they avoided the Scylla of “absolutism” and the Charybdis of “relativism” by 
holding that there is a “universally valid hierarchy of ends”, without there being 
any “universally valid rules of action” (NRH 162). Strauss explains: 
 
… when deciding what ought to be done, i.e., what ought to be done by 
this individual (or this individual group) here and now, one has to 
consider not only which of the various competing objectives is higher in 
rank but also which is most urgent in the circumstances. What is most 
urgent is legitimately preferred to what is less urgent, and the most urgent 
is in many cases lower in rank than the less urgent. But one cannot make 
a universal rule that urgency is a higher consideration than rank. For it is 
our duty to make the highest activity, as much as we can, the most urgent 
or the most needful thing. And the maximum of effort which can be 
expected necessarily varies from individual to individual.” (NRH 162-
163) 
 
Strauss concludes that there are indeed universally valid standards, viz. the 
hierarchy of ends. However, he adds, whereas these standards are sufficient for 
passing judgment “on the level of nobility of individuals and groups and of actions 
and institutions” (NRH 163), it is insufficient for guiding our actions. 
Thereby, Strauss’s reconstruction of the classical position regarding the 
“thoughtful” guidance of politics appears to overcome the opposition between the 
“doctrinairist” demand of a single rational standard to be universally applied in 
practice on the one hand, and the “existentialist” denial of the existence of rational 
standards on the other. The recognition of the existence of a hierarchy of ends runs 
counter to the “existentialist” assumption that politics is entirely at the mercy of the 
“urgency” of saving the existence of a political community in the extreme case. On 
the other hand, the classical recognition that such a hierarchy of ends will never be 
sufficient to guide our actions agrees with the “existentialist” admission that 
practical decisions are in theory “undecidable”, while it runs counter to the 
“doctrinairist” assumption that theoretically established standards are to be 
immediately applicable in practice. As the previous chapter showed, Popper 
mistakenly assumed that the classics demand that “the highest” or the summum 
                                                     
278 Ibid., 79. See, inter alia, NRH 193. 
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bonum was to be universally realized in practice. His own decision to adopt the 
admittedly lower and more “urgent” goal of the elimination of the summum malum 




At the start of this chapter we stated that Strauss’s “change of orientation” from 
modern political philosophy’s culmination in positivism and historicism toward 
classical political philosophy is in the end to be understood as a rehabilitation of 
the philosophic life over and above the political life. As we have demonstrated, 
however, his recovery of philosophy in fact also presupposes a recovery of the 
political, against the oblivion of the distinct features and mutual opposition of both 
in modernity. Moreover, we demonstrated that his return to classic political 
philosophy also provides a framework for the normative guidance of political 
decisions and judgments. 
We argued that Strauss’s classical understanding of “the political” includes 
Schmitt’s definition of the political in terms of the friend-enemy distinction: given 
that war is an ineradicable human possibility, political societies or “cities” [poleis], 
will always be closed societies, each of which upholds its own law, in the name of 
which it may demand the ultimate sacrifice – the death of individual citizens – in 
the extreme case. However, Strauss suggests, the raison d’être of political societies 
does not consist in the real possibility of war itself, but rather in the pursuit of 
virtue or excellence [aretē] by its citizens and the peaceful order or law [nomos] 
that is required for it, in the name of the defense of which it may indeed in some 
situations be necessary to wage war. 
We also argued that Strauss’s understanding of “classic natural right” 
offers the possibility of normative guidance of political action. Against the modern 
“doctrinairism” of Hobbes and others, which upholds a single normative standard – 
“natural public law” – which is to be universally applied in practice, it recognizes 
the possibility of formulating a hierarchy of ends, the application of which in 
concrete situations is to be interpreted by the individual lawgiver or statesman 
concerned. Against the ultramodern “existentialism” of Schmitt and others, which 
denies the existence of moral standards for political action other than that of 
necessity in concrete situations, it recognizes the possibility of formulating a 
hierarchy of ends which is still to be applied in concrete situations by the 
individual lawgiver or statesman concerned. Thus, Strauss’s reconstruction of the 
classical position regarding the “thoughtful” guidance of politics does indeed 
provide us with a framework for political decision-making and judgment that 
moves between an escape from politics into philosophy on the one hand and a 
reduction of politics to polemics on the other. 
Accordingly, Strauss claims, the classics believed that the “best regime” in 
theory or “in speech” consists in the rule of the wise, while the best regime in 
practice or “in deed” exists in a “mixed regime”, i.e. the rule of gentlemen under a 
law drawn up by a wise lawgiver and then freely adopted by the citizens. 
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According to the “Platonic” natural right teaching, the guidance provided for the 
philosopher-lawgiver consists in the requirement of “diluting” natural right, i.e. 
what is right by nature, by conventional right, i.e. what is right by mere convention. 
According to “Aristotelian” natural right, the guidance provided for the statesman 
consists in the formulation of principles for “normal” politics, i.e. commutative and 
distributive justice, and of principles for “exceptional” politics, i.e. public safety. 
Which of these principles is to prevail is to be determined by the individual 
statesman on the spot, who should decide by taking his bearings from the normal 
situation wherever possible, and from the extreme situation only if absolutely 
necessary. The quality of his decisions is determined by the quality of his 
character, and hence by the moral education he received.  
Strauss’s “classical” account of the political and of thoughtful politics may 
of course be criticized, for example on the basis of Popper’s critique of 
“naturalism”. We may note that Strauss tends to picture the political figures of the 
lawgiver and the statesman as “imitations” of the philosopher, the validity of 
whose truth claims appeared to be derived from a privileged form of knowledge of 
“nature” that appears to be inaccessible to “the many” by definition. Hence, it 
seems that not all citizens are considered to be capable of asking whether a specific 
“natural law” formulating a “natural” hierarchy of ends in answer to the question 
of “natural right” and in the name of which actual decisions are being made, is in 
fact all that “natural”. A similar model of a privileged form of cognition seems to 
underlie Strauss’s suggestion of the possibility of a just decision based on a “full” 
consideration of “all” the circumstances” (NRH 159) and “objective” 
discrimination of just and unjust actions (NRH 161). What appears to be missing 
from Strauss’s account, then, is a theory of public reason, i.e. of rational discussion 
– a giving-of-account in the spirit of a “Socratic” attitude of reasonableness – about 
political decisions and judgments among citizens who enter the public domain as 
political equals, each of whom is entitled to give his own point of view. 
Be that as it may, it is too early to draw any definite conclusions about 
Strauss’s classical “theory” of the political and about his classical “theory” of 
thoughtful political action, for at the beginning of this chapter we bracketed one 
consideration that is of crucial importance: his work is in the final instance not 
intended to provide an answer, to defend a body of knowledge – either a specific 
set of descriptive propositions about the nature of politics or a specific set of 
prescriptive propositions about the nature of “thoughtful” political action – but 
instead to raise questions and articulate problems and the alternative solutions to 
them in order that we ourselves start to philosophize, i.e. to use our very own 
freedom of thought. Hence, we must emphasize the tentative character of the 
“theories” we have reconstructed. In the introduction to Natural Right and History 
he claims that the need for natural right that has risen in reaction to the relativist 
consequences of positivism and historicism does not yet prove that this need can be 
satisfied: “A wish is not a fact. Even by proving that a certain view is indispensable 
for living well, one proves merely that the view in question is a salutary myth: one 
does not prove it to be true” (NRH 6). 
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We therefore need to shift our focus from Strauss’s political philosophy in 
the sense of the philosophy of politics to his “political” philosophy in the “deeper” 
sense of the politics of philosophy, which manifests itself especially in his theory 
and practice of “the art of writing between the lines”. As will be shown, this is the 
most prominent manifestation of the more “remote” guidance provided by the 
“Platonic” philosopher-lawgiver in the guise of telling “noble lies” or “salutary 
myths”, which we mentioned above and the precise nature of which we have yet to 
determine. 
Moreover, even when we assume that we have actually succeeded in 
reconstructing Strauss’s preferred position here, we have not yet examined what 
seemed to fulfill a decisive role in political decision-making and judgment: the 
quality of the character of the statesman concerned. Since much seems to depend 
on the quality of the moral education he receives, we need to examine the nature of 
the education Strauss envisions and in fact practices in his own writing: learning 
through reading [lesendes lernen], i.e. the reading of texts that are written 
according to the “political” art of writing between the lines.  
In order to complete our examination of Strauss’s political philosophy, 
then, in the next chapter we focus on a reconstruction and critical examination of 
his theory and practice of “the art of writing between the lines”, in which his 
theoretical self-consciousness of the political conditions of philosophy becomes 
manifest. We examine both its ontological and its hermeneutical assumptions. 
More specifically, we ask to what extent the practice of “political” philosophy does 
in fact reach its professed goal of stimulating its “attentive” readers themselves to 
philosophize in a “Socratic” manner rather than teaching them to dogmatically 
accept a specific answer to the question of “nature” and “natural right”. Moreover, 
we ask to what extent does this practice differ from an allegedly “Machiavellian” 
politics that takes its bearings from the extreme case – in this case, a mutual 
hostility between the philosophical “few” and the un-philosophical “many” – in 
answer to which it presupposes that it is possible to conquer “chance” – in this 
case, a denial of the contingency that is intrinsic to all human action, including 











They believed that the gulf separating “the wise” and “the vulgar” was a basic fact of 
human nature which could not be influenced by any progress of popular education:  





Socrates: ‘But after all, we too were there in the theatre and were part of  







In the previous chapter we reconstructed the philosophy of politics of Leo Strauss 
(1899-1973) or what we believe to be his likeliest answer to the philosophical 
question “what is political?”. In doing so, we deliberately bracketed the fact that 
his work is ultimately not aimed at the presentation of a certain teaching – his “last 
word” in the guise of an ontological or normative claim about “the political” – but 
first and foremost at creating an awareness of perennial philosophical problems and 
the alternative solutions to them, or, to be more precise: at recovering philosophy 
as a distinct way of life, the bios theōretikos.  
Thus, we acted as if he has written philosophical “treatises” instead of 
“commentaries”, “histories of ideas”, or perhaps even disguised “dialogues”. We 
acted as if he himself does not employ the manner of writing that he describes as 
“the art of writing between the lines” (PAW 24). If we were to use his own 
terminology, we might say that we proceeded too quickly to “the philosophical 
question” to which we sought his answer, instead of first paying attention to “the 
literary question” and how he deals with it,
281
 that is, the question of the 
communication of philosophy and his framing of it in terms of philosophy’s 
relation to society. Moreover, we claimed to know Strauss’s own position, while in 
fact he warns us that the crucial part of the argumentation of a philosopher who 
applies the art of writing is to be discovered by his readers, provided they are 
“attentive” or “careful”.
282
 But if this is the case, we may wonder who exactly has 
                                                     
279 PAW 34. 
280 Plato, Symposium, 194c 
281 For the distinction between “the philosophical question” and “the literary question”, see PAW 78, 
CM 52. 
282 NIP 351.  
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spoken in the previous chapter: Strauss, or we ourselves?
283
 Moreover, if he does 
not fully disclose his thoughts in his texts, will we ever be able to find his “last 
word” in the same way as he claimed to have found Carl Schmitt’s, for example? Is 
there any propositional content that we can ascribe to him? 
In order to find his answer to the question “what is political?” we therefore 
need to shift our attention from his political philosophy in the ordinary sense of 
philosophy about politics to his political philosophy in the “deeper” sense of 
politics of philosophy, that is, of politics as philosophy’s specific “manner of 
treatment” or as the specific way the philosopher communicates with the city.
284
 
This “political” philosophy is conducted through “the art of writing between the 
lines” or of “exoteric writing”, which is supposed to allow the philosopher-writer 
to fish for “the few” who are “by nature” fit to become philosophers, while 




We not only pay attention to what Strauss says about “political” 
philosophy – his propositions about the art of writing – but also, and more 
fundamentally, to the politics to which any text attests that is written in accordance 
with the rules of the art of writing. It may well be the case that we will be able to 
find Strauss’s “last word” precisely within his deeds, that is, within the principles 
as they are performed by his writing.  
 As we have indicated in the previous chapter, the reception of Strauss’s 
work has been highly polemical. Critics have accused him of proclaiming the use 
of “noble lies” as well as maintaining an all-too-rigid dichotomy between “the few” 
and “the many”, or “the wise” and “the vulgar”, between philosophers and the rest 
of mankind. Stephen Holmes, for instance, argues that “Strauss is undemocratic 
and illiberal” because “he knows in advance that the philosophical few have 
nothing whatsoever to learn from the unphilosophical many.”
286
 Shadia Drury even 
goes so far as to claim that Strauss “corrupts”, since he “seduces men into thinking 
that they belong to a special and privileged class of individuals that transcend 
ordinary humanity and the rules applicable to other people.”
287
 The use of noble 
                                                     
283 In a letter to Jacob Klein, 16 February 1939, Strauss claims: “…der [thumos] ist rein ironisch! Die 
Unterscheidung zwischen [epithumia] und [thumos] ist nur exoterisch zulässig, und damit bricht 
»Glaukons« [kallipolis] zusammen.” (Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, 568.) If we take Strauss 
at his word here, then in the previous chapter we have indeed reconstructed his exoteric teaching 
instead of his esoteric thought. 
284 CPP 94, 93. 
285 NRH 6, PAW 35, CM 102-103. 
286 Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, 79. 
287  Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, 193. Cf. Czeslaw Milosz’s description of the 
phenomenon of “ketman” in his book The Captive Mind, 58: “Ketman fills the man who practices it 
with pride. Thanks to it, a believer raises himself to a permanent state of superiority over the man he 
deceives, be he a minister of state or a powerful king; to him who uses Ketman, the other is a 
miserable blind man whom one shuts off from the true path whose existence he does not suspect; 
while you, tattered and dying of hunger, trembling externally at the feet of duped force, your eyes are 
filled with light, you walk in brightness before your enemies. It is an unintelligent being that you 
make sport of; it is a dangerous beast that you disarm. What a wealth of pleasures!” 
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lies is considered to be incompatible with the liberal demand that the legitimacy of 
politics must be founded upon (public) reason instead of authority, which in turn is 
based on the fundamental moral demand that every single human individual is to be 
regarded and treated as an end in him/herself, and never merely as an instrument in 
the hands of others.
288
  
 Charitable readers such as Nathan Tarcov and Heinrich Meier have retorted 
that these interpretations of Strauss’s work rest on a misunderstanding. According 
to them, the use of “noble lies” was never intended as a device to be employed by 
politicians against their citizens, but as a means for philosophers to protect their 
life of truth-seeking, their freedom of thought, against the authoritative claims of 
the law – whether political or religious – and, more importantly, to stimulate gifted 
young readers to start philosophizing for themselves, to live a life devoted to 




 Notwithstanding the great merits of their reading, I consider it worthwhile 
to examine whether and to what extent the “misunderstanding” which is spoken of 
here is indeed simply a misunderstanding. After all, in a certain sense, Strauss’s 
whole work can be considered a persistent attempt to think through the possibility 
and consequences of the misunderstanding of philosophy. Indeed, Strauss shows 
himself to be very much aware of the extent to which the societal or historical 
impact of a text can be very different from, even opposite to its original 
philosophical intent. More specifically, he realizes that writing is a form of acting, 
and that philosophy, to the extent that it is expressed in public, becomes part of 
history, while, he insists, essentially being an attempt to search for trans-historical 
truth, that is, to replace opinions [doxai] about nature or “the whole” by knowledge 
[epistēmē] about nature or “the whole”.  
It is rather striking, therefore, that the vast majority of Strauss scholars 
choose to present an apology on the basis of their professed knowledge of what he 
says, that is, of the philosophical propositions or standpoints he is “really” 
supposed to hold,
290
 instead of seizing the opportunity to critically examine his 
specific attempt to rethink the possibility of philosophy being misunderstood.  
We need to examine both his specific way of framing this condition – viz. 
as shaped by the necessary opposition between “the few” and “the many”, 
philosophy and society, nature and history, caused by the “natural” order of rank 
between them – as well as his specific response to this condition – viz. his recovery 
and practice of the politics of the art of exoteric writing. I argue, however, that 
Strauss’s expectations of the capacity of the “art of writing” to remedy this 
condition are exaggerated. This exaggeration concerns both the hermeneutical 
assumption of the possibility of a perfect “logographic necessity”, that is, of the 
                                                     
288 Schofield, Plato, 293. 
289  Tarcov, ‘On a Certain Critique of “Straussianism”’; Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-
Political Problem. 
290 Especially Zuckert & Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss; but also Pangle, Leo Strauss: An 
Introduction to his Thought and Intellectual Legacy; Smith: Reading Leo Strauss. 
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complete elimination of contingency or “chance” in writing and reading – which 
denies the fact of their always being in part determined by conditions of which 
neither the writer nor the reader is in full control or completely aware – and the 
ontological assumptions that are affirmed by his texts insofar as they are written in 
accordance with the rules of the “art of writing”. I argue that Strauss’s defenders’ 
claim that the accusatory reading of his work rests on a misunderstanding may be 
justified insofar as it is based on what he says, that is, on his explicitly formulated 
philosophical intention, but that it is wrong if they were to take into account what 
he does, that is, the principles that are necessarily acted on in his practice. In the 
final instance it is herein, I claim, that we must locate the “deeply hidden structural 
features” of his political philosophy that have co-determined Strauss’s historical 
influence and “success”. 
 In the first two sections of this chapter I reconstruct Strauss’s recovery of 
the politics of philosophy, “the art of writing” and its use of “irony” and “noble 
lies”, as well as the ontological assumptions about the relation between the 
philosopher and society and between nature and history that it presupposes. 
Strauss, following Al-Farabi, identifies the art of writing with “the way of Plato”, 
which he presents as a combination of “the way of Socrates” and “the way of 
Thrasymachus”, the former of which is the manner of dialectically addressing “the 
few”, while the latter is the manner of rhetorically addressing “the many”. 
 In the third section I present a critique of Strauss offered by Alexandre 
Kojève and Claude Lefort, who claim that his art of writing implies the assumption 
of the complete “self-sufficiency” of the philosopher-writer who conceives himself 
as the sovereign master of his writings as well as his readership. Thus, the 
conception of politics implicit in “political” philosophy appears to be strikingly 
similar to the modern, “Machiavellian”, conception of politics as the conquest of 
chance, which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Strauss precisely rejects. 
In the fourth section I formulate a reply to this critique, the reconstruction 
of which owes a great deal to the readings of Tarcov and Meier. Strauss expresses 
his awareness of the overwhelming “success of Plato”, of the fact that the latter’s 
exoteric teaching, viz. the conviction that philosophy is salutary for society, may 
have become “too successful” in comparison with its esoteric intent, viz. the 
conviction that philosophy and society are naturally at odds. In other words, 
Strauss realizes very well that no writing can shield itself from misunderstandings, 
despite the various remedies against it that may be inserted in such writings.  
If we read his own writings on the basis of this premise, we are enabled to 
decide which parts of his work are meant philosophically, that is, as expressions of 
a genuine freedom of thought, and which parts are meant as Strauss’s mere 
polemical reply to a powerful contemporary adversary, viz. the thesis of radical 
historicism that philosophy and society are essentially in harmony with each other. 
We therefore consider the possibility that even the ontological assumptions that 
underlie the art of writing are not meant esoterically but exoterically, that is, as 
“noble lies”, designed primarily to undermine modern philosophy’s having become 
completely “oblivious of the whole or of eternity” (NRH 176). Strauss’s “last 
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word” should not be identified with these assumptions, then, but only with the 
exhortation to philosophize as such. Hence, when we, as readers, attach more 
weight to the “success” of his writings than to their “intention”, the responsibility is 
entirely our own. 
 In the fifth section I suggest a reply. First, Strauss himself admits that not 
only the esoteric but also the exoteric meaning of the text is intended by its author. 
We may therefore assume that he deliberately chose to cause a specific 
“misunderstanding” or “lie”, which we may ascribe to him and the professed 
“salutary” or “noble” character of which we may critically evaluate. Secondly, and 
more fundamentally, insofar as his works are themselves performances of the art of 
writing they attest to the ontological assumptions mentioned earlier (viz. the strict 
separation between “the few” and “the many”, philosophy and society, nature and 
history), including the possibility of eliminating contingency or chance. These are 
so to speak the “confessions of faith” that become manifest in his writings- (and 
readings-) as-actions.
291
 In this sense, the criticisms inspired by Kojève and Lefort 
still hold, albeit not when based on what Strauss says, but rather when based on the 
assumptions which the philosopher-writer (or -reader) simply has to make as soon 
as he starts practicing the art of writing (or reading) between the lines.  
Strauss seems to assert that the choice whether to read a text according to 
its “speech” or its “deed” is, in turn, determined by the question whether its 
particular reader is “naturally” interested in theory or rather in action. In order to 
illustrate his own stance in this regard, in the sixth section we examine his reading 
of a telling passage in one of Plato’s dialogues in which the very distinction 
between “the few” and “the many” is itself at stake.  
In contradistinction to Popper, Strauss not only articulates the political 
condition of philosophy, but he clearly displays a “theoretical self-consciousness” 
in the sense of an awareness of the implications thereof for his own manner of 
writing. We conclude, however, that the practice of this “art” harbors and furthers 
the assumption of both the “natural” division between “the few” and “the many” – 
which seems to be driven by the desire of philosophers to escape altogether from 
their political, and even from their “Socratic” condition – and the possibility of 
eliminating contingency or “chance” – which, ironically or not, Strauss considers 
precisely the core assumption of modern, “Machiavellian”, political philosophy 
that he aimed to remedy in the first place. Thus, both Strauss’s specific 
conceptualization of and his specific solution to the peculiar conditions under 
which political thinking operates seem to presuppose an inadequate understanding 
of these conditions.  
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4.2. THE PROBLEM OF SOCRATES: “TRUE” POLITICS 
 
As the previous chapter showed, Strauss aims at a re-opening of “the quarrel 
between the ancients and the moderns”, or a “change of orientation” towards the 
ancients. He argues that modern political philosophy, “founded” by “Machiavelli”, 
has culminated in radical historicism, or the thesis that human thought is essentially 
historically determined – including the historicist thesis itself. As a result, 
philosophy in its original sense, as well as political philosophy in its original sense, 
are no longer believed to be possible. He claims that philosophy originally 
understood itself as the attempt to rise from opinion [doxa] of “the whole” or of 
“nature” to knowledge [epistēmē] thereof. Accordingly, political philosophy 
originally understood itself as the attempt to rise from mere opinions about what is 
the right way of living together or what is “natural right”, to true knowledge 
thereof.  
Strauss repeatedly reminds us that it is Socrates whom tradition regards as 
the “founder” of political philosophy,
292
 that is, the first philosopher “who called 
philosophy down from heaven and forced it to make inquiries about life and 
manners and good and bad things” (NRH 120). Insofar as Platonic “political” 
philosophy and the “art of writing” can be understood as a “solution” to the 
“problem” that is posed by Socratic political philosophy, we first need to acquire 
an adequate understanding of the latter.  
Since the mere articulation of a problem already orients us towards a 
specific solution to it, we first need to address “the problem of Socrates” in the 
sense of determining what he stood for – which would seem to be difficult enough, 
since he himself did not write anything – before addressing “the problem of 
Socrates” in the sense of determining the worth of what he stood for.
293
 To achieve 
this first aim, we need to search for Strauss’s understanding of Socrates’ teaching 
before his “change of orientation” to the ancients, and especially before his 
recovery of the Platonic “art of writing”, that is, before Strauss took sides.  
Such an account of what Socrates stood for can be found in a lecture that 
Strauss delivered in 1931. This is one year before he published his “comments” on 
Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, which Strauss regards as his first 
public expression of his “change of orientation”, after which he would gradually 
rediscover “the manner in which heterodox thinkers of earlier ages wrote their 
books”.
294
 The lecture, titled ‘Cohen and Maimonides’, remained unpublished 
during his lifetime.
295
 In it, Strauss aims to arrive at an understanding of the 
political meaning of the philosophy of Maimonides (1135-1204) through an 
understanding and critique of the moral philosophy of Hermann Cohen (1842-
1918). Insofar, Strauss argues, as Cohen regards Plato rather than Aristotle as the 
                                                     
292 Cf. CM 13; Strauss, Socrates and Aristophanes, 3 
293 Cf. Strauss, Socrates and Aristophanes, 6. 
294 Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 31. 
295 Strauss, ‘Cohen und Maimuni’. The lecture was delivered on 4 May 1931 at the Hochschule für 
die Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin. 
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ancient example of true philosophizing, he helps us to understand the extent to 
which Maimonides’ thought is fundamentally Platonic instead of Aristotelian in 
nature. Strauss notes in his lecture that Plato’s philosophizing is essentially the 
same as that of Socrates, at least insofar as he is presented to us in the Platonic 
dialogues.
296
 As there is no mention of any difference between Socrates and Plato, 
therefore, it is precisely against the background of this as yet “undecided” stance 
toward them that we are enabled to bring into clear view the decision that will 
underlie Strauss’s later understanding of “the problem of Socrates”, in the sense of 
the worth of his teaching and his recovery of the Platonic “solution” to it.
297
  
Strauss begins the account in ‘Cohen and Maimonides’ by stating that 
Socrates did not have a teaching [Lehre]. Instead, he brought others to insight by 
raising questions, starting with the insight that they did not know what they 
thought they knew.
298
 Moreover, Socrates himself did not possess the knowledge 
that others lacked, for his wisdom consisted precisely in the fact that he knew that 
he knew nothing. Strauss adds, however, that this not-knowing must itself not be 
understood as a teaching, that is, as an answer to a question. Socrates is not a 
skeptic. The apparent answer he gives – knowledge of not-knowing – is merely the 
sharpest expression of the question: “Socratic philosophizing means 
questioning”.
299
 In agreement with this, Strauss was in his later work to 
characterize Socratic philosophizing as being neither dogmatic nor skeptic, but 
“zetetic”, or as skeptic in the original sense of the word.
300
 
 Nevertheless, Strauss adds, one only asks questions if one is seriously 
interested in finding answers. Indeed, there were many things that Socrates in fact 
knew, such as that Themistocles and Pericles, “the greatest sons of Athens”, had 
actually not benefited their city at all, contrary to common opinion.
301
 Strauss 
concludes that Socrates deliberately chose to lead a life of questioning. This, 
though, is not a questioning “at will” [beliebig], that is, a questioning of “the things 
in the Hades, underneath the earth and in heaven”.
302
 Socrates is no natural 
philosopher. Rather, it is a questioning that is “necessary for life” 
[lebensnotwendig], which consists in asking how one should live, in a giving-of-
account [sich-verantworten] for one’s own way of life. Since Socrates knew, 
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therefore, that an unexamined life is not worth living,
303
 he provides an answer to 
the question of the right way of life: “Questioning the right way of life – that is the 
only right way of life” [emphasis in original].
304
 Strauss explains further: 
 
The questioning and examining is not a questioning-oneself and 
examining-oneself of the solitary [einsam] thinker; it is a mutual 
questioning and mutual examining; it is a giving-of-account [Sich-
verantworten] in the original sense: one can always only give account 
before a person. Socrates always only philosophizes with others. His 
questioning of the right way of life is a questioning together. He questions 
together with others not because he wants to persuade [überzeugen] 
others – only someone who is purely a teacher [Lehrender] may want this 
–, but because he aims for understanding [Verständigung] and agreement 
[Einklang]. He aims for understanding and agreement, because only out 
of understanding and agreement, out of concord [Einsinnigkeit] among 





Strauss concludes that Socratic questioning of the right way of life is a questioning 
together of the right way of living together for the sake of the right way of living 




Strauss notes, however, that the meaning of the word “political” is 
ambiguous. He explains that the basis for this lies in the fact that human life exists 
as such in living together and is thus political life: “all human doings and goings 
[Tun und Treiben] and thinking [Denken] are in themselves political”.
307
 However, 
the latter is not always explicitly [ausdrücklich] the case. After all, Strauss argues, 
we call people “politicians” only when they deal explicitly with living together. 
One may deal explicitly with living together in two ways: either without giving 
account [ohne Verantwortung] or by giving account [in Verantwortung], which 
explains the ambiguity of the term “political”.
308
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In the case of the first kind of politics, Strauss explains, one does not ask 
what is good; rather, one is of the opinion that one knows what is good. Moreover, 
if one knows what is good, one is capable of teaching it, of teaching it publicly. 
Hence, one is capable of writing it down. In the case of the second kind of politics, 
he continues, one does not know what is good, and hence one cannot teach it 
publicly, one cannot write it down. Because Socrates knows that he knows nothing, 
or that understanding can only exist by consent [Einverständnis], he does not 
address the multitude [die Menge], but the individual [der Einzelne], with whom he 
speaks in the form of a dialogue [Dialog]. Strauss claims that this is the reason why 
Socrates speaks and does not write. For, as Socrates says in Plato’s Phaedrus, what 
is written is necessarily misunderstood, what is written cannot protect itself against 
misunderstanding.
309
 Since a piece of writing does not know whom to address, it 
always says the same thing, whereas, Strauss claims, “the crucial point is rather to 
speak the one truth [das eine Wahre] ever differently”.
310
  
We may note that the account of Socrates given here coincides pretty much 
with Socrates’ self-presentation in Plato’s Gorgias, where he calls himself “the 
only true politician”, in contrast to statesmen like Themistocles and Pericles, who 
are praised by Callicles, the sophist.
311
 In sum, Strauss seems to have made a 
distinction between two kinds of politics: (i) the sophistic kind of politics, which 
attempts to persuade the multitude of one’s opinions by means of rhetoric; (ii) the 
Socratic kind of politics, which consists in the philosophical search for agreement 
in truth about the right way of living together, and which can only take place in the 
form of a dialectical discussion between two individual persons.
312
  
Now that we have “solved” “the problem of Socrates” in the sense of 
determining what he stood for according to Strauss, we need to turn our attention to 
“the problem of Socrates” in the more fundamental sense of determining Strauss’s 
answer to the question of the worth of what he stood for. The question Strauss does 
not address in his early lecture is whether Socrates’ “true politics” is at all capable 
of achieving its aim, that is, whether its method of “dialectical” conversation with 
individual persons is indeed capable of delivering its promise of uniting the citizens 
in true knowledge. In light of the fate of the historical Socrates, who was sentenced 
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to death in the name of the laws of the city, it seems that the answer to this question 
must be negative. Yet if Socratic politics is indeed bound to fail, it would seem that 
every state, or political life in general, is necessarily at the mercy of sophistry.  
One of Strauss’s clearest accounts of the conception of political philosophy 
that is exemplified by Socratic “true politics” especially, and of its vulnerability, 
can be found in his article ‘On Classical Political Philosophy’ (1945).
313
 Strauss 
explains that classical political philosophy regards itself primarily as a practical 
discipline, aimed at the right guidance of political life rather than at understanding 
it.
314
 Hence its orientation is the same as the one inherent in political life, although 
not that of the partisan “who prefers victory in civil war over arbitration”, but of 
the good citizen who attempts “to make civil strife cease and to create, by 
persuasion, agreement among the citizens” (CPP 81). More specifically, the 
political philosopher tries to settle “the most fundamental political controversy” 
(CPP 84), that is, the question of the best political order, or “who should rule?”  
However, Strauss adds that this question can only be answered if the 
philosopher raises “an ulterior question which is never raised in the political arena” 
(CPP 90). In order to answer the question “what is that virtue whose possession … 
gives a man the highest right to rule?” (CPP 90), the philosopher first needs to 
address the question “what is virtue?”, which Strauss calls a “distinctly philosophic 
question” (CPP 90). As soon as one tries to answer this question, however, it will 
turn out that opinions that are commonly held about virtue are in fact contradicted 
by other opinions about virtue that are equally commonly held, which leads to the 
following: 
 
To reach consistency the philosopher is compelled to maintain one part of 
common opinion and to give up the other part which contradicts it; he is 
thus driven to adopt a view that is no longer generally held, a truly 
paradoxical view, one that is generally considered “absurd” or 
“ridiculous”. (CPP 91)  
 
In other words, the philosopher is compelled to hold a view that is para-doxical in 
the literal sense of being “beside” common opinion.  
However, Strauss continues, ultimately the philosopher is compelled to 
transcend not only the sphere of common opinion, but even the sphere of political 
life as such, for he will realize that the ultimate aim of political life cannot be 
reached by political life, but only by a life devoted to contemplation. The highest 
subject of political philosophy, then, is the philosophic life: “philosophy – not as a 
teaching or as a body of knowledge, but as a way of life – offers, as it were, the 
solution to the problem that keeps political life in motion” (CPP 91). Strauss notes 
that this is what Socrates is referring to when he calls his own questioning a search 
for “the true political skill” (CPP 91).
315
 We may note that the account he presents 
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so far coincides with his picture of the Socratic life of questioning presented in his 
earlier lecture.  
At the same time, Strauss continues, as philosophy understands itself as 
“an attempt to rise from opinion to science”, it remains necessarily related to 
political life, being “the sphere of opinion” (CPP 92). Therefore, the question “why 
philosophy?”, or “why does political life need philosophy?” (CPP 92, 93), will 
arise sooner or later. Philosophy is thus called before the tribunal of the political 
community, it is made “politically responsible” (CPP 93). Strauss adds that such a 
justification was urgent because the meaning of philosophy was not generally 
understood, and philosophy was therefore distrusted by many citizens. After all, he 
reminds us: “Socrates himself fell victim to the popular prejudice against 
philosophy” (CPP 93).  
Strauss explains that in order to justify itself before the tribunal of the 
political community, philosophy has to justify itself in terms of the political 
community, that is, by making use of a kind of argument that appeals not to 
philosophers as such but to citizens as such: 
 
To prove to citizens that philosophy is permissible, desirable or even 
necessary, the philosopher has to follow the example of Odysseus and 
start from premises that are generally agreed upon, or from generally 





In other words, Strauss introduces a type of “dialectics” here that differs from the 
one encountered in his earlier lecture. Now we learn that there are two distinct 
types of “dialectics”, each of which is meant to address a different kind of 
audience. Strauss derives the distinction from Xenophon’s Memorabilia, where it is 
noted that Socrates employed two different types of dialectics,
317
 the first of which 
appeals to “philosophers as such” and leads to the truth by way of questioning 
generally accepted opinions,
 318
 while the second appeals to “citizens as such” and 




Strauss concludes that from the viewpoint of philosophy’s need to justify 
itself before the tribunal of the city, “political philosophy” changes in meaning: 
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From this point of view the adjective “political” in the expression 
“political philosophy” designates not so much a subject matter as a 
manner of treatment, from this point of view, I say, “political philosophy” 
means primarily not the philosophic treatment of politics, but the 
political, or popular, treatment of philosophy, or the political introduction 
to philosophy – the attempt to lead the qualified citizens, or rather their 
qualified sons, from the political life to the philosophic life. (CPP 93-94) 
 
In sum, Strauss introduces a division of “dialectical” speech into two kinds. This 
division was not present in his earlier lecture. The earlier statement that one should 
speak the one truth “ever differently” is now reduced to two typical options: one 
may either strive for (i) agreement based on truth, or (ii) agreement based on 
generally accepted opinions. But because Socrates turned out to be incapable of 
convincing the masses that philosophy is salutary for the city, it seems that he did 
not fully master the second, “Odyssean”, kind of dialectics.
320
 The situation of 
philosophy seems very precarious, therefore, for writing seems to offer no solace 
either, since Strauss claimed in his earlier lecture that all writings are necessarily 
misunderstood. 
However, Strauss would qualify this latter thesis after his “change of 
orientation”. As the next section shows, he claims that Plato employed a specific 
“art of writing” that is capable of remedying the precarious political condition of 
philosophy. To be more precise, Strauss presents the Platonic dialogue as 
embodying a type of writing that is capable of speaking differently to the two kinds 
of people who were addressed by Socrates in speech, a kind of writing that is 
indeed capable of protecting philosophy from misunderstanding.  
 
4.3. THE SOLUTION OF PLATO: “POLITICAL” PHILOSOPHY 
 
As has already been mentioned, in his autobiographical preface Strauss intimates 
that after his “change of orientation” he gradually became “ever more attentive to 
the way in which heterodox thinkers of earlier ages wrote their books.”
321
 He owes 
his rediscovery of “the art of writing between the lines” especially to his reading of 
the work of Al-Farabi (c. 872-c. 950) and Maimonides (1135-1204). In 
reconstructing Strauss’s account of this art, we focus first on the first two chapters 





                                                     
320 CPP 89, OPS 246. 
321 Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, 31. 
322 The introductory chapter, simply called ‘Introduction’, owes much to Strauss’s earlier article titled 
‘Farabi’s Plato’, which was published in 1945. The second chapter, which bears the same title as the 
book as a whole, had been published as an article in 1941. 
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4.3.1. THE ART OF WRITING: BETWEEN “THE WAY OF SOCRATES” AND “THE WAY 
OF THRASYMACHUS” 
 
In the first chapter, Strauss explains that the Jewish and Islamic thinkers of the 
medieval ages, insofar as they were philosophers, found themselves “compelled to 
justify their pursuit of philosophy before the tribunal of Divine Law” (PAW 10). 
To be sure, divine law was understood not as a “creed” or a set of dogmas (as in 
Christianity), but as a “social order, if an all-comprehensive order, which regulates 
not merely actions but thoughts and opinions as well” (PAW 10). According to 
Strauss, Al-Farabi expressed his thought most clearly in a short treatise called 
Plato, which was the central part of a tripartite work called On the Purposes of 
Plato and of Aristotle.
323
 Strauss indicates that this work owes its origin to a 
concern with a restoration of philosophy “after it has been blurred or destroyed” 
(PAW 12). Moreover, he adds, it is more concerned with the purpose common to 
Plato and Aristotle than with their disagreements.  
In his Plato, Al-Farabi tells us that philosophy, which delivers “the science 
of the essence of every being” (i.e. of the nature of every being), is both necessary 
and sufficient for realizing man’s happiness (PAW 12): “Through the mouth of 
Plato, Farabi declares that religious speculation, and religious investigation of the 
beings, and the religious syllogistic art, do not supply the science of the beings, in 
which man’s highest perfection consists, whereas philosophy does supply it” 
[emphasis added] (PAW 13). Thus, Strauss explains, Al-Farabi “avails himself … 
of the specific immunity of the commentator or the historian in order to speak his 
mind concerning grave matters in his ‘historical’ works, rather than in the works in 
which he speaks in his own name” (PAW 14). He puts things in the mouth of Plato 
that do not only flagrantly deviate from the letter of Plato’s teaching – he refuses 
“to succumb to Plato’s charms” (PAW 14-15), as Strauss puts it – but also from 
what Al-Farabi himself tells us when he speaks in his own name.  
Although Al-Farabi’s Plato identifies the philosopher with the king, he 
suggests that they are not simply identical. In Al-Farabi’s view, Plato agrees with 
the orthodox view that philosophy needs to be supplemented if it is to lead man 
toward happiness. Because the required supplement is not religion, but politics, 
however, the “other world” is replaced by the “another city”, which is an earthly 
city, although it exists not “in deed” but “in speech”.  
According to Al-Farabi, Plato states that according to “the way of 
Socrates”, philosophy is primarily a political matter, since Socrates focuses on “the 
scientific investigation of justice and the virtues” (PAW 16). As there was no 
freedom of teaching and investigation in his time, Socrates was confronted with an 
alternative: either obey the law and public opinion, or challenge them by openly 
searching for the “other city”, that is, for the “virtuous city”, in speech (see Plato’s 
Republic). Socrates could have chosen “security and life”, but then he would have 
had to conform with his fellow-citizens’ false opinions and wrong way of life. 
                                                     




Socrates chose the only alternative: “non-conformity and death” (PAW 16). Plato’s 
attitude was different, because for him philosophy was primarily a theoretical 
matter, that is, “the science of the essence of every being” (PAW 16), or natural 
philosophy. 
Strauss explains that Plato found a solution to the problem posed by 
Socrates’ fate. According to Al-Farabi, Plato in fact gave two accounts of Socrates, 
or he “repeated” his first account. Strauss states that such a “repetition” is actually 
a pedagogic device that is meant to reveal the truth to those who are capable of 
finding it for themselves, while hiding it from those who are not fit for it. While 
“the vulgar” will fall asleep from the repetition, “the wise” will notice the 
“addition” that is present in the “repetition”.
324
 According to Al-Farabi, Plato’s 
second statement in fact amounts to a modification of his first statement,
325
 that is, 
to a correction of the Socratic way: 
 
The Platonic way, as distinguished from the Socratic way, is a 
combination of the way of Socrates with the way of Thrasymachus; for 
the intransigent way of Socrates is appropriate only for the philosopher’s 
dealing with the elite, whereas the way of Thrasymachus, which is both 
more and less exacting than the former, is appropriate for his dealings 
with the vulgar.
326
 (PAW 16) 
 
To explain, Thrasymachus is a sophist who figures prominently in Book I of 
Plato’s Republic and who defends the popular opinion that justice is in fact nothing 
more than the right of the strong. As Strauss explains elsewhere,
327
 Thrasymachus 
knows how to “play” the city, how to act like the vulgar. Al-Farabi suggests that by 
combining the way of Thrasymachus with that of Socrates, Plato was able to avoid 
the conflict with the vulgar and thus avoid the fate of Socrates. Socrates’ 
“revolutionary quest for the other city”, for the best political order, was replaced by 
Plato’s “more conservative way of action” (PAW 16, 17).  
The course of action chosen by Plato is described by Strauss as “the 
gradual replacement of the accepted opinions by the truth or an approximation to 
the truth” (PAW 17). This replacement can best be understood as a gradual 
undermining of the accepted opinions, which are accepted provisionally. At the 
same time, their replacement is accompanied by the suggestion of opinions that 
point to the truth (for the few, the potential philosophers) but that at the same time 
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do not too flatly contradict the accepted opinions (for the many, the vulgar),
328
 as 
they are a mere “imaginative representation” of the truth.
329
 Strauss says that Al-
Farabi’s Plato thus eventually replaces the philosopher-king, who rules openly in 
the virtuous city, with the secret kingship of the philosopher who, being “a perfect 
man” precisely because he is an “investigator”, lives privately as a member of an 
imperfect society, which he tries to humanize within the limits of the possible.  
Moreover, Strauss explains that what is described as “Plato’s policy” or 
“the procedure of the true philosophers” coincides with the application of the 
philosophic distinction between “exoteric” and “esoteric” teaching. Al-Farabi 
recovered this “antiquated and forgotten distinction” because philosophy and the 
philosophers were “in grave danger”, since society did not recognize the right of 
philosophizing (PAW 17). The exoteric teaching was needed to protect philosophy. 
Strauss writes: “It was the armor in which philosophy had to appear. It was needed 
for political reasons. It was the form in which philosophy became visible to the 
political community. It was the political aspect of philosophy. It was “political” 
philosophy” (PAW 18). The following two sections examine the ontological and 
hermeneutical assumptions of this “politics”. 
 
4.3.2. THE ART OF WRITING: ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
In the following passage from the title chapter of Persecution and the Art of 
Writing, Strauss indicates there are certain assumptions that underlie the “political” 
philosophy of the “art of writing”: 
 
[The earlier philosophers] believed that the gulf separating “the wise” and 
“the vulgar” was a basic fact of human nature which could not be 
influenced by any progress of popular education: philosophy, or science, 
was essentially a privilege of “the few.” They were convinced that 
philosophy as such was suspect to, and hated by, the majority of men. 
Even if they had had nothing to fear from any particular political quarter, 
those who started from that assumption would have been driven to the 
conclusion that public communication of the philosophic or scientific 
truth was impossible or undesirable, not only for the time being but for all 
times. They must conceal their opinions from all but philosophers, either 
by limiting themselves to oral instruction of a carefully selected group of 
pupils, or by writing about the most important subject by means of “brief 
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First, this passage clearly indicates that the separation between philosophers (“the 
wise”) and non-philosophers (“the vulgar”) is regarded as an unchangeable fact of 
human nature. As Strauss insists on several other occasions, philosophy, as the 
attempt to replace opinion [doxa] by knowledge [epistēmē], is necessarily at odds 
with society, for society necessarily lives in the element of opinion, no matter how 
well it is ordered.
331
 Hence, the philosopher, who as philosopher is independent of 
society or “the cave”, is “self-sufficient” and “truly free”.
 332
 Secondly, what 
underlies this freedom or independence of the philosopher is an even more 
fundamental independence: the independence of nature or “the whole” from history 
or “the historical process”, as Strauss indicates in the following footnote to the 
earlier version of the same chapter: 
 
… there were always people who were not merely exponents of the 
society to which they belonged, or of any society, but who successfully 
endeavored to leave “the cave.” It is those people, and those people only, 
whom we still call philosophers, lovers of the truth about “the whole” and 
not merely about “the whole historical process.” The independence of the 
philosopher, as far as he is a philosopher, is only one aspect of a more 
fundamental independence, which was recognized equally by those who 
spoke of a presocial “state of nature” and by those who emphasized so 





Strauss thus indicates that the existence of something called “nature”, which exists 
independent of “history”, is recognized not only by ancient philosophers such as 
Aristotle, who in his Physics claims that “man is generated by man and the sun”,
334
 
but even by modern philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, insofar as 
they proclaim the existence of “state of nature” that predates civil society or exists 
independently of it.  
 
4.3.3. THE ART OF WRITING: HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Now we have reconstructed Strauss’s account of “the way of Plato” and its 
underlying assumptions about the relation between philosophy and society, we turn 
to his account of the hermeneutics of the “art of writing”. We focus on his analysis 
of the Platonic dialogues, which may perhaps be considered as the most exemplary 
kind of exoteric writing. We find Strauss’s most elaborate account of this in his 
commentary on Plato’s Republic, which is the central essay of his book The City 
and Man (1964).  
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Strauss begins with a well known problem of interpretation. Since Plato 
wrote dialogues, that is, since he never speaks in his own voice, it would seem to 
be impossible to know what Plato himself stood for, apart from his characters. 
Perhaps we should assume, then, that he chose Socrates, his chief character, as his 
spokesman, which is what is usually done. In that case, the dialogues seem to tell 
us that we should live as Socrates teaches us to live. However, Strauss retorts, this 
is problematic too, because Socrates is famous for his irony. 
According to Strauss, irony is a kind of dissimulation, or untruthfulness. In 
opposition to the boaster, who overstates his worth, the ironic man understates his 
worth. Strauss, who follows Aristotle here, describes irony as the humanity that 
belongs to the “magnanimous” man, that is, “the man who regards himself as 
worthy of great things while in fact being worthy of them” (CM 51). Moreover, if 
the highest superiority consists in superiority in wisdom, irony in the highest sense 
would then consist in the dissimulation of one’s wisdom or of one’s wise thoughts. 
This can be done in two different ways:  
 
either expressing on a “wise” subject such thoughts (e.g. generally 
accepted thoughts) as are less wise than one’s own thoughts or refraining 
from expressing any thoughts regarding a “wise” subject on the ground 
that one does not have knowledge regarding it and therefore can only 
raise questions but cannot give answers. (CM 51) 
 
Note that what is described here corresponds to the two types of “dialectics” 
distinguished above, the former being directed to “the many”, the latter to “the 
few”. Strauss concludes: “If irony is essentially related to the fact that there is a 
natural order or rank among men, it follows that irony consists in speaking 
differently to different kinds of people” (CM 51).
335
 
 However, he adds that we still need to understand what a Platonic dialogue 
is: the understanding of Plato’s teaching cannot be separated from the form in 
which it is presented, for the meaning of the substance depends on the form, the 
“what” depends on the “how”. As Strauss states, before reaching the philosophical 
questions, one has to focus first on the “literary question”,
336
 that is, the question of 
the communication of philosophy. According to him, this question, properly 
understood, is identical to “the question of the relation between society and 
philosophy” (CM 52). 
 The literary question is addressed by Plato’s Socrates in the Phaedrus, 
where he speaks about the essential defects of writing and thus leads us to 
understand why he himself did not write any speeches or books. However, as Plato 
wrote dialogues, Strauss claims, we may assume “that the Platonic dialogue is a 
kind of writing which is free from the essential defect of writings” (CM 52). In 
agreement with what was said in his earlier lecture, Strauss states that writings are 
essentially defective because they are equally accessible to all who can read, or 
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because they do not know whom to talk to, and to whom they should be silent, or 
because they say the same things to everyone. “We may therefore conclude,” 
Strauss claims, “that the Platonic dialogue says different things to different people 
– not accidentally, as every writing does, but that it is so contrived as to say 
different things to different people, or that it is radically ironical” (CM 52-3).
337
  
Strauss suggests that what it means to properly read a piece of good writing 
is intimated by Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus, 264bc. A good writing complies with 
“logographic necessity”, which consists in the requirement that “every part of the 
written speech must be necessary for the whole; the place where each part occurs is 
the place where it is necessary that it should occur” (CM 53). Strauss claims that 
another clue is provided by Xenophon, who in his Memorabilia notes that Socrates 




When someone contradicted him on any point, he went back to the 
assumption underlying the whole dispute by raising the question “what is 
…” regarding the subject matter of the dispute and by answering it step 
by step; in this way the truth became manifest to the very contradictors. 
But when he discussed a subject on his own initiative, i.e. when he talked 
to people who merely listened, he proceeded through generally accepted 
opinions and thus produced agreement to an extraordinary degree. This 
latter kind of the art of conversation which leads to agreement, as 
distinguished from evident truth, is the art which Homer ascribed to the 
wily Odysseus by calling him “a safe speaker”. (CM 53) 
 
Here again we encounter the two ways in which Socrates addressed his 
interlocutors. Once more basing himself on Xenophon, Strauss adds that Socrates 
tried to lead men possessing “good natures”, or his “good friends”,
339
 to the truth, 
whereas he tried to lead men lacking such natures to agreement through generally 
accepted opinions.
340
 According to Strauss, the combination of the information 
derived from the Phaedrus and Xenophon leads to the following conclusion: 
 
… the proper work of a writing is truly to talk, or to reveal the truth, to 
some while leading others to salutary opinions; the proper work of a 
writing is to arouse to thinking those who are by nature fit for it; the good 
writing achieves its end if the reader considers carefully the “logographic 
necessity” of every part, however small or seemingly insignificant, of the 
writing. (CM 54) 
 
Because the good writing must imitate the good conversation, it seems that the 
primary addressee in the dialogue acts as a representative of the type of reader 
whom Plato wishes to reach above all. Strauss therefore suggests that we hear Plato 
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himself, as distinguished from his characters, above all through his selection of 
conversations.
341
 The Platonic Socrates converses only with people who belong to 
an elite, including potential philosophers, but never, or almost never, with the elite 
in the highest sense, viz. actual philosophers: “there is no Platonic dialogue among 
men who are, or could be thought to be, equals” (CM 55). 
 Insofar as the Platonic dialogues are dramas, Strauss claims, we cannot 
identify any utterance of Plato’s characters as his own without precaution. Rather, 
the “speeches” of the Platonic characters must be understood in light of the 
“deeds”, which comprise both the setting and the action of a particular dialogue – 
including its “silences” – as well as the facts that were known to Socrates or to 
Plato. He explains: 
 
The speeches deal with something general or universal (e.g. with justice), 
but they are made in a particular or individual setting: these and those 
human beings converse there and then about the universal subject; to 
understand the speeches in the light of the deeds means to see how the 
philosophic treatment of the philosophic theme is modified by the 
particular or individual or transformed into a rhetorical or poetic 
treatment or to recover the implicit philosophic treatment from the 




In a Platonic dialogue, poetry is “ministerial” to philosophy.
343
 Strauss admits that 
it is much less difficult to understand the “speeches” of the characters than it is to 
perceive “what is in a sense not said”, or “how what is said is said” (CM 60). 
Hence, he postulates, the law of logographic necessity cannot be taken seriously 
enough. In a Platonic dialogue nothing is accidental; that is, everything necessarily 
occurs at the place where it occurs: “Everything which would be accidental outside 
of the dialogue becomes meaningful within the dialogue” (CM 60). Because 
chance plays a considerable role in all real conversations, it is implied that all 
Platonic dialogues must be radically fictitious. Strauss concludes that the Platonic 
dialogue is based on a “fundamental falsehood”, a “beautiful or beautifying 
falsehood”, viz. “the denial of chance” (CM 60). 
This section has presented Strauss’s account of “political” philosophy in 
the sense of the “art of writing”, as well as its ontological and hermeneutical 
assumptions. The next section turns to a critique of these assumptions. 
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4.4. THE “SELF-SUFFICIENCY” OF THE PHILOSOPHER-WRITER 
 
Several authors have criticized the underlying assumptions of Strauss’s theory of 
the “art of writing”. The core of this criticism consists in the claim that this manner 
of writing implies the “self-sufficiency” and immunity of the philosopher-writer 
and his complicit “careful reader”. The writer assumes that he is the sovereign 
master both of his own thought and writing, and of the possible interpretations 
thereof by his readers, who are supposed to fall into two categories: the “careful” 
and the “uncareful”. However, it is claimed, not only does this attest to an 
overestimation of the ability to master the meaning of the language we use, it also 
presupposes that the philosopher-writer and his “careful” reader are immune to 
failure and criticism, which would be un-philosophical in the Socratic sense.  
In this section we first pay attention to the hermeneutical assumption of 
“logographic necessity”, that is, the postulate that every “repetition”, “addition”, or 
“contradiction” in a text that is written in accordance with the rules of the art of 
writing is the consequence of the intention of its author. Secondly, we focus on the 
specific conception of philosophy and the philosopher that underlies the possibility 
of and demand for the “art of writing”, viz. the “natural” division of mankind in 
two categories: “the few” philosophers who are supposed to be “self-sufficient” 
and “independent”, and “the many” other people who are supposed to be incapable 
of escaping from “the cave”.  
 The objection to the first assumption has been formulated most sharply by 
Claude Lefort (1924-2010) in his commentary on Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958), 
which is generally considered one of Strauss’s most difficult works.
344
 Strauss 
reads Machiavelli as a philosopher who addresses his “careful” readers. According 
to Lefort, however, Strauss’s concomitant hermeneutical postulate that all 
contradictions and flaws within Machiavelli’s text are the effect of an intention, 
lacks legitimacy. Lefort argues that this postulate is bound up with a conception of 
philosophy as teaching and of the philosopher as master.
345
 According to the 
Greeks, however, philosophy is not the product of the philosopher, nor is the 
philosopher the master who makes philosophy speak. Rather, Lefort notes, 
“philosophy speaks through [à travers] the philosopher,” and his contradictions 
may be precisely a sign of his failure or of his faithfulness to the philosophical 
question to which he is receptive.
346
 
Lefort claims that it is in fact Strauss who occupies the position of the 
philosopher as teacher and reader alike, and who thereby reduces the discourse of 
the other – in this case of Machiavelli – to being nothing more than a moment 
within his own discourse. If there is nothing in the discourse of the other that 
escapes from the intention of its author, this would mean that no single thought is 
capable of escaping from Strauss himself:
347
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The assurance of his [viz. Strauss’s] own intention is guaranteed to him 
by the intention that he lends out to this author who is author only 
because he freely produces his thoughts. As reader of Machiavelli, 
Strauss makes himself the author of the Machiavellian discourse, but he 
only makes himself its reader because he was already its author. Ideally, 
the difference between reading and writing is abolished, at the same 
moment as all difference that is internal to writing and all difference that 





Lefort adds that Strauss would probably suggest to his own “careful” readers that 
they should meet him half way, or, stated differently, that they should “discover” 
the decisive part of the argument by themselves.
349
 He retorts, though, that, 
referring to what he has not written, Strauss suggests that he could have written it, 
as a consequence of which everything becomes readable in his texts. Ultimately, 
Lefort suggests, the desire of the reader is here led by the fantasy [phantasme] of a 
representation that is in fact impossible, just as the desire of the writer (i.e. teacher) 
is led by the fantasy that he is capable of already implying within himself the 
reader (i.e. pupil) he is yet to produce.
350
  
To further clarify the underlying idea of the “self-sufficient” philosopher, 
we now turn to Alexandre Kojève’s (1902-1968) critique, which is contained in his 
response to Strauss’s commentary to Xenophon’s dialogue Hiero. Strauss’s 
ascription to the philosopher of “the greatest self-sufficiency which is humanly 
possible” (OT 91) means that the philosopher is only interested in the theoretical 
pursuit of the truth. According to Kojève, this makes the philosopher an isolated 
figure, uninterested in the opinions held of him by others.
351
 In turn, the 
philosopher’s absolute isolation can only be justified on the assumption of a 
specific conception of nature, that is, Being:  
 
one has to grant that Being is essentially immutable in itself and eternally 
identical with itself, and that it is completely revealed for all eternity in 
and by an intelligence that is perfect from the first; and this adequate 
revelation of the timeless totality of Being is, then, the Truth. … Man (the 
philosopher) can at any moment participate in this Truth … by his own 
individual effort to understand (the Platonic “intellectual intuition”), the 
only condition for such an effort being the innate “talent” of the one 
making this effort, independently of where he may happen to be situated 
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Moreover, Kojève states, the implication is that it is possible for the philosopher to 




However, Kojève adds, if this is the case, then the question arises of how it 
would be possible to distinguish the philosopher from the madman. After all, the 
madman also claims to have some exclusive knowledge other human beings have 
not. As Kojève argues: 
 
it is only by seeing our ideas shared by others (or at least an other) or 
accepted by them as worth discussing (even if only because they are 
regarded as wrong) that we can be sure of not finding ourselves in the 




Although Strauss would probably answer that the philosopher will discuss with the 
others who also belong to “the few”, Kojève retorts that the danger would then 
arise that they constitute a small elite which stick to their own prejudices.
355
 
Furthermore, Kojève argues, it is in fact impossible to assess “subjective certainty” 
by mere introspection, or decide among different subjective certainties, should they 
contradict each other.
356
 He concludes, therefore: 
 
[the philosopher] will have no philosophically valid reason to 
communicate his knowledge (orally or in writing) to others (unless it be 
with a view to gaining their “recognition” or admiration, which is 
excluded by definition), and he will therefore not do so if he is truly a 
philosopher (who does not act “without reason”). We will therefore not 
know anything about him; we will not even know whether he exists, and 
hence whether he is a philosopher or simply a madman. What is more, in 
my opinion he will not even know it himself since he will be deprived of 
every social control, which is the only way to weed out “pathological” 
cases. In any event, his “solipsist” attitude, excluding as it does all 




In other words, Strauss’s presupposition of the “self-sufficient” philosopher is 
simply not realistic, because a philosopher needs others to examine the validity of 
his own beliefs, that is, to discover whether his own knowledge is indeed 
“objectively” certain or merely “subjectively” certain, or, to use Strauss’s own 
terms, whether he has reached the level of true knowledge [epistēmē] or is still 
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stuck with opinion [doxa], or whether he has mistakenly identified the goal of his 
thinking with the point at which he has become tired of thinking.
358
  
To be sure, Kojève himself holds that there is no way to settle this from the 
outside by having recourse to some kind of trans-historical standard or procedure. 
He thereby takes the exact reverse of Strauss’s position. We believe, though, that 
the validity of Kojève’s criticism of Strauss does not depend on his commitment to 
the historicist claim, that human thought is completely determined by history, 
which is in fact the exact polemical counterpart of Strauss’s claim that human 
thought is completely independent of history.  
 If the arguments advanced by Lefort and Kojève hold, we would have to 
conclude that the “politics” underlying Strauss’s conception of the “art of writing” 
is that of the “self-sufficient” philosopher who is capable of a sovereign mastership 
over his own thought and writing and the reading thereof by others. It denies their 
being permeated by contingency or “chance”, that is, their being at least partly 
determined by conditions over which we have no control, and it excludes the 
possibility of an unexpected encounter with the truly other who may call our 
opinions into question. It strikes us that the conception of politics presupposed by 
Strauss’s art of writing draws precisely on the conception of politics underlying the 
project of modern political philosophy he professes to reject. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, Machiavelli, whom Strauss considers the inaugurator of 
modern political philosophy, lowered the standards of the best regime to make its 




 We may suspect that Strauss would have been aware of such a manifest 
contradiction. We therefore must ask whether it is indeed the case that the 
postulates that Lefort and Kojève claim are put forward by Strauss – viz. the 
hermeneutical assumption that all “repetitions” or “contradictions” in a text are the 
consequence of the intention of the author, and the ontological assumption of the 
philosopher being “self-sufficient” because of his being “by nature” independent of 
human “history” – are indeed propositions asserted by him, whether they do indeed 
reflect his “last word” in the sense of his true intention. Stated differently, did they 
misunderstand Strauss? 
 
4.5. FROM THE HISTORICAL SUCCESS TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL INTENTION 
 
The beginning of this chapter asked whether our reconstruction of Strauss’s 
philosophy of politics in the previous chapter led us in fact to mistake his exoteric 
teaching for his esoteric thinking. Similarly, we may now ask whether his critics’ 
understanding of his politics of philosophy, reconstructed in the previous section, 
presupposes the same mistake: if Strauss’s account of the art of writing itself is 
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“dogmatism – or the inclination ‘to identify the goal of our thinking with the point at which we have 
become tired of thinking’ – is so natural to man that it is not likely to be a preserve of the past.” 
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written according to the rules of the art of writing, it may be doubted whether his 
statements are entirely trustworthy.
360
  
 First, we return to the introduction of Persecution and the Art of Writing 
(1952), specifically to its final paragraph. After stating that the art of Plato averted 
the danger posed to the philosopher by the city, Strauss adds the following 
warning: “the success of Plato must not blind us to the existence of a danger which, 
however much its form may vary, is coeval with philosophy” (PAW 21). 
Elsewhere, he puts it even more strongly: “the political action of the philosophers 
on behalf of philosophy has achieved full success. One sometimes wonders 
whether it has not been too successful”.
361
 In other words, Strauss seems to leave 
open the possibility that the exoteric teaching of the philosophers – even Plato – 
may become so influential that the esoteric intention – to save philosophy in its 
original, “zetetic”, sense – will be forgotten.  
Strauss thus expresses an awareness of the fact that the method of 
“political” philosophy harbors the risk that the esoteric teaching will be 
overwhelmed by the exoteric teaching, or that the historical success of a piece of 
writing will overshadow its philosophical intention. If he shows himself to be 
aware of the danger present in all “Platonizing”, he must also have been aware of 
the danger of his own “Platonizing”. Insofar as his own texts are indeed written in 
accordance with the rules of the “art of writing”, we may assume that his own texts 
are not exempt from this danger. 
As Nathan Tarcov has shown in his brilliant essay ‘On a Certain Critique 
of “Straussianism”’,
362
 Strauss’s “review” ‘On a New Interpretation of Plato’s 
Political Philosophy’ (1945), which is about a book on Plato by John Wild,
363
 
should in fact be read as Strauss’s equivalent to Marx’s statement that he was not a 
Marxist. Tarcov convincingly argues that Strauss meant the following sentence 
about Plato to be applicable to himself, too: “Plato composed his writings in such a 
way as to prevent for all time their use as authoritative texts. In the last analysis his 
writings cannot be used for any purpose other than philosophizing …”.
364
 This 
means that Strauss’s “true intention” can only lie in the exhortation to his readers to 
philosophize for themselves.  
 We are thus confronted with the task to distinguish the “Odyssean” 
utterances, which are merely meant ad hominem or are polemical, from the “brief 
indications”, which point to the philosophical truth. To start with, Strauss saw 
himself confronted with a different prejudice from both Plato and his followers, 
such as Al-Farabi and Maimonides. These thinkers were confronted with the 
prejudice that philosophy endangers society, and therefore they attempted to show 
that philosophy is in fact salutary for the political community. By contrast, Strauss 
saw himself confronted with radical historicism’s conviction that philosophy and 
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society are in complete harmony, which implies that every thinker is by definition a 
child of his time. One might therefore argue that philosophy is in greater danger 
than ever, for this time philosophers themselves have forgotten philosophy’s true 
calling. Indeed, Strauss explains his recovery of the art of esoteric-exoteric writing 
– as practiced by Al-Farabi and Maimonides in earlier ages – out of a sense of 
urgency:  
 
Freedom of thought being menaced in our time more than for several 
centuries, we have not only the right but even the duty to explain the 
teaching of Maimonides, in order to contribute to a better understanding 
of what freedom of thought means, i.e., what attitude it presupposes and 
what sacrifices it requires [emphasis added]. (PAW 56) 
 
Strauss described Lessing as the last author who “wrote between the lines about the 
art of writing between the lines”.
365
 In turn, we might regard Strauss himself as the 
first author for several centuries who wrote within the lines about writing between 
the lines. The reason why he explicitly conveys a secret that must under normal (or 
“natural”) circumstances not be conveyed – viz. that philosophy and society are 
essentially at odds with each other – inheres precisely in the fact that Strauss 
believes that he writes under exceptional (or “artificial”) circumstances.
366
 It might 
be said that he is compelled by a historical contingency to write exoterically about 
the art of writing and, therewith, about the underlying conception of philosophy 
and of society and their conflictual relation, precisely because this art and its 
underlying assumptions are threatened with oblivion. 
With this historical context in mind, we are now enabled to examine which 
statements of Strauss are genuinely philosophical and which of them are merely 
polemical. Let us start by quoting a passage from Persecution and the Art of 
Writing in which he describes a conviction that is the exact opposite of the 
conviction of “the earlier type of writers” quoted above in the second section of 
this chapter: 
 
After about the middle of the seventeenth century an ever-increasing 
number of heterodox philosophers who had suffered from persecution 
published their books not only to communicate their thoughts but also 
because they desired to contribute to the abolition of persecution as such. 
They believed that suppression of free enquiry, and of publication of the 
results of free enquiry, was accidental, an outcome of the faulty 
construction of the body politic, and that the kingdom of general darkness 
could be replaced by the republic of universal light. They looked forward 
to a time when, as a result of the progress of popular education, 
practically complete freedom of speech would be possible, or – to 
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exaggerate for purposes of clarification – to a time when no one would 
suffer any harm from hearing any truth [emphasis added]. (PAW 33-34) 
 
As Strauss expressly states that he is exaggerating his account of the philosophers 
who, from the middle of the seventeenth century onwards, started to believe that 
the conflict between philosophy and society is accidental instead of essential, we 
may say that his positioning of the opposite conviction of “the earlier type of 
writers” should be understood at least in part as a polemical act. As he admits 
elsewhere: “…today it is perhaps better … to overstate Plato’s thesis regarding the 
disproportion between philosophy and politics than to follow the beaten path by 




As Strauss himself explicitly admits in the quotation, ultimately he 
exaggerates “for purposes of clarification”.
368
 That is to say, by reconstructing the 
two opposing alternatives he aims to clarify the significance of the philosophical 
question underlying these alternatives. Hence, he should not be read as if he 
proposes some kind of solution, but rather as if he induces us to grasp the 
philosophical problem at issue. In a footnote inserted immediately after the 
quotation above, Strauss reproduces the words of the American writer Archibald 
MacLeish, who wrote: “Perhaps the luxury of the complete confession, the 
uttermost despair, the farthest doubt should be denied themselves by writers living 
in any but the most orderly and settled times. I do not know [emphasis added]” 
(PAW 34n14). As we have learned from the example of Socrates, acknowledging 
that we do not know is the beginning of philosophy. In fact, we might say, Strauss 
induces us, insofar as we are “careful” readers, to examine and decide by and for 
ourselves whether the “most halcyon conditions” or the “most orderly and settled 
times” (PAW 34n14) have ever existed in the past (e.g. in the pre-historical age of 
Cronus / Saturn?), whether they exist in the present (e.g. in our current liberal 
democracy or “open society”?), and whether they will ever exist in the future (e.g. 
in Marx’s post-historical realm of freedom?). 
 Similarly, we are capable of examining the extent to which the words of 
Strauss that Lefort and Kojève seem to take at face value are not in fact meant 
exoterically, viz. both the hermeneutical assumption that texts written in 
accordance with the “art of writing” do indeed comply with the law of 
“logographic necessity”, as well as the ontological assumption that the philosopher 
is “self-sufficient”. If this is the case, we should be able to find indications to that 
intent in Strauss’s texts. 
First, we return to Strauss’s hermeneutical assumption. We found him 
saying that the Platonic dialogue is based on the denial of chance, yet at the same 
time he calls this assumption a “fundamental falsehood”, even a “beautiful or 
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beautifying falsehood”. We may now note that this expression is clearly an 
alternative formula for the notion of the “noble lie”. In other words, the statement 
that the Platonic dialogue complies entirely with the law of “logographic necessity” 
is itself a noble lie. Moreover, we should already have become suspicious by the 
sentence “We may assume that the Platonic dialogue is a kind of writing which is 
free from the essential defect of writings” (CM 52). This sentence is clearly 
contradictory, for if certain defects are essential to writing, we may safely infer that 
no writing can exist without them. In other words, the possibility that a piece of 
writing is accidentally misunderstood, is not excluded by Strauss.
369
 This would 
also mean that his suggestion needs qualification that it is actually possible to 
recover the universal (philosophical) teaching from the particular (literary) setting 
of the dialogue. In his interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero, Strauss admits that, in 
interpreting a text written in accordance with the rules of the art of writing, 
 
... a certain ambiguity remains, an ambiguity ultimately due not to the 
unsolved riddles implied in many individual passages of the Hiero but to 
the fact that a perfectly lucid and unambiguous connection between 
content and form, between a general teaching and a contingent event 
(e.g., a conversation between two individuals) is impossible [emphasis 
added]. (OT 66)  
 
This would lead to the conclusion that we should understand the postulate of the 
“logographic necessity” of a text rather as a kind of pedagogic device, which is 
meant to induce “careful” readers not to underestimate the writing skills and level 
of intelligence of the philosophical author in question.
370
 What is more, the 
“beauty” of the idea of a perfectly composed text arouses the philosophical eros of 
these readers. 
This reading is confirmed by Strauss himself in ‘On a Forgotten Kind of 
Writing’, in which he explicitly replies to some of his critics.
371
 According to 
Kojève, Strauss’s method of reading can be compared to that of a detective, who, 
by a subtle interpretation of the apparent facts, finally finds the criminal – the 
difference, however, being that Strauss’s method cannot lead to the confession of 
the criminal.
372
 In a direct reply, Strauss retorts: “I would be happy if there were 
suspicion of crime where up to now there has only been implicit faith in perfect 
innocence”.
373 
In other words, he prefers to over- rather than underestimate the 
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possibility that a philosopher-writer has a “hidden” motive. In the following 
statement, in response to another critic, Strauss even explicitly denies that he put 




I never said that “a historian must proceed on the supposition that 
philosophers, even original and important ones, always know the 
presuppositions and consequences of all the statements they make.” I 
merely said that the historian must proceed on the supposition that the 
great thinkers understood better what they thought than the historian who 




Thus, Strauss emphasizes that his hermeneutical postulate serves as a caveat to the 
reader (or the “historian” of philosophy) not to underestimate the level of thinking 
of certain philosophical writers rather than as an ontological claim. Now we have 
argued, therefore, that the assumption of “logographic necessity” should not be 
considered a “last word”, but rather a pedagogic device, we proceed by examining 
the exact meaning and status of the other assumption attributed to Strauss, viz. that 
the philosopher is “self-sufficient”. 
As we have seen above, Kojève argued that Strauss conceives of the 
philosopher as an isolated figure, standing completely outside or above history. We 
submit now that this conception should at least in part be understood as the 
polemical counterpart of the radical historicist assumption of the philosopher being 
completely immersed in history. We therefore now take a closer look at the exact 
reply Strauss gave to Kojève on this point.  
In his ‘Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero’, Strauss contends that the 
classic teaching about philosophy is a teaching about friendship. Philosophers, 
insofar as they are philosophers, are in need of friends, that is, actual or potential 
philosophers. Friendship presupposes shared opinions, shared prejudices. However, 
Strauss admits, this is incompatible with the idea of philosophy as a “quest for 
wisdom”, for: “Philosophy as such is nothing but genuine awareness of the 
problems, i.e., of the fundamental and comprehensive problems”.
376
 He adds that it 
is impossible to think about philosophical problems without becoming inclined 
toward a solution. The philosopher ceases to be a philosopher as soon as his 
“subjective certainty” of a solution becomes stronger than his awareness of the 
problematic character of that solution.
377
 At that point, Strauss claims, the 
philosopher turns into a sectarian. Nevertheless, he continues, the danger of 
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succumbing to the attraction of solutions is “essential” to philosophy, for without 
it, it “would degenerate into playing with problems”.
378
 Moreover, he contends:  
 
the philosopher does not necessarily succumb to this danger, as is shown 
by Socrates, who never belonged to a sect and never founded one. And 
even if the philosophic friends are compelled to be members of a sect or 





The last two words are the beginning of the ancient saying “Amicus Plato, sed 
magis amica veritas”, “Plato is my friend, but the truth is my greater friend.” Thus, 
Strauss suggests to us that a genuine philosopher will always be prepared to 
question his prejudices (i.e. his opinions) in the name of truth, even if he has been 
“compelled” (i.e., on historical / political, not philosophical grounds!) to become a 
member of a sect or to found one (as arguably Strauss himself has done by 
founding a Straussian “school”).
380
 
Strauss admits, however, that this reply still presupposes the validity of 
“the idea of philosophy”,
381
 that is, the classical idea of philosophy, and that this 
idea itself also stands in need of a justification. Moreover, the “idea of philosophy” 
in turn presupposes “the idea of nature”: “It presupposes then that there is an 
eternal and unchangeable order within which History takes place and which is not 
in any way affected by History”.
382
 Strauss thus seems to confirm the 
presupposition that Kojève brought to the fore as necessarily underlying the idea of 
the self-sufficient philosopher. However, we have to add that Strauss understands 
by an “idea” primarily a fundamental problem revealed in “dialectical” speech,
383
 
by which it is implied that, in turn, the “idea” of philosophy and the “idea” of 
nature are themselves capable of being questioned in a philosophical conversation.  
If we were to follow the conclusions of Strauss’s charitable readers who 
excavate his “true intention”, we would have to admit that his critics were wrong, 
then. In fact his critics misunderstood his exoteric (or polemical, ad hominem) 
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teaching for his esoteric (or philosophical, genuine) teaching. If we follow Tarcov 
and Meier, then, we may say that Strauss’s “last word” is to be understood only as 
existing in the exhortation to philosophize. Indeed, in the following passage we 
may read “Strauss” where Strauss writes “Plato”: 
 
No interpretation of Plato’s teaching can be proved fully by historical 
evidence. For the crucial part of his interpretation the interpreter has to 
fall back on his own resources: Plato does not relieve him of the 
responsibility for discovering the decisive part of the argument by 
himself. … Plato composed his writings in such a way as to prevent for 
all time their use as authoritative texts. … In the last analysis his writings 
cannot be used for any purpose other than for philosophizing. In 
particular, no social order and no party which ever existed or which ever 




In other words, Strauss’s postulate of “logographic necessity” should not be 
interpreted as a denial of the possibility of a philosophical text being accidentally 
misunderstood (besides the necessary misunderstanding between philosophy and 
society), nor should his assumption of the “self-sufficiency” of the philosopher be 
interpreted as a denial of the possibility that a philosopher fails in his grasp and 
teaching of the truth. Rather, Strauss induces us not to underestimate the effort it 
takes to genuinely understand the writings of a genuine philosopher. Moreover, 
should we decide to think for and by ourselves, he warns us not to affirm one 
philosophical alternative (such as that of classical political philosophy) as a merely 
polemical counterweight to another philosophical alternative (such as that of 
radical historicism). In other words, Strauss warns us not to pursue a philosophical 
goal by polemical means: “Let us beware of the danger of pursuing a Socratic goal 
with the means, and the temper, of Thrasymachus.” (NRH 6) 
On the basis of our findings in this section, we would have to conclude, 
then, that Strauss is in fact the genuine Socratic whom his defenders take him to be. 
When interpreting Strauss, we put ourselves at stake as philosophers, that is, we 
take our own stances, we make our own decisions, which we in our turn may 
examine to see whether or not they are philosophically valid. As Meier explains, 
the hermeneutical moment smoothes over into the philosophical moment, that is, 
the moment when we reach the point that it no longer matters which propositions 
are ascribed to whom, but merely whether or not these propositions are valid.
385
 It 
                                                     
384 Strauss, ‘On a New Interpretation of Plato’s Political Philosophy’, 351. 
385 Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, 65. See also ibid., 71: “Whoever is 
wholly devoted to understanding a philosopher exactly as he understood himself, and whoever allows 
himself to be led in the study of that philosopher by the maxim that the greatest effort and care is to 
be employed in order to discover whether his oeuvre contains the truth, may reach the point at which 
it no longer makes any difference to him whether he thinks the thoughts of the philosopher or his own, 
because he moves on a plane on which the arguments take the lead and the alternatives visibly emerge 
that, beyond the “historical embeddedness” of both the author and the interpreter, determine the issue 
towards which the thought of both is directed.” According to Meier, the following statement of 
Strauss on Al-Farabi can be read as a self-explicative statement: “It may be added that by transmitting 
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is our own responsibility, then, to make a distinction between the esoteric (i.e. 
philosophical) and the exoteric (i.e. polemical) Strauss, or to refuse to succumb to 
Strauss’s charms. To the extent that his “success” – the actual influence of his 
exoteric message – is greater than his “intention”, we ourselves are responsible for 





4.6. “POLITICAL” PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICE 
 
In our search for Strauss’s answer to the question of the political as contained in 
his account of “political” philosophy, we seem now to have reached an impasse. 
On the basis of the interpretation of Strauss’s work given in the previous section, it 
seems that the only “teaching” we may indeed ascribe to him is his “intention” to 
lead others, that is, his “attentive” readers, toward philosophy as a way of life, as 
exemplified by Socrates. In other words, there is no way to be sure (based on 
textual evidence) whether any theoretical proposition we ascribe to him – either 
about his definition of the political as subject matter of philosophy (previous 
chapter) or his definition of the political as philosophy’s manner of treatment 
(current chapter) – and which we may subsequently want to argue for or against, is 
not in fact of our own finding or invention. As a consequence, Strauss himself 
seems to be immune to criticism and not capable of being held to account, which 
would in fact be un-Socratic. 
 There are a few strings we can hold on to, though. As we have seen, Meier 
claims that, as interpreters or historians of philosophy, we move from the history of 
philosophy to the intention of the philosopher, i.e., what is required is “that one 
return from the philosopher’s transmitted “contribution” to the “history of 
philosophy” to his intention.”
387
 Nevertheless, Meier seems to downplay the fact 
that the “contribution” a philosopher delivers to “the history of philosophy” is not 
entirely a matter of historical accident.  
In the first place it should be emphasized that not only the esoteric intent 
(inducing potential philosophers to become actual philosophers), but also the 
exoteric teaching (the telling of “salutary myths” or “noble lies”) is intended by 
any author who performs the art of writing.
388
 We may therefore assume that 
Strauss deliberately took the risk of creating a very specific “misunderstanding”, 
which he regards as precisely the appropriate understanding for “the many”. On 
                                                                                                                                       
the most precious knowledge, not in ‘systematic’ works, but in the guise of a historical account, 
Farabi indicates his view concerning ‘originality’ and ‘individuality’ in philosophy: what comes into 
sight as the ‘original’ or ‘personal’ ‘contribution’ of a philosopher is infinitely less significant than his 
private, and truly original and individual, understanding of the necessarily anonymous truth .” 
(Strauss, ‘Farabi’s Plato’, 377). 
386 In CM 112, Strauss suggests that the inclination to “personify” standpoints, or, we may add, to 
argue “ad hominem”, is itself thumotic in origin. 
387 Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem, 64. 
388 OT 47: “The superficial understanding is not simply wrong, since it grasps the obvious meaning 
which is as much intended by the author as is the deeper meaning” [emphasis added]. 
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this basis, we may retroactively conclude that our reconstruction of Strauss’s 
philosophy of politics, which we embarked upon in the previous chapter, that is, of 
his teaching of “the fact of the political” and of “the latitude of statesmanship” or 
phronèsis, may indeed to some degree legitimately be ascribed to him. 
Subsequently, we are allowed to critically examine whether this exoteric teaching, 
which Strauss seems to present as being “noble” and “salutary”, in fact legitimately 
deserves these characteristics.  
 In the second place, and more fundamentally, Strauss, as well as anyone 
else who engages in practicing the art of writing (and / or reading), necessarily 
attests to the distinctions between “the few” and “the many”, “the wise” and “the 
vulgar”, the esoteric and the exoteric, philosophy and society, and, finally, nature 
and history. Although the “true” intention of these texts may lie in their inviting the 
readers to ask questions, or, to be more specific, to engage in Socratic philosophy 
as a “zetetic” way of life, the actual practice presupposes and furthers certain 
specific answers to those questions from the outset , and is to that extent dogmatic 
rather than “zetetic”. It may be said that these answers function as the “confessions 
of faith” [Glaubensbekenntnisse] of Strauss’s “politics” of philosophy. As long as 
one is performing this art of writing and reading, one is necessarily affirming the 
ontological assumptions that are presupposed by it. And as long as one is 
subscribing to these assumptions, one may be held to account for doing so,
389
 for 
the historical “success” of a specific philosopher cannot be reduced to a mere 
matter of historical contingency or fate.  
I submit, therefore, that the critical evaluations of Lefort and Kojève must 
in the final analysis be understood not as directed against what Strauss says – no 
matter whether it belongs to his esoteric or his exoteric teaching – but rather 
against what he does, that is, against the assertions he attests to by performing 
them. Moreover, the legitimacy of these assertions or answers may be evaluated, 
either in terms of their truth value – are they “realistic” or a mere “fantasy” 
[phantasme]? – or in terms of their moral value or political impact, are they 
“salutary” or dangerous? 
Strauss might of course reply that the approach to the performative aspect 
of his work sketched in the previous paragraph presupposes the primacy of practice 
(or action) over theory (or argument), an assumption that he would reject in the 
name of the primacy of theory, that is, in the name of the conviction that the 
Socratic dictum that “virtue is knowledge” is true and that the bios theorētikos is 
the highest way of life. This would imply not only that a theoretical thesis should 
not be mistaken for a practical proposal,
390
 but also that a belief [Glaube] or 
commitment that is presupposed in practice must not be confused with an opinion 
                                                     
389 Cf. Geuss, Outside Ethics, 36, who speaks of the “various assumptions the people who are going 
to act on the theory make”. 
390 Cf. OT 76: “When Socrates was charged with teaching his pupils to be “tyrannical,” this doubtless 
was due to the popular misunderstanding of a theoretical thesis as a practical proposal. Yet the 
theoretical thesis by itself necessarily prevented its holders from being unqualifiedly loyal to 
Athenian democracy, e.g., for it prevented them from believing that democracy is simply the best 
political order. It prevented them from being “good citizens” … under a democracy.” 
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[Meinung] or proposition, the truth of which is to be examined in theory. After all, 
it might be argued that a philosopher is to be judged for the validity of the opinions 
he argues for, and not for that of the engagements he enacts. Stated differently, 
when we judge his “speeches” in the light of his “deeds”, we ourselves run the risk 
of doing so on the implicit assumption that the latter is “higher” than the former, 
whereas Strauss himself maintains that this assumption should be understood as a 
“noble lie”, an ironical and hence merely provisional inversion of the hierarchy 
between theoretical and practical (or political) life.
391
  
We should state, though, that it would be difficult to reconcile this reply 
with Strauss’s concomitant claim that philosophy should be regarded not so much 
as “a teaching or as a body of knowledge”, but as “a way of life” (CPP 91), which, 
in common with every way of life, harbors its own decisions and commitments.
392
 
What is more, Strauss claims that “philosophy (as the quest for the truth about the 
whole) and self-knowledge (as realization of the need of that truth as well as of the 
difficulties obstructing its discovery and its communication) cannot be separated 
from each other” [emphasis added],
393
 or, as he puts it more precisely, that the 
politics of philosophy or “the art of writing” belongs to philosophy’s “essential 
accidents” (OPS 250). Although Strauss emphasizes that the latter (the accident) 
belongs to a different, that is, lower, level than the former (the essence), it is 




Strauss gives an additional explanation in his course notes on Plato’s 
Symposium, which were published posthumously.
395
 While he states that there is no 
element of “spiritedness” [thumos] or indignation in philosophy proper, that is, 
there is no polemical element – the element without which, Strauss claims, the 
political cannot exist (see previous chapter) – he adds that in “its utterances or in its 
teaching, this is another matter” (OPS 243). Since Socrates did not write, Strauss 
notes, he was the more pure or consistent philosopher. Yet, he adds, “in honor of 
Plato, we are compelled to say that Socrates did not write because he could not 
write [emphasis added]” (OPS 246), or “more precisely, because he could not write 
on the highest level, and writing on the highest level includes the ability to write 
tragedy, the tragedy behind which are the avenging gods” (OPS 246-247).
396
 
                                                     
391  Cf. Strauss, ‘The Spirit of Sparta and the Taste of Xenophon’, 519n2: “the “deed-speech” 
antithesis … is an ironical expression of the antithesis between practical or political life and 
theoretical life.” 
392 Cf. NRH 26: “the theoretical analysis of life is noncommittal and fatal to commitment, but life 
means commitment”, NRH 46, 81. 
393 Strauss, ‘Farabi’s Plato’, 366. 
394 Ibid., 366. 
395 Leo Strauss, On Plato’s Symposium (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). This is the 
edited transcript of a course on Plato’s Symposium which Strauss had given at the University of 
Chicago in 1959. 
396 Cf. Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 296: “The philosophers and the demos in the sense indicated 
are separated by a gulf; their ends differ radically. The gulf can be bridged only by a noble rhetoric, 
by a certain kind of noble rhetoric which we may call for the time being accusatory or punitive 
rhetoric. Philosophy is incapable of supplying this kind of rhetoric. It cannot do more than to sketch 
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Examples of such writing are the myths of the rewards and punishments by the 
gods in the hereafter with which Plato concludes his dialogues Gorgias and 
Republic. Stated otherwise, Socrates was not able to practice the kind of writing 
that Strauss identifies with “the way of Thrasymachus”. By stating that “[w]riting 
on the highest level is higher than nonwriting on the highest level” (OPS 250), 
Strauss clearly expresses his de facto preference for the “Platonic” practice of 
“political” philosophy over the “Socratic” practice of “true politics”, the former of 
which is a combination of “the way of Socrates” and “the way of Thrasymachus”, 
or philosophy and polemics.  
 
4.7. FROM “POLITICAL” PHILOSOPHY TO “TRUE” POLITICS 
 
In order to illustrate Strauss’s de facto decision in favor of “Platonic” “political” 
philosophy over “Socratic” “true politics”, we turn now to a passage from Plato’s 
Symposium in which Socrates engages in a brief exchange with Agathon, the young 
tragedian, in which the distinction between “the few” and “the many”, between 
“the wise” and “the vulgar”, plays a prominent role.  
As is well known, in Plato’s Symposium, Socrates and his interlocutors 
give speeches about the theme of love [eros]. The company of friends is hosted by 
Agathon, the young and handsome tragedian who won the first price at the tragedy 
festival which took place the night before. Now that Eryximachus, a physician, has 
finished his speech, it is the turn of Agathon, who is to be the last speaker before 
Socrates. Just before Agathon begins, he initiates a brief exchange with Socrates. 
First, Socrates praises the “successful contribution” of Eryximachus, to whom he 
says: “If you were there where I am now, or rather, where I shall be perhaps, when 
Agathon too has made a splendid speech, you would be very worried indeed and in 
the state of panic I am in now.”
397
 Then Agathon intervenes:  
 
“Your praise, Socrates, has a wicked purpose”, said Agathon. “You want 
to make me lose my head at the thought of the audience [theatron] having 
high expectations of a great speech from me.” “But I saw your assurance 
[andreia] and confidence”, Socrates replied, “when you went on to the 
platform with the actors and looked straight ahead at that huge audience 
without being in the least perturbed, and just before your own plays were 
to be performed too. I should have to be extremely forgetful to think you 
would lose your head now at the thought of a few people like us.” “What 
do you mean, Socrates?”, said Agathon. “Surely you don’t think me so 
obsessed by the theatre [theatron] as not to realize that, to anyone with 
any sense, a small but thoughtful audience is far more terrifying than a 
                                                                                                                                       
its outlines. The execution must be left to orators or poets.” (According to Strauss Plato’s Gorgias is 
characterized by the quest for this noble rhetoric.) Cf. Strauss’s letter to Kojève, 22 April 1957: “I do 
not believe in the possibility of a conversation of Socrates with the people …; the relation of the 
philosopher to the people is mediated by a certain kind of rhetoricians who arouse fear of punishment 
after death; the philosopher can guide these rhetoricians but can not do their work (this is the meaning 
of the Gorgias).” (OT 275). 
397 Plato, Symposium, 194a (translation M.C. Howatson). 
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large and thoughtless one?” “Of course not, Agathon,” he said. “In your 
case I couldn’t possibly think anything so crass. I know very well that if 
you were faced with people you considered intelligent [sophos] you 
would take more notice of them than of the general public [hoi polloi]. 
But after all, we too were there in the theatre and were part of the public, 
so perhaps we are not these select few. However, if you did come across 
other people who were intelligent, you might well feel ashamed in front 
of them if you thought perhaps you were doing something wrong – what 
do you say?” “You’re right”, he said. “But in the case of the general 
public [hoi polloi], you would not feel ashamed in front of them if you 




At this point, Phaedrus intervenes and asks Agathon not to reply to Socrates 




In my reading of this passage, Agathon turns the distinction implicit in 
Socrates’ suggestion that it is more natural to be afraid of a huge audience than a 
small one into a normative distinction between “the few” and “the many”, or 
between “the wise” and “the vulgar”. He suggests that the multitude present in the 
theatre is not wise (or “thoughtless”), whereas the few people present in his home 
are wise (or “thoughtful”). Socrates continues by saying that of course he knows 
that Agathon, if he were to be confronted with a few people who are indeed wise, 
would naturally take more notice of them than of the many. However, Socrates 
questions whether the particular persons present are indeed wise, for, “after all”, 
he says, “we too were there in the theatre and were part of the public, so perhaps 
we are not these select few” [emphasis added]. So we may say that, by questioning 
Agathon’s suggestion that these particular “few” who are present are indeed wise, 
Socrates points to the difficulty of applying the general distinction between “the 
few” and “the many”, which always involves a particular act of judgment or a 
particular decision by a particular person, and which may turn out to be 
misguided.  
Of course, one could reply that this will merely have consequences for the 
(wrong or right) application of the distinction between the few and the many, the 
wise and the vulgar, but not necessarily for the validity of the distinction as such, 
but these things cannot be fully separated, for the problem of the concrete 
application of a conceptual distinction necessarily points to the problem of the 
validity of the distinction as such. In other words, the fact that a thumotic 
“gentleman” [kalokagathos] like Agathon might apply the distinction wrongly, 
may induce us, Plato’s readers, to doubt whether the use of his distinction at all is 
in fact very salutary or wise. Stated otherwise, we may as well take Phaedrus at his 
word when he calls this brief exchange a “dialogue”, that is, a genuine attempt by 
Socrates to raise and discuss the philosophical question of how to distinguish the 
wise from the unwise, and, if one is capable of doing so, whether it is justified to 
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treat the wise differently than the unwise. In fact, we may read it as a “brief 
indication” in precisely Strauss’s sense: at this point in the text, we are invited as 
readers to “complete” the argument by and for ourselves, that is, to think through 
the use and validity of the few-many distinction as such. 
Strauss’s own comments on this passage betray a different stance, 
however.
400
 According to him, the theme of this brief exchange is fear of disgrace 
before the audience. He asserts that both Socrates and Agathon merely claim to 
fear disgrace, but that in fact they do not fear it. He adds that, of the two, only 
Agathon is found out, since he walks into the “trap” that Socrates had set up for 
him to reveal that Agathon is in fact less “beautiful”, less a “gentleman” 
[kalokagathos] than he appears.
401
 Strauss thus clearly reads Socrates’ questioning 
here as an ironical device – in Strauss’s sense – to unmask Agathon’s lack of 
sincerity, rather than an attempt on Socrates’ part to dialectically answer the 
philosophical question mentioned above. In other words, Strauss fails to use this 
passage to display a “theoretical self-consciousness” of the “deeply hidden 
structural features” of his own work, viz. his use of the few-many-distinction which 
co-determines his historical influence or “success”, whereas he could very well 
have used this passage to display his intention of recovering philosophy or freedom 
of thought by actually exercising it. 
In addition, just as he reads into the text that Agathon knows of himself that 
he does not fear the audience, he reads into the text that Socrates knows of himself 
that he does not fear the audience. Yet the text itself remains indecisive on this 
point. It seems, therefore, that it is Strauss himself who decides what Socrates’ and 
Agathon’s (private) thoughts are by in fact lending them his own thoughts. His 
interpretation clearly betrays a preference for the “ironical” Socrates – irony 
understood here in Strauss’s sense of “magnanimity” – over the “zetetic” Socrates 
which he himself had presented earlier in his 1931 lecture. That is, he is silent here 
about the Socrates who led a life of a “giving-of-account” [logon didonai] or of 
“dialectical” philosophizing, who in this Platonic (!) dialogue may be understood to 
effectively “deconstruct” the distinction between the few and the many, between 
the wise and the vulgar, that is, the ontological assumption without which Strauss’s 




In the previous chapter we reconstructed Strauss’s political philosophy in the sense 
of his philosophy of politics, consisting both of a conception of the political and of 
“thoughtful” political judgment and decision-making. At the start of the current 
chapter, however, we noted that such a “propositional” reading is problematic 
insofar as his work is ultimately not intended to present any body of knowledge, but 
rather to recover a specific way of life, viz. the philosophical life, over and against 
another way of life, viz. the political life. Moreover, in accordance with this 
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intention, his writing is guided by another political philosophy in the “deeper” 
sense of a politics of philosophy, that is, a specific form of political action called 
“the art of writing between the lines”, which is intended to protect and further 
philosophy as a way of life. 
 In the second chapter we argued that Popper’s writing displays the 
performative condition of political thinking, without him showing a “theoretical 
self-consciousness” and without his offering an answer to it. The current chapter 
argues that Strauss explicitly shows himself to be aware of the problem of the 
communication of philosophy, or of the possibility of philosophy being 
misunderstood, but that his way of framing it as the necessary opposition between 
the few and the many and his way of offering a solution to it in the guise of the 
“political” philosophy of the art of writing amount to the aspiration of being able to 
escape from this condition. While Strauss recognizes the situated character of all 
writing and reading as a consequence of which every writing will necessarily be 
misunderstood, the practice of the “art of writing” harbors and furthers the 
assumption or fantasy that this condition can definitely be overcome.  
In the first place Strauss reduces the many different misunderstandings that 
are possible among human beings to one cardinal misunderstanding: that between 
“the few” and “the many”, or between philosophy and society. This in turn can 
only be regarded as the cardinal misunderstanding, on the underlying assumption 
that “virtue is knowledge”, that the philosophical life is the highest way of life.  
In the second place, the “political” remedy Strauss chose, viz. the “art of 
writing between the lines”, implies a belief in the possibility of neatly 
distinguishing the philosophical (or “esoteric”) intention of his writing from its 
polemical (or “exoteric”) intention, that is, the possibility of occupying an 
“objective” standpoint from which this dichotomy can be known and mastered. It is 
thereby implied that the source of the misunderstanding of texts that are written in 
accordance with the rules of this art, or of mistaking one’s “subjective certainty” 
for “objective certainty”, lies entirely with the reader, who thus turns out to be 
“uncareful” or “inattentive”, while it is implied that the writer and “careful” or 
“attentive” reader are de facto incapable of making this mistake and are thus 
sovereign and immune to failure and criticism. First, we argued that this 
implication would be at odds with the demand that one should assume 
responsibility for and be ready to give an account of one’s opinions, which is 
inherent in the practice of Socratic “true politics” or “dialectical” conversation that 
Strauss wished to recover in the first place. Secondly, we argued that the 
presupposition inherent in the “art of writing”, that a complete elimination of 
contingency or “chance” in writing and reading is possible, is at odds with the 
condition of contingency in which human thought finds itself, especially insofar as 
it is expressed, the denial of which Strauss himself seemed to reject in his criticism 
of modern, “Machiavellian”, political philosophy. 
In sum, whereas Strauss, in contradistinction to Popper, displays a form of 
“theoretical self-consciousness” of the condition of political philosophy, he 
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performatively attests to the problematic assumption that it is somehow possible to 
escape from its condition.  
The following chapters turn to the political thinking of Hannah Arendt, 
who tries to think outside the scheme of classical political philosophy – or what she 
calls “the Socratic school” – to offer an alternative account of the conditions of 
political thinking, as well as alternative ways of dealing with these conditions. To 
begin with, she claims that it is not a matter of course that the philosophical life or 
bios theōrētikos is the highest way of life. In fact, she argues, the underlying 
demand to establish such a hierarchy at all prevents us from acquiring an adequate 
understanding of the phenomenology of human action (including politics) and 
human thinking (including philosophy). As Chapter 5 shows, she claims that 
philosophy has interpreted action after the model of making, as a result of which it 
has failed to do justice to the realm of human affairs, which is a realm of freedom 
and hence of contingency. As Chapter 6 shows, she asserts that philosophy has 
interpreted thinking after the model of cognition and has subjected it to the rules of 
logic, as a result of which it has failed to do justice to the freedom inherent in the 
thinking activity, as well as its distinctive “political” – that is, perspectival – and 





THE PRAISE OF ARENDT: 
 

















Political institutions, no matter how well or how badly designed,  
depend for continued existence upon acting men; their conservation  







Despite the fact that Karl Popper and Leo Strauss present themselves as 
philosopher and defender of philosophy, respectively, they have come to be 
accepted as members of the canon of political philosophy to a much lesser degree 
than Hannah Arendt. This may be regarded as highly ironical, for Arendt is the 
only one of the three who explicitly distances herself from philosophy and its 
attitude to politics. Precisely because of her incorporation into the canon, it is very 
important to bear in mind that Arendt explicitly refused to call herself a 
philosopher.
404
 It is my conviction that we will only be able to do justice to her 
work if we place her critique of (the tradition of western) philosophy in the 
foreground, and, above all, if we understand that critique correctly.  
 This chapter reconstructs Arendt’s answer to the question “what is 
political?” or, to be more precise, her conception of the conditions of political 
action, of what makes politics possible. Especially instructive is her approach to the 
question of the founding of political order. In contradistinction to Popper and 
Strauss, who treat this question in a traditionally philosophical manner, viz. as a 
theoretical search for an “absolute”, that is, a principle, criterion, or standard the 
validity of which is to be established by cognition,
405
 Arendt interprets it as an 
originally political issue, the answer to which is to be found by the “men of action” 
themselves, in practice, that is, in confrontation with “the frailty of human affairs” 
                                                     
402 Aron, Le spectateur engagé, 256. 
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404 See inter alia Arendt, ‘ “What Remains? The Language Remains”: A Conversation with Günter 
Gaus’, 1,“I do not belong to the circle of philosophers.” 
405 Not only Strauss, but even Popper, despite the latter’s explicit attempts to distance himself from 
the traditional way of framing the question as “who should rule?”, remains committed to three of its 
premises: politics is in the end about rule (i.e. government or dominion of some over others); there 
should be one single criterion on the basis of which legitimate and illegitimate rule can be 
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philosophy to find and rationally ground that criterion (principle, standard) and answer. 
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or “the abyss of freedom”. As such, she proves to be capable not only of 
phenomenologically describing the performative conditions of politics, but also of 
thereby praising its possibility.  
 In order to find out what we may learn from Arendt about these conditions, 
we need to take a different approach than the one taken in the previous chapters. In 
the case of both Popper and Strauss, we started by reconstructing their work, before 
proceeding with a deconstruction. That is to say, first we searched for their “first 
principle” or “last word”, and then demonstrated how what their texts propose to 
reject nevertheless remains manifest in what is enacted by them. As we have seen 
in the case of Popper, his texts perform the friend-enemy logic of the closed 
society, which at the same time they propositionally reject. In the case of Strauss 
we have seen that his texts perform the modern form of “utopianism”, which at the 
same time they profess to reject. Thus we learned something invaluable about the 
conditions of politics which, apparently, we could only retrieve despite themselves 
instead of thanks to themselves. 
 In the case of Arendt, such a deconstruction of what is taken to be the 
propositional content of her work has already become rather common in the 
secondary literature. Most critics have not drawn the ultimate consequence of their 
reading, however, which is to question the validity of the standard propositional 
reading in the first place. As I show in the first section of this chapter, both the 
standard reading and most of its criticisms assume that Arendt should be 
interpreted as if she proposes some kind of “solution”. However, it can be 
demonstrated that this runs counter to her explicitly formulated intention. Only 
when we take this intention seriously will we be capable of properly reconstructing 
her conception of politics.  
In the second section I show that, according to the so-called standard 
reading of The Human Condition, Arendt is understood to opt for “the Greek 
solution” of polis life (as exemplified especially by Periclean Athens) over and 
above the philosopher’s “traditional substitution of making for acting” (as 
exemplified by “the Socratic school”) in response to “the frailty of human affairs”. 
Broadly in agreement with arguments set out by Roy Tsao,
406
 I show that in fact the 
alleged “solutions” both of the Greek polis and the philosophers of “the Socratic 
school” remain tied to the same conceptual framework. According to this 
framework, which is manifest for instance in Plato’s Gorgias, a concern for the 
individual self (or soul) is placed above a concern for the common world, and 
politics – or at least the founding of political order – is conceived as a matter of 
“making” instead of “acting”. By liberating her work from these remainders of 
what she considers to be the traditional philosophical outlook, we are able to 
recover her original intention: to understand the conditions of political life. 
In the third section, however, I argue that Tsao throws the baby out with 
the bathwater insofar as he claims that Arendt distances herself not only from the 
Greeks’ exaggerated concern for individual immortality, but also from their faith in 
the lasting power of acting together, that is, Pericles’ “supreme confidence that 
                                                     
406 Tsao, ‘Arendt Against Athens: Rereading The Human Condition’. 
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men can enact and save their greatness at the same time” (HC 205). Although 
Arendt does indeed acknowledge that, as a matter of factual truth, no action can 
survive its moment without the help of the homo faber who “reifies” it, I take her 
to realize that, as soon as we make this assumption of the inevitable “futility” of 
human affairs into the premise of our action, we adopt a fatalist stance toward the 
point and possibilities of human action.
407
 According to Arendt, the public realm 
within which “acting-in-concert” takes place is established by “power” and held 
together by mutual “promising”, which are themselves again forms of “acting”, not 
of “making”. Her praise of “faith in and hope for the world” (HC 247) serves as a 
counterweight to the philosophers’ fatalism, which results in “worldlessness”.
408
 
Thus, her work is not only led by the aim of adequately understanding the worldly 
conditions of politics, but also of praising the possibilities of politics within that 
world. 
In the fourth section I demonstrate how this twofold aim enables her to 
offer an original approach to what is still regarded as one of the most important 
questions of political philosophy: under what conditions can we speak of a 
legitimate foundation of a political order? This question, which still remained 
implicit in The Human Condition, is addressed explicitly by Arendt in On 
Revolution and The Life of the Mind: Willing. By assuming the perspective of the 
“men of action” of the American Revolution – the “founding fathers” – instead of 
that of the “men of thought”, she tries to articulate the dilemmas of confronting 
“the abyss of freedom” without succumbing to the desire for a “guarantee” in the 
guise of either a transcendent absolute (God’s commands or Nature’s laws) or an 
immanent absolute (History as “made” by mankind).
409
 Instead, Arendt tries to 
acquaint us with the possibility of founding a political order on the basis of the 
principle of “public freedom” as it becomes manifest in the performance of the 
founding act.  
As the fifth section shows, Arendt’s claim that the American Declaration of 
Independence was “one of the rare moments in history when the power of action is 
great enough to erect its own monument” (OR 130) invited criticisms analogous to 
that of her celebration of Pericles’ words quoted earlier. Bonnie Honig and Alan 
Keenan claim that her attempt to consider the foundation of freedom as a pure 
“performative” without recourse to any “constative” is bound to fail. However, I 
show that the interpretations of Honig and Keenan rest on the problematic premise 
                                                     
407 HC 54: “Worldlessness as a political phenomenon is possible only on the assumption that the 
world will not last; on this assumption, however, it is almost inevitable that worldlessness, in one 
form or another, will begin to dominate the political scene.” 
408 Arendt finds this fatalism exemplified especially in Sophocles’ words “Not to be born prevails 
over all meaning uttered in words; by far the second-best for life, once it has appeared, is to go as 
swiftly as possible whence it came” (Oedipus at Colonus, cited by Arendt in OR 281), and in 
Ecclesiastes’ “Vanity of vanities; all is vanity … There is no new thing under the sun, … there is no 
remembrance of former things; neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with 
those that shall come after” (cited by Arendt in HC 204). 




that Arendt’s celebration of the American founding is intended either as factual 
statement (the truth of which is historically to be verified) or as normative 
judgment (the validity of which is philosophically to be justified). I argue that her 
claim that the Declaration of Independence was an instance of pure political 
freedom should rather be read as an utterance of faith on her part, and, in the final 
instance, as an invitation to ask ourselves how much faith we actually have in the 
possibility of politics. 
In the sixth and final section I argue on the basis of Arendt’s work that the 
course of action we will eventually decide upon remains free in the sense that it 
cannot be determined on the basis of some fixed and fixing decision procedure: it is 
in theory “undecidable”. Instead, guided by our judgment and executed by our will, 
it is carried by our faith grown into a love for public freedom as the principle of 
public freedom. In the secondary literature this crucial role of love (for action, for 
freedom) is seldom articulated, despite the fact that Arendt explicitly thematizes it 
in her last work: The Life of the Mind: Willing. To conclude, in my reading 
Arendt’s answer to the question of the founding of political order lies both in the 
actual performance of “public freedom” itself, as well as in the participants’ 
continuing love for its principle which at the same time becomes manifest in it. 
 
5.2. UNDERSTANDING THE VITA ACTIVA WITHOUT THE VITA CONTEMPLATIVA 
 
In The Human Condition, which is widely considered to be her main work, Arendt 
famously states that “the greater part of political philosophy since Plato could 
easily be interpreted as various attempts to find theoretical foundations and 
practical ways for an escape from politics altogether.” (HC 222) According to 
Arendt, since Plato (or more broadly, since “the Socratic school”), philosophers 
have attempted to escape from politics by substituting “making” for “acting”, by 
replacing the “acting-in-concert” of citizens regarded as “equals” [isonomia] by the 
“rule” [archè, Herrschaft] of “the few” over “the many” [hoi polloi], i.e. by those 
who on the basis of their true knowledge [epistēmē] exercise command over those 
who dwell in the shadow world of opinion [doxa] and obey orders. According to 
Arendt, Aristotle’s famous definition of man as zoion logon echon, that is, as 
animal rationale or “rational living being”, has traditionally not been understood to 
refer to a being that possesses the gift of “speech”, but rather to a being that 
possesses the gift of “cognition”, the proper use of which enables him either to 
fully devote himself to the vita contemplativa culminating in the contemplation 
[theōria] of the eternal cosmic truth, or to mold the world to his will by the 
application of knowledge in the form of technē. 
According to the most common interpretation of her work, and especially 
also when read in contrast with Strauss, Arendt’s work appears as a defense of the 
traditional counterpart of the vita contemplativa, which is the vita activa, especially 
in its “highest” form of the bios politikos. She is understood to plea for the “agonal 
spirit” [agōn] of the Greek polis that was historically unique in allowing its citizens 
to compete with their “peers” by means of persuasion instead of violence in order 
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to achieve immortal fame or “greatness” for their words and deeds. Hence, at first 
sight, Arendt appears to reverse the traditional hierarchy according to which the 
vita contemplativa or bios theōrētikos (striving for eternal truth) is ranked higher 
than the vita activa, higher even than the latter’s highest form of life, the bios 
politikos (striving for immortal fame). 
 What has been called Arendt’s “Greek nostalgia”
410
 has been criticized in 
the secondary literature on (at least) two different grounds. On the one hand, it is 
criticized for its lack of a moral basis. In this case, her recovery of the “agonal 
spirit” (HC 41, 194) is understood as a recovery of tragic life, of the virtue of 
andreia as embodied especially by her example of Achilles.
411
 She is criticized for 
her alleged celebration of an aestheticized conception of politics as an end-in-itself, 
conducted for its own sake, devoid of (moral) content and purpose. Her plea for 
“greatness” in word and deed seems to make her an “existentialist” or even 
“decisionist”, comparable to Nietzsche or even to Carl Schmitt.
412
 
On the other hand, her conception of politics is criticized for its lack of 
realism. Her emphasis on politics as being conducted “through words and 
persuasion and not through force and violence” (HC 26) seems to make her a 
defender of what has come to be called a “deliberative” model of politics.
413
 
However, critics have argued that this conception of politics is “utopian” in the 
sense that it is blind to the moments of exclusion, sovereignty, and violence that are 
inescapably part of politics and remain implicated within her purified conception of 
politics as “public freedom”, as can indeed be shown throughout her work.
414
 For 
instance, Hanna Pitkin has demonstrated how, in The Human Condition, Arendt’s 
narrative of the decline of “the political” against the rise of “the social” in fact 
performs the fatalism (the necessity, irresistibility) from which her concept of 
politics (as freedom, resistability) claims to escape.
415
  
Yet, as I try to demonstrate, these criticisms presuppose a reading of 
Arendt according to which it is her intention to advocate a specific way of life and 
a specific understanding thereof (viz. the bios politikos) above another way of life 
(viz. the bios theōrētikos), or, to be more precise, to posit a certain decisive, 
because “highest” principle, which serves as criterion or standard by which to 
measure reality.
416
 This reading is by no means self-evident, however, as is argued, 
for instance, by Jeremy Waldron: 
                                                     
410 See Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, xxxix. 
411 HC 25-26, 41, 194 
412  Jay, ‘The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt’; O’Sullivan, ‘Hannah Arendt: Hellenic 
Nostalgia and Industrial Society’. 
413  HC 25-27. Habermas, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power’; Benhabib, 
‘Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt’s Thought’; idem, The Reluctant 
Modernism of Hannah Arendt. 
414 Breen, ‘Violence and Power: A Critique of Hannah Arendt on ‘the Political’; Keenan, ‘Promises, 
Promises: the Abyss of Freedom and the Loss of the Political in the Work of Hannah Arendt’. 
415 Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Conception of the Social, e.g. p. 15: “[Arendt] 
stresses human agency and condemns those who hide it by invoking superhuman entities and forces, 
yet she herself invokes the social in just this way.” 
416 Cf. Bedorf, ‘Das Politische und die Politik. Konturen einer Differenz’, 16-20. 
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we run a great danger if we think of theory – even evaluative theory – as 
primarily political advocacy or as primarily the laying out of a social or 
constitutional “wish-list.” We should think of it instead, I want to say, 
literally as political philosophy – a deepening of our insight into the realm 
of the political and of our understanding of what is involved in making 




Although Waldron claims that in principle (almost) all political philosophies can 
(and perhaps should) be read in the latter way, he mentions the work of Arendt as 
an exemplary case in point.  
When we read her carefully, it becomes clear that Arendt herself explicitly 
turns against such “reversals” of which she mentions Nietzsche’s turning Plato 
upside down as perhaps the best known example.
418
 According to her, what this 
modern reversal shares with the traditional hierarchy is “the assumption that the 
same central preoccupation must prevail in all activities of men, since without one 
comprehensive principle no order could be established” (HC 17). However, she 
claims, this assumption is by no means “a matter of course” (HC 17).
419
 
Accordingly, she claims that her own use of the term vita activa presupposes that 
“the concern underlying all its activities is not the same as and is neither superior 
nor inferior to the central concern of the vita contemplativa.” (HC 17) We may 
now conclude, therefore, that the two main criticisms introduced above presuppose 
that Arendt does wish to understand and measure reality under one aspect, one 
“comprehensive principle”, viz. the principle of agonal self-display, and the 
principle of communication free of rule [herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation], 
respectively. 
Against such interpretations, I argue that it simply has not been Arendt’s 
intention to advocate one way of life (vita activa) over and above another way of 
life (vita contemplativa).
420
 She does not analyze the examples of “men of action” 
such as Achilles or Pericles in order to fortify some kind of proposal, but instead to 
bring to light important phenomenological aspects of the conditions of political 
action.
421




In Arendt’s view, an adequate understanding of the phenomenology of the 
world of human interaction is removed from sight if we start from the experience 
that belongs to the way of life of the “men of thought”. To be more precise: her 
                                                     
417 Waldron, ‘What Would Plato Allow’, 139. Cf. idem, Law and Disagreement, 99-101, in which he 
speaks of the task of taking into account “the circumstances of politics”. Unfortunately, however, he 
does not spell out what he counts among these “circumstances”.  
418 HC 17, 293, LM1 11, 211-212. 
419 Cf. PP 102, LM2 6, 11. 
420 Waldron, ‘What Plato Would Allow’, 139 
421 As Arendt herself later admitted, The Human Condition is indeed a better title than Vita Activa 
(see LM1, 6).  
422  Cf. Arendt’s explanation of her use of “idealtypes” during an interview that was held at a 
conference on her work held in 1972 in Toronto, the transcript of which was published as: Arendt, 
‘On Hannah Arendt’. See ibid., 326, 329. See also Arendt, Denktagebuch, 716, 771. 
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critique of the philosophical tradition is in the last instance not directed at the 
theories held by philosophers about politics, that is, at their propositions either of a 
descriptive (verifiable: “what is …?”) or of a normative kind (justifiable: “what 
ought to be done?”), propositions with which Arendt may agree (as is often 
asserted of Aristotle’s theory of praxis and Kant’s theory of judgment) or disagree. 
Her approach is much more radical. It is directed at the attitude toward politics 
that is engendered by the philosophers’ activity of thinking itself, an attitude in 
which the theories they held are ultimately rooted. As she states explicitly in her 
last work, The Life of the Mind: “Both the philosopher’s hostility toward politics, 
‘the petty affairs of men,’ and his hostility toward the body have little to do with 
individual convictions and beliefs; they are inherent in the experience itself” (LM1 
84-85). That is to say, the derogatory attitude of philosophy toward politics is not 
to be understood as being a mere matter of convictions that are held by individual 
philosophers, but rather as being rooted in the nature of the thinking experience.  
According to Arendt, thinking is literally “out of order” – not only because, 
while devoting oneself to the thinking activity, one needs to abstain from engaging 
in worldly activity, but also because, while thinking, one is incapable of reaching 
the realness of the outside world of “contingent” phenomena, events, facts. For, by 
representing the outside world within the mind, thinking necessarily removes itself 
from the world. This tendency of philosophical life to “forget” the worldly 
conditions of politics is inherent to the thinking experience itself. As a 
consequence, the life of the mind harbors the danger of “negating” the worldly 
conditions of political freedom and of instead developing a preference for necessity 





5.3. CONDITIONS OF POLITICS I 
 
When we read The Human Condition through the lens of Arendt’s intention, 
reconstructed in the previous section, that is, as an attempt to understand the 
specific phenomenology of political reality, her work, including its passages about 
the Greek polis in ‘The Greek Solution’ (HC §27), will no longer appear as a plea 
for a specific “solution”. As she would say in her later work, Arendt originally 
wished to call her book Vita Activa,
424
 but she admits that her publisher had chosen 
a better title: The Human Condition.
425
 She expresses her awareness of the fact that 
the term vita activa itself was framed by those who looked down on it: the “men of 
thought” who naturally preferred the vita contemplativa.  
It should be emphasized that Arendt expressly speaks about the “human 
condition” instead of “human nature”. She claims that only the first expression 
enables us to do justice to the feature that human beings are not only a “what” 
(which is capable of being defined) but also a “who” (which defies definition). 
                                                     
423 See HC 12-17 and especially LM1 80-92. 
424 The German version of The Human Condition (1958) is actually titled Vita activa (1967). 
425 LM1 6. 
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Moreover, it allows us to acknowledge that human beings are never completely 
determined by their “conditions” in the way they are by their “nature” (their 
“essence” or telos). 
 Building on this assumption, Arendt is able to present to us what may be 
called a phenomenology of the world of human affairs, of human togetherness 
[inter esse]. According to her, all action, including political action, is conditioned 
by plurality, natality, and worldliness. First, plurality indicates that not man (in the 
singular) but men (in the plural) inhabit the world. Secondly, natality indicates that 
by virtue of being born, of being a beginning themselves, human beings are 
capable of beginning something new in the world. Finally, worldliness refers both 
to the human artifice – the world of tangible objects that are fabricated by man as 
homo faber – and to the intangible “web of human relationships”, which is the 
result of human acting and speaking together. According to Arendt, this “web” is 
no less real than the world of objective things. It comes into being because human 
beings not only communicate something (a “what”) but also disclose themselves (a 
“who”), or, in other words, because they not only speak about some worldly 
objective reality but also to one another.
426
 
 The world thus understood coincides with the space of appearances or the 
public realm, which is the scene of political action. It is characterized by 
perspectivity, which means that the world only becomes common and real to us by 
virtue of the fact that it is perceived and talked about from different standpoints. 
Our sense of the real, or of our common world, is endangered or distorted in the 
following two ways: either when the world is perceived only under one aspect – as, 
for instance, in the case of the conformist force of “public opinion”
427
  or when 
the disclosing character of acting and speech vanishes because people are only for 
or against other people – as, she claims, in the case of modern warfare and 
propaganda.
428
 Thus, Arendt brings in something novel in response to the question 
of how to make sense of politics. As we have seen, in the previous chapters, Popper 
and Strauss display a lack of appreciation for the “worldly” character of political 
life, for the “in-between” which tends to disappear from view when politics is 
interpreted after the model of either science / philosophy – which strives for the 
cognition of an “objective” “what” – or polemics – which reduces the “in-between” 
to a binary “for or against” – an interpretation that is the result of a privileging of 
the scientific or philosophical perspective and experience over others. 
 The three human “conditions” mentioned above – plurality, natality, 
worldliness – result in what Arendt calls “the frailty of human affairs” (HC §26), 
which manifests itself in four different ways. First, human acting and speaking 
together is characterized by boundlessness, which means that “action and reaction 
among men never move in a closed circle and can never be reliably confined to two 
partners” (HC 190). Secondly, actions are characterized by their irreversibility: 
what has happened has become part of our reality and cannot be undone, cannot be 
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“wished away”, so to speak. Thirdly, action and speech are characterized by 
unpredictability: all actions are events that appear in the world like miracles, and 
their singular realness can in no way be anticipated. Fourthly, words and deeds are 
characterized by futility: they will vanish from the world without leaving a trace if 
they are not noticed, remembered, talked about, and, finally, reified by homo faber. 
 At first sight, The Human Condition presents two “solutions” or 
“remedies” to this fourfold “frailty of human affairs”. One of the two, “the 
traditional substitution of making for acting” (HC §31), is clearly rejected by 
Arendt. This “remedy”, which Arendt claims has been adopted by the greater part 
of political philosophy since Plato, tries to escape from “the frailty of human 
affairs” and thus from politics by taking refuge in the certainty that is offered by 
homo faber, who, isolated from his fellow human beings, remains master over 
himself and his doings from beginning to end. The hallmark of this substitution is 
the concept of “rule” [archē, Herrschaft], which implies that “the few” who 
command are strictly separated from “the many” who obey. He who is capable of 
ruling himself and his own body is regarded as being capable of ruling and is 
entitled to rule the body politic. Arendt observes: “Within the narrower sphere of 
political theory, … the notion of rule and the concomitant questions of legitimacy 
and rightful authority played a much more decisive role than the understanding and 
interpretations of action itself” (HC 228).  
In contradistinction to Strauss, who emphasized the discontinuity between 
the ancients and the moderns, Arendt emphasizes the continuity between the 
ancients and the moderns, in the sense that the underlying paradigm of politics 
being conceived as a matter of “making”, remains dominant throughout the 
tradition of Western thought. The only reason why the violent implications of this 
paradigm did not become manifest before modernity, she claims, lies in the fact 
that the vita contemplativa was traditionally still ranked higher than the vita activa. 
Only after the demise of the contemplative life were the implications of violence 
unleashed into the public realm.  
 As it is clear that Arendt rejects “the traditional substitution of making for 
acting”, it may appear as if she embraces the alternative remedy, introduced earlier 
as “the Greek solution” (HC §27). This “solution” is especially intended as a 
remedy against the “futility” of human affairs. It consists in the foundation of the 
polis, which is meant to guarantee immortal fame for the words and deeds of its 
citizens (HC 196) without the help of the poets, and it seems to be embodied by 
Pericles: 
 
The polis – if we trust the famous words of Pericles in the Funeral 
Oration – gives a guaranty that those who forced every sea and land to 
become the scene of their daring will not remain without witness and will 
need neither Homer nor anyone else who knows how to turn words to 
praise them; without assistance from others, those who acted will be able 
to establish together the everlasting remembrance of their good and bad 




When we take a closer look, however, it becomes clear that the “remedy” of the 
philosophers and the “solution” of the Greek polis in fact share the same 
assumptions. 
 For, in the first place, the Greek philosophers and the Greek citizens agree 
with each other in one important respect: for both of them, the foundation of the 
body politic is a matter of “making” rather than “acting”.
429
 It is the lawgiver who 
lays down the law of the polis before the “men of action” can start to engage in 
politics together (HC 194). Arendt calls this an outstanding “symptom” of the 
“agonal spirit” of the Greeks and claims that as a result, the law “did not command 
the same loyalty we know from the Roman type of patriotism” (HC 195, PP 82). In 
fact, the philosophers use the concept of politics-as-making that is already present 
in the polis itself, and turn it into the concept of politics par excellence: “To them, 
legislating and the execution of decisions by vote are the most legitimate political 
activities because in them men ‘act like craftsmen’: the result of their action is a 
tangible product, and its process has a clearly recognizable end” (HC 195). Thus, 
the individualism of the “agonal spirit” is itself dependent upon a concept of the 
law-(or founding)-as-making. As a consequence, Arendt’s alleged affirmation of 
the agonal spirit would imply an undermining of her own attempt to criticize the 
substitution of making for acting that results in worldlessness. 
 In the second place, the Greek attempt to assure “that the most futile of 
human activities, action and speech … would become imperishable” (HC 197-198) 
in fact does not leave enough room for the action and speech of succeeding 
generations. As Roy Tsao has shown, in the German version of The Human 
Condition – which is at points more elaborate and more precise than the English 
version – Arendt explains that the Greeks aspire to retain the past by preserving it 
as an unchangeable present throughout time, whereas the Romans remember the 
past as past, that is, while retaining a temporal distance from it.
430
 In this light, 
Tsao explains, it becomes clear why Arendt claims that the Greek polis’ aim “to 
make the extraordinary an ordinary occurrence” is not only the cause of “the 
incredible development of gift and genius in Athens”, but also of “the hardly less 
surprising swift decline of the city-state” (HC 197). 
 On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that it is precisely the 
individualist exaggeration or hubris that becomes manifest in the “agonal spirit” 
(PP 82, HC 41, 194, HC 19, 49: aien aristeuein) of the Greek polis which is the 
forerunner of what also becomes visible in the case of the philosophers: a concern 
for the individual self above a concern for the world. In other words, Arendt seems 
to adhere to the framework of Plato’s Gorgias, in which Socrates uses the concept 
of the agōn from the vocabulary of Callicles, his polemical opponent, in order to 
transform the citizens’ (or politicians’) strife against one’s fellow human beings 
(the defense of one’s bodily existence and one’s honor or reputation) into a strife 
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against the lie within one’s own soul (the improvement of one’s soul).
431
 In either 
case a concern for the world common to us all disappears from view. 
 In this light it also becomes understandable why Arendt, when introducing 
the difference between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa in terms of the 
difference between a concern with “eternity” and a concern with “immortality”, 
respectively, calls this the “shortest, albeit somewhat superficial, way” (HC 18) of 
indicating this difference. By now, after all, we understand that this binary 
opposition implies that there is in each case only one aspect or “highest” criterion 
by which the specific way of life is categorized – the demand for which she 
explicitly rejects. Even in the ‘Prologue’ to The Human Condition she makes it 
very clear that her book is not meant as a plea for a specific solution (let alone the 
only possible solution) to a specific problem, but rather as an attempt “to think 
what we are doing” (HC 5). In light of her intention to understand political 
action,
432
 then, her reconstruction of “the Greek solution” should not be interpreted 
as a plea for an ideal.  
 If we now read the section titled ‘The Greek Solution’ (HC §27) against 
this background, we are drawn to the following passage, at the end of the section:  
 
The polis, properly speaking … is the organization of the people as it 
arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between 
people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to 
be. “Wherever you go, you will be a polis”: these famous words … 
expressed the conviction that action and speech create a space between 
the participants which can find its proper location almost any time and 
anywhere. It is the space of appearances in the widest sense of the word 
…. (HC 198)  
 
Here, it becomes explicitly clear that even the “founding” of the polis takes place 
entirely in terms of “acting and speaking together” instead of in terms of making or 
producing. 
 Accordingly, Arendt no longer interprets crucial concepts like “freedom” 
[eleutheria] and even archē in light of experiences drawn from outside the political 
sphere, such as that of the household [oikos], of despotic regimes or of the homo 
faber, for each of these experiences implies an interpretation of archē as the 
“command” by someone who is isolated from the executors instead of as the 
“beginning” by a primus who remains inter pares, who stays first among his peers. 
Arendt understands political freedom neither as the creative freedom of the homo 
faber who, in isolation from his fellow human beings, remains master over himself 
and his doings, nor as philosophical freedom or liberum arbitrium, that is, the 
mental freedom of the will to choose between two given options. According to her, 
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freedom is first and foremost a political phenomenon, that is, a characteristic of 
action as it appears within the public “space of appearances”. It becomes manifest 
in the guise of virtuosity [virtú] in the sense of “the excellence with which man 
answers the opportunities the world opens up before him in the guise of fortuna” 
(WIF 153).
433
 It is this kind of freedom, which only becomes manifest in action 





5.4. CONDITIONS OF POLITICS II 
 
As we have seen, with Tsao I believe that Arendt does not elevate the Greek 
“agonal spirit” to the sole aspect by which to understand political action, for as 
such it would be destructive of “the common world” or “reality”. However, in his 
reading of Arendt Tsao goes one step further, especially when he cites the 
following passage in which Arendt refers to Pericles for a second time: 
 
The words of Pericles, as Thucydides reports them, are perhaps unique in 
their supreme confidence that men can enact and save their greatness at 
the same time and, as it were, by one and the same gesture, and that the 
performance as such will … not need the transforming reification of homo 
faber to keep it in reality. (HC 205) 
 
Tsao believes that Arendt, because she refers to Pericles twice, wants to make a 
didactic point here.
435
 According to him, she tries to tell us that we should not 
follow Pericles in his confidence that action is capable of “saving” itself, of 
keeping itself in reality without the help of homo faber, that is, without the help of 
the poet or the lawgiver. Tsao gives two arguments for this interpretation.  
In the first place he notes that Pericles’ trust in the fact that the “men of 
action” do not need man as homo faber to guarantee their remembrance is at odds 
with statements of Arendt elsewhere in The Human Condition where she asserts 
that all acting and speaking necessarily needs to be “reified” in order to survive 
(HC 95): “acting and speaking men need the help of homo faber in his highest 
capacity, that is, the help of the artist, of poets and historiographers, of monument-
builders or writers, because without them the only product of their activity, the 
story they enact and tell, would not survive at all” (HC 173). Indeed, Tsao notes, 
Pericles himself needed Thucydides to report his words.
436
 
In the second place, whereas it seems to us that Arendt laments the fact that 
Pericles’ words “[have] always been read with the sad wisdom of hindsight by men 
who knew that his words were spoken at the beginning of the end” (HC 205), Tsao 
                                                     
433 Arendt refers to Machiavelli to illustrate her view that action cannot exist without fortuna or 
“chance”, while we have seen that Strauss, on the contrary, ascribes to Machiavelli the aim of 
completely eliminating “chance”. 
434 WIF 146, 151, 156. Cf. HC 197. 
435 Tsao, ‘Arendt against Athens’, 112. 
436 Ibid., 111. 
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asserts that in fact she means to say that his words should precisely be read “with 
the sad wisdom of hindsight” (HC 205), in spite of her subsequent claim: “What is 
outstandingly clear in Pericles’ formulations … is that the innermost meaning of 
the acted deed and the spoken word is independent of victory and defeat and must 
remain untouched by any eventual outcome, by their consequences for better or 
worse” (HC 205). Tsao notes that Arendt had claimed earlier that “the light that 
illuminates processes of action, and therefore all historical processes, appears only 
at their end, frequently when all the participants are dead” (HC 192). He argues, 
therefore, that she cannot possibly intend to say that the meaning of an action 
“must remain untouched by any eventual outcome”. The following statement by 
Arendt is often used as an example of her seemingly Nietzschean embrace of 
immoralism: “Thucydides, or Pericles, knew full well that he had broken with the 
normal standards for everyday behavior when he found the glory of Athens in 
having left behind “everywhere everlasting remembrance [mnēmeia aidia] of their 
good and their evil deeds” [emphasis added]” (HC 205-206). Tsao retorts, 
however, that in fact the criterion of “greatness”, which he identifies with the 
capacity of action to guarantee its own everlasting remembrance, could hardly be 
plausible for Arendt, because, he argues, according to her this kind of everlasting 
remembrance does not exist.  
 This shows that Tsao in fact agrees with Arendt’s critics insofar as they 
state that her Greek conception of politics is “utopian” because it expects too much 
of politics. However, the difference between him and her critics consists in the fact 
that they assume that Arendt agrees with Pericles, whereas Tsao claims she 
disagrees. As a result, Tsao not only throws away the bathwater, that is, the 
“agonal spirit” as ideal (which, according to her critics, may or not be a justified 
ideal), but the baby too, that is, confidence in action as the condition for politics. 
Hence, in fact he substitutes an exaggerated expectation of politics (“utopianism”) 
for its opposite: a lack of expectations of politics (“fatalism”). 
 In my reading, however, neither of Tsao’s two arguments holds. In the case 
of the first argument, Tsao reads Arendt’s references to Pericles as propositional 
claims rather than performative ones, that is, he regards them as truth claims, the 
validity of which may be objectively established (either by empirical observation or 
rational justification), instead of as utterances of trust or faith, which may or may 
not be “proven” true by performing them. The textual evidence for the last 
interpretation is clear: the second Pericles reference mentioned above is directly 
preceded by Arendt’s criticism of the tradition’s lack of “trust in the world as a 
place fit for human appearance, for action and speech” (HC 204). The “melancholy 
wisdom” of Ecclesiastes – “Vanity of vanities; all is vanity…. There is no new 
thing under the sun, … there is no remembrance of former things; neither shall 
there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come 
after” (HC 204) – Arendt regards as the “certainly unavoidable” result of this lack 
of trust in the world, rather than its reason or ground. This reading is confirmed by 
what she had said earlier in the same work: “Worldlessness as a political 
phenomenon is possible only on the assumption that the world will not last; on this 
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assumption, however, it is almost inevitable that worldlessness, in one form or 
another, will begin to dominate the political scene” (HC 54). 
 In reply to Tsao’s second argument: there is no textual evidence for his 
claim that Arendt rejects “greatness” and that the meaning of words and deeds 
remains “untouched” by any “eventual outcome” (HC 205) to the extent that she 
would claim that the meaning of words and deeds coincide with their outcome, i.e. 
with their victory or defeat. This, after all, would mean that Arendt replaces the 
alleged criterion of a-moral greatness by the criterion according to which the 
verdict of History is decisive. Again, this would mean that the criterion of 
“greatness” is replaced by the criterion of “fate”, while in fact the implication of 
the passage about “greatness” (HC 206) is that there is no such single prior 
criterion (such as motive or aim) by which to judge a specific event, as this would 
inhibit our attempt to adequately understand the meaning of an event (or word or 
deed) as it lies in its performance, such as in the case of “energeiai” like play 
acting or flute playing (HC 207). 
 In my view, it should be regarded as a symptom of Tsao’s misreading of 
the second Pericles passage that he left out the following words on the space of the 
three periods: “be enough to generate dynamis and” (HC 205). By leaving out these 
words, Tsao suggests that Pericles expresses his trust (merely) in actions of 
individual citizens – that is, the agonist self-display embodied by Achilles – 
whereas in fact he is (also) talking here about the power [dynamis] which is the 
result of acting together. Indeed, Tsao fails to mention that the second Pericles 
passage is part of a section called ‘Power and the Space of Appearances’ (HC §28) 
and can only be properly understood within this context. For it is precisely in 
Arendt’s conception of power and of “faith in dynamis (and consequently in 
politics)” (HC 205) that a “concern for the world” assumes shape, a concern that 
disappeared from view in the traditional framework embodied by Plato’s Gorgias . 
 Power is described by Arendt as that which keeps the public realm in 
existence (HC 200, 244): “What keeps people together after the fleeting moment of 
action has passed (what we today call ‘organization’) and what, at the same time, 
they keep alive through remaining together is power.” (HC 201) The identity 
between “political freedom” and “power” is expressed by Arendt at several places 
in her work when she refers to the following passage of Montesquieu: political 
freedom “ne peut consister qu’à pouvoir faire ce que l’on doit vouloir et à n’être 
point constraint de faire ce que l’on ne doit pas vouloir”, which is rendered by her 
as: political freedom “can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will 
and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will” (WIF 161, OR 301-
302n17, LM2 199). According to her, the emphasis is on power [pouvoir]: political 
freedom exists only when an “I will” coincides with an “I can”. In political thought, 
power is usually understood as either potentia [dynamis, Vermögen] or as potestas 
[archē, Herrschaft], and at first sight it may seem that Arendt prefers the first 
conception of power, because she claims that power is always a “power potential” 
(HC 200). However, her conception of power in fact falls outside these two 
interpretations. What she emphasizes in fact is that power is of a performative 
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nature, which is to say that it always remains dependent on “the unreliable and only 
temporary agreement of many wills and intentions” (HC 201 – a passage often 
overlooked). While being a power potential, it should nevertheless regularly be 
actualized in order that is does not gradually pass away. However, the important 
point is that power cannot be materialized, it is not “an unchangeable, measurable, 
and reliable entity like force or strength” (HC 200) or like the instruments of 
violence which can be possessed by man as homo faber. 
 Power, in turn, is held together by promise, that is, by the force of mutual 
promise or contract (HC 245), which Arendt describes as “the only alternative to a 
mastery which relies on domination of one’s self and rule over others; it 
corresponds exactly to the existence of a freedom which was given under the 
conditions of non-sovereignty” (HC 244). In fact, promising grants sovereignty a 
certain limited reality. Precisely because promising is a form of action (it takes 
place within the public realm), it enables Arendt to conceive of a form of 
“redemption” for human action (for “the frailty of human affairs”, especially for its 
unpredictability) that is immanent to the sphere of action itself, for it avoids the 
danger both of escaping from human affairs by seeking redemption by means of a 
transcendent foundation in the guise of “divine law” or “natural law”, and of 
escaping from human affairs by regarding human history entirely as the product of 
man as homo faber.
437
 This is the meaning of Arendt’s claim that the remedy 
against action’s predicaments “does not arise out of another and possibly higher 
faculty, but is one of the potentialities of action itself” (HC 237). 
 Finally, at the end of the section titled ‘Unpredictability and the Power of 
Promise’ (HC §34), Arendt makes it clear that every form of action, including 
power and promising, presuppose faith and hope, two virtues which she claims are 
not of Greek but Christian origin. It is clear now that Arendt does not stop at a 
phenomenological description of political action, she also tries to show that acting 
presupposes confidence in acting, which, in turn, is enhanced by acting. Hence, her 
understanding of political action also implies a praise of action.  
This twofold aim is beautifully articulated and performed by Arendt when 
she expresses herself as follows: “men, though they must die, are not born in order 
to die, but in order to begin” (HC 246). As Susannah Gottlieb aptly explains, 
because Arendt does not use the phrase “for the sake of” here (which would be an 
expression of meaning) but the phrase “in order to” (which is an expression of 
utility), Arendt provides an ontology (or even a teleology) of mankind, but at the 
same time she undermines that ontology (or teleology) by ironizing it in the very 
same sentence. Thereby, Arendt not only indicates that man’s telos consists in his 
being a-telic – insofar as he is a beginner, his has an open end – but that this 
statement in itself, in turn, should not be understood as an ontological (or 
teleological) truth claim either – in the sense that men are born “for the sake of” 
                                                     
437 Cf. Gottlieb, Regions of Sorrow, 140: “… the very inconspicuousness of Arendt’s messianism … 
allows her to retain the thought of salvation without succumbing either to some form of traditionalism 
that understands redemption as the act of a transcendent being or to some version of modernism that 
neutralizes the messianic idea by presenting the redeemed world as a matter of human fabrication.” 
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beginning, that it is their “essential” end to begin – but rather as an utterance of 
faith, which is to be “proved true” by performing it (just as it can be “refuted” by a 
refusal to perform it).  
This would imply that in the end, Arendt’s words “if we trust the famous 
words of Pericles [emphasis added]” (HC 197) and her claim that the words of 
Pericles “are perhaps unique in their supreme confidence [emphasis added]” (HC 
205) are addressed to us, her readers: by emphasizing that no action, and hence no 
politics, is possible without “trust in the world as a place fit for human appearance, 
for action and speech” (HC 204), without “faith in and hope for the world” (HC 
247), she provides us not so much with a “solution” or “remedy”, that is, a 
theoretical answer in the sense of a “first principle” or “last word”, which we may 
“keep on the mantelpiece forever” (Virginia Woolf);
438
 rather, she induces us to ask 
how much trust we actually have in action, in the world, in politics, that is, in 
something which only exists if it is practiced by us. 
 
5.5. FOUNDING FREEDOM I 
  
Based on our reading of The Human Condition, we have now established that 
Arendt would appear to be contradicting herself in answering the question of 
whether politics is in the final instance conditioned by “acting” or by “making” 
only if it were to be assumed that she is searching for a theoretical (i.e. 
propositional, constative) answer to the question of the foundation of politics. As 
we have shown, however, this assumption does not hold, since she conceives of the 
raison d’être of politics (that is, of political freedom or of power held together by 
mutual promising) not as a principle to be known, but as a principle to be enacted. 
What has not been answered yet, however, is the question what “saves” 
political action over time, that is to say, not only for this generation of promisers, 
but for generations to come. In The Human Condition we saw the beginning of an 
answer in Arendt’s preference for the Romans over the Greeks, but it is only in On 
Revolution and in The Life of the Mind: Willing that she explicitly addressed the 
question that is left unarticulated in her earlier work:
 439
 the question of founding 
freedom in the sense of the establishing of a “lasting institution”. 
 In these two works, Arendt tries to understand the question of the 
legitimacy of political order not as it was traditionally approached, that is, as a 
philosophical, theoretical, search for an absolute principle, but rather as it 
originally arises as a political, practical matter within the public realm. She 
provides her understanding of the act of foundation of the American “founding 
fathers” in the guise of a story told from the perspective of the “men of action” 
themselves, who act, decide, and judge eye-to-eye with “the abyss of freedom”. 
                                                     
438 Cf. Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, 5: “I should never be able to fulfill what is, I understand, the 
first duty of a lecturer – to hand you after an hour’s discourse a nugget of pure truth to wrap up 
between the pages of your notebooks and keep on the mantelpiece for ever.” 
439 Cf. Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob, 219. 
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 The condition which in The Human Condition was, in light of the aim of 
earthly “immortality”, still called “the frailty of human affairs”, returns in On 
Revolution and The Life of the Mind: Willing as “the abyss of freedom”. According 
to Arendt, we pay the price of contingency for our freedom – again, freedom not 
understood as the creative freedom of the sovereign homo faber, nor as the 
philosophical freedom or liberum arbitrium, but in the sense of public freedom. 
Every act we have committed, may as well have been left undone, and yet, as soon 
as we have committed it, it excludes all other acts we could have committed. As a 
result, there is an element of arbitrariness to our freedom. In Arendt’s words: 
 
an act can only be called free if it is not affected or caused by anything 
preceding it and yet, insofar as it immediately turns into a cause of 
whatever follows, it demands a justification which, if it is to be 
successful, will have to show the act as the continuation of a preceding 
series, that is, renege on the very experience of freedom and novelty. 
(LM2 210) 
 
In contradistinction to the example of Achilles, where the emphasis lies on “the 
urge toward self-disclosure” at the expense of all other factors (HC 194), the 
American founders count as a true example of “public freedom”, says Arendt. 
Their power is held together by “mutual promise”, of which she explicitly says: 
“There is an element of the world-building capacity of man in the human faculty of 
making and keeping promises” (OR 175). She notes that this “horizontal” contract 
should be distinguished from the “vertical” contract which consists of the consent 
of the governed to be ruled by their governors (OR 170), for in the latter case the 
relation of rule remains primary.
440
  
 As public freedom was already in place, then, the question with which the 
founding fathers were confronted was how public freedom (established by power 
and held together by mutual promising) can also be secured for future generations. 
In other words, their already existing power needed to be supported by authority. 
 Because every “we” of a political community is to a certain extent 
contingent (or random), it is tempting to try to escape from this condition of 
contingency, that is, of possible futility or meaninglessness, by seeking to justify 
itself in terms of the “certainty” or “necessity” granted either by “natural” or 
“divine” right (truth), or by the verdict of history or progress (victory, success). 
Arendt asks how we can cope with “the abyss of freedom” without succumbing to 
the desire to escape from this condition by providing our acting-in-concert with a 
justification in the name of God, Nature or History, as a result of which our acting-
in-concert loses precisely its characteristic of being freely chosen. Bonnie Honig 
aptly phrases Arendt’s question as follows: “is it possible to have a politics of 
                                                     
440 It is likely, therefore, that Arendt would dismiss not only Strauss’ return to the question “who 
should rule?”, but also Popper’s replacement of this question by “how can we so organize our 
political institutions that our leaders will be prevented from doing too much harm?”. 
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 Traditionally, Arendt claims, the answer to this question is framed in terms 
of the “vicious circle” of Rousseau, who wrote: “The great problem in politics, 
which I compare to the problem of squaring the circle in geometry … [is]: how to 
find a form of government which puts the law above man” (OR 183).
442
 Thus, the 
problem of authority rose in the guise of a “higher” law that would guarantee the 
validity of positive law. As laws were understood as commandments, Arendt 
continues, the founding fathers succumbed to the temptation to anchor the positive 
law in an absolute, which is why the Declaration of Independence starts with the 
words “we hold these truths to be self-evident”. For, she explains, these words 
“combine … an agreement necessarily relative because related to those who enter 
it, with an absolute, namely with a truth that needs no agreement since, because of 
its self-evidence, it compels without argumentative demonstration or political 
persuasion” [emphases added] (OR 192). This formula, she continues, due to its 
reference to the “self-evident truth” that “all men are created equal”, remains on the 
one hand tied to the traditional Hebrew conception of the law as a compelling 
command or imperative, while on the other hand combining this absolute with the 
intrinsically relative “we hold”.  
However, Arendt claims, “only theoretically” (OR 195) did it seem to be 
the case that there was no avoiding the problem of the absolute, for what saved the 
American Revolution was in fact neither “nature’s God” nor “self-evident truth”, 
but the act of foundation itself, contained in the “we hold”. The revolutionaries did 
not find any clues in the traditional concept of law to understand what they were 
doing. While looking for precedents they arrived at the Romans, who realized that 
the stability and the authority of a political community should be derived from its 
origin. According to Arendt, the authority or legitimacy of a constitution – i.e. the 
law which holds the polis together – should not be derived from an absolute, 
transcendent source (God, Nature, History), but rather from the initial and “integer” 
beginning [initium, principium]: “one is tempted to conclude that it was the 
authority which the act of foundation carried within itself … that assured stability 
for the new republic” (OR 199). They learned from the Romans that “the very 
authority of the American Constitution resides in its capacity to be amended and 
augmented” (OR 202). 
 However, the question remains: how to solve “the problem of beginning”, 
for in the case of the Romans the beginning was conceived as something that must 
have occurred in a distant past (OR 198). They did not conceive of the founding of 
Rome as an absolute beginning, but they attempted to anchor the “integrity” of 
their political order by referring to the prehistorical freedom of the era of Saturn 
(Cronus), that is, in a mythical past. Virgil’s famous line from the Fourth Eclogue, 
“magnus ab integro nascitur ordo saeclorum”, implies that the “greatness” of the 
                                                     
441 Honig, ‘Declarations of Independence’, 98. Cf. idem, Political Theory and the Displacement of 
Politics, 97. 
442 Rousseau in a letter to the Marquis de Mirabeau, 25 July 1767 (see OR 312n5). 
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order exists by virtue of its being inspired by a beginning that preceded it. In The 
Life of the Mind, Arendt laments the fact that “freedom in its original integrity” 
only survived in political theory in the guise of this prehistoric past (the Age of 




However, Arendt notes, the American revolutionaries changed Virgil’s 
words into “novus ordo saeclorum”, by which they had admitted that they were no 
longer founding “Rome anew”, but founding a “new Rome”. Hence, she says, it 
seemed that the men of the American Revolution, who were aware of the absolute 
novelty of their enterprise, were caught in something for which “neither the 
historical nor the legendary truth of their own tradition could offer any help or 
precedent” (HC 212). And yet, she says, the American revolutionaries might have 
tried a different reading of Virgil’s Fourth Eclogue. Traditionally, his words were 
interpreted as the pagan announcement of the birth of Christ.
444
 According to 
Arendt, the American revolutionaries might have interpreted Virgil’s words 
differently, viz. as the affirmation of the divinity of birth as such, or “that the 
world’s potential salvation lies in the very fact that the human species regenerates 
itself constantly and forever” (OR 211). She claims that this condition of natality, 
which was articulated by the Christian philosopher Augustine – “Initium ergo ut 
esset, hominem creatus est” – “could have become the ontological underpinning of 
a truly Roman or Virgilian philosophy of politics” (LM2 216). 
 Read in this light, the foundation (beginning) carries a principle 
[principium] within itself, by which we are inspired and “authorized”, that is, not 
by its actual success, but by its original and originating meaning: 
 
What saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries 
its own principle within itself, or, to be more precise, that beginning and 
principle, principium and principle, are not only related to each other, but 
are coeval. The absolute from which the beginning is to derive its own 
validity and which must save it, as it were, from its inherent arbitrariness 
is the principle which, together with it, makes its appearance in the world. 
The way the beginner starts whatever he intends to do lays down the law 
of action for those who have joined him in order to partake in the 
enterprise and to bring about its accomplishment. As such, the principle 
inspires the deeds that are to follow and remains apparent as long as the 
action lasts. (OR 212-213) 
 
In other words, beginning and principle [archè] coincide. Elsewhere, she describes 
the notion of “principle”, which she derives from Montesquieu, as follows:  
 
                                                     
443 LM2 216. 
444 As we have seen in the third chapter, Schmitt’s use of Virgil’s words as the last sentence of his 
‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’ are usually interpreted in this way. We have also 
seen that Strauss, by contrast, re-interprets them as a reference to the “integrity” of philosophical 
knowledge of nature. 
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unlike the judgment of the intellect which precedes action, and unlike the 
command of the will which initiates it, the inspiring principle becomes 
fully manifest only in the performing act itself yet while the merits of 
judgment lose their validity, and the strength of the commanding will 
exhausts itself in the course of the act which they execute in cooperation, 
the principle which inspired it loses nothing in strength or validity 
through execution. (WIF 152)  
 
According to Arendt, the principle of the American Republic is the spirit of “public 
freedom”, which in turn requires “the interconnected principle of mutual promise 
and common deliberation” (OR 214), that is, forms of acting-in-concert which 
simultaneously concern the republic (they are about public / common affairs) and 
constitute it (they are a public / common affair). 
 
5.6. FOUNDING FREEDOM II 
 
Arendt famously praises the American Declaration of Independence as being “the 
perfect way for an action to appear in words” (OR 130). She claims that “we are 
confronted with one of the rare moments in history when the power of action is 
great enough to erect its own monument” (OR 130). These words remind us of her 
references to Pericles in The Human Condition, and we should not be surprised that 
Arendt has been criticized once more for failing in her aim to purify political 
freedom from violence, that is, to completely sever the “performative” from the 
“constative”. Just as in the case of her earlier work, her conception of politics is 
called “utopian” for pushing the violent aspects out of it. 
 For instance, Bonnie Honig, while referring to Jacques Derrida, claims that 
in Arendt’s own case, too, the constative remains present. It surfaces in her 
“fabulous faith” that the founding was indeed pure:  
 
Arendt dismisses, among other things, the constative structure of the 
Declaration of Independence and insists that the pure performative of the 
declaration was a sufficient guarantor of the authority of the new republic 
– in order to fill the place with a fabulous faith, the faith that the 
American founding fathers did not need gods in order to found a 




In a later article, Honig calls Derrida’s deconstructive analysis “franker” than 
Arendt’s “effort to provide us with a far less contaminated origin for democratic 
politics.”
446
 In the same vein, Alan Keenan asserts that every “freedom” necessarily 
implies a “founding”, which is why he speaks of “the ultimate failure of Arendt’s 
quest for a foundation that would guarantee an experience of freedom and the 
                                                     
445 Honig, ‘Declarations of Independence’, 107. 
446 Honig, ‘An Agonist’s Reply’, 194. 
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political cleansed of the “nonpolitical” sovereignty and rule”.
447
 According to him, 
she merely shifts her answer away from power to promise to authority. 
 Honig believes that Arendt’s notion of “augmenting” provides her with a 
possibility to escape from this criticism. According to this notion, the authority of 
the constitution resides in its inherent capacity to be amended, by means of which 
“all innovations and changes remain tied back to the foundation which, at the same 
time, they augment and increase” (OR 202). However, Keenan argues that this 
concept merely reiterates the problem: 
 
authority as “augmentation” attempts to have it both ways: to insulate the 
political from the threat that the “necessity” of foundation poses to 
freedom and from the loss threatened by its lack of foundation. Arendt’s 
“augmentation,” that is, presents as a smooth, evolutionary process what 





In a later article, Honig shifts attention from Derrida’s “franker” analysis towards a 
recognition of the fact that the practice of mutual promising was actually already in 
place – “in medias res” – before the founding itself. Yet, she argues, as the 
occurrence of this already existing “shared reality” was itself a matter of 
contingency, Arendt saw herself confronted with what Derrida has called “the 
paradox of exemplarity”: in order for a practice to function as an example, it should 
at the same time be unique (contingent), in order for it to be forceful enough; and it 
should be not unique (not contingent), in order for it to bear repeating.
449
 The 
actual historical story is “too located and contingent to inspire action in the 
present”, Honig argues, and therefore “Arendt offers a fable of founding instead 




If we were to follow Honig and Keenan here, in other words, if we were to 
understand Arendt as offering a “fable” or “example” of pure founding which in 
fact misrepresents the underlying historical reality, her conception of politics 
would indeed appear “utopian”. On the other hand, if we were to expect Arendt to 
offer a “frank” description of political reality, actually always being “mixed”, we 
would run the danger of ending up with a “fatalist” conception of politics. Both 
outcomes would be hard to reconcile with what we reconstructed, on the basis of 
our reading of The Human Condition in the first half of our current chapter, as 
Arendt’s intention: that the conditions for the possibility of politics are not so much 
to be described in a “propositional” fashion – either in the guise of a normative 
political “proposal” or “ideal” or in the guise of an ontological description of the 
eternally recurring “nature” of politics – but rather in a phenomenological and 
performative fashion. 
                                                     
447 Keenan, ‘Promises, Promises’, 79. 
448 Ibid., 95. 
449 Honig, ‘An Agonist’s Reply’, 195. 
450 Ibid., 196. 
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 Keenan should be criticized on two important points. As we shall see 
below, Honig’s position is in fact more faithful to Arendt’s. In the first place, the 
conception of freedom that Keenan ascribes to Arendt – as a kind of “pure” 
freedom – is much more similar to her conceptions of freedom as liberum 
arbitrium or as the sovereign freedom of the homo faber than to her own notion of 
political freedom. According to this latter notion, it is inherent to freedom that 
every decision that is actually taken excludes other decisions that might have been 
taken. However, “exclusion” in this sense, viz. that all actual decisions could have 
been otherwise, is not identical to the kind of “exclusion” that is inherent to the 
exercise of “sovereignty” or the use of “violence”, as Keenan believes. Rather, 
exclusion in the basic sense of the contingency of human decisions is merely one of 




 In the second place, on the basis of our reading it is not the case that 
Arendt, as Keenan asserts, keeps “shifting” the answer to the question of which 
foundation “saves” freedom – from power to promise to authority – nor is it the 
case that, as a result, she disregards the fact that “pure” politics is always lost and 
that this is in fact the insight that she should yield. To the contrary, for her, insight 
in these ontological regularities of politics counts as a rather trivial truth which is 
precisely the point of departure of her investigation, and not its outcome. The 
“shift” of which Keenan is speaking is not the symptom of Arendt’s failure, then, 
but of the necessary failure of any theory to think what is so difficult to think, 
namely “what we are doing”.
452
 In Arendt’s view, power, promise, and authority 
are not meant as philosophical principles (criteria, standards), but as practices of 
“redeeming” or “saving” political action, in favor of which we may or may not 
decide by enacting them. In other words, this criticism once again implicitly and 
mistakenly assumes that Arendt’s utterance that the American founding “is” in fact 
a matter of pure politics, should be understood as a proposition, that is, a truth 
claim about which we may achieve certainty (either in the guise of historical 
evidence or some kind of “fabulous faith”).  
As soon as we realize this, we can also make sense of the fact that there are 
passages elsewhere in On Revolution in which she attests precisely to the opposite, 
viz. that the spirit of the revolution – the principle of the Declaration – is lost. In 
these passages she does not praise the success of the revolution, but instead laments 
                                                     
451 Kalyvas, ‘From the Act to the Decision’, 338, provides the correct diagnosis – Arendt fails to fully 
articulate her own theory of the decision because she remains dependent on her rejection of Schmitt’s 
notion of the decision – but he neglects the fact that Arendt does offer alternatives. In the first place, 
throughout her work, a notion of the decision may be traced which is not an irrational act of will, but 
a public act which is irreversible, unpredictable, etc. In the second place, he ignores the crucial role 
that love fulfills, according to her, in the completion of the will, as we show in the next section. 
452 Cf. OR 223-224: “Terminologically speaking, the effort to recapture the lost spirit of revolution 
must, to a certain extent, consist in the attempt at thinking together and combining meaningfully what 





 Far from seeing this as a symptom of an alleged inconsistency in 
Arendt’s work, I propose to interpret these expressions as a sign of Arendt’s 
attempt not so much to establish the “objective” success or failure of the American 
revolution (or of Pericles’ polis), but rather to invite us to seek its meaning, which 
cannot be “deduced” by the application of any single criterion of truth. What is 
neglected is the fact that these are expressions of a form of confidence or faith, and, 
more importantly, of an attempt to induce us to examine our own confidence or 
faith, which requires a decision, an intervention on our part. 
 In contradistinction to Keenan, Honig attests to this in her earlier article. 
According to Honig, Arendt’s account of authority as a practice of augmenting 
“commits her … to the insistence that we treat the absolute as an invitation for 
intervention, that we refuse its claim to irresistibility by deauthorizing it.”
454
 
Nevertheless, more could be done to articulate the crucial role of such 
“commitment” (and of a possible lack thereof) for politics, both within Arendt’s 
account of the conditions of political action, and within her writing. True, Arendt 
sometimes suggests that it was a “conceptual necessity” that forced the American 
revolutionaries to interpret the law as command, just as she had stated at one point 
in The Human Condition that the identity of “ruling” and “beginning” was 
“linguistically predetermined” in the Greek word archein (HC 224). Yet when we 
take a closer look at the text of On Revolution, what attracts our attention is the 
crucial role of the founding fathers’ “confidence” (OR 167), and at some points the 
lack thereof, as when Arendt speaks of their “despair” (OR 199, 216) and 
“misgivings” (OR 191). It is no coincidence, therefore, that her book ends with her 
contrasting two lines of Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus, the first of which 
represents the fatalist’s stance – better not to be born at all – while the second 
represents the confident stance – “it was the polis, the space of men’s free deeds 
and living words, which could endow life with splendour” (OR 281). Arendt 
laments the fact that the first expression is much better known within our tradition 
than the second, which is why she brings it back into our memory.  
 
5.7. LOVE OF FREEDOM AS PRINCIPLE OF POLITICS 
 
Arendt’s work seems to embody the aim of formulating a political philosophy that 
does justice to the conditions of politics. As we have seen, she suggests the 
possibility of developing a “truly Roman or Virgilian philosophy of politics” which 
recognizes “freedom in its original integrity”, the “ontological underpinning” for 
which is provided by an Augustinian “philosophy of natality” (LM2 110) or a Duns 
Scotian “philosophy of freedom” (LM2 146).
455
 
                                                     
453 The sixth chapter of On Revolution, called ‘The Revolutionary Tradition and Its Lost Treasure’, is 
devoted to the failure of the spirit of the revolution to find its appropriate institution . See, inter alia, 
OR 280. 
454 Honig, ‘Declarations of Independence’, 108-111. 
455 Indeed, Arendt claims that Augustine’s “philosophy of natality” may provide the “ontological 
underpinning for a truly roman or Virgilian philosophy of politics” (LM2 216), and about the work of 
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However, she notes, the fact of natality “seems to tell us no more than that 
we are doomed to be free by virtue of being born, no matter whether we like 
freedom or abhor its arbitrariness, are “pleased” with it or prefer to escape its 
awesome responsibility by electing some form of fatalism” (LM2 217). In other 
words, insofar as even these philosophies can be understood in a propositional, 
“objectifying” manner, they cannot be decisive in determining our answer to the 
question of whether or not we are indeed “pleased” with our freedom, whether we 
want to escape from our freedom or be confident that our actions will not be in 
vain. Recall how, at the end of the third section of this chapter, we decribed how 
Arendt tries to avoid this kind of fatalist implication of philosophical argument by 
simultaneously ironizing these kind of ontological stances: “men, though they must 
die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin” (HC 246).
456
 
Yet, in The Life of the Mind, Arendt claims that the impasse may be solved 
by an appeal to the faculty of judgment,
457
 which she describes as “the ability to tell 
right from wrong, beautiful from ugly” (LM1 193), or, more precisely, “the faculty 
that judges particulars without subsuming them under general rules” (LM1 192-
193).
458
 Accordingly, Honig suggests in her earlier article, Arendt’s “fable” should 
not be interpreted as an authoritative faith, but as an instance of her judgment.
459
 
Commentators have written more about the third part of The Life of the Mind, on 
judging, which never appeared, than on the other two parts combined, on thinking 
and willing, which did appear, as if they were searching for Arendt’s “last word” 
about judgment. However, if we take seriously her remarks on the faculty of 
judgment that appear in ‘What Is Freedom?’,
460
 we have to conclude that according 
to her, action, insofar as it is free, can indeed be prepared by judgment (that is, by 
the cognition of the right aim by our intellect), but it cannot be determined by it. 
Nor can it be determined by the will, that is, the power to command the execution 
of judgment, for, she claims, the exercise of the will is a matter of strength or 
weakness, not freedom. She concludes: “Action insofar as it is free is neither under 
the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will …” (WIF 152).  
What, then, conditions freedom, makes action possible, if not a philosophy 
of freedom, nor by judgment, or the will? What remains, I argue, is something for 
which Arendt uses terms like “faith” (HC 205, 247; WIF 168) and a set of closely 
related concepts such as “trust” (HC 197, 204, 208), “confidence” (HC 205), “good 
will” (HC 245-246), “hope” (HC 247), and, finally, “love” (HC 324). As we have 
                                                                                                                                       
Duns Scotus she says “we meet not simply conceptual reversals but genuine new insights, all of 
which could probably be explicated as the speculative conditions for a philosophy of freedom” (LM2 
145-146). 
456 Gottlieb, Regions of Sorrow, 142. 
457 LM2 217. 
458 Arendt describes judgment as “deciding, without any over-all rules, this is beautiful, this is ugly, 
this is right, this is wrong …” (LM1 69) and phronèsis as “a kind of insight and understanding of 
matters that are good or bad for men, a sort of sagacity – neither wisdom or cleverness – needed for 
human affairs” (LM2 59). 
459 Honig, ‘Declarations of Independence’, 107. 
460 WIF 152. 
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seen, she writes about “faith in dynamis (and consequently in politics)” (HC 247); 
“trusting in action and speech as a mode of being together” (HC 208); “trust in the 
world as a place fit for human appearance, for action and speech” (HC 204); “faith 
in and hope for the world” (HC 247); and, finally, of “the genuine experience of 
and love for the world” (HC 324). 
Although this constitutive role of love for has indeed been recognized in 
the secondary literature (consider especially Elizabeth Young-Bruehl’s famous 
biography of Arendt, titled For Love of the World), it has not been sufficiently 
worked out theoretically. In my view, the main reason for this consists in the fact 
that elsewhere in The Human Condition, Arendt describes love – that is, love 
between two persons – as an anti-political passion, for, as she says, it “destroys the 
in-between which relates us to and separates us from others” and is thus “by its 
very nature … unworldly” (HC 242).
461
  
However, in The Life of the Mind: Willing she gives another, entirely 
different account of love,
462
 which may in fact be understood to serve as an 
explanation of the constructive and even crucial role of love for (political) 
action.
463
 For, whereas the will, which floats between hope and fear in anticipation 
of the realization of its project and is characterized by strength or weakness, is 
described by Arendt rather mechanically as the “spring” of action (LM2 101),
464
 
she calls love (of freedom) the “inspiring principle” of action (LM2 203). Drawing 
upon the thought of Augustine and Duns Scotus, she claims that the will is 
“completed”, that is, “redeemed” by love, that is: it is love that invites the will to 
cease willing and start acting.
465
 Moreover, Arendt suggests that of faith, hope, and 
love, the last is the most durable: 
 
What Love brings about is lastingness, a perdurance of which the 
mind otherwise seems incapable. Augustine has conceptualized 
Paul’s words in the Letter to the Corinthians: “Love never ends”; of the 
three that “abide” – Faith, Hope, Love – “the greatest” [the most durable, 
as it were] is love” (I Corinthians 13:8) (LM2 103-104) 
 
We may read her Augustinian account of the conditions for acting in contrast to the 
moral intellectualism of Socrates and perhaps even of Greek philosophy in general, 
                                                     
461 Cf. Arendt’s account of “compassion” in OR 86, which is very similar. 
462 LM2 95-96, 102-104.  
463 Interestingly, in Arendt, Denktagebuch, 203-204, 289-290 (in 1952), 459 (in 1953), she mentions 
love as a fourth form of human activity, besides labor, work, and action . On the one hand, this would 
seem to indicate that love does indeed play a more important role in her understanding of the human 
vita activa than she acknowledges in her published work. On the other hand, her account of love in 
these few fragments is largely in agreement with her account in The Human Condition, where she 
characterizes love as an unworldly activity. 
464 Cf. WIF 152. 
465 LM2 102: “…the Will is redeemed by ceasing to will and starting to act, and the cessation cannot 
originate in an act of the will-not-to-will because this would be another volition.” 
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according to which to know justice is to act justly: “virtue is knowledge”.
466
 By 
contrast, consider what Arendt has to say about Augustine: “Men do not become 
just by knowing what is just but by loving justice [emphasis added]” (LM2 104) 
467
 
Analogously, we may say that human beings do not become free by knowing 
freedom, but by loving it.  
What carries the founding of freedom, then, is love for the principle of 
public freedom, which at the same time manifests itself in performing it. As 
mentioned already, the notion of “principle” is derived from Montesquieu,
468
 who 
describes in his The Spirit of the Laws principles in this specific sense as “the 
human passions that set [a form of government] in motion”.
469
  
A distinctive feature of Arendt’s later account of love lies in its being 
entirely different from the specific political passion that we encountered in the 
work of Strauss: thumos, which in the guise of “anger” or “indignation” remains 
dependent of what it polemicizes against.
470
 Stated otherwise, love can be 
described as a welcoming, hospitable passion, whereas thumos is primarily an 
averting, hostile passion. Incidentally, our reconstruction of Arendt’s conception of 
love in this sense has provided us with an additional argument against the 
interpretation of Arendt’s notion of “agonal spirit” as a celebration of the tragic life 
or of courage [andreia] as a thumotic virtue. Just as her concept of “greatness” 
should be associated with the concept of a potentially lasting meaning, her 
appraisal of the “agonal spirit” should be understood as an appraisal of courage as 
the basic readiness to appear in public out of love of freedom,
471
 which is the 




By way of conclusion, we first return briefly to the work of Popper and Strauss. In 
the first part of this dissertation we have seen that Popper attests to “faith in 
                                                     
466 Cf. HC 247: “Only the full experience of [the capacity to act, to begin] can bestow upon human 
affairs faith and hope, those two essential characteristics of human existence which Greek antiquity 
ignored altogether, discounting the keeping of faith as a very uncommon and not too important virtue 
and counting hope among the evils of illusion in Pandora’s box. It is this faith in and hope for the 
world that found perhaps its most glorious and most succinct expression in the few words with which 
the Gospels announced their ‘glad tidings’: ‘A child has been born unto us.’” 
467 She could have added: nor do men become just by our making them just. Cf. HC 188: “The 
popular belief in a ‘strong man’ who, isolated against others, owes his strength to his being alone is 
either sheer superstition, based on the delusion that we can “make” something in the realm of human 
affairs – ‘make’ institutions or laws for instance, as we make tables and chairs, or make men ‘better’ 
or ‘worse’ – or it is conscious despair of all action, political and non-political, coupled with the 
utopian hope that it may be possible to treat men as one treats other ‘material.’”. 
468 WIF 152: “Such principles are honor or glory, love of equality, which Montesquieu called virtue, 
or distinction or excellence – the Greek [aei aristeuein] (‘always strive to do your best and to be the 
best of all’), but also fear or distrust or hatred.” See also LM2 201. 
469 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 21. 
470 For Arendt’s use of the concept of thumos, see WIF 158-159. For her critique of a polemical 
conception of politics, see her account of Rousseau in OR 77-78. 
471 HC 36, 186-187. 
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reason”, that is, in the problem-solving capacity of (scientific) rationality. In the 
second part we have seen that Strauss (in his letters) claims that he firmly believes 
– “firmitur credo” – in the truth-achieving capacity of philosophical dialectics 
[logon didonai]. However, both of them seemed to imply that this “faith” is in the 
final instance “irrational”, insofar as their standard of reference is that of 
theoretical, i.e. propositional, knowledge (either scientific or philosophical). In the 
end, their categories of the rational and the irrational remain bound to Plato’s 
scheme of the cave (in the Republic) and the opposition between dialectics and 
rhetoric (in the Gorgias). As a result, the work of both authors remains vulnerable 
to the criticism that it is “founded” on an “irrational” decision.  
 As we have seen, Arendt too attests to a specific faith, viz. “faith in the 
world”. Yet not only is the object of her faith different, but, in contradistinction to 
Popper and Strauss, she allows us to account explicitly for the crucial role and the 
distinct character of this “faith”. She regards it as a performative condition of 
political action, which can be conceived of as such only outside the traditional 
framework of “the Socratic school”. When we act on this faith we allow the world 
in its plurality to exist, we welcome it, make it into a meaningful place. Although 
the strength of our will and the quality of our judgment are important, our action is 
in the final instance made possible by love.  
We may now conclude that just as in the case of her Pericles quotations, 
Arendt’s praise of the American Declaration of Independence should preferably not 
be read as an authoritative claim or proposition (whether descriptive or normative), 
but rather as an utterance of faith. Whether the actual event in question was indeed 
“really” an instance of pure politics will ultimately remain undecidable, in the 
sense that there is no decisive empirical evidence (historical record) or final 
rational justification (philosophical argument) available that will decide for us, 
forever and unambiguously, whether that was indeed the case. Ultimately, our 
verdict rests on our faith grown into love, the presence or absence of which is never 
completely within our own control.  
Arendt differs from the other political thinkers we have examined to the 
extent that she explicitly acknowledges the conditions of politics are twofold: we 
not only need a phenomenologically adequate description of political reality, that 
is, of the essentially performative character of political action, but this description 
should somehow also imply a praise of the very possibility of political action. 
Theory, let alone philosophy, is not a sufficient condition for an “integer” political 
order, for that can be established by action only. As Arendt says in The Life of the 
Mind: Willing, the will, as long as it has not yet decided on the course of action to 
take, is floating between hope and fear. The decision that will finally be taken is 
conditioned in all kinds of ways, but in the end we are free to opt for freedom (the 
polis, public freedom), or fatalism (Ecclesiastes, Sophocles). Hanna Pitkin put it as 
follows: 
 
no set of facilitating conditions is sufficient to produce action or assure 
free citizenship. No conceptualization or theorizing can guarantee their 
remembrance; no institutions can assure their continuation; no type of 
182 
 
character suffices to make people free agents, because freedom is not 
something that can be caused, given, or imposed. It has to be taken, 
chosen, exercised, enacted, if it is to exist at all. Nothing can guarantee its 
coming into existence except doing it; nothing can make it endure except 




These words imply that Virgil’s line “magnus ab integro nascitur ordo saeclorum” 
should in Arendt’s case be interpreted in the sense that political order will only 
exist in the “integer”, that is, free, spontaneous, practice of acting-in-concert, that 
is, in the actual performance of “public freedom”. Yet, and this is something that 
Pitkin does not mention, although she might attest to it, we add that the actual 
founding of political order is at the same time driven by faith grown into love as the 
inspiring principle of public freedom, a love to which Arendt’s writing attests. 
Readers who are more inclined to the life of the mind than the life of action 
may now be disappointed. Arendt’s whole work seems to be one big signpost 
pointing in the direction of action, so it seems that thought is no use whatsoever in 
politics. In the first place, however, we should realize that her work is of course 
itself the product of thought – albeit the question remains unanswered as to what 
kind of thought exactly. In the second place, we ought to remind ourselves again 
that Arendt did not intend to reverse the traditional hierarchy between the vita 
contemplativa and the vita activa, so by no means does she want to reject the 
merits of thought. In fact she wishes to recover the activities of thinking from their 
having been made subservient to the aim of contemplative cognition. In the next 
chapter I reconstruct three different motifs of the activity of thinking that can be 
traced throughout her oeuvre. In each case I examine whether she takes thinking to 
be sufficiently attuned to political reality, both in comparison to traditional 
“Platonic” philosophy, and to contemporary “thoughtlessness”, the latter of which 
may be considered as the internal, mental counterpart to the external phenomenon 
of “worldlessness”. 
  
                                                     





Three Activities of Thinking and  




Every one of us is like a man who sees things in a dream  
and thinks that he knows them perfectly and then 





 Comprehension ... means the unpremeditated,  
attentive facing up to, and resisting of, 







As we have seen in the previous chapter, Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) criticizes the 
tradition of political philosophy for looking down on the life of action from the 
superior life of contemplation, substituting making for acting and thus replacing 
politics by rule. Her work is rightly understood as an attempt to rehabilitate politics 
as the exercise of “public freedom” and “acting-in-concert”. However, this does 
not mean that she inverts the traditional hierarchy between action and thought. In 
fact, she not only provides an alternative interpretation of action, she also provides 
a novel account of the activity of thinking, against both traditional contemplation 
and contemporary “thoughtlessness”. Thus, her work should not only be 
understood as an attempt to restore politics, but simultaneously as an attempt to 
retrieve ways of thinking that are in a certain sense “fit” for politics. 
It is usually assumed that Arendt’s account of thinking is quite univocal, 
namely that it is conceived of as a solitary dialogue between me and myself, as 
exemplified in the figure of Socrates. In this chapter I argue that in fact this is only 
one of three distinct types of thinking that can be traced, almost like literary motifs, 
throughout her oeuvre. When properly reconstructed, each of them presents a 
unique alternative both to traditional philosophical contemplation and to recurring 
forms of “thoughtlessness”. I examine each of these ways of thinking in terms of 
its “fitness” for understanding politics, or its promise to heal the rift between the 
inner life of the mind and external worldly reality.  
In the first part of the chapter I reconstruct the fundamentals of Arendt’s 
phenomenology of thought by providing a reading of The Human Condition which 
                                                     
473 Plato, Statesman, 277d. Used by Arendt as epigraph in LM1 vii. 
474 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, viii (Preface to the First Edition, 1950). 
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shows that her book does not offer a simple inversion of the traditional hierarchy 
between vita activa and vita contemplativa. Although it remains to a large extent 
inarticulate, she already offers us some indications of what an alternative to both 
traditional philosophy and a current lack of thought could look like. She therewith 
anticipates some of the insights of her last book, The Life of the Mind, which 
contains her most elaborate investigation of human thinking.  
In the second part I examine the extent to which the Socratic model of 
thought as the solitary and silent dialogue between me and myself, which produces 
conscience as its by-product, can assume the role of this alternative. Although there 
are indeed some indications that Arendt gives a political twist to this model, I 
demonstrate that she chose not to pursue that path and, contra Dana Villa, that she 
had good reasons for doing so.  
In the third part I reconstruct her account of a second type of thinking, 
which she called “representative thinking”. This refers not to the solitary dialogue 
between me and myself (a duality), but to the imagined and anticipated dialogue 
with others (a plurality). While the first type of thinking remains a-political, the 
second may rightly be called political. On its basis, the citizen, either in his role of 
actor or spectator, prepares opinion and judgment, which Arendt considers the two 
“politically most important, rational faculties” (OR 229).  
In the fourth part I reconstruct a third type of thinking, called “poetic 
thinking”, which dives for and brings back to the surface the events, experiences, 
and phenomena that lay hidden within our political concepts. In contradistinction to 
the second type of thinking, this is not directly aimed at the preparation of opinions 
or judgments about particular political issues or events, but rather serves as a 
reminder of the meaning and possibility of political action as such by invoking the 
spirit of originating that is contained within our political speech or language. 
In the concluding section I claim that the three ways of thinking I have 
reconstructed are rooted in different concerns and that the ways in which they are 
“fit” for politics vary accordingly. Whereas the solitary dialogue is primarily rooted 
in a concern for a truthful self and will only become political by accident, the other 
types of thinking are primarily rooted in a concern for the world, for its 
preservation and its renewal. This happens either directly, by representing within 
the mind the manifold perspectives that constitute the world, or indirectly, by 
invoking the original spirit of the experiences that lie hidden in our political 
concepts and by thus praising the possibilities of politics. I argue that both of these 
activities of thinking could fulfill the promise of bringing the “men of action” and 
the “men of thought” together, whose separation since the rise of political 
philosophy in “the Socratic school” Arendt so greatly laments. 
 
6.2. FROM THE HUMAN CONDITION TO THE LIFE OF THE MIND: THINKING 
AFTER CONTEMPLATION AND THOUGHTLESSNESS 
 
At first sight, her book The Human Condition (1958) appears to be a rehabilitation 
of the vita activa and of politics as “acting-in-concert”. Arendt argues that political 
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philosophers have always looked down upon politics from the perspective of 
philosophy, thereby turning politics into rule [Herrschaft] and substituting making 
for acting. In line with this reading, her book has often been interpreted as a sign of 
romantic nostalgia for the lost Greek polis of Pericles’ Athens.
475
 As I have shown 
in the previous chapter, what is problematic about this reading is that it thus seems 
as if Arendt inverts the traditional hierarchy, by putting active life (or bios 
politikos) above contemplative life (or bios theōrētikos), valuing the aspiration for 
this-worldly immortality over that for other-worldly eternity. In fact, however, she 
warns against such “reversals” because they all imply that “the same central human 
preoccupation must prevail in all activities of men” (HC 17). Arendt claims that 
this assumption is “not a matter of course”, and she makes it explicitly clear that 
her “use of the term vita activa presupposes that the concern underlying all its 
activities is not the same as and is neither superior nor inferior to the central 
concern of the vita contemplativa” (HC 17). 
 This leaves room for an interpretation according to which she not only 
rehabilitates “acting-in-concert”, but also the “activity of thinking”.
476
 In her last 
book, The Life of the Mind, she explains that she herself had planned to call her 
book ‘Vita Activa’, but that her publisher opted for ‘The Human Condition’. She 
now calls this a wise decision, and explains that “what had always troubled me 
about it was that the very term I adopted for my reflections on the matter, namely, 
vita activa, was coined by men who were devoted to the contemplative way of life 
and who looked upon all kinds of being alive from that perspective” (LM1 6).
477
 
Thus, the understanding of active life ran the risk of remaining polemically tied to 
its counterpart, contemplative life, while it was precisely Arendt’s intention to 
break with this binary and hierarchical scheme, as seen in the previous chapter. She 
expresses her awareness of the fact that this break was already visible in The 
Human Condition, which ends with a sentence that Cicero ascribed to Cato: “never 
is a man more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than when 
he is by himself” (HC 325).
478
 Just as in The Human Condition (HC 5) she aims “to 
                                                     
475 Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, xxxix calls this “the standard view”. 
476 At some point in The Human Condition, Arendt even calls thinking “the highest and perhaps 
purest activity of which men are capable [emphasis added]” (HC 5), which seems to convey the 
conviction that there does exist some kind of hierarchical relation among the human activities, which 
would contradict her intention mentioned above. In earlier publications she expressed herself in 
similar terms, for instance when she speaks of thinking as “the freest and purest of all human 
activities” (Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 473) and when she asserts: “the capacity for 
thought … for thousands of years has been deemed to be the highest capacity of man” (Arendt, 
‘Understanding and Politics’, 318). As far as I have been able to ascertain, she no longer uses this 
manner of expressing herself in The Life of the Mind. 
477 This mode of expression suggests that the human capacities of labor, work, action, and thought 
should primarily be understood as different “perspectives” on reality. For Arendt’s account of the 
perspectival character of the public realm, see chapter 4. 
478 See also LM1 7-8. 
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think what we are doing”
479
; in The Life of the Mind Arendt sets out to think what 
we are “doing” when we are thinking.
480
 
 Before showing how The Human Condition already clears the road for the 
recovery of thought,
481
 we need to say more about Arendt’s claim that thinking has 
traditionally been subjected to contemplation and making. She carefully 
distinguishes contemplation as the speechless beholding [theōria] of the truth from 
thinking as the solitary and silent dialogue between me and myself [eme emautō], 
which was described as such for the first time by Plato’s Socrates in the Gorgias.
482
 
Arendt claims that what in “the Socratic school” (HC 18, 302) was considered as 
the beginning of philosophy, is the state of speechless wonder [thaumazein] in 
which one finds oneself when one marvels at the miracle of being, that is, the 
beauty of the eternal cosmos. Analogously, the end of philosophy was seen as a 
state of contemplation of the truth.
483
 Thinking, in turn, came to be understood as 
the most important and direct road to the contemplation of eternal truth, just as in 
the medieval period meditation was considered as the most important and direct 
road to the contemplation of God.  
Yet, Arendt explains, a source was added which overlaid the first, and 
which becomes visible especially in Plato’s doctrine of ideas. The experience of 
the philosopher who contemplates the eternal cosmos came to be interpreted after 
the experience of the craftsman who contemplates the idea or model of the product 
he wishes to make.
484
 As a consequence, the state of speechless wonder that had 
initially been an incidental and unintended experience was now replaced by the 
sustained and deliberate contemplation of an idea. Thus, the experience of 
contemplation could be prolonged, as the result of which one came to speak of the 
“vita” contemplativa: contemplation as a way of life.
485
  
From the seventeenth century onwards, Arendt continues, thought was no 
longer treated as the handmaiden of contemplation – which lost its meaning 
altogether – but instead became the handmaiden of “doing”. This was possible 
because of the already existing inner affinity between contemplation and 
fabrication. Yet, Arendt adds, what counted was no longer the model and not even 
the product of making, but first and foremost its fabrication process. Thus, thought 
was replaced by “reckoning with consequences” (Hobbes), or, as she puts it, “the 
faculty of deducing and concluding, that is, of a process which man at any moment 
can let loose within himself” (HC 238). 
                                                     
479 Consider also HC 322. 
480 LM1 8: “What are we ‘doing’ when we do nothing but think?” 
481  As far as I have been able to ascertain, the only other attempt to trace Arendt’s scattered 
reflections on thought in The Human Condition is Jonas 1977. 
482 Plato, Gorgias 482c, referred to in: HC 76, 76n85, 291, and also in PP 85. She uses the same 
expression in TMC 442 and LM1 185, but on these occasions she refers to Plato, Theaetetus, 189e 
and Sophist, 263e. She also refers to the latter passage in ‘Martin Heidegger at Eighty’, 52. Her first 
reference to the “two-in-one” occurs already in The Origins of Totalitarianism, 476. 
483 HC 302. 
484 In LM1 104, Arendt mentions the Platonic notion of “idea” as an example of the decisive influence 
of the use of metaphors in philosophical language. 
485 HC 302-303. 
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 Seen in this light, we should not be surprised that in The Human Condition 
the activity of thinking – where it is identified with the solitary inner dialogue 
between me and myself – is carefully distinguished both from “cognition” and 
“logical reasoning”. To begin with, cognition, of which we may say that 
contemplation is but one form, pursues a definite aim, whereas thought “has neither 
an end nor an aim outside itself, and it does not even produce results” (HC 170). 
She calls the activity of thinking “as relentless and repetitive as life itself” (HC 
171), thereby anticipating its characterization in The Life of the Mind as an 
“energeia”,
486
 a term that she still reserves in The Human Condition for the 
characterization of action only.
487
 In The Life of the Mind, Arendt claims that the 
“basic fallacy of the metaphysical tradition” has indeed been to interpret thought on 
the model of cognition.
488
  
Whereas cognition strives for “truth”, thought searches for “meaning”.
489
 
That is to say, whereas the former asks “what something is or whether it exists at 
all”, the latter takes its existence for granted and instead asks “what it means for it 
to be” (LM1 57). What science and cognition are after is “irrefutable truth, that is, 
“propositions human beings are not free to reject – they are compelling” (LM1 59). 
They come in two kinds: “truths of reasoning” and “truths of fact” (LM1 59). 
Arendt illustrates the difference between “truth” and “meaning” by interpreting the 
following lines from a poem by W.H. Auden:  
 
Unpredictably, decades ago, You arrived 
among that unending cascade of creatures spewed 
from Nature’s maw. A random event, says Science. 
Random my bottom! A true miracle, say I, 
for who is not certain that he was meant to be? 
 
As the first three lines express, scientifically speaking we “know” that the birth of a 
human being is nothing but “a random event”, i.e. a contingent fact. However, 
Arendt says, the answer contained in the two lines immediately following, “a true 




The second distinction Arendt draws is that between thought and logical 
reasoning, the latter of which she describes as “deductions from axiomatic or self-
evident statements, subsumption of particular occurrences under general rules, or 
the techniques of spinning out consistent chains of conclusions” (HC 171). She 
considers it to be “a mere function of the life process itself” (HC 172) and 
                                                     
486 LM1 123, where she refers to Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 12, 1072b27: “The activity of thinking 
[energeia that has its end in itself] is life.” See also LM1 129: “the thinking activity belongs among 
those energeiai which, like flute-playing, have their ends within themselves and leave no tangible 
outside end product in the world we inhabit.”  
487 HC 206, 206n35. 
488 LM1 15. 
489 LM1 14-15, 57-62, 129.  
490 LM1 60-61. 
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characterizes it as a “playing of the mind with itself” (HC 284).
491
 Before the 
publication of The Human Condition, Arendt had already used the notion of logical 
deduction in order to understand the functioning of totalitarian ideologies,
492
 which 
she characterized as “isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can explain 
everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise” (OT 468). 
Adherents of these ideologies learn nothing from experience: “Ideological thinking 
orders facts into an absolutely logical procedure which starts from an axiomatically 
accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with a 
consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality” (OT 471). As a result, 
thought, “which as the freest and purest of all human activities is the very opposite 
of the compulsory process of deduction” (OT 473), emancipates itself from 
experience and reality. Arendt explains that when people have lost contact with 
their fellow men and with worldly reality, they “lose the capacity of both 
experience and thought” [emphasis added] (OT 474). To be sure, she draws a 
careful distinction between “loneliness”, which serves as breeding ground for the 
“ice-cold reasoning” of totalitarian ideologies, and “solitude”, which, as we shall 
see, is actually required for the activity of the thinking dialogue of me with myself. 
Nevertheless, solitude may turn into loneliness when, all by myself, I am deserted 
by my own self, that is, by my own inner companion.  
It is important to note that this earlier notion of the “loss of the capacity of 
thought” is very similar to what Arendt was later to call “thoughtlessness”, 
described by her in The Human Condition (1958) as “the heedless recklessness or 
hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of ‘truths’ which have become trivial 
and empty” (HC 3). In Eichmann and Jerusalem (1963), she famously uses the 
term “thoughtlessness” to capture Adolf Eichmann’s “inability to think, namely, to 
think from the standpoint of somebody else”.
493
 In the introduction to The Life of 
the Mind: Thinking (1971), she gives the following explanation of Eichmann’s 
“absence of thinking” (LM1 4): 
 
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of 
expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of 
protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking 
attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence. If we 
were responsive to this claim all the time, we would soon be exhausted; 
Eichmann differed from the rest of us only in that he clearly knew of no 
such claim at all. (LM1 4) 
 
It becomes clear, even on the basis of these few passages, that Arendt’s use of the 
word “thoughtlessness” is by no means equivocal, for the absence of the inner 
                                                     
491 Note that “life” is used here in a different sense than in the preceding paragraph. 
492 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 468-474; idem, ‘Understanding and Politics’, 317-318. 
493 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 49. Cf. ibid., 47-48, where she speaks of Eichmann’s “almost 
total inability to look at anything from the other fellow’s point of view.” See also ibid., 287-288, 
where she seems to identify his “thoughtlessness” with a “lack of imagination”, resulting in a 
“remoteness from reality”. 
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dialogue between me and my self is by no means the same as the absence of the 
ability to place myself in the perspectives of others, neither of which, in its turn, is 
identical to a complacent use of empty language. Hence, if we wish to acquire an 
adequate understanding of the apparently complex phenomenon of 
“thoughtlessness”, we will first need to acquire an adequate understanding of the 
multiplicity of Arendt’s account of “thought”. 
What both traditional “contemplation” and contemporary forms of 
“thoughtlessness” have in common is a certain turning-away from worldly reality. 
Arendt repeatedly notes that, since the rise of political philosophy, the “men of 
thought” and the “men of action” parted company, as a result of which “thinking 
began to emancipate itself altogether from reality, and especially from political 
factuality and experience” (OR 177).
494
 She expresses the hope that the rift may be 
healed in the modern age, now that the thread of tradition has been broken. At the 
same time, however, it remains the case that, in order to think, one inevitably 
removes oneself from the external world of appearances. Accordingly, in The Life 
of the Mind Arendt speaks of the “intramural warfare” between man’s common 
sense and our faculty of thought. The former provides us with a “sense of 
realness”, the experience of the world of appearances in its “sheer thereness”, while 
the latter withdraws itself from that world and loses the feeling of realness. As 
Arendt explains, thought “can seize upon and get hold of everything real – event, 
object, its own thought; but their realness is the only property that remains 
stubbornly beyond its reach [emphasis added]” (LM1 49).
495
 As thinking is by 
definition “out of order” in this sense,
496
 solitary thinkers will always run the risk 
of becoming lonely “when they can no longer find the redeeming grace of 
companionship to save them from duality and equivocality and doubt” (OT 476). 
Nevertheless, Arendt indicates that the activity of thinking – as distinguished from 
the contemplation of cosmic truths and from the subjection to conventional codes 
or rules of logic – may in a very specific sense be able to retain a relationship with 
worldly reality. She is looking for a thinking activity that is somehow capable of 
compensating for its necessarily being “out of order”.
497
  
In the concluding paragraph of The Human Condition, Arendt displays her 
worries about the grim prospects for thought in the modern world,
498
 and comments 
that this fact “may be irrelevant, or of restricted relevance, for the future of the 
world; it is not irrelevant for the future of man.” (HC 324-5). As we will see, this 
                                                     
494 Cf. HC 17. 
495 LM1 45-53. 
496 LM1 78. 
497 Curtis phrases Arendt’s quest as follows: “Is there something in the thinking experience itself that, 
when habitually performed, conditions and forms us, something that enables us to be more attentive 
to the real?” (Curtis, Our Sense of the Real, 47), and, more specifically: “if we take seriously the 
experience of being a self that-is-not-one, feel its pleasures, know its interests and needs, if these 
experiences become habits crucial to our sense of well-being, do we become more attentive to the 
claim of reality?” (Curtis, Our Sense of the Real, 54) 
498 Arendt claims that “no other human capacity is so vulnerable” and that wherever men live under 
the conditions of political freedom, “thought is still possible, and no doubt actual”, but under 
conditions of tyranny “it is in fact far easier to act … than it is to think.” (HC 324) 
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distinction between a concern for the world and a concern for man will prove to be 
important in answering the question of which activities of thinking are suited to 
healing the rift, for only those types of thinking that somehow intrinsically display 
a concern for the world count as serious candidates.  
 
6.3. DIALECTICAL THINKING 
 
Never is a man more active than when he does nothing,  





Dana Villa, who is one of the most influential interpreters of Arendt’s work, has 
argued that her work “point[s] to the possibility of a philosophical or Socratic form 
of citizenship, one that undercuts the dichotomy of philosophy versus politics”, of 
the bios theōrētikos versus the bios politikos, of ‘mere” opinion [doxa] versus 
“true” knowledge [epistēmē].
 500
 Yet, he claims, Arendt ultimately eschews this 
possibility by “chastising philosophy (as did Callicles) for its “unmanly” 
withdrawal from the world” and by her plea for active and “manly” citizenship 
instead.
501
 According to Villa, she thereby betrays her “best insights” and leaves us 
with “the false alternative between civic republicanism on one hand and 
philosophical elitism on the other”.
502
 As a result, he states, “The terms set by the 
Gorgias, and by Callicles in particular, return in all their Procrustean violence.”
503
 
This statement shows that Villa, while presenting Socrates as a figure of mediation 
between philosophy and politics, leaves the underlying conceptual framework 
intact. By failing to notice the radical nature of Arendt’s critique of “the Socratic 
school”, he fails to see that she had good reasons for rejecting Socratic citizenship 




Villa bases his reconstruction of Arendt’s account of “Socratic citizenship” 
primarily on ‘Philosophy and Politics’, a lecture she gave in 1954, which she 
decided not to publish during her lifetime.
505
 In this piece she displays an optimism 
about the civic role of philosophy that is never repeated in her published work. As 
the trust that she puts in Socratic philosophizing as a binding force in polis life is 
completely absent in her later work, I consider that too much relative weight is 
                                                     
499 “Numquam se plus agere quam nihil cum ageret, numquam minus solum esse quam cum solus 
esset.” See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 476, HC 325, LM1 7-8, 123. 
500 Villa, ‘The Philosopher versus the Citizen: Arendt, Strauss, and Socrates’, 149, 165, 150. 
501 Ibid., 164, 165. 
502 Ibid., 149. 
503 Ibid., 165. 
504 Ibid., 149, 167, 164. 
505  It is surprising how much attention this unpublished lecture has attracted, possibly because 
philosophers and political theorists find some reassuring confirmation in it for their activity being in 
some sense directly “relevant” or “useful” for the political community, whereas I believe that the 
utmost they may achieve is that it may be “meaningful”. 
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assigned to this unpublished text.
506
 Contra Villa, I argue that Arendt was in fact 
rather skeptical about the role of philosophy in politics, or, to be more precise, of 
thinking, not as contemplation but as the dialogue between me and myself. 
 In ‘Philosophy & Politics’, Socrates and Plato are being contrasted insofar 
as in the case of Socrates, thought is not (yet) instrumentalized as a handmaiden to 
reach a state of contemplation. In contradistinction to Plato, Arendt argues, 
Socrates did not oppose philosophical dialectics (the search for true epistēmē) and 
political persuasion (the assertion of doxa), but was instead looking for truth in 
opinion [doxa]. She describes this Socratic method of “maieutic” as “a political 
activity, a give and take, fundamentally on the basis of strict equality, the fruits of 
which could not be measured by the result of arriving at this or that general truth 
[emphasis added]” (PP 81). This kind of understanding – “seeing the world ... from 
the other fellow’s point of view” – Arendt calls “the political kind of insight par 
excellence” (PP 84).  
At some point in Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates says to Callicles: “It is better to 
be in disagreement with the whole world than, being one, to be in disagreement 
with myself”.
507
 Arendt interprets him as saying: “Because I am already two-in-
one, at least when I try to think, I can experience a friend ... as an ‘other self’ 
[emphasis added]” (PP 85). According to Socrates, Arendt explains, being capable 
of living together with others begins with being capable of living together with 
oneself: only he who knows how to live with himself is fit to live with others. As 
one becomes conscious of oneself in the solitary dialogue between me and myself, 
one is likely to develop one’s conscience: I should be able and willing to live with 
myself, with my inner companion, with the person who awaits me every time I 
retreat into the solitude of my own mind. Arendt claims: “The political relevance of 
Socrates’ discovery is that it asserts that solitude ... is ... the necessary condition for 
the good functioning of the polis, a better guarantee than rules of behavior enforced 
by laws and fear of punishment [emphasis added]” (PP 89). In other words, 
thinking as a dialogue between me and myself appears to be a prerequisite of being 
able to live in a polis.
508
 
However, already in ‘Philosophy and Politics’ itself Arendt expresses her 
awareness of the limits of thinking in this sense: “Nobody can doubt that such a 
teaching was and always will be in a certain conflict with the polis, which must 
demand respect for its laws independent of personal conscience, and Socrates knew 
the nature of this conflict full well when he called himself a gadfly [emphasis 
added]” (PP 90). It is this observation that Arendt puts at the very foreground in her 
works on the relation between thinking and politics that she did decide to publish. 
In ‘Civil Disobedience’ (1970), for instance, she draws a strict distinction between 
the “unpolitical” conscientious objector and the “political” civil disobedient, or 
                                                     
506  In Chapter 5 of his book Socratic Citizenship, Villa partly revokes his earlier thesis by 
emphasizing the “exceptional position” of PP within Arendt’s oeuvre, and shifting the weight of his 
interpretation to TMC and LM1. He maintains his ideal of “Socratic citizenship”, however. 
507 Plato, Gorgias, 482c. 
508 Connect this to Socrates’s statement in Plato’s Gorgias, 521d that he is the “true politician”. 
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between “the good man” and “the good citizen”.
509
 She argues that conscience is 
primarily interested in the self instead of the world, which means that “the two-in-
one are friends and partners, and to keep intact this ‘harmony’ is the thinking’s ego 
foremost concern” (LM2 64). As a consequence, she concludes, the conscience is 
politically unreliable,
510
 for, as she observes, not only is it the case that what I 
cannot live with may not bother another man’s conscience, the presupposition that 
everybody is interested in his own self cannot be taken for granted.  
To be sure, Arendt adds, the solitary thinker is of course “not thematically 
concerned with the Self but, on the contrary, with the experiences and questions 
that this Self ... feels are in need of examination [emphasis added]” (LM2 64). 
Arendt tells us more about the object of thought in ‘Thinking and Moral 
Considerations’ (1971) and in The Life of the Mind, where she claims that Socrates 
“wanted to bring philosophy down from the sky to the earth and hence began to 
examine the invisible measures by which we judge human affairs”
511
 (LM1 165). 
His activity of thinking is described by Arendt as a kind of “meditation”
512
 or 
“pondering reflection” on the meaning of what we call “concepts”, such as 
happiness, courage, or justice.
513
 Each of them is “something like a frozen thought 
that thinking must unfreeze whenever it wants to find out the original meaning 
[emphasis in original]”
514
 (LM1 171). Arendt claims that this examination does not 
produce any tangible results, however. Socrates called himself a “gadfly” because 
the result of his thinking is negative, and possibly even dangerous, for “it does not 
create values, it will not find out, once and for all, what ‘the good’ is, and it does 
not confirm but rather dissolves accepted rules of conduct” (TMC 445).  
Now she has found that the conscience is unreliable and the results of 
thinking are negative, we might therefore conclude that thinking and conscience 
are of no political use whatsoever, according to Arendt. However, in fact she does 
leave some room for a “political” role of (Socratic) thinking. In ‘Truth and Politics’ 
(1967) she explains that the truth claim of a philosopher – for example Socrates’ 
statement that it is better to suffer wrong than do wrong – appears as no more than 
one opinion among many as soon as it enters the political realm. Nevertheless, 
Arendt says, there is one form of “persuasion” that philosophical truth is capable of 
without perversion or distortion, which is teaching by example: “by setting an 
example and ‘persuading’ the multitude in the only way open to him, [the 
                                                     
509 Only the acting-in-concert of citizens, of which civil disobedience is only one of the many forms, 
can lead to law-giving in Arendt’s sense, viz. as a collective inscription of speech-acts.  
510 About the political unreliability of conscience, see also Arendt, ‘Religion and Politics’, 383. 
511 In the philosophical respect, Arendt claims, Socrates differed from Plato in being concerned with 
human affairs rather than divine matters. However, for the history of thought, she does not regard this 
difference as decisive: “What matters in our context is that in both instances thought is concerned 
with invisible things that are pointed to, nevertheless, by appearances (the starry sky above us or the 
deeds and destinies of men) …” (LM1 151). 
512 In LM2 64 she speaks of a “meditating examination of everything given”. 
513 LM1 170. 
514 Cf. TMC 431. 
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philosopher] has begun to act [emphasis added]” (TP 248). This, however, remains 
what she calls a “borderline experience” for the philosopher. 
In her later reflections on thinking (as of 1970),
515
 Arendt introduces 
another way thinking may perform a political role: “Good men become manifest 
only in emergencies, when they suddenly appear, as if from nowhere, in all social 
strata”.
516
 In other words, in case of emergencies the thinking activity becomes a 
form of acting in the outer world, for “[w]hen everybody is swept away 
unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, those who think are 
drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join is conspicuous and thereby 
becomes a kind of action [emphasis added]” (TMC 445-6, LM1 192). In these 
cases, Arendt explains, it is precisely the purging element in thinking, the 
destruction of existing opinions and therewith of authoritative standards of 
judgment already mentioned, that is political by implication (TMC 446, LM1 192), 
for:  
 
If thinking, the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue, actualizes the 
difference within our identity as given in consciousness and thereby 
results in conscience as its by-product, then judging, the by-product of the 
liberating effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the 
world of appearances, where I am never alone and always too busy to be 
able to think. (TMC 446, LM1 193)  
 
In other words, by dissolving accepted rules of conduct, the thinking activity makes 
room for the activity of judging, which Arendt defines as “the faculty to judge 
particulars without subsuming them under those general rules which can be taught 
and learned” (TMC 446, LM1 193). As such, it is “the ability to tell right from 
wrong, beautiful from ugly” (TMC 446, LM1 193). In addition, Arendt considers 
the ability to judge “the most political of man’s mental abilities” (TMC 446, LM1 
192).  
The precise relationship between thinking and judging, however, still 
seems obscure, for the merely negative result of thinking that exists in the 
destruction of existing standards of judgment does not tell us if and how thinking 
can play a positive and constructive role in the preparation of judgments. 
Commentators have paid insufficient attention to the difference between thinking 
as a precondition for the need for reflective judgment to arise at all, that is, the 
purging effect of Socratic thinking which leads to the destruction of existing 
standards, and a form of thinking which would seem to be required for the actual 
                                                     
515 That is, starting with Arendt, ‘Civil Disobedience’, and running via TMC to LM1. 
516 Arendt, ‘Civil Disobedience’, 65. Cf. Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 37: “What 
[Socrates] actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process – that dialogue that 
soundlessly goes on within me, between me and myself; he performed in the marketplace the way the 
flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity” Cf. LM1 187: “the 
Socratic two-in-one heals the solitariness of thought; its inherent duality points to the infinite plurality 
which is the law of the earth.” 
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exercise of reflective judgment.
517
 As they have mainly focused on Arendt’s 
distinction between the mental faculties of thinking and judging, commentators 
have overlooked the fact that she uses a distinct motif of thinking when she speaks 
about the faculty of judgment, called “representative thinking”.
518
 As I demonstrate 
in the next section, this activity of thinking differs in important respects from 
thinking as the solitary dialogue of the “two-in-one”. 
Despite the important role that the solitary thinker may fulfill in emergency 
situations, we should remain aware of the fact that Arendt kept emphasizing that 
thinking as such is always “out of order”, and that the solitude of the philosopher 
always runs the risk of lapsing into loneliness, as a result of which he will lose 
even his final contact with reality.
519
 Although it might indeed be the case that 
thinking in the sense of Socratic philosophizing is “irrelevant, or of restricted 
relevance” for the future of the world, that doesn’t exclude the possibility of the 
existence of other forms of thinking that are relevant in this respect. We found a 
glimpse of the latter when Arendt described Socrates’ way of understanding as 
“seeing the world ... from the other fellow’s point of view” (PP 84). As the next 
section shows, though, nowhere in her published works does she associate this 
“political kind of insight par excellence” (PP 84) with Socrates, whereas the 
connection she draws with the figure of the statesman remains in place. We 
examine the extent to which this alternative, or what she was to call “representative 
thinking”, may indeed be capable of bringing the “men of thought” and the “men 
of action” closer together.  
 
  
                                                     
517 Curtis claims that all that Arendt’s thesis that thinking “activates judgment” can bear is that 
thinkers return to the world in the state of reflective judgment, “although this says nothing about what 
sort of response we will have to that state” (Curtis, Our Sense of the Real, 60). I claim that it cannot 
even bear this, for there is no guarantee that the purging of standards will lead the thinker into “the 
state of reflective judgment”. He could also enter the world in a state of nihilism, which Arendt calls 
“ the other side of conventionalism”. The creed of nihilism consists of “negations of the current, so-
called positive values to which it remains bound” (TMC 435). In this sense nihilism may be seen as 
an ever-present danger of thinking. “But this danger does not arise out of the Socratic conviction that 
an unexamined life is not worth living but, on the contrary, out of the desire to find results which 
would make further thinking unnecessary. Thinking is equally dangerous to all creeds and, by itself, 
does not bring forth any new creed” (TMC 435). See also LM1 177. 
518 In part, they are misled by Arendt herself, whose tripartite division of thinking, willing, and 
judging leads us to forget that “representative thinking”, which she links exclusively to “the power of 
judgment”, is nonetheless still a form of thinking, even of a distinct kind. 
519 See also LM2 200: “Under exceptionally propitious circumstances that dialogue, we have seen, 
can be extended to another insofar as a friend is, as Aristotle said, ‘another self.’ But it can never 
reach the We, the true plural of action.” 
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6.4. REPRESENTATIVE THINKING 
 





We seem to be left now with the choice between either anti-political (Platonic) rule 
on the basis of contemplation, or an a-political (Socratic) concern with the self 
which becomes political only by accident, in case of emergencies. But what about 
normal politics? Fortunately, there is second conception of thinking present in her 
work, which is quite consistent and occurs for the first time in 1958, the same year 
The Human Condition was published. In ‘Karl Jaspers: A Laudatio’, Arendt says 
that Jaspers’ thought, which is always “related closely to the thought of others,” is 
“bound to be political even when it deals with things that are not in the least 
political; for it always confirms that Kantian ‘enlarged mentality’ which is the 
political mentality par excellence”.
521
 One year later, in ‘On Humanity in Dark 
Times: Thoughts about Lessing’ (1959), she claims that “Lessing’s thought is not 
the (Platonic) silent dialogue between me and myself, but an anticipated dialogue 
with others ...”.
522
 Apparently, there is a way of thinking that is different from the 
dialogue of me with myself (a duality) by somehow “pointing to” or representing 
plurality more fully. 
 The first, more elaborate account of this appears one year later still, in ‘The 
Crisis in Culture’ (1960), where for the first time she claims that it is Kant’s 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, in contradistinction to his Critique of Practical 
Reason, that “contains perhaps the greatest and most original aspect of Kant’s 
political philosophy [emphasis added]” (CC 219). Kant’s law of reason – the 
categorical imperative – is a principle of agreement with oneself, which Arendt 
traces back to Socrates’s claim, mentioned above, that “Since I am one, it is better 
for me to disagree with the whole world than to be in disagreement with myself” 
(Plato, Gorgias 482). But Arendt discovers in the Critique of Judgement “a 
different way of thinking, for which it would not be enough to be in agreement 
with one’s own self, but which consisted of being able to “think in the place of 
everybody else” and which he therefore called an “enlarged mentality” (eine 
erweiterte Denkungsart)” (CC 220). This way of thinking, which she also calls “the 
power of judgment”, rests on a potential agreement with others, that is: 
 
…the thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like 
the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, 
                                                     
520 “Victrix causa deis placuit sed victa Catoni” (LM1 216). Arendt also used this line as one of the 
two epigraphs on the title page of the final part of The Life of the Mind, called Judging, which she was 
unable to finish before she died in 1975. 
521 Arendt, ‘Karl Jaspers: A Laudatio’, 79. 
522 Arendt, ‘On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing’, 10. These expressions remind us 
in part of Arendt’s depiction of Socrates in PP 84, quoted above. However, after this essay, which, I 
repeat, was never published during her lifetime, she associates this motive exclusively with Kant of 
the third Critique and with Homeric impartiality, and never with Socrates. 
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but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making 
up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I 
know I must finally come to some agreement. (CC 220)  
 
In other words, judgment cannot function “in strict isolation or solitude” [emphasis 
added], for “it needs the presence of others ‘in whose place’ it must think, whose 
perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom it never has the 
opportunity to operate at all” (CC 220). Accordingly, the validity of judgment is of 
a specific kind. Although it transcends that of privately held opinions, it cannot 
reach universal validity either, for it never extends beyond the others in whose 
place the judging person has put himself, nor is it valid for those who do not judge 
or for those who are not members of the public realm where the objects of 
judgment appear. What matters here is that the perspectives in whose place I 
imagine myself to be are those of actual members of an actual community in 
which both my fellow citizens and I myself happen to be present.
523
 
For the purpose of our examination it is important to note that Arendt 
considers the capacity to judge, understood in the indicated sense of “the ability to 
see things not only from one’s own point of view but in the perspective of all those 
who happen to be present”, to be “a specifically political ability” [emphasis added] 
(CC 221). She adds that it may even be “one of the fundamental abilities of man as 
a political being insofar as it enables him to orient himself in the public realm, in 
the common world” [emphasis added] (CC 221). She claims that it can be 
identified with what the Greeks called phronèsis (or “insight”), that is, with what 
they regarded as the principal virtue of the statesman as distinct from the virtue of 
the philosopher, or from wisdom.
524
 Whereas the judging insight of the statesman is 
rooted in “common sense”, which “discloses to us the nature of the world insofar 
as it is a common world” (CC 221), the speculative thought of the philosopher 
constantly transcends it. In culture as well as in politics, Arendt claims:  
 
…it is not knowledge or truth which is at stake, but rather judgment and 
decision, the judicious exchange of opinion about the sphere of public life 
and the common world, and the decision what manner of action is to be 
taken in it, as well as to how it is to look henceforth, what kind of things 
are to appear in it. (CC 223) 
 
Similarly, in ‘Truth and Politics’ (1967), she claims that “to take into account other 
people’s opinions” is the hallmark of all strictly political thinking. Again she 
explains that political thought is “representative” by referring to Kant’s notion of 
                                                     
523 In her posthumously published Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, she seems to amend her 
earlier account by stating: “in the last analysis, one is a member of a world community by the sheer 
fact of being human; this is one’s ‘cosmopolitan existence.’ When one judges and when one acts in 
political matters, one is supposed to take one’s bearings from the idea, not the actuality, of being a 
world citizen and, therefore, also a Weltbetrachter, a world spectator” (Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s 
Political Philosophy, 76). 




“enlarged mentality” (TP 241). It is significant that she explicitly distinguishes it 
from philosophical thought: “even if I shun all company or am completely isolated 
while forming an opinion, I am not simply together only with myself in the solitude 
of philosophical thought; I remain in this world of universal interdependence, 
where I can make myself the representative of everybody else” (TP 242).  
Arendt explains that the quality of an opinion “depends upon the degree of 
its impartiality” (TP 242). This means that one does not “blindly adopt the actual 
views of those who stand somewhere else” (TP 241): it is neither a matter of 
empathy (to try to be or to feel like somebody else), nor “of counting noses and 
joining a majority” (TP 241). Rather, it is a matter of “being and thinking in my 
own identity where actually I am not” (TP 241); that is, in worldly positions that 
are different from my own: 
 
The more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while I am 
pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel 
and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for 
representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my 




In his influential ‘Interpretative Essay’ on Arendt’s Kant’s Lectures on Political 
Philosophy, Ronald Beiner claims that Arendt leaves this account behind in her 
later work (from 1971 onwards), and that she no longer focuses on the thought of 
political actors, but philosopher-spectators who give their verdict about the 
performance of the actors.
526
 Though he is right that there is a shift in attention 
(viz. from the judgment of future deeds to that of past ones), this does not mean 
that she revokes her “previous” account, nor that she contradicts it, for what Beiner 
ignores is the fact that even in her last work, The Life of the Mind, Arendt employs 
a strict distinction between the spectator and the philosopher (LM1 94, 96).
527
 
                                                     
525 In TP 247, Arendt gives the famous words from the American Declaration of Independence as her 
example: “We hold these truths to be self-evident.” By saying “we hold”, it indicates that “All men 
are created equal” is not self-evident but stands in need of agreement and consent, or that equality, if 
it is to be of political relevance, is a matter of opinion and not truth. Their “validity depends upon free 
agreement and consent; they are arrived at by discursive, representative thinking; and they are 
communicated by means of persuasion and dissuasion.” 
526 Beiner, ‘Interpretative Essay’, 91. 
527 The confusion is most clear in Beiner’s interpretation of one of the epigraphs of the third part of 
The Life of the Mind (see Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ii), from Goethe’s Faust: 
Könnt’ ich Magie von meinem Pfad entfernen, / Die Zaubersprüche ganz und gar verlernen, / Stünd 
ich Natur vor dir, ein Mann allein, / Da wär’s die Mühe wert ein Mensch zu sein. Beiner, 
‘Interpretative Essay’, 127, gives the following explanation for Arendt’s use of this quotation: 
“Judgment is rendered not by the collective destiny of mankind [i.e. the verdict of History] but by 
“man alone,” the judging spectator who stands before nature unencumbered by metaphysical dreams 
and illusions.” However, Beiner misses the point: it is the philosopher who finds himself before 
nature, whereas the spectator finds himself in and before the world. Taminiaux, The Thracian Maid 
and the Professional Thinker, 170, gives the only plausible interpretation: man, standing alone face to 
face with nature, is not the same as the spectator, who does not judge nature but human affairs, amidst 
his fellow men. 
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Whereas the spectator takes the views of others into account (while being impartial 
and freed from the interests of gain and fame), the philosopher remains solitary. 
For Arendt, it is decisive that “Kant’s spectators exist in the plural” (LM1 96). As a 
result of his identification of the spectator with the philosopher, Beiner assumes 
that the actor and the spectator exhibit two different ways of life (the citizen’s bios 
politikos and the philosopher’s bios theōrētikos, respectively) instead of reading 
them as two different roles that the citizen at some point may take upon himself. In 
my view the distinction between the citizen and the self is more fundamental for 
Arendt than the distinction between the actor and the spectator, which are two 
different roles that the citizen may assume.
528
 Whereas the citizen-actor initiates 
events, the citizen-spectator judges them, while both remain bound to political 
reality or the realm of human affairs. 
Furthermore, in ‘The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern’ (1958), 
which appeared in the same year as the motif of “enlarged mentality” occurred for 
the first time in her writings, Arendt connected the very same “long experience of 
polis life” that taught the Greeks “to understand – not to understand one another as 
individual persons, but to look upon the same world from one another’s standpoint, 
to see the same in very different and frequently opposing aspects” with the 
impartiality of poets and historiographers (and hence not with Socrates’ maieutic!). 
What the “representative thinking” of Kant and the story-telling of Homer, 
Herodotus, and Thucydides have in common is that all of them strive for 
impartiality instead of objectivity.
529
  
Indeed, throughout her work Arendt praises the tradition that was 
inaugurated by Homer, as when she claims that “no civilization, however splendid, 
had been able to look with equal eyes upon friend and foe, upon success and defeat 
– which since Homer have not been recognized as ultimate standards of men’s 
judgment, even though they are ultimates for the destinies of man’s lives” (TP 
263). In other words, our judgment of the meaning of events should not depend on 
the verdict of history.
530
 Indeed, Arendt herself acted in Homer’s spirit when she 
                                                     
528 In fact, we already find evidence for the close connection between these two roles of the citizen in 
one of Arendt’s earlier essays, ‘Understanding and Politics’ (1954), in which she wrote: “If the 
essence of all, and in particular of political, action, is to make a new beginning, then understanding 
becomes the other side of action, namely, that form of cognition, distinct from many others, by which 
acting men (and not men who are engaged in contemplating some progressive or doomed course of 
history) eventually can come to terms with what irrevocably happened and be reconciled with what 
unavoidably exists” [emphasis added] (ibid., 391). It should be noted that she does not yet use the 
word “cognition” in the narrower sense of truth-seeking here, which she started doing from 1958 on. 
Rather, it should be understood to refer to “thinking” in a general sense. 
529 Arendt, ‘The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern’, 51. 
530 Arendt usually contrasts Homeric impartiality with the Hegelian conception of history. See Arendt, 
‘The Concept of History’, 51: “Not only does it leave behind the common interest in one’s own side 
and one’s own people …, but it also discards the alternative of victory or defeat, which moderns have 
felt expresses the “objective” judgment of history itself, and does not permit it to interfere with what 
is judged to be worthy of immortalizing praise.” See also LM1 216: “Finally we shall be left with the 
only alternative that there is in these matters – we either can say with Hegel: Die Weltgeschichte ist 
das Weltgericht, leaving the ultimate judgment to Success, or we can maintain with Kant the 
autonomy of the minds of men and their possible independence of things as they are or as they have 
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spoke of the Hungarian Revolution as “a true event whose stature will not depend 
upon victory or defeat; its greatness is secure in the tragedy it enacted”.
531
 
To summarize this section, opinions, decisions, and judgments are prepared 
by a type of thinking that is distinctly different from thinking as the solitary 
dialogue between me and myself. I have tried to demonstrate that despite the fact 
that every type of thinking will necessarily lead to a forgetfulness of realness, 
representative thinking is “worldlier” than the solitary thought of the philosopher 
who concerns himself with “the essence of everything that is”.
532
 The former is 
thematically concerned with the meaning of real particulars – political events, 
experiences, phenomena – that are bound to a specific space and time and that are 
subject to opinion and judgment, which means that its “region of withdrawal is 
clearly located within our ordinary world, the reflexivity of the faculty 
notwithstanding” (LM1 97).
533
 What is crucial here, is that the activity of 
representative thinking enacts the plurality of worldly positions
534
 within the 




6.5. POETIC THINKING 
 
Full fathom five thy father lies, 
Of his bones are coral made, 
Those are pearls that were his eyes. 
Nothing of him that doth fade 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange.
536
 
Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act I, Scene 2 
 
So far we have reconstructed two distinct activities of thinking. Of these, 
dialectical thinking, the exercise of the inner two-in-one, while itself being a-
political, could accidentally fulfill a political role by liberating the faculty of 
                                                                                                                                       
come into being.” Arendt of course chooses Kant, whose concept of judgment she interprets in line 
with the conception of history of Homer and Herodotus: “the Homeric historian is the judge” (LM1 
216).  
She concludes The Life of the Mind: Thinking with the quotation of Cato that I have used as 
epigraph for this section: Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni (“The victorious cause pleased 
the gods, but the defeated one pleases Cato”), just as she concluded The Human Condition with that 
other line of Cato, which characterizes the activity of thinking as the solitary dialogue between me 
and myself. 
531 Arendt, ‘Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution’, 5. 
532 Arendt, ‘Understanding and Politics’, 391. 
533 See also LM1 93. 
534 To repeat, Arendt refers not to a pluralism of actually held opinions or convictions, but to a 
plurality of actually occupied positions in the spatio-temporal world. 
535 Cf. Curtis, ‘Our Sense of the Real’, 115: “Arendt discerned in Kant’s work a mode of public 
thinking suited to respond to and build, in the invisible space of the mind, the world’s complex 
phenomenality or appearingness. Kant’s ‘reflective judgment’ emphatically concerns the world, and it 
is made possible only through a certain sociability.”  
536 WB 193, LM1 212. 
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judgment. Representative thinking, by contrast, which can be either future-oriented 
or past-oriented, intentionally represents within itself the plurality of (more than 
two) perspectives that are constitutive for the political world outside. In either case 
it is not primarily the object of thought that determines its “political” character, but 
the peculiar character of the thinking activity.  
We might argue, though, that something is still missing. Perhaps we wish 
to search for a third type of thinking which, contrary to the Socratic kind, is indeed 
primarily concerned with the world instead of with the self, but which, contrary to 
the representative kind, is not so much involved with the formation of actual 
political opinions and judgments, but rather with the recovery of the meaning of 
politics as such. Arendt, after all, criticizes our philosophical tradition not only for 
its inherent lack of attentiveness to the reality and singularity of events – which 
may be compensated by “representative thinking” – but she also refers to 
tradition’s 
 
lack of conceptual clarity and precision with respect to existing realities 
and experiences [which] has been the curse of Western thinking ever 
since, in the aftermath of the Periclean Age, the men of action and the 
men of thought parted company and thinking began to emancipate itself 
altogether from reality, and especially from political factuality and 
experience [emphasis added]. (OR 177)  
 
In other words, our philosophical tradition has hindered us from acquiring an 
adequate understanding and hence appreciation of politics due to its wrong use of 
certain concepts, or its problematic use of language. As the previous chapter 
showed, Arendt argues, for instance, that a specific concept (such as “rule” [archè, 
Herrschaft] and “idea” [idea]) has been problematically transferred from one 
context of experience to another (from the household sphere to the political realm 
and from the sphere of fabrication to the life of the mind),
537
 that a specific term 
(such as “politics” itself) has lost its original meaning (contained in the Greek word 
polis),
538
 or, finally, that the “spirit” or “principle” of a specific event (such as the 
“treasure” of the revolution) has barely found an adequate term at all (“public 
freedom”, “public happiness”).
539
 Indeed, Arendt asserts that in order for events, 
experiences, and phenomena to become capable of being remembered and judged 
at all, they must first be rendered into words,
540
 a task which she says was always 
                                                     
537 HC 222; Arendt, On Violence, 43. For the use of the word “idea”, see the first section of this 
chapter. 
538 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 15. 
539 Ibid., 5; OR 221-222, 280. 
540 OR 220: “What saves the affairs of mortal men from their inherent futility is nothing but this 
incessant talk about them, which in its turn remains futile unless certain concepts, certain guideposts 
for future remembrance, and even for sheer reference, arise out of it.” Cf. LM1 133: “Without 
spectators the world would be imperfect; the participant, absorbed as he is in particular things and 
pressed by urgent business, cannot see how all the particular things in the world and every particular 
deed in the realm of human affairs fit together and produce a harmony, which itself is not given to 
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To be sure, what is problematic here is not so much the carrying-over of 
meaning as such, nor the loss of the original or “first” meaning per se. Rather, the 
point is that we lose our access to the underlying phenomena and experiences, in 
the sense not only of adequately understanding them, but also of appropriately 
praising their very possibility.
542
 Indeed, Arendt laments the fact that the 
philosophical tradition has lost the notion that “all appearances, inasmuch as they 
appear … demand recognition and praise”, adding that this notion is still present in 
the reflections of the poets (LM2 92).  
In The Life of the Mind, Arendt once again testifies to her critical distance 
from the tradition of philosophy, indicating that she has “clearly joined the ranks of 
those who for some time now have been attempting to dismantle metaphysics, and 
philosophy with all its categories, as we have known them from their beginning in 
Greece until today” (LM1 212). She asserts that it was Kant who had discovered 
the “scandal of reason”, that is, “the fact that our mind is not capable of certain and 
verifiable knowledge regarding matters and questions that it nevertheless cannot 
help thinking about” (LM1 14). Kant distinguishes intellect [Verstand] and reason 
[Vernunft], which Arendt states coincides with the distinction between knowing 
and thinking, between the quest for truth and the quest for meaning.
543
 She claims, 
however, that when Kant famously said that he had “found it necessary to deny 
knowledge … to make room for faith”, he had in fact denied knowledge only of 
things that are unknowable, and he had made room not for faith but for thought 
(LM1 15, 64). (In other words, we might say, even Kant remained caught within 
the conceptual framework of Plato’s Gorgias.)  
Arendt notes that the breakdown of tradition seems to result in “a growing 
inability to move … in the realm of the invisible” (LM1 12). We will need to learn 
anew how to think,
544
 therefore, how to settle down in “the gap between past and 





This small non-time-space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and 
the culture into which we are born, cannot be inherited and handed down 
by tradition, although every great book of thought points to it somewhat 
cryptically …. Each new generation, every new human being, as he 
becomes conscious of being inserted between an infinite past and an 
                                                                                                                                       
sense perception, and this invisible in the visible would remain forever unknown if there were no 
spectator to look out for it, admire it, straighten out the stories and put them into words.” 
541 See also Arendt, ‘Bertold Brecht, 1898-1956’, 249.  
542 Cf. Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social, 274-276. 
543 The only attempt I know of to press the originality and importance of Arendt’s distinction between 
knowing and thinking, between truth and meaning, and to develop it further, is Gray, ‘The Winds of 
Thought’. 
544 Cf. Arendt, ‘Tradition and the Modern Age’, 29-30, CC 204. 
545 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 13. 
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infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave anew the path of 




In spite of this predicament, Arendt develops a specific account of how to think, 
which she first described in the preface to Between Past and Future (1961).
547
 
Here, on the assumption that “thought itself arises out of incidents of living 
experience and must remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take 
its bearings”,
548
 she formulates the following aim for her “exercises in political 
thought”: 
 
to discover the real origins of traditional concepts in order to distill from 
them anew their original spirit which has so sadly evaporated from the 
very key words of political language – such as freedom and justice, 
authority and reason, responsibility and virtue, power and glory – leaving 
behind empty shells with which to settle almost all accounts, regardless of 




This motif of recovering the original experiences and phenomena underlying the 
words we live by is reintroduced and further developed, first in her 1968 essay on 
Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) and later in The Life of the Mind: Thinking. In both 
cases, Arendt begins by noting that what we are left with is a fragmented past, that 
is, a past that has lost its authority, its certainty of evaluation.
550
 In both cases, she 
quotes Shakespeare – see the epigraph to the present section – in order to 
metaphorically portray as “pearl diving” a non-traditional way of dealing with the 
past, a way of thinking which she explains as follows in the last paragraph of her 
Benjamin essay:  
 
this thinking, fed by the present, works with the “thought fragments” it 
can wrest from the past and gather about itself. Like a pearl diver who 
descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring it 
to light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in 
the depths and to carry them to the surface, this thinking delves into the 
depths of the past – not in order to resuscitate it the way it was and to 
contribute to the renewal of extinct ages. What guides this thinking is the 
conviction that although the living is subject to the ruin of the time, the 
process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization, that in 
the depth of the sea, into which sinks and is dissolved what once was 
alive, some things “suffer a sea-change” and survive in new crystallized 
forms and shapes that remain immune to the elements, as though they 
                                                     
546 Cf. Ibid., 13. 
547 Its subtitle is Eight Exercises in Political Thought. Consider the following comment in Young-
Bruehl, For Love of the World, 473: “[Arendt] herself once remarked that Between Past and Future 
was the best of her books. She believed in its form: as its subtitle indicates, it contains ‘exercises in 
political thought,’ and was thus not systematic.” 
548 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 14. 
549 Ibid., 15. 
550 WB 193, LM2 212. 
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waited only for the pearl diver who one day will come down to them and 
bring them up into the world of the living – as “thought fragments,” as 
something “rich and strange,” and perhaps even as everlasting 
Urphänomene. (WB 205-206) 
 
Commentators have tended to interpret the metaphor of “pearl diving” developed 
here primarily in the context of Arendt’s search for new ways of dealing with the 
past, and hence they have been inclined to read it as a description of her “method” 
– a term she herself detested
551
 – of “historiography”.
552
 Yet they failed to pay 
sufficient attention to the fact that the passage is explicitly presented as explanation 
of “the gift of thinking poetically” (WB 205), the overall aim of the essay being to 
show that Benjamin, who was “neither a poet nor a philosopher”, nonetheless 
“thought poetically” (WB 156).
553
  
Arendt explains that Benjamin understood language as an essentially poetic 
phenomenon, which implies that he did not investigate “the utilitarian or 
communicative functions of linguistic creations”, but rather tried to understand 
them “in their crystallized and thus ultimately fragmentary form as intentionless 
and noncommunicative utterances of a “world essence”” (WB 205), and it also 
implies that he regarded metaphor as “the central gift of language” (WB 166). 
What underlies Arendt’s critique of the conceptual framework of tradition is 
precisely this more fundamental point concerning philosophy’s neglect of the 
poetic or disclosing quality of language in favor of its communicative function – 




We may of course ask whether what she says about Benjamin is also 
applicable to her. At least the following passage strongly suggests that this is the 
case, for the example of the word “political” is clearly her own:  
 
Any period to which its own past has become as questionable as it has to 
us must eventually come up against the phenomenon of language, for in it 
the past is contained ineradicably, thwarting all attempts to get rid of it 
once and for all. The Greek polis will continue to exist at the bottom of 
our political existence – that is, at the bottom of the sea – for as long as 
we use the word “politics.” This is what the semanticists, who with good 
reason attack language as the one bulwark behind which the past hides – 
its confusion, as they say – fail to understand. They are absolutely right: 
in the final analysis all problems are linguistic problems; they simply do 
not know the implications of what they are saying. (WB 204)  
 
                                                     
551 LM1 211. 
552 Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, 93-95, 173; Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob, 
274-278; Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political, 9-10, 267. 
553 Cf. WB 166, 205. 
554 Cf. HA 26, 176, 179. 
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Arendt devotes several chapters to the relation between language and thought in the 
first volume of The Life of the Mind,
 555
 in which she criticizes traditional 
philosophy’s understanding of thought and speech as a mere means for cognition 
culminating in the speechless contemplation of compelling truth.  
To begin with, Arendt points to the close affinity of thought and speech: 
“thinking beings have an urge to speak, speaking beings have an urge to think 
[emphasis in original]” (LM1 99). The urge to speak is not caused by the need to 
communicate [mitteilen], for thoughts do not have to be communicated in order to 
occur, while they cannot occur without being spoken (whether silently or out loud). 
Arendt illustrates this by referring to Aristotle’s On Interpretation. The criterion of 
speech [logos] is not truth or falsehood, but meaning: “speech … is not necessarily 
apophantikos, a statement or a proposition in which alētheuein and pseudesthai, 
truth and falsehood, being and non-being, are at stake” (LM1 99).
556
 A prayer, for 
example, is a form of speech, but it is neither true nor false. Rather, the need of 
reason [logos] is to “give account” [logon didonai] of whatever may be or may 
have occurred, which is prompted not by the search for knowledge, but by the 
search for meaning: “The sheer naming of things, the creation of words, is the 
human way of appropriating and, as it were, disalienating the world into which, 
after all, each of us is born as a newcomer and a stranger” (LM1 100). 
However, Arendt notes, language is “by no means as evidently adequate 
for the thinking activity as vision is for its business of seeing” (LM1 100). 
Language needs to borrow its vocabulary from words that were originally meant to 
correspond to sense experience, a borrowing which is never haphazard or arbitrary. 
Arendt claims that all philosophic and most poetic language is metaphorical, which 
means that the insights contained in it are gained by analogy, which is not to be 
understood in the usual sense of “an imperfect semblance of two things”, but of “a 
perfect resemblance of two relations between totally dissimilar things” (LM1 104). 
The example she gives is Kant’s depiction of the despotic state as a “mere machine 
(like a hand mill)” because it is “governed by an individual absolute will…. For 
between a despotic state and a hand mill there is, to be sure, no similarity; but there 
is a similarity in the rules according to which we reflect upon these two things and 
their causality.”
557
 According to Arendt, then: 
 
All philosophical terms are metaphors, frozen analogies, as it were, whose 
true meaning discloses itself when we dissolve the term into the original 
context, which must have been vividly in the mind of the first philosopher 
to use it. (LM1 104)
558
 
                                                     
555 LM1 14-15, 57-65, 98-125, 211-213. 
556 Aristotle, De interpretatione, 17a1-4. 
557 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §59, as quoted by Arendt. 
558 This passage reminds us of her description of Socratic “pondering reflection” on “concepts”, each 
of which is “something like a frozen thought that thinking must unfreeze whenever it wants to find out 
the original meaning” [emphasis in original] (LM1 171). Cf. LM1 174-175. Yet as we have seen in 
the second section above, in the case of Socrates Arendt emphasizes the destructive character of this 
form of thinking, which poses a threat to the polis. By contrast, in her reflections on metaphor – 
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She notes that language is capable of bridging the abyss between the invisible 
realm of the mind and the visible world of appearances precisely because of its 
metaphorical character: “the mind’s language by means of metaphor returns to the 
world of visibilities to illuminate and elaborate further what cannot be seen but can 
be said [emphasis added]” (LM1 109). Accordingly, metaphors are described by 
her as “the threads by which the mind holds on to the world even when, 
absentmindedly, it has lost direct contact with it” (LM1 109). Moreover, within the 
thinking process itself they serve as models to guide us among experiences that our 
bodily senses, with their relative certainty of knowledge, cannot. Finally, the 
relationship that is expressed in metaphor is irreversible, indicating “the absolute 
primacy of the world of appearances” and providing additional evidence of “the 
extraordinary quality of thinking, of its being always out of order” (LM1 109). In 
sum:  
 
Language, by lending itself to metaphorical usage, enables us to think, 
that is, to have traffic with non-sensory matters, because it permits a 
carrying-over, metapherein, of our sense experiences. There are not two 
worlds because metaphor unites them.
559
 (LM1 110) 
 
Arendt warns, however, that language, “the only medium in which the invisible can 
become manifest in a world of appearances”, is “by no means adequate for that 
function as our senses are for their business of coping with the perceptible world” 
(LM1 112). In other words, although the metaphor may cure the defect, the cure 
has its dangers too, which lies in “the overwhelming evidence the metaphor 
provides by appealing to the unquestioned evidence of sense experience” (LM1 
112). Arendt suggests that this is the reason why the great philosophers 
 
have almost unanimously insisted on something “ineffable” behind the 
written word, something of which they, when they thought and did not 
write, were very clearly aware and which nevertheless refused to be 
pinned down and handed over to others; in short, they insisted that there 
was something that refused to lend itself to a transformation that would 
allow it to appear and take its place among the appearances of the world. 
(LM1 113-114)  
 
Arendt draws special attention to Plato’s famous claim that “these things cannot be 
put into words like other things we learn”,
560
 which she interprets as an implicit 
                                                                                                                                       
which are entirely absent from her reflections on Socratic thinking – she draws attention to the very 
possibilities of metaphorical language in reconciling ourselves with the (political) world in a 
meaningful way. 
559 See also LM1 187: “As the metaphor bridges the gap between the world of appearances and the 
mental activities going on within it, so the Socratic two-in-one heals the solitariness of thought; its 
inherent duality points to the infinite plurality which is the law of the earth.” 
560 Plato, Seventh Letter, 341c. 
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denial of the existence of an unwritten doctrine as well.
561
 She claims that it is 
tempting to read these utterances as “attempts to warn the reader that he was in 
danger of a fatal mistake in understanding: what were offered him were thoughts, 
not cognitions, not solid pieces of knowledge which, once acquired, would dispel 
ignorance” (LM1 114). To explain further, she speaks of “a possible 
incompatibility between intuition – the guiding metaphor for philosophical truth – 
and speech – the medium in which thinking manifests itself: the former always 
presents us with a co-temporaneous manifold, whereas the latter necessarily 
discloses itself in a sequence of words and sentences” (LM1 118). There is a 
natural tension between seeing [theōria] and reasoning with words [logos], for 
“nothing expressed in words can ever attain to the immobility of an object of mere 
contemplation” (LM1 122). Arendt concludes: “Compared to an object of 
contemplation, meaning, which can be said and spoken about, is slippery; if the 
philosopher wants to see and grasp it, it ‘slips away’” (LM1 122). 
 The sight metaphor, inadequate for the characterization of thinking, is 
manifestly present not only in Plato’s notion of “idea”, which he took from the 
experience of the craftsman who creates the model he holds before his eyes, but 
also in his cave parable, which Arendt calls “essentially poetic”. In search, then, of 
an alternative metaphor for the thinking experience, she arrives at Aristotle’s 
notions of energeia (an activity that has its end in itself), of noēsis noēseōs 
(reasoning turning in circles), and, finally, of the very sensation of being alive: 
“without thinking the human mind is dead” (LM1 123). Whereas the cognitive 
enterprise follows a rectilinear motion, “Aristotle’s circular motion, taken together 
with the life metaphor, suggests a quest for meaning that for man as a thinking 
being accompanies life and ends only in death” (LM1 124). Since these metaphors 
indeed relate to no cognitive capacity, they remain loyal to the fundamental 




 Arendt could have returned to her metaphor of the pearl diver, but she did 
not, possibly due to its being linked too exclusively with her account of how to deal 
with the past. What is even more significant, perhaps, is that something essential is 
lacking from the figure of the pearl diver (as well as from that of the “collector” 
and of the “flâneur”, both of which also figure in the Benjamin essay): the element 
of speech. As we have seen in the case of “dialectical” thinking, the metaphor that 
                                                     
561 The agrapha dogmata which we know about through a remark by Aristotle in his Physics 209b15. 
Arendt takes the notion of an “unwritten” or “esoteric” teaching to be an expression of the conviction 
that thought (as the quest for meaning) should not be confused with knowledge (as the quest for truth), 
whereas we saw that Strauss takes it to be an expression of the conviction that true knowledge 
[epistēmē] – as opposed to mere opinion [doxa] – can only be found by “the few” who are “naturally” 
capable of thinking for and by themselves, thereby identifying thought with the quest for truth. 
562 Arendt uses Kafka’s parable ‘He’ (Arendt, Between Past and Future, 7-13, LM1 202-211) to tell 
us where we are when we think, viz. between past and future instead of in Plato’s cave. Only in this 
specific sense can one understand why she says that this parable offers “a perfect metaphor for the 
activity of thought” (LM2 209), for it does not yet indicate how to move, that is, what we should be 
“doing” in the gap between past and future. 
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is used to make sense of the internal, invisible dialogue between me and myself, is 
actually derived from the external, visible experience of a lively “dialogue” or 
conversation between two close friends.
563
 As we have seen in the case of 
“representative” thinking, the metaphor that is used to make sense of the internal, 
invisible representation of the standpoints of my fellow human beings, is actually 
derived from the external, visible experience of the lively verbal exchange of 
standpoints between fellow actors who find themselves confronted with a common 
issue, or between fellow spectators who find themselves caught up in a common 
event.
564
 Finally, we may suggest that, in the case of “poetic” thinking, the 
metaphor that is used to make sense of the internal, invisible use of metaphor in 
order to make sense of the invisible, is actually derived from the external, visible 
experience of poetry itself, more precisely of the poet who is singing the praise of 
the world. 
We may ask why Arendt did not seem to think of this. There is a rather 
obvious explanation, however: in her vocabulary, “poetry” is linked up with the 
Greek term poièsis, which refers to the activity of work, making, and fabrication, 
that is, the activity of homo faber who, sitting in his workplace, isolated from his 
fellow human beings, silently uses his material to create his product.
565
 In other 
words, she may have thought that, by explicitly proposing the making of poetry as 
a metaphor for thought, she would have reiterated precisely the traditional 
interpretation of the activity of thinking in terms of the element of the 
contemplative vision of an idea, which is inherent to the experience of making. 
Indeed, in The Human Condition, in the section titled ‘The Permanence of the 
World and the Work of Art’, she asserts that writing poetry involves “the same 
workmanship which, through the primordial instrument of human hands, builds the 
other durable things of the human artifice” (HC 169).  
Yet, in the very same section, another, perhaps more promising 
understanding of “poetry” starts to emerge. Here, Arendt calls music and poetry 
“the least ‘materialistic’ of the arts because their ‘material’ consists of sounds and 
words” – note her use of quotation marks here – and she adds that the 
workmanship these arts demand is “kept to a minimum” (HC 169). Moreover, after 
having suggested that the durability of a poem is not so much caused by the fact 
that it is written down, but by “condensation”, she speaks of poetry as “language 
spoken in utmost density and concentration [emphasis added]” (HC 169), the 
German word for condensation being “Verdichtung”, for density “Dichte”, both of 
which resonate in the German verb “dichten”, and not in the English expression “to 
make a poem”.  
Arendt does not explicitly identify the activity of “condensation” with the 
use of metaphor, but she may have had it in mind. One page earlier, she refers to a 
poem by Rilke to illustrate the “veritable metamorphosis” a work of art is capable 
                                                     
563 Cf. PP 82-86. 
564 Cf. LM1 93. 
565 According to Markell, Arendt’s concept of “work” is in fact richer in meaning. See Markell, 
‘Arendt’s Work: On the Architecture of The Human Condition’. 
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of bringing about, being more than mere reification, more than a matter of mere 
“making” (HC 168). Consider especially the second stanza, which simultaneously 
articulates and performs the power of metaphor in “calling” the invisible:  
 
Here is magic. In the realm of a spell 
the common word seems lifted up above… 
and yet is like the call of the male 




We may say that it is the singing poet who uses the power of metaphorical 
language to give meaning to what appears, and thus to praise its existence.
567
 In 
The Life of the Mind, Arendt claims that the ancient Greek notion that “all 
appearances, inasmuch as they appear … demand recognition and praise”, cited at 
the beginning of this section, served as “a kind of philosophical justification of 
poetry and the arts” (LM2 92).  
To conclude this section, we may say that “poetic thinking” is Arendt’s 
way of undoing the meaninglessness of the world. By realizing that language is 
essentially metaphorical and thus capable of connecting the invisible life of the 
mind with the visible worldly reality, it establishes or re-establishes that 
connection, either by diving for the original and originating experiences that lie 
hidden within our inherited words or by finding and making words that adequately 
capture novel experiences. Although only representative thinking is “political” in 
the proper sense of the word, insofar as it helps us to orient ourselves within the 
world, we may now say that, by “thinking poetically”, we enable ourselves to 
appropriate or re-appropriate that world in the first place. Therein we may find an 
alternative to the “distanced” and yet “worldly” citizenship that Dana Villa was 







In this chapter we have argued that Arendt rejects the “Platonic” conceptualization 
of the specific character of and difference between philosophy and politics. In her 
view, they have been interpreted as “cognition” and “rule”, respectively, led by the 
analogy with the activity of the solitary craftsman who, in his workplace, fabricates 
the “idea” he contemplates before his inner eye. As a result, the phenomenal 
specificity of both thinking and acting was lost. Acting together results in events 
that constitute the space of appearances, the public realm, the stubborn “realness” 
of which will forever remain outside the reach of thought. And yet, all thinking 
activity is concerned with the quest for the meaning of actions, of worldly 
phenomena including those of politics – an activity from the endlessness of which 
                                                     
566 Translation John J.L. Mood. Arendt cites the German original only. 
567 LM1 143, LM2 92, 185-6 
568 Villa, ‘The Philosopher versus the Citizen’, 149. 
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we cannot escape by appealing to the certainty either of the compelling evidence of 
truth or untruth (in the case of Science, logic, and philosophy understood after the 
model of contemplation), or to the certain verdict of victory or defeat (in the case 
of History). 
We raised the question of whether Arendt leaves room for ways of thinking 
that are somehow capable of bridging the gap between thought and action, between 
our inner mind and the outer world – while still doing justice to their mutual 
differences, to thought’s always necessarily being “out of order”. Throughout her 
oeuvre we have traced three motifs of thinking which could count as suitable 
candidates for living up to this task: (i) dialectical thinking; (ii) representative 
thinking; and (iii) poetic thinking. 
As has been shown, one way of distinguishing these three types of thinking 
is to look at the difference in the objects with which they are concerned. The first, 
dialectical thinking, which is connected to the exemplary figure of Socrates, is 
thematically concerned with the meaning (or “essences”) of concepts (or “ideas”), 
such as happiness, courage, justice, etc., which serve as invisible standards for our 
conduct. In itself, this type of thinking is an expression of the Socratic conviction 
that an unexamined life is not meaningful, and what underlies it is a concern with 
the harmony of the inner self. The second, representative thinking, which Arendt 
links to the tradition of ancient historiography, to the Greek notion of practical 
wisdom [phronèsis], and to Kant’s third Critique, is concerned with the meaning 
and desirability of particular (political) deeds and events. The third, poetic 
thinking, which she associates with Benjamin, is concerned with the meaning and 
appropriateness of the words we live by. In contradistinction to the first, these last 
two types of thinking are not concerned with (the integrity of) the self, but with 
(the integrity of) the world: the second by judging which “works and deeds and 
words” (HC 19) that world is to be constituted by, and the third by naming and 
praising it. 
The extent to which these ways of thinking can be said to be “fit” for 
politics should in the final instance be determined by another way of distinguishing 
them, viz. according to the nature of their inner activity. The first type of thinking – 
the conversation of the dual two-in-one – is a manifestation of worldly plurality in 
the self, however limited. However, only in case of emergencies – accidentally, as 
it were – does this duality act as a corrective to a loss of plurality in the real world 
of politics. The second type of thinking, which leads to the formation of judgment, 
opinion, and decision, is inherently “worldly” insofar as it intentionally represents 
within the mind the plurality of perspectives of the political realm in which one 
happens to find oneself. Hence, in contrast to the first type of thinking, it is 
genuinely “at home” in the world of political reality. This is also true of the third 
type of thinking, which tries to render, retain, or retrieve the “spirit” of the 
phenomena, experiences, and events that are contained within the words and 
concepts that we shape and are shaped by. Because thought is essentially discursive 
(conducted in speech), and by virtue of the fact that our language is essentially 
poetic or metaphorical, the visible world of appearances is introduced within the 
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invisible life of the mind. Thus, by “thinking poetically”, we may achieve a form of 
reconciliation between ourselves and the world, a form of meaningfulness, if only 
for a brief moment in time. 
We may say that by her drawing corresponding distinctions between 
thinking and knowing and between acting and making, Arendt breaks with the 
classical “Platonic” scheme of the Gorgias in which “rational” philosophy and 
“irrational” politics are played off against each other and hierarchically ordered in 
relation to each other, and in which both turn out in the final instance to be 
concerned with the individual self rather than with the common world. 
Accordingly, Arendt’s approach to the problem of political thinking, of how to 
understand the political while doing justice to the peculiar nature of both activities, 
as well as to that of thoughtful politics, is to be distinguished from the approaches 
of both Popper and Strauss, who respectively conceive of science and philosophy 
as privileged approaches to the world which culminate in “rational” and “true” 
knowledge of that world. According to Arendt, however, this conception forms the 
necessary premise for the possibility of manipulating, “making” and, finally, 
“ruling” that world.  
We have argued, contra Dana Villa, that Arendt is bound to reject the first, 
Socratic, dialectical form of thinking as a model for political thinking, because of 
its self-oriented character, because of its embodiment of a limited form of plurality, 
and because of its merely negative results, which together make it essentially a-
political. To be sure, the politically lacking aspect of Socratic thinking was also 
recognized by Popper (see chapter 2) and Strauss (see chapter 4). Popper stated that 
Socrates was rather interested in the “personal” than the “institutional” dimension 
of the open society. Strauss stated that Socrates was insufficiently aware of the 
danger to the law of the polis that is posed by free philosophizing. Their respective 
answers, however – the scientific politics of institutional reform and the 
philosophical politics of exoteric writing – remain tied to the “Platonic” 
substitution of cognition for thought. 
The kind of “thoughtful politics” we were looking for, that is, sound 
political judgment and decision-making, seems to be embodied especially in 
Arendt’s notion of representative thinking, for it actively retains the plurality of 
perspectives out of which the political realm is constituted by “representing” them 
within the mind. Although its value of “impartiality” – rather than that of 
“objectivity” – is also defended by Popper (see chapter 1), his conception of 
rationalism, of “reasonableness”, or of “listening to each other”, ultimately remains 
instrumental to the pursuit of knowledge. The former acquires its value and 
meaning in light of the value and meaning of the latter. As a result, Popper 
subordinates the perspectival or worldly quality of political reasoning to its 
cognitive aspect. We have also encountered a recovery of practical wisdom 
[phronèsis] in the case of Strauss (see chapter 3). However, as his prudent 
statesman is in the last instance modeled after the contemplative philosopher, he 
also downplays the perspectival or worldly quality of political reasoning, which 
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becomes manifest, for instance, in his claim that it is the task of the historian to 
strive for “objective” judgment. 
Arendt’s notion of poetic thinking, finally, seems to come closest to an 
answer to our question of how to understand the political as such and at all. In 
order for representative thinking to operate, that is, in order to be able to form 
judgments, opinions, and decisions about actual political events, they need to be 
rendered in words. Arendt emphasizes the essential role of the metaphorical 
character of our language in giving meaning to the world, in reconciling ourselves 
with the world. Popper, by contrast, was shown to be incapable of giving account 
of the analogical and metaphorical traces within his own use of language, since 
both the “essentialist” view of language he polemicizes against (i.e. the view 
according to which each word has its intrinsic, “original”, referent) and the 
“nominalist” view of language he embraces (i.e. the view according to which 
language users choose the referent of a word at will) presuppose that the 
communicated meaning of our concepts is or can at some point be fixed and hence 
mastered. As a result, he fails to see the way the “poetic” quality of language is 
effectively operating within his own writing, for instance in his crucial metaphor of 
“social engineering” (see chapter 2). In contradistinction to Popper, Strauss does 
acknowledge the poetic quality of language (see chapter 4), but since he considers 
it to be “ministerial” to its philosophic quality, he, too, sticks to the presupposition 
(or at least the fiction) that the meaning of our words is ultimately to be mastered 
completely. Arendt’s notion of poetic thinking allows us to acknowledge that our 
thought, due to the metaphorical character of language, is itself intrinsically 
worldly by its capacity of “carrying over” the visible into the invisible and vice 
versa. So if we declare this dimension of language to be “irrational” or at best 
“ministerial”, our most intimate possibility of appropriating the world and 









The better we understand what politics is, the better we will be able to act 
politically. That is to say, the better we know how to orient ourselves within the 
political domain, the better we will be able to take adequate political decisions and 
make sound political judgments. Yet, as we noted at the beginning of this 
dissertation, at first sight it would seem that political philosophy has little to teach 
us about the nature of politics in this sense. Not only does it tend to accept a certain 
conception of politics as given – usually its being restricted to the domain of 
government in liberal-democratic states – it also tends to interpret politics in its 
own image, viz. as a kind of rational discussion that is merely not rational enough. 
Insofar as it does not first raise the question “what is political?”, it runs the risk of 
providing us with an uncritical and perhaps even a distorted picture of political 
reality, whereby it fails to acquaint us with political reality as a realm of contingent 
human interaction of which our actions, decisions, and judgments are part.  
We also noted that political philosophy is usually understood as a 
theoretical enterprise, that is, as the pursuit of propositional knowledge. As a 
result, there is a tendency to neglect the fact that it is itself, at least insofar as it 
expresses itself in speech or writing, also a practice. As such, it is part of the same 
domain as all other human interaction, including politics. Hence, there seems to be 
no way to determine “from the outside” where the practice of philosophy ends and 
where the practice of politics begins. In common with all human actions, political-
philosophical writings may therefore have a certain impact in reality that is neither 
expressly intended nor foreseen. The propositional content or intention of a certain 
political-philosophical text may be contradicted by its performative implications. 
These implications may be due to the various assumptions that people who are 
going to act on the theory are bound to make, and to the various uses of language 
which escape from the explicit argumentative reasoning of a text, but which 
nevertheless fulfill a constitutive role in it, such as analogical and polemical forms 
of reasoning. A political philosophy should somehow take this into account if it 
wishes to contribute to an adequate understanding of politics and if it wishes to 
teach us how to act politically in a thoughtful way. 
Given this condition of political philosophy, we raised the following, 
tripartite question: (i) how can we philosophize (think) about politics (action) in 
such a way, (ii) that it takes into account the specific characteristics both of politics 
(as a form of action) and of philosophy (as a form of thinking), and (iii) that it 
prepares us for the exercise of what may be called ‘thoughtful politics’, that is, 
taking adequate political decisions and forming sound political judgments, and 
choosing the right courses of political action? 
Instead of embarking on a systematic, straightforward for / against 
argument to answer these questions, we embarked on a study of the propositional 
contents and the performative meanings of instances of political-philosophical 
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writing, thereby aiming to give due consideration to the fact that, generally 
speaking, texts are not only read and do not only become influential “thanks to 
themselves”, that is, in accordance with the propositions, theories and arguments 
that are put forward in them, but that they are also read and that they also become 
influential “despite themselves”, that is, in accordance with their action, with what 
they “do”. Although the actual historical ‘influence’ achieved by a text may be 
indicative of its performative meaning, they do not entirely coincide, for the 
historical circumstances and institutional settings in which a text is received will 
vary from time to time, while its inner structure remains the same. 
The works of Karl Popper, Leo Strauss, and Hannah Arendt have been 
studied in particular, all of whom aimed to re-think the relationship between 
philosophy and politics, or between thought and action, and all of whom have 
proposed and used different strategies to deal with this relationship, especially in 
discussion with its “Platonic” conception. By digging for the “deeply hidden 
structural features” (Raymond Geuss) of their writings – hidden assumptions that 
are “realized” by acting on them, analogies drawn in them, polemics staged by 
them – our aim has been to contribute to an understanding of the relationship 
between philosophy and politics, and thereby of the conditions of political 
understanding – how to make sense of politics – and of thoughtful politics – how to 
act politically, how to take decisions and make judgments within the political 
realm.  
 
In Part I, we saw Karl Popper criticizing the “closed society” and its approach to 
politics, called “utopian social engineering”, for its elimination of our individual 
freedom and responsibility for decisions. Instead, he proposes to adopt the 
approach of “piecemeal social engineering”, which belongs to the “open society” 
and prepares legislation by democratic government. We argued, however, that due 
to Popper’s logical separation of facts and values, he runs the danger that the ends 
that this social technology (as choice of the most efficient and effective means of 
solving social problems by institutional reform) is supposed to serve, are ultimately 
arbitrary. In the end, Popper himself admits that rational political decision-making 
and judgment rest on an “irrational faith” in reason. To prevent this conclusion, we 
argued, Popper requires a broader, more all-encompassing conception of 
rationality, on which he does in fact draw – an attitude of “reasonableness” or 
“listening to others” – but which he cannot vouch for on the basis of his narrower, 
falsificationist conception of scientific rationality (Chapter 1).  
 Instead, we noted that Popper draws several analogies between the 
formulation of moral and political proposals and that of scientific propositions, 
thereby bestowing on politics the aura of certainty derived from scientific 
methodology, most notably in his pointing to the compelling appeal of the 
elimination of avoidable human suffering. However, we demonstrated that 
Popper’s propositional defense of a politics of rational discussion, which finds 
support in the analogy between politics and science, is contradicted by his 
performance of the polemical friend-enemy conception of politics, which he 
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invokes in the name of the urgency to defend the “open society” against the “closed 
society” (Chapter 2). 
We concluded that Popper would seem to require some form of theoretical 
self-consciousness of his theory also being a practice: (i) his theory makes use not 
merely of logical reasoning but also rests on the use of analogical reasoning, which 
in fact appears to be constitutive for the ‘validity’ of Popper’s proposal for 
piecemeal social engineering, and (ii) his theory is embedded in the performance of 
a fierce polemic against the enemies of the open society, which in fact contradicts 
that proposal. Moreover, he requires a broader conception of politics, which 
encompasses the phenomenon of the exercise of government power or rule – the 
presence of which he appeared to self-evidently presuppose as a necessary evil – as 
well as the apparently inevitable possibility of a friend-enemy struggle between 
political societies. Finally, he requires a conception of philosophy that is not 
reduced to methodology but allows for the rationality of other forms of language 
than pure falsificationism, especially for the rationality of value judgments.  
 
In Part II we saw that Strauss seems to meet all three of these demands. He 
identifies philosophy not with scientific methodology but with philosophical 
dialectics, which ascends from opinions – among which is the law of the polis, 
which is the authoritative opinion par excellence – that turn out to contradict each 
other, in order to replace them by true knowledge of nature. We saw that the 
philosopher ultimately looks down on the city, because it cannot live up to the 
demand of truth, the demands of what is right by nature and not merely right by 
convention. Strauss identifies the political with the sphere of the law of a “city” or 
“civil society”, which, as a closed society, commands unconditional obedience 
from its citizens, at least in case of war. This does not mean, though, that we have 
to choose between philosophic life, the life of reason [logos], which amounts to an 
escape from politics, and political life, the life of “spiritedness” [thumos], which 
then seems to be condemned to a lack of rational standards for political decision-
making and judgment. Strauss leaves room for some form of rational guidance for 
politics. According to his reconstruction of the classical teaching of “natural right”, 
thoughtful politics consists in the “dilution” of what is right by nature by what is 
right by convention, as in the case of the Platonic philosopher-lawgiver, and in 
deciding in concrete political situations which end is the most “natural” one, be it 
the “higher” or the more “urgent” end, as in the case of the Aristotelian statesman. 
In either case, decisions in practice (i.e. in concrete, “existential” situations) cannot 
be directly “deduced” from theory (i.e. the knowledge of a hierarchy of ends) 
(Chapter 3).  
We saw that Strauss distinguishes another, “deeper” form of politics, 
which, he claims, is required for the communication of the philosopher with the 
political community. He thereby displays a “theoretical self-consciousness” of the 
political condition of philosophical writing, including his own. As the 
philosophical search for the truth is at odds with the political community upholding 
the authoritative opinion of the law, the philosopher is required to use a specific 
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form of political writing, called “the art of writing between the lines” to prevent 
him from being misunderstood by “the many” and to stimulate “the few” to start 
philosophizing. We argued, however, that this manner of writing, when performed, 
affirms certain hermeneutical and ontological assumptions that rest on the fiction 
of being able to completely master the political conditions to which the expression 
of philosophical thought is subject, and thereby to escape from them (Chapter 4). 
Although Strauss offers both a conception of philosophy and a conception 
of politics that is broader than Popper’s reduction of the first to scientific 
methodology and the latter to rational discussion with a view to democratic 
legislation, Strauss’s theory and practice, both of “thoughtful” politics and of 
“political” philosophy, imply an overestimation of the possibilities to control the 
meaning of language and human interaction, due to a lack of appreciation for the 
contingency that is inherent to both.  
 
Part III turns to the work of Hannah Arendt, who starts precisely with a recognition 
of the contingent character of human interaction, or its freedom. As we have seen, 
on the basis of her account of the human conditions of natality and plurality, she 
criticizes the tradition of philosophy for having attempted to escape from politics 
by substituting it with rule. In her view, the raison d’être of the political is public 
freedom, which is realized by the acting-in-concert of citizens who appear within 
the public realm. Public freedom is in no way capable of being “guaranteed” by a 
theoretical justification in terms of either a transcendent absolute (the laws of God 
or the truth of Nature) or an immanent absolute (the success of History). Instead, 
she emphasizes that politics continuously requires action and confidence in action 
out of love of freedom (Chapter 5).  
However, this does not mean there is no role for thought in Arendt’s case. 
On the contrary, against the traditional reduction of thought to contemplation (or 
cognition) and against contemporary forms of thoughtlessness, Arendt recovers 
three types of the activity of thinking. The first of these, “dialectical thinking”, or 
the inner dialogue between me and myself, is politically unreliable, since by itself 
it cannot establish the plural “we” of the political, or at best only in emergency 
situations, when its inner two-in-one becomes an example of plurality, despite 
itself, and however limited, within the outer world. The second type, 
“representative thinking”, is political in the normal sense that it prepares for 
political decision-making and judgment by “representing” within the mind the 
various perspectives on a specific public matter. The third type, “poetic thinking”, 
is political at a remove, for, by taking into account the inherently metaphorical 
character of language, it is able to criticize common political-philosophical 
language for its lack of correspondence to actual phenomenal reality. By diving for 
forgotten phenomena and experiences that lie hidden in our language, or by 
developing new conceptual vocabularies, it enables us to make ourselves at home 
again in the political world (Chapter 6). 
Although Arendt’s work could be interpreted as if she performatively 
invokes the impossibility of politics against which she propositionally advocates its 
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possibility, her manner of writing somehow resists this reading. Rather than 
offering a “solution” or establishing a “hierarchy’, it performs the plurality and 
perspectivity – the “in-between” – of human interaction, whereby we, Arendt’s 
readers, are invited to examine our own worldly position and test our own 
confidence in politics. 
 
On the basis of our reading of the writing of these three authors, we are able to 
argue the following in answer to the question we raised in the introduction, which 
we recalled at the beginning of this conclusion, viz. how to philosophize about 
politics in such a way, while taking into account the specific character both of 
philosophy and politics, that we may be able to act politically in a thoughtful 
manner. 
 
In the first place, we argue that a political philosophy should possess or develop a 
realistic or adequate understanding both of politics (as a form of action) and 
philosophy (as a form of thinking), for which it is at least required that it should not 
accept uncritically what is generally called “political” (as that which is restricted to 
the government or the state) and towards what is generally called “philosophical” 
(as the rational justification of propositions in terms of their truth value or 
legitimacy).  
We saw that Popper adheres to a fairly common sense picture of politics. 
His term “political” self-evidently refers to the exercise of “power of man over 
man” as embodied by the state or the government in liberal democracies. Normal 
politics appeared to consist in the “solving” of social “problems” in a manner that 
is as “rational” – i.e. “scientific” – as possible. We also saw that exceptional 
politics – the polemical defense of “the open society” against its enemies or of 
democracy against dictatorship actually practiced by Popper – tends to fall outside 
his conception of politics, or is at least not accounted for in his conception of 
“piecemeal social engineering”. Strauss, on the other hand, includes the element of 
“closure” in his conception of the political when he refers to the “fact” that a 
political order is held together by the law of a regime that is “authoritative” and 
demands obedience from its individual citizens, and to the “fact” that every 
political society, being a “closed society’, stands in potentially inimical relations 
with other “closed societies”. In his case, politics seems to consist in the self-
preservation (or existence) and, if possible, self-improvement (or excellence) of 
such a society. We may say that Popper somehow presupposes the unity or order of 
a political community within which the “piecemeal social engineering” takes place 
(the reform of society by means of state policy and legislation), whereas Strauss 
explicitly tries to understand the raison d’être of the unity or order of a political 
community, of a “city” or “civil society” [polis] in the first place. He does so in 
terms of the “natural” end of human excellence or virtue [aretē] in answer to the 
question of the right way of life, the highest virtue – the philosophical pursuit of 
knowledge – being trans-political, the political virtues par excellence being 
“freedom” (i.e. independence from other cities) and “empire” (i.e. the exercise of 
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hegemony over other cities). From Arendt’s perspective, finally, one may note that 
Popper and Strauss identify politics with “government” or “rule” [Herrschaft], 
whereas she identifies politics with the performance of “public freedom”, that is, 
with citizens acting together in a public realm constituted by contingent human 
interactions, i.e. by unique “events” which might as well not have occurred, but 
which, once they have become part of the realm of human affairs, can no longer be 
“wished away”. She argues not so much that it is possible to establish within this 
realm a politics completely purified of “rule”, i.e. of the “vertical” relation of 
command and obedience, or completely purified of polemics, i.e. of the formation 
of groupings which are merely for or against each other. Rather, she wishes to 
prevent the understanding of politics and of related terms such as “power” and 
“authority” in terms of rule or in terms of polemics, rather than in terms of the 
acting-in-concert of political “equals”, from undermining our love of freedom, our 
faith in the possibility of “horizontally” establishing and maintaining a realm of 
public freedom together. 
Regarding philosophy, we saw that Popper identifies philosophy with the 
methodology of science, which provides logically valid criteria by which to 
distinguish scientific from pseudo-scientific propositions. He also draws on a 
broader conception of philosophy, viz. the Socratic “reasonableness” of “listening 
to each other”. This conception permits a restricted form of rationality for value 
statements – viz. of arbitration or compromise – whereby it oversteps the 
boundaries of strictly falsificationist scientific reasoning. In addition, Popper 
makes ample use of analogical reasoning – explaining the “rationality” of moral 
and political reasoning by way of analogy with scientific reasoning – but the 
“rational” status of this way of reasoning remains unaccounted for in his work. By 
contrast, Strauss explicitly recovers the Socratic form of philosophical dialectics 
against the deductive method of science. Philosophical dialectics “ascends” to the 
truth by “speaking through” mutually contradictory opinions about the “what”, that 
is, the “nature” or “essence” of things, especially the human things, such as 
“virtues”, which, as they are “in speech” rather than “in deed”, cannot be 
“deduced” from any factual account of human nature. Finally, Arendt criticizes the 
tendency to identify philosophy with contemplation, or, more generally, to identify 
thinking with cognition, to which both Popper and Strauss in fact adhere. 
According to Arendt, cognition strives for truth – i.e. to know “what” something is 
and whether it exists at all – whereas thinking strives for meaning – to “ponder” or 
to “think through” what it means for something to exist. Moreover, she claims that 
the activity of thinking always remains “out of order” in the sense that the mind 
can never “reach” the actual realness of the things and events that make up the 
external world. Of the several motifs of thinking that can be traced throughout her 
oeuvre, her own way of thinking is best captured by her notion of “poetic 
thinking”, which acknowledges that all conceptual language is metaphorical, that 
is, all words we use to refer to the invisible ‘concepts’ of the mind – such as the 
concepts ‘politics’ and ‘idea’ – are derived from sense-experience, from our 
experience of the visible, phenomenal world. Thus, it is precisely the metaphorical 
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character of thought that allows us to “reconcile” ourselves with the external world 
of appearances. As such, Arendt’s conception of speech or language is richer than 
that of Popper and Strauss. While Popper acknowledges the rationality of 
propositional language only and tends to believe that it is possible to eliminate or at 
least greatly reduce the influence of the meaning of metaphorical or “poetic” 
language, Strauss allows for the existence of the “poetic” use of language, but he 
tends to presuppose that the meaning of this type of language can be mastered 
entirely by the speaker or writer in question and made “ministerial” for the 
philosophical pursuit of truth.  
 
In the second place, we claim that a political philosophy should possess or develop 
some degree of theoretical self-consciousness that it is also a practice, at least 
insofar as it expresses itself in speech or writing, and of the implications thereof for 
(i) the validity or status of its propositions or theory, and for (ii) the influence of its 
“deeply hidden structural features” on actual politics.  
In the case of Popper, we noted a lack of such awareness. We demonstrated 
that, despite himself, his proposal for a “rational” politics of piecemeal social 
engineering rests on analogical reasoning, that is to say, on the analogy of politics 
with science, and that his proposal is even contradicted by his performance of a 
polemical conception of politics. Only on two occasions in his work does he seem 
to acknowledge that thought – especially spoken or written thought – is a practice: 
when he characterizes the decision to adopt an attitude of rationalism as an “act of 
faith” and when he praises, for once, the “manner of writing” of Plato’s earlier 
dialogues for being the embodiment of rational argumentation. By contrast, 
Strauss’s oeuvre may be considered a persistent attempt to think through and 
remedy the repercussions of the fact that philosophical writing is not only a form of 
theory but also of practice. We saw that he presupposes that the political 
predicament of philosophy can be overcome by employing a cunning art of writing. 
However, the underlying conception of a “natural” opposition between philosophy 
and politics, between “the few” and “the many”, implies a binary picture of human 
interaction that is simply unrealistic: in practice, readers cannot be so neatly 
divided into two classes that any “misunderstanding” that was not foreseen by the 
writer can be forestalled. Finally, Arendt displays a theoretical self-consciousness 
of writing insofar as she acknowledges that any ontological assumption about 
political reality, i.e. any statement of fact about the nature of the political that is 
claimed to be “objectively” true in theory, such as an account of the nature of 
politics in terms of “rule”, will be “proved true”, will be realized in practice, as 
soon and as long as people act on that assumption. In that sense, even the 
theoretical proposition that human beings are born to be free may be understood in 
practice to imply that we are doomed to be free. In order to provide an antidote to 
this ineradicable interpretative option, Arendt chooses to speak of the human 
“condition” rather than human “nature”, whereby she aims to keep the “end” of 
human beings to a certain degree open, i.e. “undecidable” in theory. She provides a 
phenomenology of the political which at the same time embodies a praise of the 
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continuous possibility of political freedom: she writes about political phenomena 
and experiences in such a manner that the capacity of human beings spontaneously 
to start something new is not merely described but also invoked. 
 
In the third place, a political philosophy that fulfills these two demands of taking 
into account the specific nature of philosophy (as a form of thinking) and politics 
(as a form of acting), and of possessing some kind of theoretical self-consciousness 
of its own performative condition, should be able to assist us in understanding what 
we are doing when we wish to act politically in a “thoughtful” way, i.e. when we 
wish to make adequate decisions and issue sound judgments within the political 
realm.  
In the case of all three authors, the form of “rational” or “thoughtful” 
political action they offer is developed against the background of the traditional 
model of Socratic dialectics or “true politics”. We saw that Popper proposes an 
approach to political decision-making and judgment called “piecemeal social 
engineering”. We argued that piecemeal social engineering in itself presupposes a 
narrow conception of rationality in terms of the choice of the most effective and 
efficient means to realize already chosen ends. Popper’s strict dualism of facts and 
values implies that there is no way rationally to establish the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of ends. In order to avoid the inevitable result that decisions and 
judgments are merely “personal”, “ad hominem”, or “arbitrary”, Popper adopts the 
stance of negative utilitarianism, that is, the need to relieve human beings of 
avoidable suffering as the only urgent and hence universally valid goal for public 
policy. Furthermore, the framework into which Popper’s form of “rational” politics 
fits is from the very start that of the “open society”, within which the sphere of the 
government or the state as the normal political realm has already been established. 
Only in case of emergency, i.e. when the open society’s existence and form of 
government are threatened by its enemies, may one have recourse to violence 
instead of reason.  
However, what remains out of sight is the possibility of a rational choice of 
positive values in case the elimination of avoidable suffering has already been 
realized. We saw that Popper’s broader notion of Socratic rationality, in the sense 
of “reasonableness” or “listening to each other”, embodies a form of “impartiality” 
in decision-making and judgment that is more promising in this respect than the 
deductive choice of one single criterion only – viz. negative utilitarianism – for all 
politics. Popper nevertheless suggests that Socrates himself was more interested in 
the character formation of persons than in institutional reform. Be that as it may, 
this form of rational discussion would seem to be the only alternative Popper has to 
offer for scientific reasoning and its technological application (in case of normal 
circumstances) on the one hand, and polemical struggle (in case of emergency) on 
the other. 
In contradistinction to Popper, Strauss does not exclusively identify politics 
with the sphere of what we could call “normal” politics, for he is constantly aware 
of the fact that a political society lives potentially at war with other political 
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societies. Moreover, he rejects Popper’s separation of facts and values, instead 
acknowledging the possibility of rational discussion of values – or of “virtues” – as 
embodied by Socratic dialectics, the outcome of which may be the establishment of 
a specific “hierarchy of ends”. These two elements together result in the suggestion 
of forms of “thoughtful” politics that move between philosophy (or the escape 
from politics) and polemics (or a total immersion in the urgent struggle for the 
survival of a political community or “city”). Especially Strauss’s account of the 
“Aristotelian” form of practical wisdom or phronèsis of the statesman offers an 
answer here. In “normal” circumstances the “city” should strive for “normal” 
justice, that is, distributive and commutative justice. In “exceptional” 
circumstances, however, the city should strive to protect its own existence against 
the enemies of the city, be they internal or external. Although the existence of a 
hierarchy of ends – that is, of the ends of justice – is acknowledged, Strauss adds 
that there is no way to universally determine beforehand what constitutes a 
“normal” situation and an “exceptional” situation. This is to be decided by the 
statesman on the spot, the moral education of whose character is therefore to a 
certain extent decisive.  
What is problematic, however, is Strauss’s claim that there is a “natural” 
decision in every situation – based on “a full consideration of all the 
circumstances”  which can afterwards be “objectively” established by the 
competent judgment of the historian. We may doubt whether this is right, though, 
due to the finite character of human knowledge (recognized by Popper) and the 
contingent character of human interaction (recognized by Arendt). 
Finally, Arendt’s notion of what we have called “thoughtful” politics is 
informed by her account of the public realm. She claims that the public realm or 
the world common to us all is perspectival in character, which is due to the human 
conditions of natality – being capable of beginning something new by virtue of 
being born into the world – and plurality – appearing as distinct and unique 
individuals by virtue of the fact that not man, but men inhabit the world. Hence, we 
saw her reject Socratic thinking – the soundless and inner dialogue between me and 
myself – for its lack of plurality in the political sense. Rather, thinking becomes 
truly “political” to the extent that it is capable of “representing” within the mind the 
various perspectives that the people involved may have on an actual public affair. 
Thereby, she argues, a citizen-actor or statesman may arrive at an “impartial” 
decision regarding a specific course of political action – Arendt also uses the 
concept of phronèsis here – just as a citizen-spectator or a historian may arrive at 
an “impartial” judgment about past political events. In contradistinction to Strauss, 
Arendt identifies the Greek phenomenon of phronèsis with this form of 
“representative” thinking, and she claims that the more perspectives on a common 
affair that are taken into account, the more “valid” the actual decision or judgment 
of that affair will be. 
This concluding summary is not intended as a definite “answer” to the 
question of what political philosophy is or should be like, let alone a practical 
“proposal” for actual political decision-making and judgment. Rather, the aim has 
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been to demonstrate what can be learned from the political-philosophical writings 
of Popper, Strauss, and Arendt and the manners of political thinking that they 








Naarmate we beter begrijpen wat politiek is en hoe ze werkt, zullen we beter in 
staat zijn om politiek te handelen. Anders gezegd, hoe beter we weten hoe we ons 
binnen het politieke domein moeten oriënteren, des te beter zullen we in staat zijn 
om goede politieke beslissingen te nemen en de juiste politieke oordelen te vellen. 
Op het eerste gezicht lijkt de politieke filosofie ons over politiek in deze zin niet 
zoveel te kunnen leren. Niet alleen vertoont zij de neiging één bepaalde opvatting 
van politiek als vanzelfsprekend te vooronderstellen – meestal begrijpt zij politiek 
als datgene wat betrekking heeft op de uitoefening van overheidsgezag in 
democratische rechtsstaten – ook is zij geneigd om politiek op te vatten naar haar 
eigen evenbeeld, namelijk als een vorm van rationele discussie die alleen nog niet 
rationeel genoeg is. Voor zover de filosofie niet allereerst vraagt wat politiek is, 
loopt zij echter het risico ons een onkritisch en vertekend beeld van de politieke 
werkelijkheid voor te houden, als gevolg waarvan ze ons niet vertrouwd maakt met 
de politieke werkelijkheid als specifiek domein van menselijk handelen zoals dit 
geconstitueerd wordt door politieke handelingen die worden verricht, politieke 
beslissingen die worden genomen en politieke oordelen die worden geveld.  
 De politieke filosofie beschouwt zichzelf meestal in de eerste plaats als een 
theoretische bezigheid, die gericht is op het formuleren van in proposities te vatten 
kennisaanspraken. Wat door dit zelfbeeld echter aan het oog wordt onttrokken, is 
het feit dat de filosofie, op zijn minst voor zover ze zich uitdrukt in woord en 
geschrift, zelf ook een praktijk is. Als zodanig maakt zij deel uit van het domein 
van alle menselijk handelen, waartoe ook het politieke handelen behoort. Het lijkt 
dan onmogelijk om “van buitenaf” uit te maken waar de praktijk van de filosofie 
eindigt en waar die van de politiek begint. Evenals menselijke handelingen kunnen 
politiek-filosofische geschriften een bepaalde weerslag hebben binnen de politieke 
werkelijkheid die niet expliciet bedoeld of voorzien was. De in proposities vervatte 
inhoud of bedoeling van een politiek-filosofische tekst kan op gespannen voet 
blijken te staan met de performatieve implicaties van diezelfde tekst. Deze 
implicaties bestaan bijvoorbeeld in aannamen die mensen doen zodra ze naar de 
tekst gaan handelen, of in vormen van taalgebruik die buiten het expliciete 
argumentatieve betoog van de tekst vallen maar er niettemin een dragende rol in 
vervullen, zoals het gebruik van analogieën en polemische redeneerwijzen. 
Als vertrekpunt voor deze dissertatie dient de aanname dat een politieke 
filosofie op de een of andere manier rekening zou moeten houden met haar eigen 
performatieve conditie indien zij een bijdrage wil leveren aan een adequaat 
verstaan van politiek en indien we van haar willen leren hoe we op een verstandige 
manier aan politiek zouden kunnen doen. De volgende, drieledige vraag staat 
centraal: (a) hoe kunnen we op zo’n manier aan politieke filosofie doen dat zij (b) 
rekening houdt met de specifieke kenmerken van zowel politiek (als een vorm van 
handelen) als filosofie (als denkactiviteit) en (c) ons toerust voor het bedrijven van 
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wat we aanduiden als “verstandige” of “bedachtzame” politiek, dat wil zeggen het 
nemen van goede politieke beslissingen, het verrichten van de juiste politieke 
handelingen en het vellen van de juiste politieke oordelen? 
In plaats van een systematische argumentatie te bieden in antwoord op 
deze vragen, worden in dit proefschrift de propositionele inhouden en 
performatieve betekenissen van een aantal politiek-filosofische oeuvres bestudeerd. 
Daarmee wordt recht gedaan aan het feit dat teksten in het algemeen gesproken niet 
alleen gelezen worden en invloedrijk worden “dankzij zichzelf” – dat wil zeggen, 
in overeenstemming met de proposities, theorieën en argumenten die erin vervat 
liggen –, maar dat ze tevens invloedrijk worden “ondanks zichzelf” – dat wil 
zeggen, in overeenstemming met hun handelingen, met wat ze blijken te “doen”. 
De performatieve betekenis van een tekst kunnen we weliswaar op het spoor 
komen door de feitelijke historische “invloed” van deze tekst te bestuderen, maar 
performatieve betekenis en historische invloed vallen niet volledig samen. Terwijl 
de historische omstandigheden en de institutionele omgeving waarin een tekst 
wordt gerecipiëerd van tijd tot tijd verandert, kan de inwendige structuur van een 
tekst ook op zich worden bestudeerd. 
In het bijzonder worden in dit proefschrift de werken bestudeerd van Karl 
Popper (1902-1994), Leo Strauss (1899-1973) en Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). 
Deze drie auteurs hebben alle de verhouding tussen filosofie en politiek (of tussen 
denken en handelen) opnieuw doordacht. Ook hebben zij alle drie strategieën 
voorgesteld en toegepast om met deze verhouding om te gaan, in het bijzonder in 
discussie met de “Platoonse” conceptualisering ervan. Door de “diep verborgen 
structurele kenmerken” (Raymond Geuss) van hun geschriften aan het licht te 
brengen – de erin verborgen aannames die “verwerkelijkt” worden zodra mensen 
naar hun teksten gaan handelen, de analogieën die erin worden gebruikt, de 
polemieken die erin worden gevoerd – levert het proefschrift een bijdrage aan een 
verstaan van de verhouding tussen filosofie en politiek, en van de condities van het 
politieke denken enerzijds – hoe politiek te begrijpen – en van verstandige politiek 
anderzijds – hoe politiek te handelen.  
In Deel I wordt de kritiek uiteengezet van Karl Popper op de “gesloten 
samenleving” en haar houding ten aanzien van politiek, genaamd “utopische 
maatschappelijke hervorming”, die volgens hem onze individuele vrijheid en 
verantwoordelijkheid voor beslissingen wegneemt. Popper stelt voor om in plaats 
daarvan de methode toe te passen die volgens hem eigen is aan de “open 
samenleving”, te weten “democratische sociale hervorming” of “stapsgewijze 
sociale technologie”, die bestaat in het op wetenschappelijke wijze vaststellen van 
de meest efficiënte en effectieve middelen om door middel van institutionele 
hervorming maatschappelijke problemen op te lossen. Echter, zo wordt 
beargumenteerd, door toedoen van zijn strikt logische scheiding van feitelijke en 
normatieve uitspraken loopt hij het risico dat de bepaling van de doelen die deze 
sociale technologie geacht wordt te dienen, uiteindelijk willekeurig is. Popper geeft 
inderdaad toe dat het nemen van rationele politieke beslissingen en het vellen van 
rationele politieke oordelen uiteindelijk berust op een “geloof” in de rede dat op 
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zichzelf “irrationeel” van aard is. Om de moreel-relativistische consequentie van 
deze positie te vermijden heeft hij een bredere opvatting van rationaliteit nodig. 
Daarop doet hij in feite wel een beroep – hij spreekt van een houding van 
“redelijkheid” of van “naar elkaar luisteren” – maar tegelijk kan hij deze opvatting 
niet verantwoorden op basis van zijn smallere, falsificationistische opvatting van 
wetenschappelijke rationaliteit (Hoofdstuk 1).  
 In plaats van expliciet zijn toevlucht te nemen tot een breder begrip van 
rationaliteit, blijkt Popper gebruik te maken van verschillende analogieën tussen 
morele en wetenschappelijke rationaliteit, of tussen de formulering van morele en 
politieke uitspraken enerzijds en van wetenschappelijke uitspraken anderzijds. 
Daarmee tracht hij het aura van zekerheid dat eigen is aan zijn wetenschappelijke 
methodologie over te dragen op het domein van de politieke besluitvorming. Dit 
komt onder meer tot uitdrukking in de door hem gebruikte analogie tussen de 
dwingende kracht van de deductieve weerlegging enerzijds en de dwingende kracht 
van het morele appèl tot het wegnemen van menselijk lijden anderzijds. Daarnaast 
wordt aangetoond dat Poppers propositionele verdediging van een politiek van 
rationele discussie, waarvoor hij ondersteuning zoekt in de analogie tussen politiek 
en wetenschap, nu juist wordt tegengewerkt door de polemische vriend-vijand-
opvatting van politiek die hij opvoert in naam van de urgent geachte verdediging 
van de open samenleving tegen haar “vijanden” (Hoofdstuk 2). 
In de eerste plaats concluderen we dat Popper een zeker “theoretisch 
zelfbewustzijn” (Raymond Geuss) dient te ontwikkelen van het feit dat zijn theorie 
ook een praktijk is. Zijn theorie maakt niet alleen gebruik van logische 
redeneervormen maar berust uiteindelijk op het gebruik van analogische 
redeneervormen die de facto constitutief blijken te zijn voor de “geldigheid” van 
Poppers voorstel voor stapsgewijze sociale technologie. Ook is zijn theorie ingebed 
in een felle polemiek tegen de vijanden van de open samenleving, waarmee hij in 
feite een andere vorm van politiek beoefent dan de politiek van rationele discussie 
die hij voorstaat. In de tweede plaats stellen we daarom dat Popper een bredere 
opvatting van politiek nodig heeft, één die meer omvat dan rationele discussie 
alleen en die recht doet aan het feit dat politieke beslissingen kunnen worden 
afgedwongen, desnoods met geweld (ook in een democratische rechtsstaat). De 
aanwezigheid van het overheidsgezag wordt door hem als zijnde een “noodzakelijk 
kwaad” weliswaar voorondersteld, maar ze wordt door hem niet gedacht, zoals ook 
de kennelijk onvermijdelijk aanwezige mogelijkheid van een vriend-vijand-strijd 
tussen politieke samenlevingen door hem niet wordt gedacht. In de derde plaats 
stellen we dat Popper een opvatting van filosofie nodig heeft die haar niet reduceert 
tot wetenschapsmethodologie maar die ruimte laat voor de rationaliteit van andere 
vormen van taalgebruik, in het bijzonder die van normatieve taaluitingen.  
 
In Deel II wordt uiteengezet dat Strauss’ werk op het eerste gezicht aan al deze drie 
eisen tegemoet lijkt te komen. Hij identificeert filosofie niet met wetenschappelijke 
methodologie maar met filosofische dialectiek, die volgens hem “opstijgt” van 
opinies die elkaar blijken tegen te spreken – met de wet als meest gezaghebbende 
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“opinie” – naar ware kennis. Volgens Strauss kijkt de filosoof uiteindelijk neer op 
de politieke samenleving, omdat de laatste niet is opgewassen tegen de eisen van 
de waarheid, van wat waar is van nature en niet alleen bij wijze van conventie. 
Strauss identificeert het politieke met de sfeer van de wet en het regime van de 
politieke samenleving die als gesloten samenleving onvoorwaardelijke 
gehoorzaamheid kan eisen van haar burgers in geval van oorlog. Dit betekent 
echter niet dat we de keuze hebben tussen slechts twee alternatieven: ófwel het 
filosofische leven, het leven van de logos, dat uitmondt in een ontsnapping aan de 
politiek, ófwel het politieke leven, het leven van de thumos, anderzijds, dat voor 
altijd gespeend lijkt te zijn van hogere rationele standaarden voor het politieke 
beslissen en oordelen. Strauss laat enige ruimte voor rationele standaarden voor het 
politieke handelen: volgens zijn reconstructie van de klassieke leer van het 
“natuurrecht” bestaat “bedachtzame” politiek in het “verdunnen” van wat van 
nature juist is met wat bij wijze van conventie juist is en in het in concrete politieke 
situaties beslissen welk doel het meest “natuurlijk” is, namelijk ofwel het 
“hoogste” doel, ofwel het meest “urgente”. Desalniettemin kunnen praktische 
beslissingen (beslissingen in concrete, “existentiële” situaties) volgens hem 
nimmer één-op-één worden “afgeleid” uit theoretische kennis (kennis van een 
rangorde van doeleinden) (Hoofdstuk 3).  
Naast politiek in deze zin onderscheidt Strauss een andere, “diepere” vorm 
van politiek, die volgens hem bestaat in de communicatie van de filosoof met de 
politieke gemeenschap. Door aandacht te schenken aan deze vorm van politiek laat 
hij een zekere mate van theoretisch zelfbewustzijn zien van de politieke condities 
van het filosofische schrijven, ook van zijn eigen schrijven. Aangezien de 
filosofische zoektocht naar waarheid volgens Strauss op gespannen voet staat met 
de gezaghebbende “opinie” van de wet en de publieke opinie van de politieke 
gemeenschap, is de filosoof volgens hem genoodzaakt om een speciale manier van 
politiek schrijven te hanteren, “de kunst van het tussen de regels schrijven” of 
“exoterisch schrijven”. Deze manier van schrijven moet enerzijds voorkómen dat 
de filosoof door de “menigte” wordt misverstaan en er anderzijds zorg voor dragen 
dat potentiële filosofen worden gestimuleerd om zelfstandig te gaan filosoferen. 
Echter, zo beargumenteren we, zodra deze manier van schrijven in de praktijk 
wordt gebracht, worden bepaalde hermeneutische en ontologische aannames 
gedaan die de fictie in het leven roepen dat het mogelijk zou zijn om de 
performatieve condities waaraan de expressie van het filosofische denken per 
definitie onderhevig is, volledig te beheersen en daardoor aan die condities te 
ontsnappen (Hoofdstuk 4). 
Hoewel Strauss’ opvattingen van filosofie en van politiek breder zijn dan 
die van Popper, die filosofie reduceert tot wetenschapsmethodologie en politiek tot 
rationele discussie met het oog op democratische besluitvorming, impliceren 
Strauss’ theorie en praktijk van “bedachtzame” politiek (praktische wijsheid) en 
van “politieke” filosofie (de kunst van het schrijven) een overschatting van de 
mogelijkheid om de betekenis van de taal en van het menselijk handelen te 
227 
 
beheersen. De contingentie die aan beide eigen is, wordt door Strauss onvoldoende 
erkend en gewaardeerd.  
 
Deel III van deze dissertatie betreft het werk van Hannah Arendt. Zij vertrekt in 
haar denken juist vanuit de erkenning van het contingente karakter van menselijke 
interactie. Op basis van haar fenomenologie van de menselijke condities van 
nataliteit en pluraliteit bekritiseert zij de filosofische traditie vanwege haar poging 
om te ontsnappen aan politiek door deze te vervangen door bestuur of heerschappij. 
De bestaansreden van politiek is volgens Arendt publieke vrijheid, die gerealiseerd 
wordt door burgers die samen handelen en in de publieke ruimte verschijnen. Het 
(voort)bestaan van publieke vrijheid kan volgens haar op geen enkele manier 
worden “gegarandeerd” door een theoretische rechtvaardiging in termen van ofwel 
een transcendent absolutum (Goddelijk recht of Natuurrecht) of een immanent 
absolutum (het succes van de door mensen gemaakte Geschiedenis), maar vergt dat 
we steeds opnieuw handelen, hetgeen op zijn beurt weer vertrouwen in het 
handelen veronderstelt uit liefde voor de vrijheid (Hoofdstuk 5).  
Hoewel Arendt grote nadruk legt op het handelingskarakter van de politiek, 
betekent dit niet dat ze geen enkele rol weggelegd ziet voor het denken. In haar 
werken kunnen drie denkmotieven worden getraceerd die in aanmerking zouden 
kunnen komen als alternatief voor wat zij beschouwt als de traditionele reductie 
van het denken tot contemplatie (of cognitie) en voor moderne vormen van 
onbedachtzaamheid. Het eerste motief betreft de activiteit van het “dialectische 
denken”, of van wat Arendt omschrijft als de innerlijke dialoog van mijzelf met 
mijzelf. Volgens haar is deze activiteit politiek onberekenbaar, aangezien ze uit 
zichzelf niet het meervoud van het politieke “wij” in het leven kan roepen of 
aangezien ze dat op zijn best alleen in noodsituaties kan, wanneer haar inwendige 
twee-in-één, ondanks zichzelf, een voorbeeld van (weliswaar nog steeds beperkte) 
pluraliteit wordt in de wereld. Het tweede motief betreft het “representatieve 
denken”. Volgens Arendt is deze vorm van denken “politiek” in de normale zin van 
het woord, voor zover ze ons voorbereidt op het nemen van politieke beslissingen 
en het vellen van politieke oordelen door in de menselijke geest de verschillende 
perspectieven te “representeren” die kunnen worden ingenomen op een publieke 
zaak. Het derde motief betreft het “dichterlijke denken”. Deze denkactiviteit 
veronderstelt dat we ons bewust zijn van het intrinsiek metaforische karakter van 
de taal, hetgeen ons in staat stelt om gangbare politiek-filosofische taal te 
onderzoeken op haar overeenstemming met de daadwerkelijke verschijningswijze 
van politieke gebeurtenissen en ervaringen. Door oorspronkelijke gebeurtenissen 
en ervaringen “op te duiken” die verborgen liggen in onze begrippen en door nieuw 
conceptueel vocabulaire te ontwikkelen (nieuwe metaforen en analogieën), stelt 
deze manier van denken ons in staat om ons de politieke werkelijkheid (opnieuw, 
en meestal voor even) eigen te maken (Hoofdstuk 6). 
Hoewel Arendts werk evenals dat van Popper en Strauss kan worden 
geïnterpreteerd alsof het op performatief niveau precies de onmogelijkheid van 
politiek oproept waartegen het op propositioneel niveau nu juist strijdt, constateren 
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we dat haar manier van schrijven zich hier in hogere mate tegen verzet dan in het 
geval van de andere twee auteurs. In plaats van een “oplossing” te bieden of een 
“rangorde” te vestigen, voert Arendt de pluraliteit en perspectiviteit – het 
“tussenin” – van het menselijk handelen op, waardoor wij, haar lezers, worden 
uitgenodigd en uitgedaagd om onze eigen positie in en ten aanzien van de politieke 
wereld te bepalen en de vraag te beantwoorden in hoeverre we er zelf vertrouwen 
in hebben dat het zin heeft om politiek te handelen.  
 
Op basis van deze lezing van het werk van de drie auteurs, beargumenteren we in 
de conclusie wat van hun politiek-filosofisch schrijven geleerd kan worden in 
antwoord op de aan het begin van deze dissertatie geformuleerde drieledige vraag.  
 
In de eerste plaats stellen we dat een politieke filosofie een realistisch of adequaat 
verstaan van politiek en van filosofie dient te ontwikkelen. Daarvoor is het op zijn 
minst vereist dat zij niet onkritisch accepteert (a) wat in het algemeen “politiek” 
wordt genoemd (dat wat beperkt is tot de sfeer van de regering of staat) en (b) wat 
in het algemeen “filosofisch” wordt genoemd (de rationele rechtvaardiging van 
proposities in termen van hun waarheidswaarde of legitimiteit).  
Popper verstaat onder politiek het door middel van “stapsgewijze sociale 
technologie” voeren van overheidsbeleid ter oplossing van maatschappelijke 
problemen. De politiek van de verdediging van “de open samenleving” tegen haar 
vijanden, die de facto door Popper wordt beoefend, valt strikt genomen buiten dit 
eerste begrip. Terwijl Popper de eenheid van de politieke orde waarbinnen de 
“stapsgewijze sociale technologie” wordt toegepast, impliciet vooronderstelt, tracht 
Strauss de bestaansgrond van die politieke eenheid zélf te denken. Hij doet dit met 
verwijzing naar het “feit” dat een politieke orde bijeen wordt gehouden door de wet 
van een gezaghebbend regime dat gehoorzaamheid kan afdwingen van zijn burgers 
en naar het “feit” dat iedere politieke samenleving een “gesloten” samenleving is 
die potentieel op vijandige voet staat met andere “gesloten” samenlevingen. De 
bestaansgrond van politiek is volgens hem in ieder geval het zelfbehoud 
(existentie) van de betreffende samenleving en indien mogelijk ook haar 
zelfverbetering (voortreffelijkheid of deugd). Politieke vrijheid wordt hier 
gedefinieerd als onafhankelijkheid van andere politieke samenlevingen en politieke 
macht als hegemonie over andere politieke samenlevingen. Terwijl Popper en 
Strauss politiek beide identificeren met de uitoefening van overheidsgezag of 
“heerschappij”, identificeert Arendt haar echter met de uitoefening van “publieke 
vrijheid” door burgers die samen handelen in een publiek domein dat op zijn beurt 
ook wordt geconstitueerd door gezamenlijk handelen. Dit betekent geenszins dat 
zij stelt dat het mogelijk is een politiek domein te stichten dat volledig vrij is van 
“heerschappij” en polemiek – van de “verticale” verhouding van bevel en 
gehoorzaamheid en de vorming van groepen die zich louter voor of tegen elkaar 
opstellen –, maar dat het denken van “vrijheid” en “macht” in termen van 
“soevereiniteit” en “heerschappij” het vertrouwen ondermijnt in de mogelijkheid 
van het stichten en onderhouden van publieke vrijheid. 
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Filosofie wordt door Popper geïdentificeerd met de methodologie van de 
wetenschappen die logisch eenduidige criteria vaststelt aan de hand waarvan de 
wetenschappelijkheid van uitspraken kan worden getoetst. Echter, de “geldigheid” 
van zijn eigen theorie blijkt afhankelijk te zijn van vormen van rationaliteit die 
buiten zijn eigen opvatting van strikt wetenschappelijke rationaliteit vallen: (a) de 
Socratische bereidheid om open te staan voor andermans argumenten en (b) het 
gebruik van analogieën. Strauss verdedigt nu juist de Socratische, filosofische 
“dialectiek” tegen de reductie van filosofie tot methodologie. Het dialectische 
gesprek vertrekt vanuit onderling tegenstrijdige uitspraken over het “wat” van de 
dingen om tot ware kennis te komen. Voor zover menselijke voortreffelijkheid of 
deugd veeleer “in woord” dan “in daad” bestaat, kunnen we alleen tot kennis van 
de menselijke deugden komen door ons te richten op onze uitspraken erover. 
Ondanks deze onderlinge verschillen, hebben Popper en Strauss met elkaar gemeen 
dat zij filosofie beschouwen als een streven naar in propositionele taal gevatte 
kennis. Volgens Arendt is het denken echter niet gericht op kennis – vaststellen 
“of” iets is en “wat” iets is – maar op betekenis – bedenken wat het betekent “dat” 
iets is. Enerzijds kan het denken de dingen en gebeurtenissen niet vatten in hun 
concrete realiteit, maar anderzijds leert Arendts motief van het “dichterlijke 
denken” ons dat het denken niettemin toegang heeft tot de uitwendige wereld der 
verschijnselen dankzij het metaforisch en analogisch karakter van de taal: alle 
woorden die we gebruiken om te verwijzen naar de onzichtbare “begrippen” van 
onze geest zijn ontleend aan de zintuiglijke ervaring van de buitenwereld. 
 
In de tweede plaats stellen we dat een politieke filosofie een zekere mate van 
theoretisch zelfbewustzijn dient te ontwikkelen, hetgeen wil zeggen dat zij dient te 
beseffen dat zij, op zijn minst voor zover zij zich in het spreken of schrijven 
uitdrukt, tevens een praktijk is. Ze dient de implicaties van deze conditie te 
doordenken voor (a) de status of “geldigheid” van haar proposities of theorie en (b) 
de mogelijke invloed van haar diep verborgen structurele kenmerken op de 
politieke werkelijkheid.  
Popper toont een gebrek aan bewustzijn van het feit dat zijn voorstel voor 
een “rationele” politiek van stapsgewijze sociale technologie (a) blijkt te rusten op 
de analogie tussen wetenschap en politiek en (b) wordt tegengesproken door zijn 
polemische beoefening van politiek. Hoewel Strauss’ oeuvre kan worden 
beschouwd als één grote doordenking van en remedie tegen de gevolgen van het 
feit dat filosofisch schrijven niet alleen de beoefening van theorie is, maar zelf ook 
een praktijk is, veronderstelt hij dat de politieke conditie van filosofie kan worden 
beheerst door de beoefening van een speciale schrijfkunst. Echter, de hieraan ten 
grondslag liggende opvatting van een “natuurlijke” tegenstelling tussen filosofie en 
politiek, tussen “de enkelingen” en “de menigte”, impliceert een binair beeld van 
menselijke interactie dat geen rekening houdt met haar contingente karakter. 
Arendt toont een theoretisch zelfbewustzijn van het schrijven voor zover ze 
toegeeft dat iedere ontologische aanname over de politieke werkelijkheid, iedere 
feitelijke bewering over de aard van het politieke die voor “waar” wordt gehouden 
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(zoals de theorie die stelt dat politiek bestaat in de uitoefening van “heerschappij”), 
“waargemaakt” zal worden, gerealiseerd zal worden zodra en zo lang mensen naar 
deze ontologische aanname handelen. Om een tegengif tegen deze onvermijdelijke 
interpretatieve mogelijkheid te bieden, schrijft Arendt op een manier over politieke 
verschijnselen en ervaringen die het vermogen van mensen om in vrijheid iets 
nieuws te beginnen niet alleen beschrijft, maar ook in het leven roept. 
 
In de derde plaats inventariseren we de manieren waarop een politieke filosofie, 
indien ze voldoet aan genoemde twee eisen van (a) het recht doen aan de specifieke 
aard van filosofie en politiek en (b) het ontwikkelen van een zekere mate van 
bewustzijn van haar eigen performatieve conditie, ons inderdaad kan toerusten 
voor het bedrijven van een “verstandige” of “bedachtzame” vorm van politiek. In 
hun ontwikkeling van een opvatting van zo’n “rationele” of “bedachtzame” vorm 
van politiek handelen zetten alle drie de auteurs zich uiteen met het traditionele 
model van Socratische dialectiek als “ware politiek”.  
Poppers voorstel voor een politiek van stapsgewijze maatschappelijke 
hervorming behelst het op wetenschappelijke wijze vaststellen van de meest 
effectieve en efficiënte middelen ter realisatie van bepaalde politieke doeleinden. 
De legitimiteit van deze doeleinden is echter niet op wetenschappelijke wijze 
bepaalbaar. Om de consequentie te vermijden dat de keuze van doeleinden louter 
“persoonlijk” of “willekeurig” is, opteert Popper voor een negatief utilisme, dat de 
noodzaak van de verlichting van vermijdbaar menselijk lijden als enig universeel 
doel van overheidsbeleid erkent. Dit raamwerk voor “rationele” politiek valt geheel 
binnen de sfeer van de normale politiek van de open samenleving. Alleen in het 
uitzonderlijke geval van de noodzaak van de verdediging van het voortbestaan van 
de open samenleving mag er gekozen worden voor geweld in plaats van de rede. 
Als alternatief voor deze keuze voor enerzijds de rationaliteit van de wetenschap en 
haar technologische toepassing (in het geval van “normale” omstandigheden) en 
anderzijds strijd of polemiek (in het geval van “uitzonderlijke” omstandigheden) 
zou Poppers begrip van Socratische rationaliteit – of “redelijkheid” – kunnen 
fungeren, die een vorm van “onpartijdigheid” nastreeft in het beslissen en oordelen 
die meer flexibiliteit toelaat dan het louter deductieve criterium van het negatief 
utilisme, en bovendien de mogelijkheid openlaat van de “redelijke” vaststelling van 
positieve waarden zodra de staat met zijn doelstelling van het wegnemen van 
vermijdbaar lijden eenmaal gevestigd is. Deze vorm van redelijkheid past echter 
niet binnen Poppers meer strikte opvatting van wetenschappelijke rationaliteit. 
Bovendien stelt Popper dat de Socratische redelijkheid zich beter leent voor 
persoonlijke (morele) vorming dan voor institutionele (politieke) hervorming. 
Strauss verwerpt Poppers scheiding van feiten en waarden en erkent de 
mogelijkheid van een rationele discussie over waarden – of deugden – zoals 
belichaamd door de Socratische dialectiek, waarvan de uitkomst kan bestaan in het 
vaststellen van een “rangorde van doeleinden”. Daarnaast vertrekt Strauss in 
tegenstelling tot Popper niet van een opvatting van politiek als rationele discussie, 
aangezien hij zich er van bewust is dat een politieke samenleving potentieel in 
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oorlog leeft met andere politieke samenlevingen. Deze twee elementen samen 
resulteren in de suggestie van een vorm van “bedachtzame” politiek die zich 
begeeft tussen filosofie (of de ontsnapping aan politiek) enerzijds en polemiek (of 
een volledige onderdompeling in de urgente strijd om het voortbestaan van een 
politieke samenleving) anderzijds. Vooral Strauss’ weergave van de 
“Aristotelische” opvatting van praktische wijsheid [phronēsis] is instructief: in 
normale omstandigheden moet de politieke samenleving streven naar 
rechtvaardigheid in de gewone zin (verdelende en vereffenende rechtvaardigheid), 
maar in uitzonderlijke omstandigheden dient de politieke samenleving te streven 
naar de bescherming van haar eigen voortbestaan tegen haar interne of externe 
vijanden. Hoewel Strauss de mogelijkheid van het vaststellen van een dergelijke 
rangorde van doeleinden lijkt te erkennen, voegt hij toe dat het niet mogelijk is om 
voor eens en altijd uit te maken wat het verschil is tussen een “normale” situatie en 
een “uitzonderingstoestand”. De beslissing daarover wordt genomen door de 
politicus ter plekke, wiens morele vorming daartoe doorslaggevend is. Wat 
problematisch te noemen is aan Strauss’ opvatting van “bedachtzame” politiek, is 
zijn claim dat er in iedere situatie een “natuurlijke” beslissing bestaat die gebaseerd 
is op een volledige inachtneming van alle omstandigheden, een beslissing die na 
afloop door de historicus “objectief” zou kunnen worden vastgesteld. Gezien het 
eindige karakter van het menselijke kenvermogen (erkend door Popper) en het 
contingente karakter van het menselijk handelen (erkend door Arendt), moeten we 
betwijfelen of dit realistisch is.  
Arendts notie van wat we “bedachtzame” politiek noemen, ten slotte, wordt 
geïnformeerd door haar claim dat het publieke domein of de wereld die we delen 
perspectivisch van karakter is, en wel dankzij de menselijke condities van nataliteit 
– we zijn in staat om iets nieuws te beginnen doordat we zelf een begin zijn 
(geboren zijn) – en pluraliteit – we verschijnen als van elkaar verschillende en 
unieke individuen doordat de wereld niet door de mens bewoond wordt, maar door 
mensen. De denkvorm van de Socratische dialectiek, de stilzwijgende, innerlijke 
dialoog tussen mijzelf en mijzelf (twee-in-één), wordt door Arendt als a-politiek 
beschouwd vanwege haar nog altijd gebrekkige pluraliteit (meer-dan-twee). 
Denken wordt eerst werkelijk “politiek” voor zover het de diverse perspectieven 
die mensen hebben op een publieke zaak of op de gemeenschappelijke wereld 
“representeert” in de geest. De burger-actor of politicus kan op basis daarvan tot 
een “onpartijdige” beslissing komen ten aanzien van een voorgenomen politieke 
handeling, zoals de burger-toeschouwer of historicus tot een “onpartijdig” oordeel 
kan komen over politieke gebeurtenissen uit het verleden. Deze beslissingen en 
oordelen zijn niet wetenschappelijk of filosofisch “objectief”, noch puur polemisch 
of “partijdig”. Arendt gebruikt evenals Strauss de Aristotelische term phronēsis, 
maar in plaats van te verwijzen naar een waardenhiërarchie stelt ze dat de 
“geldigheid” van een beslissing of oordeel groter wordt naarmate er in de 
voorbereidende denkactiviteit meer verschillende gezichtspunten op een bepaalde 
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